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Avon CC v Hooper and Bristol and District Health Authority
(1997–8) 1 CCLR 366, CA
 
11.67Avon CC v Hooper and Bristol and District Health Authority (1997–8) 1 CCLR 366, CA
An indemnity was a financial resource for the purposes of means-testing
Facts: Daniel Hooper was born severely disabled as a result of health authority negligence. His action in negligence against the health authority was compromised on terms that required the health authority to indemnify Daniel in respect of any liability he might incur to Avon for the costs of his home care, up to the date of the compromise. Avon then delivered a retrospective charge.
Judgment: The Court of Appeal (Butler-Sloss, Roch and Hobhouse LJJ) held that this was permitted under section 17 of the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, that a service user’s means fell to be assessed at the time the authority makes the decision to charge and that their means included the value of an indemnity:
The starting point for the evaluation of these arguments is section 17 itself. It is an empowering section. It gives a local authority the power, but not the obligation, to charge for the provision of the relevant services. It is implicit both in the language of the section and in the general law governing the activities of local authorities that the power must be exercised reasonably, that is to say, that the local authority must have relevant and reasonable grounds for choosing to exercise the power. Nothing turns upon how one construes the final words of the subsection: ‘such charge (if any) for it as they consider reasonable’. As a matter of language, these words carry the implication that the charge may be waived and that the local authority need only make any charge if it considers it reasonable to do so. Thus there is an overriding criterion of reasonableness which governs the local authority’s exercise of the power which is given by subsection (1).
This criterion of reasonableness provides the primary answer to the arguments of Mr Grace. If the right to charge has been waived, clearly no charge can be recovered. If the service was provided in circumstances under which it would be unreasonable for the authority subsequently to charge for it, then the authority is not entitled later to seek to recover a charge. Similarly, if, having provided a service, the local authority seeks to recover a charge it must be prepared to justify the reasonableness of doing so. The reasonableness of any conduct falls to be assessed at the time of the relevant conduct and having regard to all the relevant circumstances then existing. If the claim is first made some time after the provision of the services, the local authority must be prepared to justify the reasonableness of making the claim notwithstanding the delay. If the local authority is acting unreasonably, its claim will fail. If the local authority is acting reasonably, there is no basis in subs. (1) for the person availing himself of the service to say that the local authority should not recover.
If the local authority decides to charge and is acting reasonably in doing so, the person availing himself of the service has, in those circumstances, to satisfy the authority under subs. (3) that his means are insufficient for it to be reasonably practicable for him to pay the amount which he would otherwise be obliged to pay. It is for the recipient of the service to discharge this burden of persuasion. He must show that he has insufficient means. The time at which he has to do this is the time when the local authority is seeking to charge him for the services. If his means have been reduced, as might be the case with a business man whose business had run into difficulties after his being injured, the reduction in his means is something upon which he would be entitled to rely as making it impracticable for him to pay, even though at an earlier date he might have been better off. The consideration under subs. (3)(b) is the practical one: are his means such that it is not reasonably practicable for him to pay?
This also bears on the alternative argument of Mr Grace that only cash should be taken into account. This is too narrow a reading of subsection (3). As a matter of the ordinary use of English, the word ‘means’ refers to the financial resources of a person: his assets, his sources of income, his liabilities and expenses. If he has a realisable asset, that is part of his means; he has the means to pay. The subject matter of paragraph (b) is the practicability of his paying. If he has an asset which he can reasonably be expected to realise and which will (after taking into account any other relevant factor) enable him to pay, his means make it practicable for him to pay. Where the person has a right to be indemnified by another against the cost of the service, he has the means to pay. He can enforce his right and make the payment. There is nothing in any part of s17 which suggests that it is intended that subs. (3) should have the effect of relieving those liable to indemnify the recipient of the service for the cost of the service from their liability. On the contrary, it is clear that the intention of the section is to enable the local authority to recover the cost save when it is unreasonable that it should do so or impracticable for the recipient to pay. The argument of the Health Authority would, if accepted, frustrate the clear intention of the section.
Comment: there are potentially significant differences in the statutory language, but the logic of this case appears to apply charging cases arises under sections 14–17 of the Care Act 2014.
Avon CC v Hooper and Bristol and District Health Authority
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