66. In light of the Claimant’s abandonment of the attempt to quash the decision, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the failure to provide information to the Primary Care Trust in the instant appeal could possibly be said to have had anything to do with the decision of the Secretary of State. But we do believe it important to emphasise that in those cases where the obligation under section 11 may be limited, very little will be achieved by bringing proceedings for Judicial Review. In R v Brent LBC ex p Walters [1998] 30 HLR 328, in the context of disposal of housing by a local authority, this court rejected the suggestion that a breach of the obligation to consult should inevitably lead to the consequence that the consultation process should be re-started and the scheme of disposal be re-considered.

‘… the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse judicial review usually, and in this case certainly does, involve close attention to both the nature of the illegality of the decision and its consequences. In a case where the consultation process is impugned it is not irrelevant for the court to consider the consultation process required in the particular case and its purpose, what those entitled to be consulted actually understood, and whether compliance with the consultation process would in fact have had any significant impact on them and the decision … where, as here, there is overwhelming evidence that the effect of Judicial Review will not be limited to requiring the authority to repeat the process in the prescribed form, but will certainly damage the interests of a large number of other individuals who have welcomed the proposals, and acted on the basis that they will be implemented, it would be absurd for the court to ignore what Schiemann LJ rightly described as the relevant ‘disbenefits’. (per Judge LJ at page 381)

67. This approach, well-settled in the sphere of public law, is particularly important in this case. We acknowledge that the courts are concerned to ensure that public administration, particularly in a field as important as the National Health Service, should comply with obligations imposed by statute. Since we have had the opportunity to correct the erroneous legal view of the Department, something has been achieved. But we must recognise, also, that that opportunity has arisen in a case where the impact on the claimant and others receiving health services in Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire can only be described, at this stage, as minimal. Indeed, it appears that this issue has only arisen in the wake of the more turbulent controversy as to the closure of Frenchay Hospital which has nothing whatever to do with these proceedings. Our conclusion as to the law has been reached at the cost of a disproportionate amount of time and energy, exacerbated by the burden of files containing at least one thousand documents; the costs might have been better deployed in securing and maintaining health services within the region concerned. Public law falls into disrepute if it causes an unnecessary diversion of work and resources. It is dispiriting that we can discern little if any benefit to those in Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire at having established that the Department erred in law in its views as to section 11. Others may benefit, in the future, from that conclusion, but not the claimant nor, so far as we can see, anyone within Avon, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.