Facts: Ms McDonald had limited mobility and a small, neurogenic bladder, which caused her to have to urinate several times a night. Kensington initially provided Ms McDonald with a commode and a night-time carer. It then assessed her need using different language, as being for incontinence pads and absorbent sheets. Ms McDonald sought a judicial review.

Judgment: the Supreme Court (Walker, Hale, Brown, Kerr and Dyson JJSC, Hale JSC dissenting) held that (i) Kensington’s decision was not a practice, policy or procedure for the purposes of section 21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and even if it was, it was justified; and (ii) given that Kensington was discharging a function under a statute concerned with the welfare of disabled persons it was superfluous for it to refer to the disability equality duty and ‘absurd’ to suggest that its failure to have done so was evidence that it had disregarded the disability equality duty.