The defendants occupied a wooden bungalow which rested on concrete pillars, which were attached to the ground on the plaintiff’s land. They occupied under a ‘licence agreement’, which provided for an annual payment and permitted them to enter on to the land and to ‘keep thereon a bungalow and to reside’. The bungalow could not be moved without being demolished. In possession proceedings, the owner claimed that the occupants were merely licensees and not entitled to any statutory security of tenure. An assistant recorder dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for possession. The landlord’s appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal but the House of Lords restored the order of the assistant recorder.

 

A landlord let four unfurnished rooms on the first floor of a house ‘together with the use in common with the landlord of the back bedroom on the first floor’. The tenant also had shared use, with the landlord and others, of the bathroom and lavatories. After the landlord’s death, her successors in title served notice to quit and took possession proceedings.

 

The claimant sought possession of a hotel room occupied by the defendant. The room was basically furnished and did not include any cooking facilities, although there was a power point. Breakfast was initially available in the restaurant and included in the rent. Mr Collins brought in a pizza warmer, a toasted sandwich maker, a kettle and a warming plate. HHJ Cotran held that the defendant enjoyed a tenancy of a dwelling-house and that he had an assured tenancy within the meaning of Housing Act 1988. The claimant appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, contending that he was a licensee as he did not enjoy exclusive possession and that, in any event, the room was not a dwelling-house (Housing Act 1988 s1).

 

The council provided a single man with a self-contained bed-sitting room with cooking facilities and its own lockable door in a hostel. The hostel was a council-run, single men’s hostel with a resident warden employed to manage the building, assist residents and enter rooms as necessary with a duplicate key. The occupancy agreement was called a ‘licence to occupy’. It provided that (a) the occupier could be required to share with others (although it was a single room) and (b) the occupier could be required to transfer to a different room on request.

 

The claimant sought possession of a houseboat which had been let to the defendant as his home by the original owner since 1993. It was moored by ropes to pontoons on the Thames at Cheyne Walk and was also held by a chain and anchor. It ran aground at low tide for six hours. The claimant provided water, gas, electricity, telephone and vacuum sewage by means of plug-in or snap-on connections. In the county court it was held that the houseboat was a dwelling-house and was subject to an assured tenancy under Housing Act 1988.

 

An oral tenancy agreement to rent a room included a term that the tenant would share the house with whoever the landlord might choose. The landlord did not live in the house but contended that the clause meant that, in accordance with Rent Act 1977 s21, the tenancy was a restricted contract (see Rent Act 1977 s19), not a protected tenancy.

 

The lessee under a long lease sublet two basement flats to the defendant for a term in excess of the length of the remainder of the long lease. Legally that took effect as an assignment and not a subtenancy (Milmo v Carreras [1946] KB 306, CA). The defendant started to carry out major works to the flats. Before she moved in, the freeholders issued possession proceedings against the head lessee, claiming that some of the works were in breach of the terms of the lease, and obtained judgment in default against the head lessee. In the meantime, the defendant’s assigned tenancy came to an end on the term date of the original head lease.

 

A 19th-century house was let for a term of 20 years. The ground and upper floors were to be sublet as single rooms. The basement was to be sublet as a self-contained flat. The tenant claimed the protection of the Rent Act.

 

The defendant occupied a house (no 21) from 1955, but it was too small for him. As a result, in 1973 the landlord granted him a tenancy of an adjoining house (no 23), which was almost identical. The tenant slept in no 23 and used the study there. However, he never cooked or ate there. The landlord served a notice to quit in respect of no 23 and brought possession proceedings. A county court judge dismissed the claim for possession, finding that the defendant was the statutory tenant of no 23.

 

Mr Langridge was the secure tenant of a house. After allegations of nuisance, Mansfield issued a possession claim, but the proceedings were stayed when Mr Langridge received life-threatening injuries from a serious assault. When he left hospital, he moved into a hostel and his mother gave up the keys of the house to Mansfield to enable the council to clean it up. After Mr Langridge issued a claim for an injunction for the return of the keys, Mansfield made a flat, which was supported accommodation, available to him on licence until the resolution of the possession proceedings. Mr Langridge signed an agreement to occupy the flat on a temporary basis as a licensee. The agreement provided that it did not create a secure tenancy. In a letter, it was stated that the agreement was purely for the purpose of providing temporary accommodation pending trial of the possession proceedings. Subsequently, Mansfield obtained a possession order in respect of the house. The council then served notice to quit before issuing proceedings for possession of the flat. HHJ O’Rorke found that it had been the parties’ mutual intention that the agreement should be limited in time until the conclusion of the earlier possession claim and that nothing had altered that mutual intention or the nature of the licence. The flat was not a separate dwelling (Housing Act 1985 s79(3)). He made an order for possession. Mr Langridge appealed. Calvert-Smith J dismissed the appeal ([2007] EWHC 3152 (QB); 21 September 2007; February 2008 Legal Action 37).

 

There were a number of plots on Embankment Road, Bembridge Harbour which were covered by the sea at high tide. On one of the plots, there was a houseboat named ‘Emily’. It was a converted landing craft constructed during World War II, which was later modified by the addition of a super-structure so as to make it watertight and habitable. It was once capable of floating but now rested on a wooden platform which was supported by wooden piles driven into the bed of the harbour. It could only be removed from the platform by the use of a crane with an extensive supporting cradle. It had mains services such as water, electricity and gas but these could easily be disconnected. Mr Mew purchased ‘Emily’ in 1993. The purchase agreement contained a covenant by Mr Mew with the vendor to ‘pay all harbour dues and any other fees, tolls or other sums due for mooring’ but did not include an assignment of the tenancy or licence under which the site was occupied (para 10). Initially, he paid a ‘site-rent’ of £96 for his plot quarterly in advance. Tristmire bought a long lease of the plot at auction from the freeholder, the Bembridge Harbour Improvements Company Limited (‘BHIC’) in June 2007. In July 2007, Tristmire gave notice terminating Mr Mew’s licence and requiring him to deliver up possession on 31 August 2007. It then issued a possession claim. Mr Mew served a defence contending that he occupied the plot as a tenant, that ‘Emily’ was a dwelling-house and that he was an assured tenant under the Housing Act 1988. His Honour Graham Jones held that ‘Emily’ had not become annexed to the land and so was not a dwelling-house. Mr Mew was merely a licensee. Mr Mew appealed.

 

The defendant landlord appealed against an award of £21,804 damages for illegal eviction, including an award of £18,000 under Housing Act 1988 ss27 and 28. She did not challenge the quantum, but claimed that the plaintiff did not have an assured tenancy at the time of her eviction. The terms of the plaintiff’s tenancy were that she had exclusive use of her bedroom with shared use of a living room, kitchen and bathroom/lavatory. Initially the only other bedroom in the flat was occupied by another tenant, but when she moved out the landlord and her family moved into the other bedroom and started to share the other parts of the flat with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the landlord was not entitled to take up possession of the part of the property not let to her and that, in view of Housing Act 1988 s3, she was an assured tenant.

 

The tenancy of a maisonette included a right for the landlord to use the kitchen in common with the tenant. After the landlord had fallen into arrears with his mortgage, the mortgagee repossessed the property, subject to the tenancy, which had preceded the grant of the mortgage. The tenant argued that the mortgagee, as a corporation, ‘being a mere creature of the law without appetite or culinary capability was incapable of submitting to a shared use of its kitchen because it could not itself make use of the kitchen at all’. The judge rejected this submission and found that the defendant merely had a restricted contract (see Rent Act 1977 s19). He appealed.

 

Mr Parkins was employed as a teacher. As part of a staff accommodation scheme he was offered a room in a flat consisting of three bedrooms, a kitchen, a living room, a bathroom and separate lavatory. He signed a licence agreement and was given the keys to the flat and the room. Another teacher was allocated another room in the flat and signed a similar agreement. Later, the plaintiff was dismissed and the council served a notice to quit. At first instance it was held that he was a secure tenant, and the council’s claim for possession was dismissed.

 

The owner of a furnished house let it to the college for occupation by five separate subtenants. Each had a room to be used as a bedroom, study and sitting room. They shared a kitchen and bathroom. The college then applied to the rent officer to register a fair rent. A county court judge refused to grant the college a declaration that its tenancy enjoyed Rent Act protection because the house was not let as a separate dwelling. There were a number of individual subtenancies, not a joint subtenancy.

Spielplatz was the freehold owner of a woodland naturist resort near St Albans. Mr and Mrs Pearson occupied a plot under a tenancy agreement dated 14 August 1992. At the same time that they were granted the tenancy, they bought a chalet on the plot from the previous occupants. Spielplatz claimed possession asserting that there was an unprotected common law tenancy which it had determined by a notice to quit. The Pearsons’ claimed that the tenancy was an assured tenancy under Housing Act 1988, which Spielplatz had not determined in accordance with that Act, nor had it shown any ground entitling it to possession. The Pearsons’ evidence was that in 2008 they put breeze blocks around the outside of the chalet and rendered it. In 2011, they put on a new roof. In 2012, they refurbished or ‘virtually rebuilt’ much of the building following a leak into the bathroom. They estimated they spent about £100,000 on the works. It was impossible to move a building of its size in either one or two pieces. It could only be moved ‘by being taken back to its constituent parts’. After considering Elitestone Ltd v Morris (Elitestone Ltd v Morris), HHJ Lindsay Davies found the chalet was part and parcel of the plot and so there was an assured tenancy. She dismissed the claim for possession.

 

The plaintiff was the secure tenant of a ground floor flat. Because of its poor condition, and so that building works could be undertaken on the ground floor, the council gave him permission also to occupy the first floor flat in the same building. Work was never started and the tenant simply occupied both flats. He then submitted an application to buy the two flats together as a single unit. In subsequent proceedings in 1987, HHJ Oddie found that there was not a single letting but two separate units and, therefore, they could not be purchased under a single right to buy (compare Jenkins v Renfrew DC (1989) SLT (Lands Tr) 41). Accordingly, the tenant arranged his affairs so that the ground floor flat became his principal home and in 1988 he applied to buy that alone. His right to buy was accepted and the lease conveyed. On the day of completion he moved upstairs to take up occupation of the first floor flat as his ‘principal’ home and then claimed the right to buy that.

 

The claimants asserted that they had five yearly, or alternatively annual, periodic tenancies of the plots of land on which they (or their predecessors) had constructed beach huts. The defendant, who owned the land asserted that the claimants had licences for one year at a time to station their respective huts on the land. He wrote to a number of hut owners on 23 December 2014, serving what was called ‘a notice of termination’ of their licences, requiring vacant possession by 31 March 2015. On 10 June 2015, his solicitors wrote stating that if the hut owners did not remove their huts he would instruct contractors to do so. The hut owners sought a declaration that the notices were invalid and a prohibitory injunction to prevent interference with the quiet enjoyment of their use of the huts. In September 2015, without prejudice to the earlier notices, the defendant served notices to quit which were appropriate to determine a tenancy from year to year.

HHJ Paul Matthews, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, found that at the time that each hut was placed on its plot, it could have been moved by disassembly and reassembly elsewhere, and, in most cases, also by lifting by crane without the need for disassembly. That remained the position at the time of the trial for most of the huts. After considering Elitestone Ltd v Morris (Elitestone Ltd v Morris) and Mew v Tristmire Ltd (Mew v Tristmire Limited), he decided that the huts were chattels because there was either no annexation at all to the land, or only a very slight degree of annexation. He concluded that the claimants each had a periodic tenancy (from year to year) of the plot on which their hut rested. Therefore, the December 2014 notices, giving notice of less than half a year, were of no effect in law, but the September 2015 notices were effective to terminate the tenancies from the end of March 2016.

 

A large caravan was rented out at a high rent. The local authority made an application to the rent officer for registration of a fair rent because the occupant was receiving housing benefit. The owner sought an order of certiorari to quash the registration.

 

A disabled council tenant left his one-bedroomed home temporarily to stay with a relative. Through a friend, he found a young couple willing to occupy the flat in his absence. They paid a £20 deposit, agreed a rent of £40 per week, were given the keys, moved in and began redecorating. The council brought possession proceedings on the basis that security of tenure had been lost by subletting or parting with possession (Housing Act 1985 s93(2)) or that the tenant was in breach of the implied term not to sublet without consent (s93(1)(b)). The trial judge found that the tenant had got himself into a muddle and had never really intended to sublet at all.

 

 

 

In 1985 the defendant council tenant went to live with his girlfriend. During 1985 and 1986, the gas and electricity supplies to his premises were cut off. In July 1986 he told the council that he was ‘living with his girlfriend’ and that they intended to buy her home. In August 1986, the council served a notice to quit, expiring on 30 September. By that time the relationship between the defendant and his girlfriend had broken up and, shortly after the expiry of the notice to quit, the defendant returned to live in his own home. In possession proceedings, the defendant gave evidence that he had not abandoned the premises and that he had always intended returning to them.

 

The council granted a joint secure tenancy to Mr Sheeran and his then partner, Ms Gunn. She left and Ms Gay moved in to live with him as his new partner. Mr Sheeran then left the property. Ms Gay applied for transfer of his interest in the joint tenancy into her name (Family Law Act 1996 s53 and Sch 7).

 

A frail elderly secure tenant occupied her council home from 1981. It was adapted for her needs. In 1997 her grandson and his wife moved in to look after her and she later submitted a right-to-buy application jointly with her grandson. In November 1998 she was admitted to a nursing home experiencing depression in addition to physical disabilities. Her furniture remained in her home and the grandson and his wife continued living there. Whilst in the nursing home in January 1999 she signed a social worker’s note that she had decided to become a permanent resident of the nursing home and that it was ‘not now my choice’ to live in her former home. The council served notice to quit in February 1999 and, on its expiry in March, claimed possession. By the date of trial the tenant had returned to live in her home. The trial judge accepted her evidence that: (1) she had initially gone to the nursing home intending to move back; (2) the note had been made at a time when she was very depressed and had just had her medication sorted out; and (3) she ‘had every intention of returning’. He dismissed the possession claim. The council appealed contending that the material date for determining whether an absent tenant had an intention to return was the date of the expiry of the notice to quit. Evidence as to earlier or subsequent intention was immaterial and the social worker’s note was the best evidence of intention at date of expiry.

 

The defendants, who were twin sisters, were secure tenants of a flat. Both spent several days each week with long-term partners who lived elsewhere. The council carried out an investigation and produced a report stating that the property was not normally occupied by either sister. On the basis of the report, housing benefit and council tax benefit were withdrawn from both of them. Havering served a notice to quit, arguing that the tenancy was no longer secure and, in the alternative, a notice seeking possession relying on rent arrears. In the subsequent possession claim, HHJ Bailey refused an application for an adjournment to obtain legal aid and made a possession order. He held that the doctrine of issue estoppel determined the question whether the property was their only or principal home, because it was difficult to conceive of a situation where the test for housing benefit would produce a different outcome from the only or principal home test. He also held that: even if he were wrong on the estoppel issue, the property was not in fact the only or principal home of either sister; there was no prospect that they would be able to pay their rental arrears; it was reasonable to make an order for possession; and neither of them could resist the order on the basis of Human Rights Act 1998 Sch 1 Article 8 in the light of their personal circumstances. The sisters were granted permission to appeal: [2016] EWCA Civ 680.

 

Camden, as landlord, served a notice to quit and claimed possession. It contended that the tenant had lost security by failing to occupy and, in the alternative, asserted that security had been lost by parting with possession. A county court judge found for the council on the first proposition. He determined that the tenant had ceased to occupy as his only or principal home in 1986 and that security of tenure had thus been lost, despite his return to the property before service of notice to quit (Housing Act 1985 s93).

 

In 1996, Islington granted Ms Boyle a secure tenancy of a two-bedroom flat. She lived there with her partner, Mr Collier, and their three children. Their son was severely autistic and suffered from epilepsy and Tourette syndrome.

 

The joint tenants were an elderly couple. The man moved to a nursing home and the woman took a flat close to the nursing home to be near to him. Their daughter arranged for their council home to be sublet. In proceedings concerning the right to buy, the Court of Appeal held that secure status had been lost and with it the right to buy.

 

The defendant was a secure tenant. A housing officer visited the premises on two occasions and concluded that the tenant had unlawfully sublet and was no longer occupying as her only or principal residence. As a result, Lambeth served a notice to quit and took possession proceedings. A district judge found that: (1) the defendant had not been in occupation of the premises at the time of either of the housing officer’s two visits; (2) there was no evidence or sign of any family occupation of the premises by the defendant or her four children; (3) five or more people who were in occupation had been met during the two visits; (4) there were Yale locks on all the doors and one had a padlock; (5) there was no sign of any room being used as a living room and there were beds in all the rooms which the housing officer saw; and (6) four of the occupants said that they paid rent to a person whom the defendant claimed to have put into occupation of the premises rent-free as a caretaker. In the light of those facts, the district judge found that an explanation was called for by the defendant. The explanations offered by the defendant were not accepted by the district judge as credible. The district judge concluded that the whole of the premises had been unlawfully sublet, and that the defendant had ceased to be a secure tenant. She made an order for possession. The defendant appealed and a circuit judge found that the district judge had erred in reversing the burden of proof. He found that, on the evidence, it was possible that the defendant had only let part of the premises, allowed the appeal and set aside the order for possession. Lambeth appealed to the Court of Appeal.

 

A secure tenancy was granted in 1980. In 1986 the tenant bought other premises and moved out, allowing a third party into occupation. In 1987 the tenant moved back in, with the third party still present. Later the same year, the council purported to end the tenancy by notice to quit. The tenant responded by giving the third party notice to quit and counterclaimed (in an action for harassment brought by the third party) for possession. In those proceedings, the county court ruled that the third party was a subtenant. The council then brought proceedings for possession against the tenant, based on its earlier notice to quit and the findings of fact in the earlier action that the tenant had parted with possession (see Housing Act 1985 s93(2)).

 

A secure tenant exercised the right to buy in May 1989, but in October 1989 (before the purchase was completed) moved out and sublet the whole house on an assured shorthold tenancy at a profit rent. The landlords alleged that, by operation of Housing Act 1985 s93, secure status had been lost by the subletting and that a subsequent notice to quit had determined the remaining contractual tenancy. The tenant alleged that the right to buy had already arisen and been admitted by the landlord, who was thus compelled to convey the house.

 

The secure tenant of a council flat made an application under the ‘right to buy’ scheme. He then bought a different house and moved out of his flat and into the house. He subsequently again applied to buy the flat. The council responded with a notice to quit and possession proceedings in respect of the flat.

 

The defendant was an assured tenant. He sublet the entire flat on an assured shorthold tenancy on terms which were inconsistent with his remaining in occupation as his only or principal home. The rent under the subtenancy was a market rent which was £90 more than the rent that the defendant paid. He left furniture in the flat, but no personal possessions. Ujima served a notice to quit and brought possession proceedings. The trial judge held that the defendant had security since he continued to occupy the flat as his principal home.

 

 

Mr Amoah was a secure tenant. On 18 April 1997, he was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. He left items of furniture in the property and appointed a relative to act as ‘caretaker’ in his absence. The council served a notice to quit and obtained a possession order on the basis that Mr Amoah had lost his status as a secure tenant.

 

The defendant was an assured tenant. Her tenancy agreement did not permit subletting. On 28 June 1999, she signed an agreement with a letting agency which authorised the agency to form a legally binding tenancy agreement with any tenants. In July 1999, the agency, on behalf of the defendant, granted an assured shorthold tenancy to tenants. The claimant brought possession proceedings. HHJ Bradbury held that:

 

See Housing Law Casebook, 5th edition, C3.18.

 

The tenant was taken seriously ill and was admitted to hospital for about five months. His illness was such that he could not immediately return to his own home nor, more importantly, form the intention to return to it (cf, Tickner v Hearn (Tickner v Hearn)). A ‘curator bonis’ was appointed to administer his affairs. The curator bonis paid the rent and maintained the tenant’s tenancy. In order to improve the assets available to the estate of the tenant, he exercised the right to buy.

 

See Housing Law Casebook 4th edition, E14.22

 

The tenant rented a flat with two living rooms and two bedrooms. Later he and his wife bought a three-bedroomed house half a mile away. He and his family moved into the house. The tenant worked in a nightclub and, in order not to disturb his wife, slept in the flat five nights a week. He slept until early afternoon, when he went to the house and ate with his wife. He spent Sundays and Mondays, when he was not working, at the house. He had no meals in the flat and did not entertain any friends there.

 

The tenant rented a two-room flat in Harrow. Later he also took a three-room flat in the Grand Hotel in Cannes, France. On average he spent two to three months per year in England and the rest of the year in Cannes, where he had property interests and owned a golf course, which he ran. When he was in England he regarded the flat as his home, but spent much of the time visiting relations and friends in other parts of England. He actually stayed in the flat nine or ten days per year. His furniture and personal belongings remained in the flat in Harrow. At first instance, the landlord’s claim for possession was dismissed.

 

The defendant had a statutory tenancy of a flat in Islington. The original tenancy agreement had contained a covenant not to part with possession of the premises or any part of them and an obligation that the tenant should use them ‘as a private residence’ only. The tenant stayed at the flat for two or three nights a week, spending the rest of the time with a Mrs Mountney who lived in Essex. Two of Mrs Mountney’s daughters also stayed at the flat with their boyfriends. It was held that the tenant was ‘a two-home man’ who continued to enjoy Rent Act protection. However, at first instance a possession order was made on the ground that allowing Mrs Mountney’s daughters to set up residence in the flat amounted to a breach of the user covenant.

 

Mr Hughes, aged 74, was a statutory tenant of a flat in London. His wife inherited a cottage in Lancashire in 1970 and from 1978 he and his wife remained there permanently. Between 1978 and 1987 he did not return to the flat in London at all and his wife only went there three times. However, their children lived in the flat and their furniture and books stayed there. The tenant said that he intended to return to the London flat if his wife predeceased him or if their health meant that they could not manage on their own in Lancashire. Their daughter gave evidence that she did not think that they would last another winter in the cottage.

 

The tenant was sent to prison for two years for stealing six tons of tea. His partner and their two children continued living in the house, but then she left, taking the children and much of the furniture with her.

 

In 1985 Dr Malekout was granted a Rent Act protected tenancy of a flat. In 1997 or 1998 the landlord terminated the contractual tenancy, with the effect that Dr Malekout became a statutory tenant ‘if and so long as he occupied the premises as his residence’. In 1998 or 1999, the flat became uninhabitable and no one occupied it. In 2002, as a result of rent arrears, the landlord sought possession, claiming that Dr Malekout had ceased to occupy the premises as his residence. Dr Malekout defended, asserting that the statutory tenancy continued and counterclaimed for breach of repairing obligations. The claim was settled in 2003 by a Tomlin order which provided for the carrying out of repairs and that ‘both sets of proceedings are discontinued and all claims therein settled in full and final settlement’. The premises remained unoccupied and in 2004 Carphone sought possession, claiming rent arrears and that Dr Malekout was no longer a statutory tenant because he had ceased to occupy them as his residence. Dr Malekout resumed residence in the flat during the course of the trial. HHJ Walker rejected as untruthful Dr Malekout’s evidence that he had remained in residence until 1998 but found that the only ‘sensible inference’ from the terms of the Tomlin order was that Dr Malekout was a statutory tenant in 2003. Carphone was estopped from contending that Dr Malekout had lost his statutory tenancy before 2003. The claim for possession failed. Carphone appealed.

 

On the expiry of a fixed-term Rent Act protected tenancy the landlord took possession proceedings, claiming that the tenant had ceased to occupy the flat in question as a residence. The tenant, her husband and their six children had lived in the flat until 1970. Then she, her husband and four children went to live abroad. The two eldest sons lived in the flat, but by the time of the court hearing the flat was occupied by a licensee of the tenant. One son and the husband had stayed in the flat at various times. Some of the tenant’s furniture remained there. The tenant’s evidence that she originally intended to return to the flat when her children’s education was completed in 1978 or 1980, but that she now intended to return in 1976, was accepted. A county court judge dismissed the landlord’s claim for possession.

 

After the breakdown of his marriage, Mr King took a protected tenancy of premises in his own name in which it was proposed that his wife should live. He lived elsewhere with a Miss Driver. When the tenancy came to an end, the landlord sought to evict Mrs King. She claimed a statutory tenancy.

 

In 1975, Mr Lloyd granted Miss Sadler and Miss Lunt a joint tenancy of a flat for a year. The tenancy was a protected tenancy under, the then, Rent Act 1968. In 1976, Miss Lunt left the property with no intention of returning. Miss Sadler remained in occupation. Mr Lloyd instituted possession proceedings against Miss Sadler a year after the contractual tenancy had ended. Mr Lloyd contended that Miss Sadler, as a joint tenant, could not enjoy the protection of the Rent Act once the contractual tenancy had ceased unless her fellow joint tenant also occupied the property as her residence as, at common law, the ‘tenant’ meant both joint tenants. His claim for possession was dismissed and he appealed to the Court of Appeal.

 

A flat was let to Mr Dhokia in 1974. He remained in occupation until 1987 when he moved to another property. He took all the furniture and carpets. The flat was empty until November 1991, when Mr Dhokia purported to sublet the flat to his nephew, who lived there with other members of his family. He did not charge a profit rent, merely the amount that he himself paid to the landlord. When the landlord discovered the position it brought possession proceedings. Mr Dhokia did not resist the claim and a possession order was made against him. However, his nephew and the other members of the family contended that Mr Dhokia had been a protected tenant and that their subtenancy survived the order for possession as a result of Rent Act 1977 s137(2). The trial judge accepted this argument and dismissed the possession claim.

 

The plaintiff, Mr Prince, sought a declaration that he had a subsisting tenancy of a ground floor sitting room of premises which the defendants had recently bought, apparently with vacant possession, for £240,000. He had been granted a tenancy by the previous owner in the early 1970s. In 1989 he went to Devon, taking most of his personal belongings with him, but leaving a guitar and a few other items. Over the next two years he only stayed at the premises twice. The property was then squatted. On 6 February 1991 a serious fire occurred in which the squatter died and the interior of the house was badly damaged. Mr Prince tried to negotiate with the then landlord for payment of a capital sum in return for the surrender of his tenancy but no agreement was reached. However, the landlord proceeded to re-furbish the house. He did so in such a way that the tenant’s bedsit ceased to exist as identifiable separate accommodation and became part of an open-plan kitchen. Mr Prince relied on Land Registration Act 1925 s70(1)(k), which provides that a lease (which includes a tenancy) granted for a term of less than 21 years is an overriding interest.

 

The tenant rented a flat with one bedroom, a living room, kitchen and bathroom. Subsequently he formed a relationship with a woman who lived three or four miles away. He moved in with her and married her. Later, she had a baby. The tenant kept furniture and clothes in his flat. He used the flat during the daytime and worked there as a script-writer. For two months the family lived in the flat when their other home was rented out on a ‘winter let’. A county court judge held that the tenant was not occupying the flat as a residence and made a possession order.

 

The tenant left his rented flat in June 1980 to look after his parents who were seriously ill. His mother died shortly after that date. His father died in January 1981. The tenant continued living in his parents’ house to carry out work to put it into good shape and to sell it. It was on the market in December 1982 when possession proceedings brought by the landlord of the flat were heard. The tenant gave evidence that he intended to return to the flat when the house was sold and that his furniture, books, records and some clothes had been left in the flat. The county court judge held that the flat was the tenant’s home and dismissed the claim for possession.

 

Ms Stephens issued proceedings for breach of various covenants in her tenancy agreement and sought a declaration that she was a statutory tenant. Her landlord defended on the basis that Ms Stephens did not occupy the premises as a residence because she lived predominantly with a friend after she had been driven out by neighbours (Rent Act 1977 s2(1)(a)). On a trial of a preliminary issue, a judge found that, on the evidence, Ms Stephens was a statutory tenant because the connection she had with the property was sufficiently great that it could be taken that she occupied it as her residence. The landlord appealed.

 

The tenant spent five and a half years in a mental hospital suffering from schizophrenia. The Court of Appeal held that the fact that she was ‘mentally unsound’ did not mean that she was incapable of forming an intention to return to the premises.

 

The tenant was absent from the home that she rented from 1940 to 1949. Initially she stayed with relatives because of the war. Later she was prevented from returning home because she had tuberculosis. It was held that she continued to occupy the property as a residence.

 

Initially Mr O’Higgins had a tenancy of residential premises. However, in 1979 Eaton Square granted a 20-year tenancy of the property to Greylane Ltd. Mr O’Higgins, who had a 75 per cent interest in Greylane, continued to occupy the property and guaranteed the company’s obligations under the lease. On the expiry of the contractual term, he remained in occupation and claimed that he had a statutory tenancy under Rent Act 1977. The claimant sought possession contending that a company as tenant could not claim statutory protection. The judge at first instance found that Mr O’Higgins had replaced the previous statutory tenant and paid sums of money that were accepted by the claimant as rent. He dismissed the claim. He held that the common intention was that the defendant was the true tenant and so he was entitled to statutory protection. Jonathan Parker J allowed the company’s appeal. Mr O’Higgins appealed against that decision contending that the tenancy agreement with the company was a sham since it had been entered into solely for tax purposes and that he remained the true tenant.

 

Landlords let premises to a limited company with the intention of avoiding the provisions of the Rent Act. It was intended that the flat should be occupied by a director of the company and/or the daughter of the managing director of the company. Later, although the same person was to occupy the flat, a new tenancy was granted to a different company. Rent demands were sent to and paid by the companies.

 

Ms Rose was looking for accommodation to rent. She saw and answered a newspaper advertisement. It was made clear to her by the landlord that the letting was to be to a company. She was advised by solicitors and bought an ‘off the shelf’ company, Plustitle Ltd, for £150. She became a shareholder and a director. The tenancy was granted in the name of Plustitle Ltd. Before the agreement was signed, the landlord obtained a reference from Ms Rose’s own bank. The agreement gave the company the right to nominate the occupiers of the property who were to pay no rent. The rent, which was to be paid by the company, was guaranteed by Ms Rose’s brother. Ms Rose claimed that the letting was a sham and that she was the real tenant.

 

Mr Kanter responded to an advertisement in an evening newspaper, and, after viewing the flat in question and discussing rent, was informed that the landlord would only let to a company. He did not have a company and, as he was an undischarged bankrupt, he could not become a director of an ‘off the shelf’ company. Instead, two friends bought a company for him and a tenancy agreement was drawn up naming the company as the tenant. In the county court, it was held that this was a genuine letting to a company and a possession order was made.

 

Landlords took summary possession proceedings under RSC Order 113 following the expiry of a renewed, fixed-term ‘company let’. The defendant had been the true occupier throughout, having bought an ‘off the shelf’ company to take the tenancy because the landlords were not willing to let to an individual. He argued that the arrangement was a sham, as the landlords had known from the outset that the flat was required for his personal use. At first instance Jowitt J granted possession, holding that Hilton v Plustitle Ltd (Hilton v Plustitle Ltd) could not be distinguished. However, the occupier’s application for a stay of possession pending appeal was granted.

 

The claimants were tenants of a flat under a contractual periodic tenancy granted by the association in 1985. They maintained that they had a secure tenancy and so could exercise the right to buy under Housing Act 1985 Part V. HHJ Brian Knight QC decided that the tenancy was not a secure tenancy because the association was a fully mutual registered housing co-operative when the tenancy was granted, although it ceased to be fully mutual in December 1991.

 

In the early 1970s Mr Banjo was a subtenant of a housing association. Brent LBC then became the freeholder. In 1974 Mr Banjo acquired a long leasehold interest from his immediate landlord and became a tenant of Brent for the remaining term of the lease. It was a ‘long tenancy’, which, by virtue of Housing Act 1985 Sch 1 para 1, could not be a secure tenancy. The contractual term of his lease expired in September 1980. He remained in occupation after that date, but paid no rent. In February 2002 Brent gave notice of its intention to take proceedings to recover possession. Mr Banjo sought a declaration that he was entitled to exercise the right to buy. Brent brought a Part 20 claim seeking possession. A judge dismissed his claim and held that his claim to exercise the right to buy was barred by limitation and, in so far as relevant, by equitable principles of laches. The judge also dismissed Brent’s claim for possession, holding that, on the determination of the long lease, Mr Banjo had remained in occupation as a tenant at will and on that basis the tenancy was a secure tenancy. Brent appealed.

 

Mr Freeman was the tenant of a lodge in parkland. In 1970 the parkland was bought jointly by Plymouth City Council and Cornwall County Council. After the Housing Act 1980 came into force, Mr Freeman claimed the right to buy. The councils claimed that he was not entitled to do this because the property was owned jointly and, at that time, before the implementation of the Housing and Building Control Act 1984, only the city council satisfied the landlord condition under Housing Act 1980 s28(2) (now Housing Act 1985 s80).

 

See Housing Law Casebook, 5th edition, C6.4.

 

The plaintiff company was the freeholder of a house in Oakley Street, London SW3. The defendant was the Rent Act protected tenant of a first floor flat. The plaintiff also owned a house in Cranley Place, London SW7 which it held under a lease expiring in 2013. In February 1997 the plaintiff sought and obtained an order for possession of the defendant’s flat in the Oakley Street house on the ground that suitable alternative accommodation would be available. This was the first floor flat of the Cranley Place house, which the plaintiff proposed to let to the defendant on an assured tenancy within the meaning of the Housing Act 1988. It was accepted that this was suitable alternative accommodation. At first instance, HHJ Hallgarten QC, hearing the case before the Court of Appeal decision in Wellcome Trust v Hamad (Wellcome Trust v Hamad), held that, although Rent Act 1977 s137 might afford sufficient protection on the expiry of the landlord’s lease, there was sufficient doubt that the court could not be satisfied that a protected tenancy would be suitable. However, it was possible for the plaintiff to grant an assured tenancy and, in view of Housing Act 1988 s18, that tenancy would be binding on the freeholders when the lease ended (see [1997] CLY 3310, Central London County Court). The defendant appealed, contending that, because her tenancy in the Oakley Street house was a protected tenancy within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977, no valid assured tenancy could be granted to her on its termination because of Housing Act 1988 s34(1)(b).

 

From 1982 the defendant was the Rent Act protected tenant of the back room on the ground floor of a property. In 1990 he moved to the entire floor. In possession proceedings a circuit judge found that the move amounted to a surrender of the protected tenancy.

 

In 1988, before the Housing Act 1988 came into force, Secretarial let a flat for a term of one year on a Rent Act protected tenancy to three joint tenants including a Mr Marshall. In 1989 the flat was again let on a one-year tenancy to Mr Marshall and two others. The tenancy was described as an assured shorthold tenancy. In 1990 it was let to Mr Marshall, a Ms Sucdev and one other. Mr Marshall then moved out but in 1991 the flat was let to Ms Sucdev, Mr Thomas (the defendant) and one other. There was then a series of one-year tenancies which included Mr Thomas as one of the joint tenants. It followed that by this time none of the joint tenants had been a party to a pre-Housing Act tenancy. The landlord served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice and sought possession. District Judge Langley held that, in view of Housing Act 1988 s34(1)(b), Mr Thomas enjoyed Rent Act protection.

 

In 1987, the trustees of a church school granted Mr Foley a tenancy of a house. When the Diocesan Board acquired title, it considered that he occupied the property under a protected shorthold tenancy within the meaning of Housing Act 1980 s52. In May 2000, the Diocesan Board brought possession proceedings relying on Rent Act 1977 Sch 15, Case 19. Mr Foley defended. He maintained that he was a weekly tenant who enjoyed the full protection of the Rent Act. In 2001, the parties agreed a consent order which included a declaration that Mr Foley was a tenant under a protected shorthold tenancy and that there had been no grant of a further tenancy. A schedule to the order provided that the tenancy would be determined by Mr Foley delivering up possession on or before 26 September 2001, when the Diocesan Board would arrange for his dinner, bed and breakfast in a hotel. Mr Foley was to vacate the property for a minimum period of 24 hours and deliver up all keys. On 27 September 2001, the Diocesan Board would grant Mr Foley an assured shorthold tenancy of the same property for a term of five years. Although Mr Foley handed over the keys on September 26, his furniture and belongings remained in the property throughout the 24-hour period. No formal grant of a new tenancy was ever made. In 2006, the Diocesan Board served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice and began possession proceedings. On the trial of a preliminary issue, HHJ Neligan held that Mr Foley could not bring himself within Housing Act 1988 s34(1)(b) which provides that a tenancy entered into on or after the commencement of Housing Act 1988 cannot be a protected tenancy, ‘unless … (b) it is granted to a person … who, immediately before the tenancy was granted, was a protected or statutory tenant’. Section 45(1) provides that ‘“tenancy” includes … an agreement for a tenancy’. Mr Foley appealed.

 

In February 2011, the Crown Estate Commissioners sold the reversionary interest in a number of residential properties to Peabody, a housing association within the meaning of Housing Associations Act 1985 s1 and a not for profit private registered provider of social housing within the meaning of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The occupants were tenants who had been subject to and entitled to protection under the Rent Act 1977. All agreed that those Rent Act tenancies came to an end on transfer of ownership. However, a dispute arose regarding whether they became secure tenants under Housing Act 1985 Part 4 and also housing association tenants within the meaning of Rent Act 1977 s86 or assured tenants under the Housing Act (HA) 1988.

Ms Ryder occupied residential premises. In 1994, possession proceedings were settled, on the basis that she would be granted an assured tenancy. Between 1994 and 2013 notices of increase of rent were given underHousing Act 1988 s14. They were referred on five occasions to rent assessment committees and four times the rent was increased to the market rate. In 2013, the landlord sought a further increase but the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) struck out the application on the grounds that the tenancy was still a regulated tenancy under the Rent Act 1977 and not an assured tenancy. It held that immediately before the 1994 tenancy agreement, Ms Ryder occupied the premises as a Rent Act tenant.

 

The plaintiff was a statutory tenant by succession within the meaning of the Rent Act 1977. In April 1989 she agreed with her landlords to move to other accommodation owned by them. They then claimed that, since the new tenancy commenced after 15 January 1989, she was an assured tenant and served notice to increase her rent. The tenant sought a declaration that, in view of the provisions of Housing Act 1988 s34(1)(b), she remained a statutory tenant with Rent Act protection. The landlords claimed that s34(1)(b) did not apply where the accommodation was not ‘the same or substantially the same premises’.

 

See Housing Law Casebook, 5th edition, C7.7.