20.41R (Mooney) v Southwark LBC [2006] EWHC 1912 (Admin), (2006) 9 CCLR 670
Care assessments had not identified a care need requiring the provision of accommodation: this was a housing case onlyZambrano carers:housing/accommodationZambrano carers:Children Act 1989
Facts: Mrs Mooney was herself physically disabled and was the single parent of three boys, two of whom had severe disabilities. She had waited for suitable accommodation for a long time and ultimately brought proceedings to secure it, via section 21 of the National Assistance Act (NAA) 1948 or section 17 of the Children Act (CA) 1989.
Judgment: Jackson J held that the community care assessments undertaken by Southwark had not identified that Mrs Mooney had a need for ‘care and attention’ falling within NAA 1948 s21 and CA 1989 s17 did not impose a duty to rehouse the entire family – this was a housing case:
54. (iv) Nowhere in the various assessments is there any suggestion that the claimant has a need for care and attention by reason of her disability and that such care and attention is not available to her otherwise than by the provision of accommodation under section 21.
55. (v) On the contrary, the assessments arrive at a different conclusion. The assessments conclude that the proper course is for the social services department to provide additional support for the family, and also to make a priority housing nomination under the Council’s housing allocation policy. Such a nomination would enable the claimant to access suitable accommodation under Pt VI of the Housing Act 1996. In taking this course, the social services department was acting in a manner envisaged by section 47(3) of the 1990 Act (although in this instance both the social services department and the housing department were part of the same Council).
56. (vi) The fact that the provision of suitable accommodation can be achieved under the Housing Act 1996 brings into play section 21(8) of the 1948 Act. That subsection prevents section 21(1) from imposing an obligation upon the Council in the circumstances of this case.
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65. The first limb of this alternative case is based upon section 21 of the 1948 Act and therefore cannot succeed. The second limb of the alternative case is based upon section 17 of the Children Act 1989. That provision cannot be relied upon as imposing a positive duty on the Council to re-house the whole family: see the reasoning of the House of Lords in R (G) v Barnet LBC [2004] 2 AC 208. It is no doubt for this reason that Mr Kolinsky, very sensibly, did not press the claimant’s alternative case in oral argument.