Mr Jones was a secure tenant. Mrs Jones obtained an order for the transfer of the tenancy and it was assigned to her in January 1997. Her husband’s rent account had been in arrears and in February 1997 she made a written agreement to discharge those arrears. Thereafter, she paid sufficient to cover her own rent but the trust obtained a suspended order for possession based on over £400 arrears still outstanding.

 

The council claimed possession under the first limb of Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 1 (‘rent lawfully due has not been paid’) and relied on a notice seeking possession containing the words ‘Arrears of rent which at 22/1/90 amounted to £714.54.’ That amount, and the higher amount owing at trial, was entirely attributable to non-payment of general rates, water rates and other sundry charges, the tenant having received full housing benefit for rent throughout most of the tenancy.

 

A fixed-term assured tenancy agreement included a proviso for re-entry and determination if the rent was at any stage 14 days in arrears. The defendant fell into rent arrears before the expiry of the term and the landlord brought possession proceedings relying on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 8 and 10. A possession order was made, but the defendant later paid all the arrears and applied for suspension of the possession order, relying on the relief from forfeiture provisions of County Courts Act 1984 s138.

 

The defendant was an assured shorthold tenant. The claimant landlord claimed that she owed at least eight weeks’ rent and sought possession, inter alia, under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 8. The tenant, by a defence and counterclaim, did not admit that rent had been lawfully due because the landlord had been in breach of its duties to keep the property in repair and to allow quiet enjoyment. The proceedings were compromised at court by a consent order, which provided that the landlord recover possession, all future proceedings be stayed, and the landlord pay the tenant £2,500 before she left the property. A circuit judge enquired of the tenant whether she consented to the order, before approving it. The tenant subsequently appealed against the order for possession on the ground that the judge had not had jurisdiction to make it in the absence of an admission by the tenant that one of the grounds in Sch 2 was satisfied.

 

A house was let to a tenant on an assured tenancy allowing for direct payment of rent by the council’s housing benefit department. One term of the tenancy was that the tenant would not share occupation. Five months after the grant of the tenancy the landlords received a cheque in respect of housing benefit awarded to the tenant’s partner who, by this time, was living with her. When the cheque was returned by the landlords, the local authority informed them that the partner was claiming income support ‘for the family’ but undertook to issue a new cheque in the name of the tenant. However, the council later issued a second cheque in the name of the partner, which was also returned by the landlords. The landlords claimed that the two returned cheques did not count as rent and that they were entitled to a mandatory order for possession under Ground 8 (non-payment of rent).

 

A landlord brought possession proceedings under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 8, 10 and 11. The defendant filed a defence, denying receipt of a section 8 notice seeking possession. At the hearing, Ground 8 would have been made out if the landlord could have proved service of the section 8 notice, but a suspended possession order was made, apparently by consent, without any evidence being called. The terms of the order were breached and a warrant was issued. Deputy District Judge Dabezies dismissed an application to suspend the warrant, holding that, in view of Housing Act 1988 s9(6), he had no power to suspend because when the possession order was made the court must have been satisfied that Ground 8 was made out. The tenant’s appeal to Recorder Pawlak was dismissed.

 

In February 2001 the defendant was granted an assured tenancy of a flat in London. He paid his rent by cheque, posted the day before it was due, to the landlord in Daventry. However, he failed to pay his rent from May 2002 because of housing benefit problems. When 11 weeks’ rent was outstanding, the landlord served a notice under Housing Act 1988 s8 and began proceedings relying on Ground 8. When housing benefit was finally paid, the tenant’s advisers sought details of the landlord’s bank account so that rent could be paid directly into the account. No reply was received, and so, five days before the hearing, the tenant’s cheque was sent via the document exchange to the landlord’s solicitors. It was not dealt with immediately by the solicitors but, on the day of the hearing, the landlord was handed the cheque for the full amount of the arrears by his solicitor advocate. He accepted the cheque. At the hearing, the landlord said that, since the cheque had not cleared, the district judge hearing the case had no power to adjourn the proceedings (s9(1) and (6)). The district judge did adjourn to give the cheque time to clear but gave the landlord permission to appeal. A circuit judge held that the rent was unpaid on the day of the hearing and made an order for possession. The tenant appealed.

 

Mr Stirling was an assured tenant. As a result of rent arrears his landlord obtained an order under mandatory Ground 8 that he give up possession on 19 July 1996. Before the date for giving up possession, Mr Stirling offered to pay off the arrears at £100 per month. The landlord agreed to that proposal and Mr Stirling remained in occupation. Mr Stirling argued that in all the circumstances there was an agreement to create a new assured tenancy.

 

The defendants in four separate possession claims were assured tenants of housing associations who had fallen into arrears of rent. The landlords relied on mandatory Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 8. There was no dispute that, both at the date of the service of section 8 notices and at the date of the hearings before district judges, the arrears exceeded the eight weeks’ limit specified in Ground 8. On the face of it, therefore, in each case the court was obliged by section 7 to make a possession order. However, all the defendants said that they owed rent as a result of housing benefit problems. They applied for adjournments so that they could have time to resolve those problems and obtain money towards the arrears. In all four cases, district judges refused adjournments on the grounds that they had no jurisdiction to grant them, or that, if jurisdiction existed, it would have been wrong to exercise it.

 

Mrs Weaver was an assured tenant of London & Quadrant Housing Trust (LQHT), which was a registered social landlord (RSL) (now a private registered provider of social housing). Her tenancy terms and conditions contained a statement by LQHT that: ‘In providing a housing service we will comply with the regulatory framework and guidance issued by the Housing Corporation.’ By a claim for judicial review, she challenged LQHT’s decision to seek an order for possession against her on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 8 (at least eight weeks’ rent arrears). Relying on guidance issued by the Housing Corporation in respect of evictions, she argued that LQHT was in breach of a legitimate expectation in failing to pursue all reasonable alternatives before resorting to a mandatory ground for possession. She also argued that LQHT was ‘a public authority’ and, accordingly, the Human Rights Act 1998 s6(1) made it unlawful for LQHT to act in a way which was incompatible with Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 ECHR.

 

The defendant was an assured tenant. In November 2000 her landlords served a section 8 notice relying on all three rent arrears grounds, ie, Grounds 8, 10 and 11. Possession proceedings were issued, but the defendant did not attend the hearing in March 2001. At that time the rent arrears were £1,095 which was the equivalent of 3.4 months’ rent. An outright possession order was made. The order was in ‘a common form’ and did not specify the ground on which possession was ordered. Later, an application to suspend the warrant was issued and heard by the same judge. He ‘decided’ that the possession order had been made under Ground 8 and that, accordingly, he had no discretion to suspend.

 

In 1993 the claimants let a house to the defendant on an assured tenancy. The claimants brought a possession claim relying on arrears of rent. The defendant counterclaimed for lack of hot water. At trial HHJ Cook found that there were arrears of £2,069, but deducted from this £500 which he awarded as damages for the lack of hot water and £1,100 which the defendant had been ordered to pay into court to abide the event at an earlier hearing. This reduced the arrears to £469, slightly over four weeks’ arrears. Accordingly, the judge found that Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 8 was not proved. Furthermore, exercising his discretion in relation to Grounds 10 and 11, he dismissed the claim for possession, on the basis that it was not reasonable to make an order. The claimants appealed, arguing that the judge had been wrong (1) to take into account the payment into court since it still belonged to the defendant and they were not free to take the money out of court; and (2) because failure by the local authority in connection with housing benefit ought to have been equated with non-payment of rent.

 

The defendant was an assured tenant. Arrears accrued when he stopped receiving housing benefit because the housing benefit authorities formed the view that he had ceased to occupy the premises. The claimants sought possession under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 10 and 12 – discretionary grounds based on rent arrears. At the hearing, the defendant’s representative sought an adjournment to try to sort out the defendant’s housing benefit position. A district judge refused the application, referring to North British Housing Association Ltd v Matthews (North British Housing Association Limited v Matthews). He made a 28-day possession order. The defendant appealed.

 

On 8 September 1995, Miss Richardson acquired a ‘shared-ownership’ lease in respect of a house. The lease was for a term of 99 years. Miss Richardson paid £29,500 and acquired a 50 per cent share of the house. She did so without the benefit of a mortgage. The lease further required her to pay £1,456 in rent per year. The lease provided Miss Richardson with the option to ‘staircase’ to full ownership, ie she could pay further capital sums to acquire greater shares in the property. In those circumstances the annual rent would also decrease until she owned the freehold and no rent would be payable. Miss Richardson did not, however, exercise her right to purchase further shares in the property. In 2003, Miss Richardson was forced to leave her home and move to a refuge after criminal associates of her husband threatened her. In 2005, her entitlement to housing benefit ceased and she was unable to pay the rent. She therefore decided to sell the house and Midland Heart agreed to assist her in doing so. They valued the property at £151,000. The house did not sell, however, and Miss Richardson began to accrue rent arrears. As a result Midland Heart brought a claim for possession and were granted a possession order under Ground 8 as more than two months of arrears were outstanding. Miss Richardson subsequently applied to the court for a declaration that she owned a 50 per cent share of the property. Her primary contention was that she held two tenancies: an assured tenancy and a long lease that could not be terminated by Midland Heart otherwise than by forfeiture.

 

If rent is tendered after the due date but before the commencement of proceedings, that prevents rent from being ‘lawfully due’ unless time has been made the essence of the contract. The words ‘lawfully due’ mean that the obligation to pay rent must have arisen and not been discharged.

 

The landlord brought possession proceedings, claiming arrears of rent. The tenant paid the rent the day before the hearing. The Court of Appeal held that, once a landlord had shown that there were arrears of rent at the commencement of proceedings, the court had jurisdiction to make a possession order. If rent arrears were paid before the hearing, prima facie it would not ordinarily be reasonable to make a possession order. However, in this case, where the tenant had frequently been in arrears and proceedings had been issued on a number of occasions, it was reasonable to make a possession order.

 

Failure to provide a rent book did not disentitle the landlord from recovering rent.

 

 

 

Mrs O’Sullivan was a secure tenant. She lived in the property with Mr O’Sullivan, her husband, who was not a party to the tenancy, and their children. Mrs O’Sullivan moved out and sought alternative housing, alleging that she had been the victim of domestic violence. After she left the property, she served a notice to quit on Southwark. Mr O’Sullivan remained in the property. Condition 3.1 of the tenancy agreement provided that occupiers should be living together as a couple but that, if the relationship broke down, Southwark would provide suitable alternative accommodation to the person vacating the property and grant a tenancy to the remaining person. However, if the breakdown was due to domestic violence, Southwark was not obliged to grant a tenancy to the remaining person. Southwark brought possession proceedings against Mr O’Sullivan. He counterclaimed, alleging that Southwark was obliged to grant him a tenancy. A judge ordered the trial of preliminary issues, one of which was whether the tenancy was capable of enforcement by Mr O’Sullivan after its termination by his wife. The judge did not hear any evidence and regarded the issues before him as questions of law. He recorded that there might be an issue as to whether Mr O’Sullivan had operated a trigger of condition 3.1 by asking for a rent card, but then determined that any claim for a tenancy had to be made by Mr O’Sullivan before the tenancy had expired. He made a possession order.

 

 

The council brought possession proceedings against a secure tenant, relying on Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Grounds 1 (breach of term) and 2 (nuis-ance). The term relied on prohibited ‘anything … which in the opinion of the Council may be or become a nuisance’.

 

Ms Marsh was an assured tenant. The tenancy agreement provided that the landlord could issue possession proceedings on a number of grounds. One particular clause stated that the housing association had a ground to serve a notice of possession if ‘you have been convicted of using the premises for immoral or illegal purposes or of an arrestable offence’ at or in the locality of the premises. In January 2000 Ms Marsh and her partner were arrested after drugs were found at the premises. At trial her partner pleaded guilty to offences involving the supply of controlled drugs. The prosecution dropped charges against Ms Marsh. In January 2001 the housing association issued possession proceedings against her relying on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 14 (‘The tenant or a person residing in or visiting the dwelling-house … has been convicted of … an arrestable offence committed in, or in the locality of, the dwelling-house.’). A suspended possession order was made.

 

Miss Scamp, an assured tenant of the housing association, and Miss Baker, a local authority tenant, entered into a mutual exchange. Miss Baker moved into the association’s property but never completed the assignment of her council tenancy to Miss Scamp. A county court judge found that the ‘mutual exchange’ had been a sham and a fraud from the beginning, as Miss Scamp had never intended to move to the council flat and had been paid by Miss Baker for her co-operation in the transactions. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the association’s initial claim for possession, which had been based on the contention that the assignment was a nullity (see Sanctuary Housing Association v Baker (Sanctuary Housing Association v Baker). The housing association then began a second action against the defendant for possession on the ground of breach of covenant not to assign without the landlord’s consent. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was estopped from pursuing this point which should have been taken earlier. HHJ Poulton rejected this and made a possession order.

 

An assured tenancy agreement included a term stating: ‘[The tenant agrees to] participate in groups and individual programmes designed to assist with the tenant’s resettlement and to comply with the agent’s move-on policies and procedures as set out in the preamble to this agreement. The project is not intended to provide permanent accommodation for the tenant, therefore, the tenant also agrees to move into other accommodation if notified in writing by the agent that other accommodation is available.’ The landlords brought possession proceedings under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 12, claiming that this term had been broken.

 

Cadogan granted Mr McMahon a 14-year lease in March 1979. When it expired he became a statutory tenant (Rent Act 1977 s2). On 17 March 1998, he was made bankrupt. Although the covenants in the lease made no reference to bankruptcy, the re-entry clause gave the landlord a right of re-entry if the tenant became bankrupt. The landlord issued possession proceedings under Sch 15 Case 1, claiming breach of that proviso. A possession order was made. Mr McMahon’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed ([1999] 1 WLR 1689). It held that the proviso was a condition and created an obligation not to become bankrupt. In view of section 3(1) it was an obligation under the statutory tenancy within the meaning of Case 1.

 

The landlords claimed possession, relying on Rent Act 1977 Sch 15 Case 1 (breach of obligation, in this instance a breach of covenant not to carry on profession, trade or business) and Case 2 (nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers). The main allegation was that the tenant had used the premises, where he was a statutory tenant, to carry out work for the British Turkish Cyprus Committee, which he had set up. The landlords alleged that the tenant, as chair of the committee, had authorised people, including members of the committee, to come to the premises at all hours of the day and night. They had been given keys to the external door, slammed doors and whistled. Although the noise nuisance had abated over a year before the trial, the county court judge found that the plaintiff’s allegations had been made out and that it was reasonable to make a possession order. The tenant appealed, principally on the ground that there was no business use.

 

In 1991 the council granted the defendants, a married couple, a secure tenancy of a flat. Their marriage broke down. In 1997 Mrs Mallett left the property, alleging that her husband had harassed her and been violent towards her throughout their marriage. The parties later divorced. The council served notice on Mr Mallett, who remained in the property, stating that it was seeking possession of the flat pursuant Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 2A. HHJ Cotran refused the council possession of the flat on the ground that Ground 2A required that the violence or threat of violence was ‘the real reason, the effective reason, the immediate and causative reason’. He held that the wife left the flat to live with her then boyfriend and that on those facts Ground 2A was not made out. The council appealed.

 

The defendant was a secure tenant of the council. It sought an outright possession order on the ground of anti-social behaviour (drug-dealing from the premises by the tenant’s son and another male). After a trial, HHJ Ellis made a conditional suspended possession order lasting three years. The defendant sought permission to appeal on the ground that it was not reasonable for any order to be made, or that the order should have been postponed rather than suspended, or that the order should have been for a shorter duration. He also complained about the use of hearsay evidence.

 

The council brought proceedings under Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 2 (nuisance and annoyance) against the defendant, a long-standing secure tenant. The tenant allowed large numbers of cats to live in her house (38 at date of trial). Neighbours complained that the cats defecated in their gardens and elsewhere in the locality. HHJ Sennit found Ground 2 made out and granted a suspended possession order on terms that the number of cats be reduced to six or fewer within six weeks. The tenant sought permission to appeal, contending that Ground 2 could not as a matter of law have been made out because neither she not any human resident or visitor was causing a nuisance. The cats had a ‘right to roam’ and the tenant could not at common law be liable in nuisance if they chose to defecate on someone else’s property.

 

Mr Harris was a secure tenant. Hounslow received frequent complaints about noise coming from his flat. There were also complaints about excessive numbers of visitors loitering in the stairwells, smoking, drinking and drug use. Hounslow served a noise abatement notice and then entered into an acceptable behaviour contract with Mr Harris. However, the complaints continued. The police applied to Feltham Magistrates’ Court for a three-month closure order under Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 s80. On 17 November 2015, the court made an order, stating that it was satisfied that: ‘a person has engaged, or (if the order is not made) is likely to engage, in disorderly, offensive or criminal behaviour on the premises … and that the order is necessary to prevent the behaviour, nuisance or disorder from continuing, recurring or occurring.’ On 23 December 2015, Hounslow served Mr Harris with a notice seeking possession in accordance with Housing Act 1985 s83ZA stating that possession proceedings might be begun after 25 January 2016 and that Mr Harris had a right to request a review of Hounslow’s decision to seek a possession order. The notice stated, ‘A request for a review must be made in writing … by Wednesday 30th December 2015.’ Hounslow heard nothing from Mr Harris by 30 December, but on 4 January 2016 solicitors acting for him emailed Hounslow’s housing department requesting an extension of time to request a review. On 18 January, Hounslow refused the request for an extension. Hounslow issued proceedings on 29 January 2016. On 16 August 2016 Hounslow offered to review its decision, but, after review, confirmed its decision to proceed. In the possession claim, District Judge Trigg held that there was no valid public law challenge to Hounslow’s decision to serve the notice seeking possession. However, once the request for a review had been made, Hounslow ought to have granted an extension of time or (if it had no power to do so) ought to have withdrawn the notice seeking possession and to have served a fresh notice thus starting the clock again. However, the fact that Hounslow did carry out a review during the pendency of the proceedings cured any procedural defect, with the consequence that Hounslow was entitled to the possession order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. It considered whether Hounslow had the power to agree to accept an out of time request for a statutory review; or, to put it another way, to waive compliance with the statutory time limit. Lewison LJ noted that there is no express power in Housing Act 1985 s85ZA to extend either the time within which a request should be made or the time by which a review must be concluded. ‘That is a strong contextual indication that the seven-day period for triggering a statutory review cannot be extended or waived.’ [17] A request is only ‘duly’ made if it is made within that seven-day period. A ‘tenant who requests a statutory review outside the seven-day period laid down by section 85ZA (2) is not entitled to a statutory review and the landlord has no obligation or power to conduct one.’ [22] The Court of Appeal rejected a submission that if a tenant is out of time in making his request, the landlord has an obligation to serve a fresh notice seeking possession if the tenant’s failure to make a request in time was outside his control.

 

Mr Boyd was an assured tenant. In 2011, he received a custodial sentence for an offence of theft and breach of the requirements of a suspended sentence order. His landlord served notice seeking possession and subsequently issued proceedings relying on allegations of anti-social behaviour directed at his neighbours, including noise nuisance and intimidating requests for money. The evidence of these matters was contained in three anonymous hearsay witness statements from neighbours. Recorder Salter made a possession order but suspended it for two years on terms that Mr Boyd did not engage in any further anti-social behaviour. Mr Boyd appealed, contending that the judge had placed impermissible weight on the anonymous hearsay evidence.

 

The tenant, a single parent, lived with her two children aged 5 and 13. The teenage son and his friends caused considerable nuisance to neighbours, including racial abuse. The council brought possession proceedings relying on Ground 1 (breach of a covenant on the tenant’s part ‘not [to] … allow members of his household … to commit any act which may … cause offence to any other tenant … by reason of his race, colour, ethnic origin or nationality’ and Ground 2 (nuisance or annoyance). The tenant claimed that her son was beyond her control and therefore she was not respon-sible for his behaviour. Recorder Bevington made a suspended possession order (SPO).

 

Landlords brought an action for possession against a secure tenant on the ground of nuisance (Housing Act 1985 Sch 2 Ground 2). Those proceedings were adjourned in March 1995 on undertakings by the tenant about her future conduct. The undertakings were broken and the action restored. In September 1995, on an express admission that (a) the ground had been proved and (b) it was reasonable to order possession, a possession order was made by consent. However, the order recorded undertakings, first, by the tenant about her future conduct and, second, by the landlords to the effect that they would not execute the order without first offering alternative accommodation. The tenant later failed to comply with her under-takings. The landlords applied to be released from their undertakings and for execution of the possession order. The recorder held that the landlords’ undertakings were part of a consent order and so not capable of being varied or discharged by the court.

Following a history of anti-social behaviour in the course of which there had been 58 police visits to the tenant’s home, the council began proceedings for possession. At a preliminary hearing the tenant gave six undertakings not to cause nuisance, use or threaten violence, etc ‘in the locality’ of her home. Following an incident in a shopping centre three streets away from the property, where the tenant threatened a child with a knife, the council applied to commit her for contempt. The judge found the incident proved but dismissed the application. He held that the words ‘in the locality’ were too vague and it was impossible to say precisely what they meant.

 

Mr Hadjazi was a periodic assured tenant of a four-bedroom house. Metropolitan Housing Trust sought possession on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 12 (breach of tenancy obligation), 14 (nuisance or annoyance) and 14A (domestic violence). HHJ Ellis found that the violence or threats of violence that caused Mr Hadjazi’s wife and children to leave the property occurred not while they were a couple living together in the property, but after Mr Hadjazi left and went to live temporarily elsewhere. He continued to be violent towards them until they left the property. He then returned to live there on his own. HHJ Ellis found that none of the grounds was proved, and that even if they had been, it would not have been reasonable in all the circumstances to make a possession order. Metropolitan appealed. The issue on appeal was whether or not Ground 14A was confined to cases where a couple were living together in the dwelling-house immediately before the victim of the violence left.

 

Mr and Mrs Lovatt were secure tenants of the council. Their tenancy agreement imposed an obligation to ensure that no nuisance or annoyance was caused to neighbours. Their teenage sons ran wild on the council estate. Other residents were frightened. It appeared that the parents were not trying to restrain the boys. The council sought an order for possession of the house on the ground that the boys who were residing in the house were a nuisance or annoyance to neighbours. The judge found that numerous acts of criminal or anti-social behaviour had been proved and granted a possession order. The Lovatts appealed on two grounds: first, that the boys’ behaviour had taken place away from the dwelling-house and, second, that the nearest identified victim lived further than 100 metres away and so could not be classified as a neighbour.

 

The defendant secure tenant occupied her council home for nearly 30 years. She raised her grandsons at her home. They were aged 15 and 17 at the date of trial. It was alleged that the grandsons sprayed graffiti, used abusive and threatening language, and threw stones at and spat at neighbours. In November 1997 the council served a NSP relying on Grounds 1 and 2 (as amended in 1997) and giving as particulars of breach of the Grounds that the tenant had ‘allowed’ her grandchildren to behave in this way. After a two day trial a District Judge made a suspended possession order (SPO). A circuit judge dismissed an appeal by the tenant.

 

The defendant was an assured tenant. In May 2004, he was arrested on suspicion of offences under the Protection of Children Act 1978, but he was not charged with any offence until January 2006. Meanwhile, in 2005, he ‘transferred’ his tenancy to a neighbouring property owned by the same landlord. In March 2006, he pleaded guilty to 15 counts of making indecent photographs of children by downloading them on to his computer from the internet and a further four counts of possessing indecent photo-graphs of children. All the offences had been committed between May 2001 and May 2004 while he was still living at the former property. He was sentenced to an extended sentence of four years’ imprisonment comprising a custodial period of 12 months and an extended licence period of three years. His landlord sought possession under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 14 (conviction for indictable offence in locality). HHJ Burford QC made a possession order. He rejected a submission that Ground 14(b)(ii) relates only to offences committed during the currency of the tenancy agreement and does not extend to offences committed before the tenancy began. Mr Fairclough appealed.

 

A local authority took possession proceedings against a secure tenant because of anti-social behaviour, principally caused by her three children. On the date fixed for trial, there was insufficient time to hear the case and the circuit judge adjourned, giving directions. He directed that, unless the local authority wrote to Ms Simpson’s solicitors setting out their best proposals for rehousing, they would have to pay the costs of the action, unless ordered otherwise by the trial judge. He took the view that if a possession order were made, the local authority would be bound to rehouse Ms Simpson and her children as homeless persons and that the order would promote a compromise.

 

Mr Borkwood was an assured tenant. His tenancy agreement included clauses prohibiting ‘nuisance or annoyance’ and ‘racial or other harassment’. His landlord claimed that Mr Borkwood had made racially offensive comments at a tenants’ conference and that he had included racially offensive passages in correspondence. It sought interim injunctive relief. A judge refused that application. The landlord appealed.

 

Teign Housing provided social housing. It granted an assured tenancy of a flat to Mr Lane, who was a vulnerable person. Later, Teign Housing claimed possession under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 12 and 14. The particular acts relied upon included: (1) removing fixtures and fittings in the kitchen without consent; (2) removing a gas flue without consent; (3) excluding contractors from the flat; (4) installing CCTV without permission so that the cameras covered communal areas and unsettled the other tenants; (5) playing loud music so as to cause nuisance and annoyance; (6) behaving aggressively to neighbours; (7) threatening a member of Teign Housing’s staff in a telephone conversation; and (8) leaving an untaxed car blocking access to the communal car park. Mr Lane defended on the bases that: (1) breaches of the tenancy agreement had not been proved, in part because Teign had given permission for works to be carried out, and Mr Lane had not caused nuisance and annoyance; (2) it would not be reasonable to make an order for possession; and (3) an order for possession would amount to disability discrimination. A consultant psychiatrist, appointed as a single joint expert, produced a report stating that Mr Lane suffered from a paranoid personality disorder, possible adult attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and harmful use of alcohol. The personality disorder was ‘a deeply ingrained, pervasive and maladaptive pattern of behaviour. Mr Lane had a pervasive distrust and suspicion of others and their motives.’ It stated that compliance with any court order would be difficult for Mr Lane because of his condition. It was common ground that Mr Lane was disabled, within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. HHJ Simon Carr dismissed the claim for possession. The judge found that Mr Lane believed that he had been given permission to install cameras and carry out some works when no permission had been given. He stated, ‘given Mr Lane’s honest belief that it had been authorised, it cannot amount to a relevant breach’. He found some limited breaches of the tenancy agreement but stated that making ‘a possession order would not be reasonable, proportionate or fair’. He did not address the Equality Act 2010, but said that, in the light of the medical evidence, he would have concluded that a possession order would have amounted to disability discrimination. Teign Housing appealed.

In this case, the court should consider whether: (1) Mr Lane could show that he had a mental disability; (2) whether he could show that there was a sufficient causal link between the mental disability and the conduct on which the decision to evict was based; and (3) if so whether Teign Housing could show that evicting Mr Lane was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The landlord had to show that there was no less drastic means of achieving its aims and that the effect of eviction on Mr Lane would be outweighed by the benefits to Teign Housing.

Dingemans J stated that the fact that Mr Lane believed that his actions had been authorised did not provide him with a defence to the claims for breach of the tenancy agreement. The concept of ‘relevant breach’ was not a basis on which the judge should have rejected Teign Housing’s claimed grounds for possession. The judge was therefore wrong not to have found that Mr Lane had breached the terms of the tenancy agreement by installing CCTV cameras. This amounted to a ground for possession. The judge had made insufficient findings of fact, either to allow Dingemans J to dismiss the appeal or make a possession order. He therefore remitted the action to be retried.

 

The tenant was convicted of possession of 66 grains [sic] of cannabis resin in the premises that he rented. His landlord claimed possession on the ground that he had been convicted of using the premises for illegal purposes.

 

A possession order was made on the ground that the tenant had been guilty of nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers. On appeal, counsel for the tenant submitted that some of the plaintiff’s witnesses were not ‘adjoining occupiers’ because their premises were not contiguous in the sense that they were not physically joined to the defendant’s flat.

 

 

In a claim for possession based on nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers, a judge may infer that adjoining occupiers have been affected, even if none of them gives evidence of actual nuisance to them.

 

The plaintiff landlord sought possession against the defendant who was an assured tenant, under Ground 1 (owner-occupier), claiming that she required the property as a principal home for her husband. No written notice that she intended to rely on that ground had been given before the grant of the tenancy and so she sought to persuade the court that it was just and equitable to dispense with the notice requirement. She relied on the fact that she had served a blank (and therefore invalid) section 20 notice, stating that the tenancy would be an assured shorthold tenancy. At first instance, the judge heard evidence that the landlord’s husband had an urgent need for a London home because he worked long unsocial hours and that the tenants, who received income support, were unable to afford the expense of moving home. He found that the landlord had not told the tenants that the flat would be required for herself or her husband, although there had been some conversation about her husband’s intentions. He held that it would have to be an ‘exceptional case’ to justify dispensing with the written notice and so dismissed the claim for possession. The landlord appealed.

 

Dr Hegab brought possession proceedings relying on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Ground 1 (owner-occupier). Although he had occupied the flat before Mr Shamash entered into possession, he had not served a notice before the grant of the tenancy indicating that he intended to rely on this ground. The trial judge dispensed with the need for such a notice on the ground that it was just and equitable to do so. He expressly took into account the fact that no tenancy had been intended because the defendant had intended to purchase the premises from the plaintiff and the fact that the landlord had later ‘behaved in a disgraceful way’ by illegally evicting the tenant and disobeying an injunction.

 

In 1991 the plaintiff landlord lived in premises which he owned. In 1994 agents acting on his behalf let the property to the defendant under what purported to be a one-year assured shorthold tenancy but was in fact an assured tenancy because no Housing Act 1988 section 20 notice was served. The agent was later made bankrupt. The landlord brought possession proceedings under Ground 1 (owner-occupier), contending that it was just and equitable to dispense with the requirement for a notice. The defendant did not appear at trial, but the county court judge held that it was not just and equitable to dispense with the notice requirement since no indication had been given to the tenant at the outset that the landlord might require the premises for his own occupation.

 

The landlady of a flat brought possession proceedings, relying on Case 9, claiming that she reasonably required it for her own occupation. Following Smith v McGoldrick (Smith v McGoldrick) and Kidder v Birch (Kidder v Birch), it was held that the relevant date for deciding whether the premises were required was the date of the hearing, not the date of commencement of proceedings. Furthermore, the tenant had not proved that greater hardship would be caused by making the order than by not making it, because no evidence had been given by her of any attempts to find other accommodation.

 

The former landlady, before she died, expressed a wish that her executors would offer the premises in question to the plaintiff, who had been employed by her, and, if he wanted to purchase them, provide the necessary money. It was held that, once these wishes had been carried out, the plaintiff was a landlord by purchase and accordingly was not entitled to possession under Case 9.

 

A landlord brought possession proceedings against a protected tenant, claiming that he and his wife reasonably required the premises for occupation by themselves as a residence (Case 9). The landlord was himself a protected tenant of other accommodation which had been let by his employer, but had been offered either £20,000 to vacate or alternative accommodation. Notwithstanding this, a county court judge made an order for possession. The tenant appealed, contending that the judge had not properly considered the question of greater hardship.

 

The landlady, who was in her early 70s, took possession proceedings under Case 9 against the tenant, who was aged 83. The county court judge refused an order for possession on the basis that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant. The landlady appealed, contending, among other things, that the tenant had not herself looked for other accommodation.

 

A court can make a possession order under Case 9 where a landlord reasonably requires accommodation as a residence for an adult daughter, even if the daughter is an equitable tenant in common of the house and so entitled to require the landlord to transfer the premises into their joint names. (If the property had been in joint names, a possession order could not have been made, because all joint owners must require the prem-ises as a residence if they are to rely on Case 9, see McIntyre v Hardcastle (McIntyre v Hardcastle).) The Court of Appeal also stated that, although in the usual case it might well be that any judgment on a claim for arrears of rent should be stayed pending the hearing of the tenant’s counterclaim, in this case the counterclaim was so nebulous and ill-drafted that the judge was entitled to give judgment on the claim for rent arrears without a stay.

 

A county court judge found that a landlord reasonably required possession of a dwelling-house under Case 9 and that greater hardship would not be caused to the tenant by making an order. However, he dismissed the landlord’s claim for possession because he found that the potential future development of property owned by trustees under the landlord’s father’s will would improve the financial position of the landlord and so enable him to purchase another home.

 

The plaintiff, Mr Evans, held all the shares in FC Property Co, a corporate body. The company let premises to the defendant tenant. Later the com-pany sold the house to Mr Evans for a price which was well below the market value. Mr Evans then claimed possession under Case 9 for occupation as a residence for himself and his future wife and stepson.

 

This case is an example of how difficult it is for either a landlord or a tenant to appeal against a county court judge’s finding that premises either are or are not required as a residence by a landlord or a member of the landlord’s family. HHJ Hill-Smith, sitting at Willesden County Court, dismissed the landlord’s claim for possession, holding that a house which had been let to five trainee surveyors was ‘an investment property’ and was not required for the landlord’s own occupation.

 

The landlord reasonably required possession of a maisonette for two sons who were living in cramped and unsatisfactory accommodation. The tenant had lived in the maisonette for 15 years, was aged 57 and received supplementary benefit. The county court judge concluded that hardship would be caused whatever order he made, but held that the tenant had not discharged the burden of proving that greater hardship would be caused to him by making a possession order. On appeal, it was contended for the tenant that the judge had failed to take into account that he would be homeless and would not have a right to be rehoused by the local authority, whereas the landlord’s sons, with a total income of £165 per week, would be more able to find other accommodation.

 

The landlord claimed possession under Case 9 on the basis that she wanted to modernise the premises and move into them when her mother, who was aged 86 and in bad health, died. The judge made a possession order, but directed that the warrant for possession should lie in the court office until the death of the plaintiff’s mother.

 

The landlord, who had recently married, brought possession proceedings under Case 9. The tenant conceded that the landlord, who was living in a rented caravan, reasonably required the premises, but claimed that greater hardship would be caused by making an order for possession. He asserted that, although there was a letter before the court from the local authority stating that it would consider an application from him for housing under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 (now Housing Act 1996 Part 7), there was no guarantee of the nature or location of accommodation which would be offered.

 

After they had granted a tenancy to Ms Sharkey, Mr Mansukhani’s parents transferred the premises to him ‘in consideration of mutual love and affection and of the covenants hereinafter contained’. One of the covenants provided that he was to make all payments due under the mortgage taken out by his parents.

 

Where there are two or more joint beneficial owners, possession can be claimed under what is now Case 9 only if possession is required for occupation as a residence for all or both of them. The position is different under Case 11 (see Tilling v Whiteman (Tilling v Whiteman)).

 

Personal representatives can be landlords of properties for the purposes of Case 9 and can claim possession even if they have no beneficial interest. Usually, however, to do so would be a breach of trust, but that is not the case where the personal representatives are trustees for their children and are claiming possession in order to live in the house with the children.

 

It was held that a husband and wife who were joint owners of a house were entitled to claim possession under Case 9 where premises were required for the ‘illegitimate son’ of the wife, even though the husband was not his father and had not adopted him.

 

It was held that a landlord who only established an intention to sell as quickly as possible, but decided to live in the premises temporarily pending sale, could not claim that premises were reasonably required as a residence under the predecessor to Case 9.

 

The owner of a rented house died. She left the residue of her estate, including the house, to four children in equal shares. The children agreed that one daughter, the plaintiff, should take the house in part satisfaction of her share, but that she should pay three-quarters of the value of the house to her siblings to achieve equality of benefit. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was not a landlord by purchase and so was entitled to claim possession under the predecessor to Case 9.

 

Mrs Tilling and Miss Dossett jointly owned a house. Before letting it on a Rent Act protected tenancy, they served a notice under the predecessor to Case 11. At the end of the fixed-term tenancy, they brought possession proceedings on the basis that it was required as a residence for Mrs Tilling.

 

The landlord went to work in the West Indies. He served a Case 11 notice before letting his house in London to the defendant. After the tenant had applied to the rent officer, the landlord brought possession proceedings and, at trial, contended that the house was not suitable having regard to his place of work and that he required possession in order to dispose of it and to use the proceeds of sale to buy a house that was more suitable to his needs (see Rent Act 1977 Sch 15 Part 5 para 2(f)).

 

The plaintiff’s mother let a flat to the defendant’s husband. A Case 11 notice was not served and there was no suggestion that the plaintiff’s mother might wish to recover possession for her own use. The plaintiff’s mother and the defendant’s husband then died. Later the plaintiff began possession proceedings based on Cases 9 and 11 but, in the light of the hardship which would be caused to the defendant, who was aged 73, abandoned the claim under Case 9. The county court judge found it just and equitable to dispense with the requirement for notice under Case 11 and made a possession order.

 

The tenant submitted that a county court judge had been wrong to hold that it was ‘just and equitable’ to dispense with service of a Case 11 notice before commencement of the tenancy, and to find that the landlord required the premises as ‘a residence’ because it was his intention to stay in the house for only a few months of the year.

 

Before premises were let, the tenants were informed orally that the landlord had formerly occupied the property as his home. However, no written Case 11 notice was served. The landlord brought possession proceedings under Cases 9 and 11 and contended that it was just and equitable for the court to dispense with the need for written notice. The county court judge made an order for possession and the tenants appealed.

 

A landlord appealed against the refusal of HHJ Krikler to make an order for possession. The landlord had claimed that periodic visits to stay with a girlfriend in the house which he owned amounted to ‘occupation as a residence’ and that, accordingly, he was entitled to rely on Case 11 as a ‘returning owner-occupier’.

 

Landlords claimed possession under the predecessor to Case 11, even though there were two other properties that they could occupy. The county court judge dismissed their claim because he did not consider that they ‘required’ the flat which was let. The landlords appealed.

 

Possession proceedings were brought against regulated tenants, relying on Case 11. In the county court, it was claimed that the premises were required as a residence by the plaintiff’s wife and daughter, who were returning from abroad. A possession order was made, but the wife stayed in the house for a few weeks only. She found it difficult to adjust and went to live with relatives. The property was put on the market and sold. The tenants claimed that the wife had never intended to live in the house and obtained leave to appeal out of time.

 

The Court of Appeal dismissed a protected tenant’s appeal against a possession order made under Case 11. The tenant had contended that the judge had applied the wrong tests in deciding whether the landlord had occupied the flat before the grant of the tenancy and whether he had an intention to occupy the flat within a reasonable time. The Court of Appeal followed Naish v Curzon (Naish v Curzon) in finding that, for the purposes of Case 11, a landlord’s previous occupation was a question of fact and could be temporary and intermittent. The court also declined to interfere with the judge’s finding that the landlord required the premises for his occupation.

 

The plaintiff, who lived mainly in South Africa, bought a house in 1971 and lived in it from time to time until 1980, when he let it to the defendant. Subsequently he obtained a possession order, relying on Case 11. The tenant appealed, contending that, since the plaintiff only visited the country for short periods, he did not require the house for the purposes of ‘residence’.

 

The plaintiff landlords, who had last lived in the house in 1964 before going abroad, brought possession proceedings under Case 11 against the tenants, who had moved in during 1972. No written notice had been given, but on the grant of the tenancy the plaintiffs had said that they might return to the United Kingdom and require possession. The tenancy originally lacked full security of tenure because the house was furnished, but the tenancy became protected as a result of the Rent Act 1974. The landlords claimed that it was ‘just and equitable’ to dispense with written notice under Case 11. At first instance a possession order was made.

 

Mr and Mrs Simmonds, the owners of a large Victorian house, lived in the property during World War II but then moved to California. Miss Clements moved into a ground floor flat in the building in 1975 as a Rent Act protected tenant. After her husband’s death in 1996 Mrs Simmonds served a notice to quit and began proceedings under Rent Act 1977 Sch 15 Case 9 (dwelling reasonably required as a residence for her). After protracted litigation, HHJ Rowntree made a possession order. Miss Clements vacated on 22 November 2000. Mrs Simmonds did not move into the property, but within a couple of weeks instructed agents to put it on the market. The house was sold in the early part of 2001 for approximately £1.25 million. Miss Clements began proceedings under section 102 seeking compensation.

 

In possession proceedings, HHJ Simpson QC found that four people, including the statutory tenant, were living in a bed-sitting room which measured 28 feet by 18 feet. It was, therefore, statutorily over-crowded. Relying on Rent Act 1977 s101, the landlord sought, and was granted, an outright order for possession. The tenant appealed, contending that, although there was evidence on which the judge could find that there were four people living in the room, the judge had to be satisfied that there was overcrowding on the actual day when the order was made, and that the evidence was that, on the morning of the trial, only two beds were made up.