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CHAPTER I
 
Notices seeking possession – secure and assured tenants
Introduction
Landlords of secure and assured tenants must serve their tenants with a notice of seeking possession (NSP) before issuing a claim for possession other than where the court has, and is able to, dispense with the requirement to serve a notice: Housing Act 1985 ss83, 83ZA, 83A; Housing Act 1988 ss8, 8A. The form and content of the notice and the date on which a claim may be issued depend on the ground for possession that the landlord is seeking. Although the provisions are broadly similar, there are still a few differences between notices served under either Act and so cases relating to the two different regimes are summarised separately.
For notices concerning introductory, demoted and assured shorthold tenancies see chapters L and M respectively. For notices determining contractual tenancies at common law see chapter H.
Notices seeking possession (Housing Act 1985)
Housing Act 1985 s83, 83ZA and 83A preclude a court from granting an order for possession against a secure tenant unless it is satisfied that a notice seeking possession complying with the requirements of that section (and section 83A where appropriate) has been served or that, other than where the ground relied upon is under section 84A (i.e. anti-social behaviour mandatory ground for possession), it is ‘just and equitable’ to dispense with the notice requirement. If it is not just and equitable to dispense with the need for a notice, the notice must state the ground for possession and give ‘particulars’ of the ground. The relevant form, in both England and Wales, is contained in Secure Tenancies (Notices) Regulations 1987 (as amended).
Court of Appeal
 
Braintree DC v Vincent
[2004] EWCA Civ 415; 9 March 2004
 
NSP to be dispensed with in ‘relatively exceptional circumstances’; sub-licensee’s liability for mesne profits
Mrs Vincent was an elderly lady. She was a secure tenant, living in a bungalow. In April 2002, she suffered an accident and was admitted to hospital, where she remained for a long time before being placed in a nursing home. From April 2003, one of her sons, the third defendant, lived in the bungalow. The council began possession proceedings against the sons as trespassers. A judge joined Mrs Vincent as a defendant. A possession order was made on the alternative bases that the mother was no longer a secure tenant and on the ground of rent arrears. On the latter basis, the judge considered that it was just and equitable to dispense with the requirement for a section 83 notice. The judge also ordered one of the sons, the third defendant, to pay a sum equivalent to 22 weeks’ rent for his use and occupation of the property. He appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the possession order. Although it is ‘obviously only in relatively exceptional cases where the court should be prepared to dispense with a section 83 notice’, in this case the circumstances were unusual in procedural terms. The tenant was only added as a defendant at the insistence of the judge. It was therefore understandable that no section 83 notice had been served. Furthermore, a section 83 notice would have been of no benefit to the tenant – indeed it would have been to her disadvantage because it would have postponed the date for possession and added to her liability for rent. The judge was entitled to dispense with the notice on the unusual facts of the case. However, the court allowed the appeal against the order for mesne profits. Until the order for possession was made, the third defendant had been Mrs Vincent’s licensee. He had not become liable to the claimant until her tenancy came to an end. The money judgment against the third defendant was set aside.
Camden LBC v Oppong
(1996) 28 HLR 701, CA
 
Power to give leave to alter grounds in NSP imports a power to give leave to alter particulars of ground; power only to be exercised in exceptional circumstances
Although Housing Act 1985 s83 expressly enables a court to give leave for a landlord to add to or alter the ‘grounds’ on which possession is claimed (s83(4)), it is silent about the addition or alteration of the ‘particulars’ required by the notice.
Allowing Camden Council’s appeal against the dismissal of proceedings on the basis that the particulars in a notice were deficient, the Court of Appeal held that section 83(4) imports a power to add to or alter the particulars. It cautioned that such leave would be granted only in circumstances where it would be just do so and that the nature and extent of the addition or alteration would always be a critical factor.
City of London Corporation v Devlin
(1997) 29 HLR 58, CA
 
NSP not signed by Director of Housing; defence based on technical defects in notice defeated by procedural rulings
See Housing Law Casebook, 5th Edition, F2.3.
Dudley MBC v Bailey
(1990) 22 HLR 424; [1991] 1 EGLR 53; [1991] 10 EG 140; (1990) 89 LGR 266, CA
 
NSP ‘substantially to the same effect’ as prescribed form; error in particulars of ground did not invalidate notice
In possession proceedings, the council conceded that general rates were not part of the rent. However, the court had to determine whether the possession action could proceed on the basis of the notice seeking possession (NSP) which the council had served in January 1989. The notice had two potential flaws. First, it was not in the precise form prescribed by the Secure Tenancies (Notices) Regulations 1987 SI No 755. Second, the particulars referred to ‘arrears of rent of £145.96’ when the rent in arrears was £72.88, the balance being general and water rates. HHJ Stuart-White held that the notice was defective under Housing Act 1985 s83(2) and dismissed the proceedings.
On appeal, Ralph Gibson LJ held that the NSP, although not precisely in the prescribed form, was ‘substantially to the same effect’ (reg 2(1)). With regard to the particulars contained in the notice, he stated that:
The question is whether, at the date of the notice, the landlord has in good faith stated the ground and given the particulars of that ground. The requirement of particulars is satisfied, in my judgment, if the landlord has stated in summary form the facts which he then intends to prove in support of the stated ground for possession. Error in the particulars does not, in my judgment, invalidate the notice, although it may well affect the decision of the court on the merits. ((1990) 22 HLR at 431)
The council’s appeal was allowed and the case remitted to the county court.
Enfield LBC v Devonish and Sutton
(1997) 29 HLR 691; (1997) 75 P&CR 288, CA
 
Service of notice must satisfy common law, ie it must be brought to the attention of the tenant, or Law of Property Act 1925 s196(5)
Portsmouth CC v Bryant
(2000) 32 HLR 906; [2000] EHLR 287, CA
 
NSPs must be construed benevolently; it would be wrong for a judge to refuse a landlord permission to amend an NSP, so as to provide further detailed particulars of nuisance, in circumstances where it had already done so in its pleaded case;
Torridge DC v Jones
(1986) 18 HLR 107; [1985] 2 EGLR 54, CA
 
Particulars in NSP in rent arrears cases must at least show amount claimed; NSPs in all cases must tell the tenant what to do to remedy the situation
The council began possession proceedings based on arrears of rent, relying on Housing Act 1980 Sch 4 Ground 1 (now Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 1). The NSP set out the ground in full, but the particulars given were, ‘The reasons for taking this action are non-payment of rent’. The council’s possession proceedings were struck out on the basis that the particulars given in the NSP were insufficient.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that in rent arrears cases the particulars given must at least show the amount claimed, and in all cases the NSP must be sufficiently particularised to ‘tell the tenant what he had to do to put matters right before proceedings are commenced’ ((1986) 18 HLR at 114).
Wandsworth LBC v Attwell
[1995] 3 WLR 95; (1995) 27 HLR 536; [1996] 1 EGLR 57; (1996) 94 LGR 419, CA
 
Law of Property Act 1925 s196 does not apply to service of Notice to Quit (NTQ); if the landlord cannot prove that the notice was brought to the attention of the tenant there must be an express provision in the tenancy deeming the notice to have been served if it is posted or left at at the property
County courts
 
East Devon DC v Williams and Mills
December 1996 Legal Action 13, Exeter County Court
 
Proceedings struck out where particulars in NSP merely repeated the ground for possession and gave no details of the specific complaints
See Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, F2.8.
Slough BC v Robbins
[1996] CLY 3832, Slough County Court
 
Particulars in NSP need to state clearly nature of the case against the tenant
The council claimed possession relying on Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 2 (nuisance). The notice seeking possession gave particulars as follows:
Numerous complaints have been received over a period of time that annoyance and nuisance is being caused to your neighbours by noise and disruptive behaviour. This nuisance and annoyance has been investigated by my staff and I believe the complaints to be substantiated.
District Judge Fortgang held that the purpose of a section 83 notice was to ensure that the tenant knew very clearly the nature of the case against him. That was not achieved by the present notice, which was, accordingly, defective. The proceedings had to be struck out.
Waltham Forest LBC v England
March 1994 Legal Action 11, Bow County Court
 
Particulars merely referring to ‘major refurbishment scheme’ defective
The council sought possession under Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 10 (redevelopment). The notice seeking possession recited the ground and set out as particulars ‘major refurbishment scheme’.
HHJ Medawar QC dismissed the proceedings. The notice gave no particulars about the form of redevelopment proposed. It was no answer for the council to assert that the tenant’s refusal of access has led to them being unable to be more precise until possession was recovered.
Notice of proceedings for possession (Housing Act 1988)
Before bringing possession proceedings against assured tenants or assured shorthold tenants, landlords must either serve a ‘notice of proceedings for possession’ in accordance with Housing Act 1988 ss8 or 8A, or (in cases other than Grounds 7A and 8) persuade the court to dispense with that requirement on the ground that it is just and equitable to do so (for assured shorthold tenants landlords may also bring proceedings after they have served a notice under Housing Act 1988 s21, see Notice requiring possession (Housing Act 1988 s21)). If it is not just and equitable to dispense with the need for a notice, the notice must state the ground for possession and give ‘particulars’ of the ground. The relevant form, in England, is contained in the Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) (England) (Amendment No 2) Regulations 2015 (SI No 1118) (as amended) and, in Wales, is contained in Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) Regulations 1997 SI No 194 (as amended)
Court of Appeal
 
Kelsey Housing Association v King
(1996) 28 HLR 270, CA
 
Discretion to dispense with NSP exercised; applications to strike out possession proceedings where failure to comply with notice provisions should be made promptly
The defendants were assured tenants of the plaintiff housing association. On 9 February 1994 the housing association served a notice to quit. No section 8 notice was served. In May 1994 the association issued possession proceedings relying on Grounds 12 and 14 (breaches of obligations and nuisance and annoyance). In an appendix to the summons it set out the allegations of nuisance, including a reference to a conviction for actual bodily harm on a neighbour. At the trial of a preliminary issue, HHJ Kennedy held that there had been ‘a virtually total failure to comply with’ section 8. However, he also held that it was just and equitable to dispense with the notice, having regard, among other things, to the delay in objecting to the notice, the effect on neighbours and the effect on the defendants of not having been served with proper particulars. He concluded that they had known of the allegations for many months and that there had been no prejudice to them. The tenants appealed and argued that (a) as the court could not ‘entertain’ the proceedings unless it dispensed with the notice, in exercising its discretion it could only take account of events occurring before the possession claim was issued and (b) on the facts, the tenants had had insufficient notice of the nature of the complaints before the issue of proceedings to justify dispensing with the notice requirement.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Butler-Sloss and Aldous LJJ held that the judge was not confined to considering matters before issue and his exercise of discretion would not be interfered with. In deciding whether it is just and equitable to dispense with service, a court should ‘weigh all the factors before it’ and ‘take all the circumstances into account, both from the view of the landlord and the tenant’. In many cases, the fact that tenants had not been given ‘an opportunity to put right what it is alleged had gone wrong’ would be significant, but in this case they had had ample time. The attitude of the court in deciding what is just and equitable should be the same as in the Rent Act cases such as Fernandes v Parvardin (Fernandes v Parvardin), and Bradshaw and Martyn v Baldwin-Wiseman (Bradshaw and Martyn v Baldwin-Wiseman). Applications to strike out possession proceedings where there has been a failure to comply with section 8 should be made promptly.
Knowsley Housing Trust v Revell; Helena Housing Ltd v Curtis
[2003] EWCA Civ 496; [2003] HLR 63; [2004] LGR 236; (2003) Times 17 April
 
Exercise of discretion to dispense with NSP (where stock transfer) needed to be given individual consideration on notice to the tenants
Local authority landlords served notices seeking possession under Housing Act 1985 s83 on a number of secure tenants and began county court possession claims. They then transferred their housing stock to registered social landlords. As a result of the stock transfers, the landlords were no longer within the landlord condition (Housing Act 1985 s80(1)). The tenancies ceased to be secure. By virtue of Housing Act 1988 s1(1) they became assured tenancies. The tenants contended that, subject to Housing Act 1988 s8(1)(b) (the power to dispense with notices), the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the possession proceedings unless the current landlords served section 8 notices. The landlords applied to the court to dispense with the need for section 8 notices and contended that it was appropriate for the dispensation to be granted in all of the cases, without having regard to the particular circumstances of individual cases. The judge accepted those submissions and granted the dispensation sought. The tenants appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals. The court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims unless section 8 notices were served, or the court exercised the power to dispense with notice under s8(1)(b). The discretion was wide enough to allow substitution of the new landlord as claimant and dispensation of section 8 notice where the reality was that the new landlord relied on the same breach of the same term and the relief sought was no different. However, it was not legitimate for a court to dispense with section 8 notices without some consideration of any objection which might be taken by the tenant by reference to the facts of his or her case (see Kelsey HA v King (Kelsey Housing Association v King). If the landlords wished to continue with the possession proceedings, they would have to comply with CPR Pt 19.4 to obtain an order for substitution and apply to amend the pleadings, or consider commencing fresh proceedings. The cases were remitted to a district judge for a hearing to determine whether it was right to dispense with notice. Such consideration should not be dealt with on a without notice basis or without a hearing. The issue should be heard at the same hearing as to the possession claim.
Marath v MacGillivray
(1996) 28 HLR 484; (1996) 72 P&CR D25, CA
 
NSP relying on Ground 8 (mandatory rent arrears ground); section 8(2) allowed particulars, as well as grounds, to be amended with leave
The defendant was an assured tenant. After failure by the local authority to pay housing benefit, the landlords brought possession proceedings relying on rent arrears, including the mandatory ground in Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 8. A notice, purporting to comply with Housing Act 1988 s8, was served before the issue of proceedings, stating as particulars of the arrears, ‘At a meeting between the landlord and tenant on 24 July 1994 the arrears were agreed at £103.29 … Since that date no payments of rent have been made.’ No figure for the arrears at the date of the notice was given.
The Court of Appeal held that a notice from a landlord to a tenant complies with Housing Act 1988 s8 provided that:
… it is made clear … that more than three months’ rent is at the date of that notice unpaid and due and provided also that in some way or other that notice makes it clear either how much, or how the tenant can ascertain how much, is alleged to be due.
It is not necessary for the notice to contain a schedule of the arrears. The Court of Appeal also indicated that: (a) under section 8(2) a court may allow particulars to be added if they have not been given earlier; (b) the address of the landlord’s agents in a section 20 notice exhibited to an affidavit was sufficient to comply with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48; and (c) the judge was entitled to find that over 13 weeks’ rent was owing at the date of the hearing, despite the fact that housing benefit was owed by the local authority and was paid after the hearing, with the result that the arrears were reduced below the equivalent of 13 weeks’ rent.
Note: Since amendments made by the Housing Act 1996, Ground 8 is satisfied by eight weeks or two months arrears, rather than 12 weeks or three months.
Masih v Yousaf
[2014] EWCA Civ 234, [2014] HLR 27, 6 February 2014
 
The failure to include the exact wording of Ground 8 did not invalidate a section 8 notice where the notice gave the tenant sufficient information to enable her to know what to do to avoid a possession order being made
Ms Masih was an assured shorthold tenant. She accrued rent arrears. Mr Yousaf, her landlord, served a Housing Act 1988 section 8 notice seeking possession, relying on Schedule 2 Ground 8. Under the heading ‘Particulars’, the notice stated: ‘The tenant owes £1,680 which represents three months’ rent.’ It did not recite the precise wording of Ground 8, omitting the words ‘rent means rent lawfully due from the tenant’. District Judge Ayers made a mandatory possession order. Ms Masih applied to set aside the possession order, arguing that a strict approach to the prescribed wording was required because Ground 8 was a mandatory ground for possession. District Judge Flavey concluded that he did not have power to do so. HHJ Davies dismissed Ms Masih’s appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The notice gave sufficient information to enable the tenant to know what she had to do in order to avoid a possession order being made. The approach in Mountain v Hastings (Mountain v Hastings) applied equally to mandatory and discretionary grounds for possession.
Mountain v Hastings
(1993) 25 HLR 427; [1993] 2 EGLR 53, CA
 
Substance of grounds for possession must be set out; NSP relying on Ground 8 defective
A notice of intention to bring proceedings given by the landlord, under the heading ‘Ground 8’, simply stated, ‘At least three months’ rent is unpaid’, although later, under ‘Particulars of Ground’, it did state the total of arrears claimed.
Ralph Gibson LJ held that, although the full text of the ground as set out in Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 might not have to be repeated verbatim:
… the words used [must] set out fully the substance of the ground so that the notice is adequate to achieve the legislative purpose of the provision. That purpose … is to give … information … to enable the tenant to consider what she should do and, with or without advice, to do that which is in her power and which will best protect her against the loss of her home. ((1993) 25 HLR at 433)
The notice was defective because it had omitted the words ‘both at the date of service of the Notice … and at the date of the hearing’ and the explanation that ‘“rent” means rent lawfully due from the tenant’. The Court of Appeal also held that the words in section 8(2) which allow a court to alter or add to the grounds specified in a notice assume that there is a valid notice and are solely directed to the possibility of adding to or deleting grounds. The tenant’s appeal was allowed and the case remitted to the county court for rehearing.
North British Housing Association v Sheridan
[2000] L&TR 115; (2000) 32 HLR 346; (1999) 78 P&CR D38, CA
 
Landlord not limited by express terms in tenancy restricting the circumstances in which possession could be sought, but just and equitable to dispense with NSP
The defendant was an assured tenant. The tenancy agreement provided that (1) before bringing possession proceedings the landlord would give four weeks’ notice and (2) that it would only rely on certain grounds for possession which were set out in full in the agreement. (At the time the tenancy was granted, these terms reflected the statutory requirements. These requirements were later amended.) The tenant was convicted of an arrestable offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in the locality of the dwelling-house. The victim was his daughter, who lived three streets away on the same estate. The landlord immediately served a section 8 notice, which stated that proceedings would not be begun until after 15 June 1998, the date on which the notice was served. HHJ Appleton made a possession order. The defendant appealed contending that (1) the section 8 notice did not give four weeks’ notice and (2) that, although the conviction came within Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 14 as amended by Housing Act 1996, it did not come within the unamended version of the ground included in the tenancy agreement.
His appeal was dismissed. Although landlords are not precluded from giving their tenants additional rights, the parties to this agreement must have intended that the court should retain its power under section 8(1)(b) to dispense with the need for a section 8 notice if it were ‘just and equitable’. Although the judge was not asked to consider this, the Court of Appeal has all the powers of the trial judge. It decided that it should entertain an application to dispense with the requirement and should grant that dispensation. Second, it had not been the intention of the parties to the tenancy agreement ‘to restrict the landlord for ever to the statutory grounds for possession as they stood in the 1988 Act and the intention must have been that, if the statutory grounds for possession (or other related provisions) were amended, neither party would be disentitled from relying on the amended provisions’. Any other construction ‘would fossilise the agreement’.
County courts
 
McShane v William Sutton Trust
(1997) 1 L&T Rev D67; December 1997 Legal Action 13, Warrington County Court
 
Exercise of discretion to dispense with section 8 notice
The tenant, who was aged 18, was granted an assured tenancy on 19 May 1997. There were allegations that she had breached many of the coven-ants against causing nuisance or annoyance almost immediately. On 28 May 1997 a solicitor for the landlord housing association appeared ex parte before a district judge and obtained orders that it was just and equitable to dispense with service of a Housing Act 1988 section 8 notice and to abridge the time for service of possession proceedings. The judge also granted an injunction and listed the hearing of the possession claim on 4 June 1997. The housing association had made no attempt to serve a notice or the possession summons before the ex parte hearing, although it would have been quite easy for it to do so. At the hearing on 4 June the tenant appeared and applied for an adjournment so that she could obtain legal advice. The district judge refused that request, and, after hearing evidence, ordered the tenant to give up possession the following day. The tenant appealed.
HHJ Daley, granting the appeal, held: although (a) there is nothing to prevent a landlord from serving a section 8 notice on the same day as proceedings are commenced and (b) there is nothing in the rules preventing a landlord from applying ex parte to dispense with service of a section 8 notice, (c) following Kelsey Housing Association v King (Kelsey Housing Association v King), it was not possible for a judge deciding whether or not to dispense with service of a section 8 notice to weigh up all factors from both points of view without the tenant being in court; (d) the decision to dispense with service was plainly wrong; (e) following R v Kingston upon Thames Justices ex p Martin [1994] Imm AR 172, DC, the matters to be considered in relation to the application for an adjournment included the importance of the proceedings, the risk of the applicant being prejudiced, the convenience of the court, the interests of justice, the desirability of not delaying future litigants by adjourning early and the extent to which the party applying for the adjournment had been responsible for creating the difficulty; (f) no reasonable judge in the circumstances should have refused this tenant the opportunity to have a short adjournment on strict terms. The decision not to adjourn was ‘a wholly unreasonable exercise of his discretion, a breach of natural justice and plainly wrong.’ The possession order was set aside and the action re-listed for trial on 11 July 1997.
CHAPTER I
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