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CHAPTER M
 
Assured shorthold tenancies
Introduction
Assured shorthold tenancies lack security of tenure. Landlords seeking possession do not have to satisfy the court that any ground for possession exists. To recover possession they must give the tenant two months’ notice in accordance with Housing Act 1988 s21. For tenancies granted after 1 October 2015, this notice must be in the prescribed form (see Form 6A, The Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) (England) Regulations 2015 SI No 620 (as amended)). A court must, however, refuse to grant possession where:
a section 21 notice is served within the first four months of a tenancy (which was granted after 1 October 2015);
the landlord has not issued a claim for possession of the property (in respect of a tenancy granted after 1 October 2015) within four months of the section 21 notice expiring;
the landlord has been served with a relevant notice by a local housing authority under section 33 of the Deregulation Act 2015 in respect of a tenancy granted after 1 October 2015;
the landlord has failed to provide a tenant (of a tenancy granted after 1 October 2015) with a gas safety certificate, an energy performance certificate or the ‘How To Rent’ booklet;
the landlord has failed to protect a deposit or provide the tenant with the prescribed information relating to tenancy deposits; or
the landlord is the manager or controller of an HMO or other premises that are required to be licensed under Housing Act 2004 and the premises are not licenced.
In addition, landlords may seek possession on the same basis as fully assured tenancies by relying on grounds for possession – see chapter J. Landlords seeking possession during a fixed term (where there is no break clause) must rely on this procedure. The grounds on which they can rely are restricted, as for other fixed-term assured tenancies, by Housing Act 1998 s7(6)).
Requirements for assured shorthold tenancy
 
Until 28 February 1997, when amendments to Housing Act 1988 introduced by Housing Act 1996 s96 came into force, it was a mandatory requirement for the creation of an assured shorthold tenancy that the tenancy be for a fixed term of not less than six months and that the landlord should, before the tenancy was entered into, serve a notice in the prescribed form stating that the tenancy would be an assured shorthold tenancy (a ‘section 20 notice’) (see Housing Act 1988 s20(2) and the Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) Regulations 1988 SI No 2203). However, for tenancies granted on or after 28 February 1997, these formalities do not apply. All tenancies, even if granted orally, for periodic terms or for fixed terms of less than six months, are likely to be assured shorthold tenancies unless landlords specify otherwise (see Housing Act 1988 s19A).
As it is now almost 20 years since section 20 applied to the grant of new assured shorthold tenancies, almost all the cases on the validity of section 20 notices have been omitted from this edition – for full details, see Housing Law Casebook 3rd edition, D7.
Court of Appeal
 
Andrews v Cunningham
[2007] EWCA Civ 762; [2008] HLR 13; [2008] L&TR 1, 23 July 2007
 
Words ‘assured tenancy’ on cover of rent book not a statement that tenancy would not be an assured shorthold tenancy
Mr Cunningham was granted an oral tenancy of a ground floor flat. His landlord gave him a rent book which had the words ‘Assured Tenancy’ on the cover. After the landlord’s death, his executors claimed that Mr Cunningham was an assured shorthold tenant and served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice. District Judge Pollard dismissed a possession claim, holding that the rent book was a notice under Sch 2A para 1. On appeal, HHJ Hayward held that he was an assured shorthold tenant and made an order for possession of the flat. Mr Cunningham appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. The words on the cover of the rent book were not a notice under para 1 or para 2. The words ‘assured tenancy’ on the cover were not a statement ‘that the assured tenancy to which it relates is not to be an assured shorthold tenancy’ (para 1(2)(c)), because an assured shorthold tenancy is itself a type of assured tenancy. Second, if there were any doubt about that, the schedule to the rent book contained a notice to the tenant that, if the rent was payable weekly (which was not the case), the rent book had to contain the notice properly filled in. The significance of that notice was that it confirmed that the expression ‘assured tenancy’ on the first page was not confined to non-shorthold tenancies, since it said ‘if you have an assured tenancy, including an assured shorthold tenancy …’. Third, the reference in para 1 to ‘a notice’ being ‘served’ was a reference to the service of a written notice. The rent book was clearly intended and used simply to record the payment of rent.
Bhopal v Walia
(2000) 32 HLR 302, CA
 
Written agreement for assured shorthold tenancy with a higher rent was a sham
Mr Walia entered into an oral assured shorthold tenancy with a rent of £300 per calendar month. Later he signed an agreement which falsely stated that the rent was £450 per month, because the landlords wanted to mislead their bank about their income. The landlords then sold the property with vacant possession. Mr Walia refused to move out and the new landlord brought possession proceedings claiming arrears of rent, calculated at the rate of £450 per month. HHJ Hague QC made a suspended possession order.
Mr Walia appealed successfully. The written agreement was a sham in the sense described by Diplock LJ in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 at 802D. It was a document intended to give to third parties or to the court an appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations which the parties intended to create. As a sham document it gave rise to no legal rights or obligations and did not have the effect of varying the existing oral tenancy agreement. The purchasers could be in no better position than the original landlord through whom they claimed. The tenant was not estopped from asserting a tenancy agreement other than that contained in the sham agreement against his original landlord’s successors in title. The new landlords had not placed any reliance on the written agreement when purchasing, since they had contracted for vacant possession, and had made no enquiry about the terms of occupation. Furthermore, the written agreement had not been designed to mislead the purchasers.
Kahlon v Isherwood
[2011] EWCA Civ 602; [2011] HLR 38; [2011] 2 P&CR 19, 19 May 2011
 
A Schedule in a Tomlin Order stating that the parties would execute an assured shorthold tenancy did not comply with Housing Act 1988 Sch 2ATimes 20 April, CA
Mr Isherwood was granted an assured tenancy in about 1994. In 2007, his landlord, Mrs Kahlon, began a possession claim alleging rent arrears and a breach of a covenant to allow access to the property. Mr Isherwood counterclaimed for damages for breach of the landlord’s repairing covenants. The proceedings were compromised by a Tomlin Order which, among other things, provided that: ‘The claimant and the first defendant shall execute an assured shorthold tenancy agreement for the period of 12 months commencing 2 June 2008 in the form annexed hereto, to be signed by the parties not later than 2 June 2008’ (para 5). In May 2008, the parties executed a tenancy agreement headed ‘Assured shorthold tenancy agreement’. Clause 2 provided that the landlord may terminate the tenancy at any time before the expiry of the term by giving to the tenant not less than two months’ written notice. In March 2009, Mrs Kahlon served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice stating that she required possession. She then issued proceedings under the Accelerated Procedure (CPR 55.11). Mr Isherwood defended, saying that no notice in the prescribed form had been served under Housing Act 1988 Sch 2A para 7(1)(c) stating that the tenancy granted in 2008 would be a shorthold tenancy. Recorder Willetts rejected this defence and made an order for possession. He held that the schedule to the Tomlin Order, although not identical in form to Form 8 in the Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) Regulations 1997 SI No 194, was in a form substantially to the same effect. Mr Isherwood appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and remitted the case to the county court. A comparison between Form 8 and the Tomlin Order schedule disclosed a number of material omissions. The bullet points were missing and there was nothing in the schedule which corresponded to paragraph 4 of Form 8 setting out the tenant’s understanding and acceptance of the consequences, in terms of security of tenure, of a change from an assured to an assured shorthold tenancy; clearly, these were matters of substance. After referring to Manel v Memon (Manel v Memon) and Tegerdine v Brooks (1977) 36 P&CR 261, Patten LJ said that ‘where the provision in the prescribed form is clearly part of the substance of the notice … it is no answer to its omission to say that the information it conveys was well known to the tenant at the relevant time’ (para 21). Paragraph 4 is an essential part of the notice and there was nothing in the Tomlin Order schedule ‘which even remotely corresponds to it’ (para 22). The schedule to the Tomlin Order was not, therefore, a form substantially to the same effect as Form 8.
Manel v Memon
(2001) 33 HLR 235; [2000] 33 EG 74; [2000] 2 EGLR 40; (2000) Times 20 April, CA
 
Need for district judges to consider documents rigorously when landlords use accelerated possession procedure
The claimant landlord brought proceedings under the accelerated possession procedure (CCR Order 49 r6A – see now CPR 55.11 to 19) against the defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal expressed concern that the district judge adopted the accelerated possession procedure and made a possession order without giving the tenant the opportunity to make representations at an oral hearing. Holman J said:
[The accelerated possession procedure] is a robust machinery. It depends upon district judges rigorously considering the documents which have been filed. Some replies may be little more than a plea, however genuine for mercy. But if, on the face of the reply, a matter has been raised which, if true, might arguably raise a defence; or if the documents filed by the claimant might arguably disclose a defect in his claim, then the district judge must necessarily be ‘not satisfied’ within the meaning of CCR Order 49 r6A(16) and a hearing on notice must be fixed.
Saxon Weald Homes Ltd v Chadwick
[2011] EWCA Civ 1202; [2012] HLR 8, 26 October 2011
 
Conversion into assured tenancy
On 11 August 2008, Saxon Weald, a registered charity, granted Mr Chadwick a ‘Probationary Tenancy’. The tenancy agreement stated that for the first 12 months it would be a periodic assured shorthold tenancy, but that at the end of 12 months if the landlord had not taken steps to terminate the tenancy it would automatically convert into an assured periodic tenancy. It also stated that if the tenancy converted to an assured tenancy, the landlord would send a letter confirming the change in status. Soon after the tenancy began, there were allegations of anti-social behaviour. On 5 August 2009, solicitors sent Mr Chadwick a notice requiring possession pursuant to Housing Act 1988 s21(4)(a) and a notice seeking possession, indicating that the landlord intended to seek possession on Grounds 12 and 14. However, Saxon Weald mistakenly sent a letter on 11 August 2009 stating that ‘following the successful completion of your one year starter tenancy, you are now an assured tenant’. As a result, Mr Chadwick claimed that his tenancy had ceased to be an assured shorthold tenancy and had become an assured tenancy. In a subsequent possession claim, a deputy district judge rejected that contention and made a possession order on the basis that Mr Chadwick was still an assured shorthold tenant. HHJ Simpkiss allowed Mr Chadwick’s appeal. He found that the letter of 11 August 2009 was a notice for the purpose of Housing Act 1988 Sch 2A para 2 which was ‘quite plain on its face’.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Saxon Weald’s appeal. The letter, ‘naturally and objectively read, clearly [was] a notice’ causing the assured shorthold tenancy to become an assured tenancy. A tenant might well think that the landlord had simply changed its mind from its previous indicated intention. Unlike Mannai Investment Co Limited v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Limited (Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd), there was no identifiable internal ambiguity within the notice itself. The mistake was not in the wording: the mistake was in the fact that the letter was sent at all.
Notice requiring possession (Housing Act 1988 s21)
 
Landlords of assured shorthold tenants who wish to recover possession relying on Housing Act 1988 s21 must give at least two months’ notice to tenants that possession is required. If landlords comply with this requirement, they are entitled to possession. The court has no power to suspend possession orders, apart from Housing Act 1980 s89(1), which provides that orders for possession must take effect no later than 14 days after the court order, unless exceptional hardship would be caused. For tenancies granted after 1 October 2015, the section 21 notice must be in the prescribed form (Form 6A, The Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) (England) Regulations 2015 SI No 620). There is no power to dispense with service of section 21 notices.
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
McDonald v McDonald
[2016] UKSC 28; [2016] 3 WLR 45; [2016] HRLR 18; [2016] HLR 28, 15 June 2016
An occupier of land held by a private individual could not raise an Article 8 defence to a possession claim
Ms McDonald had a mental disorder, which made her particularly upset by changes in her environment. Her parents raised money from a third party lender, Capital Homes Ltd, to buy a small property so that she could have a place to live for the foreseeable future. The money was secured by a mortgage over the property. The conditions of the mortgage prohibited the grant of a tenancy to a tenant who was assisted by social security. Mr and Mrs McDonald granted their daughter an assured shorthold tenancy. Ms McDonald paid the rent with housing benefit and Mr and Mrs McDonald used that money to pay the sums payable to Capital Homes Ltd. In time, due to a change in circumstances, they became unable to pay the instalments needed to meet their obligations under the mortgage. As a result, the mortgagee appointed receivers, who, as agents of Mr and Mrs McDonald, served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice seeking possession. Ms McDonald defended the subsequent possession claim, contending that a possession order would infringe the right to respect for her home guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR and that the notice to terminate her tenancy was served on her without the appropriate authority from her landlords. HHJ Corrie made a possession order. Ms McDonald appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal ([2014] EWCA Civ 1049).
The Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal. Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale, in a joint judgment with which the other justices agreed, stated
In the absence of any clear and authoritative guidance from the Strasbourg court to the contrary … it is not open to the tenant to contend that Article 8 could justify a different order from that which is mandated by the contractual relationship between the parties, at least where, as here, there are legislative provisions which the democratically elected legislature has decided properly balance the competing interests of private sector landlords and residential tenants. [40]
The statutory provisions reflected the state’s assessment of where to strike the balance between the Article 8 rights of residential tenants and the Article 1 of Protocol No 1 rights of private sector landlords when their tenancy contract has ended. They continued
To hold otherwise would involve the Convention effectively being directly enforceable as between private citizens so as to alter their contractual rights and obligations, whereas the purpose of the Convention is … to protect citizens from having their rights infringed by the state. To hold otherwise would also mean that the Convention could be invoked to interfere with the A1P1 rights of the landlord, and in a way which was unpredictable. [41]
After reviewing a number of Strasbourg authorities, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale concluded:
while we accept that the Strasbourg court jurisprudence … does provide some support for the notion that Article 8 was engaged … there is no support for the proposition that the judge could be required to consider the proportionality of the order which he would have made under the provisions of the 1980 and 1988 Acts. Accordingly, … we would dismiss this appeal. [59]
In any event, section 21 could not be read in a way that could permit a court to dismiss a claim for possession if it had decided that the eviction was disproportionate.
Court of Appeal
 
Ahern v Southern Housing Group Limited
[2017] EWCA Civ 1934, 28 November 2017
 
Landlord’s failure to follow its own policies did not prevent it from recovering possession of a starter tenancy
Mr Ahern was granted a ‘starter’ or ‘probationary’ assured shorthold tenancy of a flat commencing in April 2012. He was a very vulnerable alcoholic whose drunken, anti-social and on occasions, lewd conduct, disturbed and greatly upset his neighbours and others. As a result, in July 2013, the landlord served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice. A possession claim was issued in October 2013. Mr Ahern defended, contending that the notice was void because, in breach of its public law duty, the landlord had not complied with its policy relating to starter tenancies. HHJ Simpkiss found that the landlord had:
failed to identify and address Mr Ahern’s support needs for mental health or alcohol dependence;
failed to interview him about his support needs or allegations about his behaviour after the probationary period of his tenancy had been extended;
served the section 21 notice and issued the claim without evidence of a serious breach of his tenancy; and
fettered its discretion because there was no provision to review the proceedings, or alternatively, failed to review the proceedings.
Nevertheless, he made a possession order. Mr Ahern appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It turned on the facts. After considering all the relevant materials documenting the history of the landlord’s engagement with Mr Ahern throughout the period leading up to the service of the section 21 notice, it considered whether the landlord was in material breach of its policies. The Court of Appeal accepted the landlord’s argument that it was aware of relevant matters without the need for any further interview. It was clear that Mr Ahern’s needs were being met (if not successfully) by the mental health services and alcohol treatment programme. The Court of Appeal asked rhetorically ‘What more could the landlord reasonably be expected to do?’
Aylward v Fawaz
(1997) 29 HLR 408, CA
 
Section 21 notice was effective in operating a break clause
An assured shorthold tenancy granted for a term of one year from 1 July 1995 included a break clause enabling the landlord to give one month’s notice to determine the tenancy after the expiry of the first six months. On 13 February 1996 the landlord simply served a section 21(1)(b) notice requiring possession on 13 April 1996.
The Court of Appeal held that that notice was sufficient to determine the tenancy under the terms of the break clause. It was clear and unambiguous and indicated in terms that possession was required. The court rejected the tenant’s contention that a separate notice was necessary to activate the break clause. To require a tenant to give up possession was, in substance, no different from giving him notice of a decision to determine the tenancy.
Barker v Hands
[2007] EWCA Civ 869, 26 June 2007
 
Possession order where section 21 notice unsigned; permission to appeal refused
A landlord served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice on an assured shorthold tenant. The notice was not signed. The tenant defended subsequent possession proceedings, arguing that because the notice was unsigned, it was invalid. District Judge Shroder found that the notice was valid and made a possession order. HHJ Rubery dismissed an appeal.
Sir Henry Brooke, sitting as a judge of the Court of Appeal, refused an application for permission to bring a second appeal on the papers. He stated, ‘This second appeal raises no important point of principle or practice, and in any event the judge’s decision was clearly right.’
Church Commissioners for England v Meya
[2006] EWCA Civ 821; [2007] HLR 4; [2007] L&TR 3; (2006) Times 4 July
 
Whether a statutory periodic tenancy is quarterly or annual is determined by the period for which rent was last payable under the contractual tenancy
The Church Commissioners initially granted Ms Meya a two-year fixed-term assured shorthold tenancy. It was subsequently renewed. The last agreement was for a term commencing on 1 January 2004 and expiring on 30 December 2004. The rent was expressed to be ‘a clear yearly rent of £17,680 per annum’. The obligation to pay the rent was expressed to be ‘to pay the rent to the landlords by equal quarterly payments in advance on the usual quarter days (the first such payment or a proportion to be made on the date of this agreement)’. No further tenancy was agreed and on 31 December 2004 Ms Meya became a statutory periodic assured shorthold tenant (Housing Act 1988 s5(2)). On 2 March 2005 the Church Commissioners served a section 21(4) notice stating ‘the landlord requires possession of the property after the thirtieth day of May 2005 or at the end of that period of your tenancy which will end after the expiry of two months from the giving of this notice whichever is the later’. A possession claim was issued on 4 July 2005. Ms Meya accepted that, if the landlord only had to give a quarter’s notice requiring possession, the notice was good. However, she claimed that she had an annual tenancy, insufficient notice had been given and that the issue of proceedings was premature. A deputy district judge dismissed the possession claim. The Church Commissioners appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. When deciding the period of a statutory periodic tenancy, what matters is the period for which rent was last payable – see Housing Act 1988 s5(3)(d). In this case, the tenancy agreement provided for the rent to be paid by instalments. The last instalment became payable in September 2004 and was payable for a quarterly period. The statutory periodic tenancy was, accordingly, a quarterly tenancy and sufficient notice had been given. (The position would have been different if this had been a common-law tenancy and s5(3)(d) had not applied. As the rent was expressed to be an annual rent, an annual tenancy, not a quarterly tenancy, would have arisen when the tenant held over.)
Elias v Spencer
[2010] EWCA Civ 246, 29 January 2010
 
A section 21 notice giving an alternative of ‘the earliest date not earlier than two months after the date of service of this notice when shall expire a period of the assured shorthold tenancy’ was valid
A landlord served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice on an assured shorthold tenant. The notice required possession: ‘After: 22ND NOVEMBER 2008 or, if this notice would otherwise be ineffective, after the date being the earliest date not earlier than two months after the date of service of this notice when shall expire a period of the assured shorthold tenancy.’ The date of November 22 was wrong because it was not a day on which the periodic tenancy expired. The landlord relied on the alternative formula provided in the notice. Recorder Owen QC accepted that submission and made a possession order. The tenant sought permission to appeal.
Stanley Burnton LJ refused permission to appeal. He said that the present case was indistinguishable from Lower Street Properties Ltd v Jones (Lower Street Properties v Jones). Sir Scott Baker refused a renewed application for permission to appeal. Although Lower Street Properties Ltd had slightly different facts, the principle that the formula was perfectly good was clear. ‘The formula was applied in this case and it obviously in the terms of the notice trumped any problem with regard to the invalidity by one day of the date’ (para 6). An appeal would not have a real prospect of success.
Fernandez v McDonald
[2003] EWCA Civ 1219; [2004] 1 WLR 1027; [2003] 4 All ER 1033; [2004] HLR 13; [2004] L&TR 5; [2003] 42 EG 128; (2003) Times 9 October
 
Section 21 to be strictly applied; section 21(4)(a) notice must specify the last day of a period of the tenancy, not the first day
The landlord granted an assured shorthold tenancy for six months from September 1999 to March 2000. After its expiry, the tenants remained as statutory periodic tenants from the 4th of each month to the 3rd of the following month. On 24 October 2002, the landlord gave them a notice headed ‘Section 21(4)(a) Assured Shorthold Tenancy: Notice Requiring Possession Periodic Tenancy’ stating ‘I give you notice that I require possession of the dwelling-house known as … on 4th January 2003’. The tenants did not leave and the landlord began possession proceedings. The tenants defended, claiming that the date specified in the notice was not ‘the last day of a period of the tenancy’ in accordance with section 21(4)(a). A district judge struck out the tenants’ defence and they appealed unsuccessfully to a circuit judge.
The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. It rejected the landlord’s contention that section 21 should be construed in the same way as the common-law rules relating to notices to quit. It might be possible to give a notice to quit that expired on either the first day or the last day of a period of the tenancy, but that was not because there were two last days. It was because the last day ended at midnight and the first day of the new period would begin thereafter. A section 21 notice is not a notice to quit. The niceties of contractual notices to quit should not be imported into the plain words of the statute. Section 21(4)(a) requires the notice to specify the last date of the period. It is not a situation where the legislation permits the form to be substantially to the same effect. The subsection is clear and precise. The notice did not comply with section 21(4)(a) and was defective.
Note: This case might now be decided differently following Spencer v Taylor (Spencer v Taylor) as it would be accepted that the notice complied with section 21(1) and therefore did not need to meet the requirements of section 21(4)(a).
Gracechurch International v Tribhovan and Abdul
(2001) 33 HLR 263, CA
 
Section 21 notice was invalid because it did not expire on the last day of a period of statutory periodic tenancy
Landlords granted a tenancy which they claimed was an assured shorthold tenancy for a term of six months from 12 June 1996. On 26 June 1998 they served a notice requiring possession, purportedly in accordance with Housing Act 1988 s21. A circuit judge dismissed possession proceedings on the basis that the notice was invalid because it did not expire on the last day of a period of the tenancy (see section 21(4)). The landlords did not contest that finding.
Simon Brown LJ, while delivering judgment on another issue, described that holding as ‘clearly correct’.
Note: This case might now be decided differently following Spencer v Taylor (Spencer v Taylor) as it would be accepted that the notice complied with section 21(1) and therefore did not need to meet the requirements of section 21(4)(a).
Ker v Optima Housing Association
[2013] EWCA Civ 579; [2013] HLR 37, 24 May 2013
 
A tenant could not defend a claim for possession, brought under section 21, by relying on Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No 1 on the basis that if a possession order were made she stood to lose a deposit that she would have obtained in the event she exercised a contractual right to obtain the freehold
In February 2009, Optima granted Ms Ker an assured shorthold tenancy of a flat under a ‘FlexiBuy’ scheme, whereby she paid a market rent of £700 but had an option to purchase the property at a later date. If she exercised that option, Optima would give her a deposit to help fund the purchase. The value of the deposit was calculated as the difference between the market rent actually paid and the notional social rent that could have been charged for the property (the difference amounting to around £2,500 per year). If Ms Ker was evicted, she would lose both the option and the right to the deposit. After about a year, Ms Ker stopped paying her rent in full. Optima served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice. Ms Ker defended the subsequent possession claim contending that it was, inter alia, disproportionate to make an order for possession. She counterclaimed for a money judgment in respect of the deposit. HHJ Hall made a possession order, with a money judgment for the arrears. He dismissed her counterclaim. She appealed. In the Court of Appeal, Ms Ker accepted that she could not afford to live in the property and did not seek to reverse the possession order. However, she challenged the money judgment for the arrears and the right of Optima to terminate her tenancy.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Miss Ker had no answer to the claim for possession on Article 8 or Article 1 of Protocol 1 grounds. The property was not provided to her as social housing but as part of a scheme designed to enable applicants to acquire ownership of property without having to enter into an immediate purchase with the financial commitment which that would involve. Ms Ker fully understood the nature of the scheme and the commercial realities it involved. It was not disproportionate for Optima to seek, or for the court to grant, an order for possession. Ms Ker had no proprietary right to the deposit. It was not her property but was, at best, a contractual right to future property which would arise if certain circumstances came to pass (ie only if she was in a position to purchase the flat under the option agreement). Looked at simply in terms of the construction of the documents signed, Ms Ker’s case was hopeless. The tenancy agreement was an ordinary form of assured shorthold tenancy. It reserved the entire £700 as rent and was granted on Optima’s standard terms and conditions. It contained no reference to part of the rent being appropriated towards a future deposit under a shared ownership purchase
Lower Street Properties v Jones
(1996) 28 HLR 877; [1996] 2 EGLR 67, CA
 
Landlord cannot bring possession proceedings until after section 21 notice has expired; no date need be specified in section 21 notice provided it can be ascertained
On 28 March 1989 an assured shorthold tenancy was granted to Mr van Praag. The fixed-term tenancy expired by effluxion of time on 27 September 1989. In the years that followed, there were two further fixed-term agreements which purported to create assured shorthold tenancies. The defendant lived with Mr van Praag in the premises. Mr van Praag died in 1992 and whatever tenancy he had vested in the defendant in accordance with Housing Act 1988 s18. The landlord began possession proceedings. However, the claim for possession was dismissed because proceedings were started the day before the section 21 notice expired.
In the Court of Appeal, Schiemann LJ stated that it is ‘implicit that the landlord cannot bring proceedings until after [the date specified in the notice]’. Kennedy LJ reached his decision on the ground that the notice served stated ‘The landlord cannot apply for such an order before the notice has run out’, and left open whether, with a different wording, proceedings could have been begun before expiry.
The occupant had also challenged the section 21 notice served on two other grounds, namely that (a) it did not specify the date on which possession was required (the wording used was ‘at the end of your period of tenancy which will end next after the expiration of two months from the service upon you of this notice’) and (b) although dated, it did not state the date on which it was served. Both these contentions were rejected by the Court of Appeal. No date need be specified in a section 21 notice provided that:
… the tenant knows or can easily ascertain the date referred to … The word ‘specified’ … means no more than ‘made clear’.
Notting Hill Housing Trust v Roomus
[2006] EWCA Civ 407; [2006] 1 WLR 1375; [2006] L&TR 23; [2007] HLR 2
 
The phrase ‘at the end of your tenancy’ has the same meaning as ‘after the end of your tenancy’
The defendant was granted a periodic assured shorthold tenancy. Notting Hill served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice which stated ‘Possession is required (by virtue of section 21(4) Housing Act 1988 of [the property] which you hold as tenant at the end of the period of your tenancy which will end after expiry of two months from the service upon you of this notice’. A possession order was made, but the tenant applied to set it aside on the ground that the section 21 notice was invalid because of the use of the word ‘at’ in the phrase ‘at the end of the period’ instead of ‘after’ (s21(4)(a)). District Judge Plaskow found that the words ‘at the end of’ had the same effect as the word ‘after’, and dismissed the application to set aside. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The phrase ‘at the end of the tenancy’ in a notice given pursuant to section 21 means ‘after the end of the tenancy’ and so complies with the requirements of section 21(4)(a). A request to an audience that they remove all their belongings ‘at the end of the concert’ is not asking them to do something in the split second when the last note is played. It is asking them to do something after the end of the concert. Similarly, to say that soldiers came home ‘at the end of the war’ means that they came home after the war had ended, not the split second when the enemy surrendered.
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue
[2001] EWCA Civ 595; [2002] QB 48; [2001] 3 WLR 183; [2001] 4 All ER 606; (2001) 33 HLR 823; [2001] UKHRR 693; [2001] LGR 489; (2001) Times 21 June
 
Housing association acting as a ‘functional public authority’ within meaning of Human Rights Act 1998; mandatory nature of possession for assured shorthold tenancy does not conflict with tenants’ right to family life
Singh v Emmanuel
(1997) 74 P&CR D18, CA
 
Section 21 notice given three months into three-year term was valid
On 6 March 1996 the plaintiff granted the defendant an assured shorthold tenancy for a term of three years. The written agreement provided that ‘the landlord may bring the tenancy to an end at any time … (but not earlier than six months from the commencement date …) by giving to the tenant not less than two months’ written notice stating that the landlord requires possession of the premises’. On 6 June 1996 the landlord gave notice that he required possession on 6 September 1996. The landlord brought possession proceedings. The tenant argued that the notice was invalid because it was given only three months into the term and so fell foul of the provision in the tenancy agreement allowing termination. A recorder made a possession order.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the tenant’s appeal. Sir Patrick Russell stated that he regarded the appeal as ‘basically unarguable’, holding that the landlord had given ‘a perfectly valid notice’.
Spencer v Taylor
[2013] EWCA Civ 1600; [2014] HLR 9, 20 November 2013
 
A notice need only comply with section 21(1), as opposed to section 21(4), where a periodic tenancy has arisen after the expiry of a fixed term
Mr Spencer let a property to Ms Taylor under an assured shorthold tenancy for a fixed term of six months, beginning on 6 February 2006, a Monday. The rent was payable weekly. There was no further contractual agreement and she became a statutory periodic tenant. In October 2011, Mr Spencer served a Housing Act 1988 s21(4) notice, stating that possession was sought ‘(a) after 01/01/2012 or (b) at the end of your period of tenancy which will end next after the expiration of two months from the service upon you of this notice’. The first of January 2012 was a Saturday. A notice expiring two months after the service of the notice would have expired on 18 December 2011. The next Sunday after that was 23 December 2011. The claim form seeking possession was issued on 27 April 2012.
Ms Taylor contended that the notice was invalid as it did not specify the correct date required by section 21(4). Mr Spencer accepted that the ‘01/01/2012’ date was wrong, but contended that the formula gave the correct date. HHJ Godsmark QC held that the notice was valid and made a possession order. Ms Taylor appealed.
The appeal was dismissed. Ms Taylor’s fixed term tenancy had come to an end, she was now a periodic tenant and landlord had given her not less than two months notice requiring her to leave. Therefore, although the notice was expressed to be served under section 21(4), the notice met all the requirements for section 21(1). Section 21(1)(b) does not require the notice to expire on any particular date nor does it require a date to be specified in the notice. In any event, the notice was also valid under section 21(4). The first date was clearly wrong, but the formula gave the correct date.
County courts
 
Dovetail Estates Ltd v Mazrekaj
31 January 2006, Clerkenwell County Court
 
Claim issued prematurely; saving clause was not effective
On 13 May 2004, F Q Sidney & Co granted Mr and Mrs Mazrekaj a joint assured shorthold tenancy of a three-bedroom flat. The tenancy was for a fixed term of six months at a weekly rent, payable on the first day of each week. Mr and Mrs Mazrekaj continued to occupy the flat when the fixed term expired on Friday 12 November 2004. Thereafter, by Housing Act 1988 s5, they occupied the flat under a joint periodic assured shorthold tenancy, which ‘renewed itself’ every Saturday. On 5 September 2005, Dovetail Estates, who claimed to be successors in title to the original landlords, sent Mr and Mrs Mazrekaj a notice requiring possession of the flat under Housing Act 1988 s21(4)). The tenants received the notice in the post on 9 September 2005. It required them to give possession of the flat ‘on 7th November 2005 or on the day ending on the last day of a period of your tenancy’. 7 November 2005 was a Monday. Possession was not given up and, on 8 November 2005, the claimants began possession proceedings, using the accelerated procedure (CPR 55 Part II). The claimant did not provide proof of its entitlement to possession when it issued the claim. The defendants argued that (1) the earliest date after which they could have been required to give up possession of the flat was Friday 11 November 2005 and that the claim had been issued prematurely (Lower Street Properties Ltd v Jones (Lower Street Properties v Jones)); and (2) the notice was invalid because 7 November 2005 was not the last day of a period of the tenancy and, applying Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd (Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd), considered objectively, the saving clause in the notice would not enable a reasonable recipient to ascertain the date after which he or she would be required to give up possession of the flat. In particular, it did not specify a period of notice or a date from which notice was intended to run.
District Judge Stary found that (1) the claim was an abuse of the court’s process, having been issued before the requisite notice period had expired; (2) for the reasons advanced by the defendants, the notice was invalid, and (3) in any event, the claimant had not proved its entitlement to possession of the flat. She dismissed the claim and ordered the claimant to pay the defendants’ costs.
Gloucestershire HA v Phelps
10 February 2003, Gloucester County Court
 
Possession cannot be ordered under section 21 within a fixed term (in absence of break clause)
The claimant granted the defendant an assured shorthold tenancy on 4 February 2002 for a fixed term of 12 months. It was described as a ‘Starter Tenancy’ and included a clause that it would cease to be an assured shorthold after 12 months conditional on no possession proceedings having been brought. On 4 September 2002, the claimant served a section 21 notice but cited rent arrears and anti-social behaviour, although no such behaviour was specified. The claimant brought a possession claim under the accelerated possession procedure. A possession order was made by a district judge without a hearing on 11 December 2002.
The tenant appealed successfully because the possession order had become effective before the 12-month fixed-term tenancy had ended. HHJ Hutton stated that section 21 specifically provides that possession may be granted only if the assured shorthold tenancy has actually come to an end at the time of the order. In this case it had not come to an end. The application and the possession order were premature. Although anti-social behaviour was raised in the claim, this was irrelevant because this action was not commenced under Housing Act 1988 s8.
Paddington Churches Housing Association v Khan
(1) 25 July 2003; [2004] 3 CLD 328; (2) 29 October 2003, Willesden County Court
 
Section 21 notice could be relied on in possession proceedings despite having been served three years earlier
The defendant was an assured shorthold tenant. In March 2000 his landlord served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice. No possession claim was issued until April 2003. A deputy district judge dismissed the claim for possession, finding that the claimant landlord had waived its right to proceed under the March 2000 notice because it had allowed the defendant to remain in the property for so long after serving the notice.
HHJ Copley allowed the landlord’s appeal and made a possession order. There was no statutory basis for the deputy district judge’s decision. He was wrong in law to rule that the section 21 notice had expired.
Note: If the tenancy had been granted after 1 October 2015 the landlord would have been unable to seek possession because claims must be begun within four months of the notice expiring.
Tenancy deposits and the Housing Act 2004
 
Housing Act 2004 provides that if a tenancy deposit is paid in connection with an assured shorthold tenancy, the deposit must be held in accordance with an authorised scheme and the initial requirements of such a scheme (see s213(4)) must be complied with in relation to the deposit. The primary sanction for non-compliance with the scheme is that landlords may not serve the Housing Act 1988 s21 notices at any time where a deposit is not being safeguarded in accordance with an authorised scheme or where either the initial requirements of the scheme have not been met or the prescribed information regarding the safeguarding the deposit has not been given (s215). In addition tenants are entitled to claim a sum equivalent to three times the amount of the deposit from a defaulting landlord (s214).
Court of Appeal
 
Ayannuga v Swindells
[2012] EWCA Civ 1789; [2013] HLR 9; [2013] L&TR 1, 6 November 2012
 
The tenant was entitled to the repayment of his deposit and a sum equal to three times his deposit where the landlord had failed to supply him with the prescribed information in accordance with section 213(6)
Mr Ayannuga was the landlord of an assured shorthold tenant. In accordance with the tenancy agreement, he paid a deposit of £950. It was held by the administrator of an authorised custodial scheme. He claimed possession based on rent arrears. Mr Swindells counterclaimed, denying any arrears and seeking repayment of the deposit. He alleged that the landlord had breached Housing Act 2004 s213(5) and (6) by failing to provide him with information about the tenancy deposit scheme as prescribed by the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order (‘the Prescribed Information Order’) 2007 SI No 797. During the hearing, the landlord provided additional information concerning the deposit scheme. The judge dismissed the counterclaim, deciding that the landlord had substantially complied with the section 213 obligations. He held that the information in the tenancy agreement and the additional information had substantially the same effect as the information prescribed by the Order. Mr Ayannuga appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The judge had reached a decision which fell outside the proper exercise of judicial judgment and evaluation. Although the tenancy agreement and additional information addressed the procedure in the event that the tenancy agreement ended and a deposit had to be returned, the provisions of the tenancy agreement did not address the procedural provisions of the deposit scheme itself. Articles 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of the Prescribed Information Order were not to be regarded as mere matters of procedure or of subsidiary importance. They were of real importance to a tenant as they defined the circumstances in which a tenant could recover his/her deposit and the means by which disputes regarding deposits could be resolved, including resolution without recourse to litigation. The court granted a declaration that Mr Ayanugga was entitled to repayment of the deposit within 14 days and ordered the landlord to pay a sum equal to three times the amount of the deposit within 14 days.
Charalambous v Ng
[2014] EWCA Civ 1604; [2015] HLR 15, 16 December 2014
A section 21 notice that was served in October 2012 was invalid because the deposit, which had been received in 2002, had not been protected in an authorised scheme
In August 2002, Mr Charalambous and Ms Karali were granted an assured shorthold tenancy for a term of one year less a day. They paid a deposit of £1,560. The tenancy was renewed in August 2003 and again in August 2004, in each case for a further period of one year. Under each tenancy agreement the same deposit was required to be paid. No further money actually changed hands. Instead the original deposit was carried over and credited against the renewed tenancy. When the last of the tenancies came to an end in August 2005, a statutory periodic tenancy arose under the Housing Act 1988. In October 2012 the landlord, Mrs Ng, served notice under section 21 requiring possession of the property to be given after 17 December 2012. The deposit paid by Mr Charalambous and Ms Karali was never held under a statutory scheme, as required by Housing Act 2004 ss212 to 214, which came into force on 6 April 2007. The defendants claimed that the section 21 notice was accordingly invalid. District Judge Manners held that the notice was valid and made a possession order.
The Court of Appeal allowed the tenants’ appeal. Lewison LJ analysed section 215. The first condition that ‘a tenancy deposit has been paid in connection with a shorthold tenancy’ was looking at a past event, not a prospective one. It was satisfied in this case when the tenancy was granted in 2002. Lewison LJ rejected the contention that section 215 meant only a deposit paid after 6 April 2007, ‘because (quite simply) it does not say so’. The second condition that ‘the deposit is not being held in accordance with an authorised scheme’ was expressed in the present tense and was ‘looking at a current state of affairs’. In this case the deposit paid by Mr Charalambous and Ms Karali was not (and never had been) held in accordance with an authorised scheme. The Court of Appeal also rejected the landlord’s contention based upon the presumption against retrospective legislation. In so far as section 215(1)(a) precludes the service of section 21 notices, it is prospective in operation rather than retrospective. It is only concerned with section 21 notices served after it came into force.
Johnson v Old
[2013] EWCA Civ 415; [2013] HLR 27, 23 April 2013
 
Rent in advance is not a deposit for the purposes of Housing Act 2004 s215
Landlords let a flat to Ms Old on an assured shorthold tenancy. The term of that tenancy was six months from 1 May 2009 to 31 October 2009 at a monthly rent of £950. The tenancy agreement required Ms Old to pay the first six months’ rent in advance. It also required payment of a deposit of £1,425. She paid those sums. The parties entered into further fixed-term agreements on the same terms, but in due course a statutory periodic tenancy came into existence. In April 2011, the landlords served a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice and sought possession. Ms Old claimed that the notice was invalid because the six months’ rent in advance amounted to a deposit that had been paid but that had not been protected by a deposit protection scheme (Housing Act 2004 s215). A deputy district judge found that the payment of rent in advance was a deposit. HHJ Simpkiss allowed the landlords’ appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms Old’s further appeal. It held that, on the particular wording of the tenancy agreement, read as a whole, it did require that the first six months’ rent be paid in advance. That lump sum was not a further ‘deposit’ for the purposes of the Housing Act 2004 and therefore did not require protection.
Okadigbo v Chan
[2014] EWHC 4729 (QB), 23 October 2014
When assessing the amount of a penalty payment the question of the landlord’s culpability was the most relevant factor
Mr Okadigbo was the assured shorthold tenant of a house. On 1 August 2012, he paid Dr Chan – his landlord – a deposit of £1,250. Dr Chan brought a claim for possession against him after he failed to pay his rent. Mr Okadigbo brought a counterclaim for the repayment of his deposit and a penalty payment arising from Dr Chan’s failure to protect his deposit and provide the prescribed information within 30 days of the deposit being received, ie by 31 August 2012. The deposit was not protected until 5 March 2013 and the prescribed information was not provided until 8 July 2013. Mr Okadigbo was awarded a penalty payment sum of £1,250. HHJ Carr refused to award a higher sum because Dr Chan was not an experienced landlord, had relied on professional agents who had let him down and the matter was therefore at the low end of the scale. Mr Okadigbo appealed to the High Court.
Males J dismissed his appeal. The judge had been entitled to regard the issue of whether a landlord was culpable for the failure as being the most relevant factor in determining the amount of the penalty payment and had been entitled to find that this case was at the lowest end of the scale for the reasons she gave. It was also relevant that the error had been corrected and that by the date of trial the deposit had been protected for some months.
Superstrike Ltd v Rodrigues
[2013] EWCA Civ 669; [2013] HLR 42, 14 June 2013
 
A deposit that had been received before the coming into force of the tenancy deposit scheme was required to be protected upon the creation of a statutory periodic tenancy after the initial fixed term had expired
Mr Rodrigues was the assured shorthold tenant of Superstrike Ltd. His tenancy commenced in January 2007 and was for a fixed period of one year less one day. He paid a deposit of £606.66. At the expiry of the fixed term, he became a statutory periodic tenant on equivalent terms. In June 2011, Superstrike gave notice under Housing Act 1988 s21, requiring possession. Mr Rodrigues defended the claim arguing that the statutory periodic tenancy was a new tenancy, so that the previously paid deposit was to be treated as having been paid in respect of that new tenancy and, as the deposit had not been protected with an authorised scheme, the section 21 notice was of no effect. Deputy District Judge Whiteley found for Mr Rodrigues, but HHJ Winstanley allowed an appeal.
Mr Rodrigues’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed. At the end of the fixed-term tenancy, a new and distinct statutory tenancy was created (see N & D (London) Ltd v Gadson (1991) 24 HLR 64, CA). The deposit was held to guarantee obligations under it and was therefore to be treated as having been paid under it. The obligations under Housing Act 2004 s213 applied to the deposit, requiring it to be held in accordance with an authorised scheme, no later than the end of January 2008. Since it was not so held, the landlord was not entitled to serve a notice under section 21 in June 2011. Accordingly the landlord was not entitled to possession. The section 21 notice was invalid.
UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v Francis
[2010] EWCA Civ 117; [2010] 3 All ER 519; [2010] HLR 28, 24 February 2010
 
Payment of a retention of 30 per cent of a purchase price was not a deposit within the meaning of Housing Act 2004
Mr Francis entered into a sale and leaseback contract relating to his home with UK Housing Alliance. He was paid 70 per cent of the sale price on completion and would receive the balance of 30 per cent after ten years on the giving up of possession. The contract provided that UK Housing Alliance might retain 30 per cent of the purchase price if it terminated the tenancy.
The Court of Appeal determined that this provision was not an unfair term within the meaning of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 SI No 2083 para 5. It also held that the payment of the final 30 per cent to Mr Francis was not a deposit within the meaning of Housing Act 2004. The references in that Act to ‘paid’, ‘received’, ‘repay’ and ‘transfer of property’ were ‘inapt … to describe a situation in which a tenant pays nothing but is the person to whom money is paid’. [para 9]
See now Consumer Rights Act 2015 Part 2.
High Court
 
Draycott and Draycott v Hannells Letting Limited
[2010] EWHC 217 (QB); [2011] 1 WLR 1606; [2010] 3 All ER 411; [2010] L&TR 12; [2010] HLR 27, 12 February 2010
 
A claim under section 214(3) may be brought against a letting agent who is holding the deposit
On 28 February 2008, Derby Build Ltd (‘the actual landlords’) granted the Draycotts an assured shorthold tenancy for 12 months. Hannells were the letting agents for the actual landlords. The agreement provided that the tenants were under an obligation to pay a deposit of £2,700 to Hannells, which was to hold it as stakeholders as security for the tenants’ performance of their obligations under the agreement. The deposit of £2,700 was credited to Hannells’ account on 4 March 2008. This was a deposit which was required to be protected under Housing Act 2004. It was registered and lodged with the Deposit Protection Service (DPS) on 19 May 2008. Its terms and conditions provided: ‘The landlord or letting agent is responsible for ensuring that deposits are submitted for protection within 14 calendar days of the date of receipt by the landlord.’ The tenants were informed of the payment to DPS on 21 May 2008. The tenants claimed that there was a failure to comply with the initial requirements (section 213) and brought proceedings under section 214(4) for three times the amount of the deposit. Hannells argued that:
a section 214 claim could only be brought against the actual landlord; and
no order could be made under section 214(4) where the tenant commenced a claim at a time when the deposit was in fact protected.
HHJ Lea rejected both arguments. Hannells appealed.
Tugendhat J held that HHJ Lea’s interpretation of the meaning of ‘landlord’ in section 214(4) was ‘clearly correct’. The words of section 212(9) were clear and unambiguous. There was no occasion to look at Hansard or to any other extraneous material to interpret section 214. The words in section 214(3)(a), ‘the person who appears to the court to be holding the deposit’, were not otiose. They limited the scope of any possible order under section 214(3)(a) to the person holding the deposit. They prevented such an order being made against any other person who would come within the statutory definition of the landlord – for example, a letting agent which, at the time of the making of the court order, was not holding the deposit. No such limitation would be appropriate in section 214(4). The penalty should be imposed on the person who was responsible for the failure to comply with section 213. In this case that was Hannells, not the actual landlord.
R (Tummond) v Reading County Court
[2014] EWHC 1039, 10 April 2014
 
A section 21 notice that was served before a deposit was protected was valid because it had been protected within 30 days and therefore complied with Housing Act 2004 s213
On 18 December 2012, Mr Tummond was granted a six-month fixed-term assured shorthold tenancy by Ms Pitcher, the landlord. He paid a deposit of £1,390 on the signing of the tenancy agreement. On the same day, Ms Pitcher served a Housing 1988 s21 notice, entitling her to issue possession proceedings at the end of the fixed term. The tenancy agreement stated that the deposit would be protected by an authorised scheme but this was not done until 2 January 2013. After expiry of the fixed term, Ms Pitcher issued possession proceedings relying on the section 21 notice. Mr Tummond defended the proceedings, arguing that the notice had no effect as it had been given before the deposit had been protected (Housing 2004 s215(1)(a)). District Judge Devlin made a possession order. Mr Tummond sought permission to appeal, but HHJ Oliver refused permission. Mr Tummond then sought judicial review.
Hamblen J granted permission but dismissed that claim. The court will only entertain an application to judicially review the decision of a circuit judge to refuse permission to appeal in ‘very rare cases’, where there is an excess of jurisdiction, or the denial of the right to a fair hearing (paras 18 and 19) This was not such a case. In any event, the judge had not made an error of law. Section 215 is a sanction for non-compliance. In the present case, there had been compliance by the landlord as the deposit had been protected with an authorised scheme in within 30 days of it being received and in accordance with the tenancy agreement.
Note: If the tenancy had been granted after 1 October 2015 the notice would have been invalid because section 21 notices cannot be served within the first four months of the tenancy.
Suurpere v Nice
[2011] EWHC 2003 (QB); [2012] L&TR 11, 27 July 2011
 
The landlord’s obligation to provide the prescribed information is of equal importance to the duty to safeguard the tenant’s deposit
Mr and Mrs Nice granted Ms Suurpere an assured shorthold tenancy for a fixed term of 6 months, at a monthly rent of £300. Ms Suurpere paid a deposit of £500, but Mr and Mrs Nice did not in fact transfer the deposit from their bank account to the Deposit Protection Service until 20 July 2009. They informed Ms Suurpere of this transfer by a letter of the same date. After serving notices which failed to comply with Housing Act 1988 s21, Mr and Mrs Nice issued summary proceedings for possession in Guildford County Court. On 10 August 2009, Ms Suurpere issued proceedings against Mr and Mrs Nice claiming the return of her deposit and a sum of three times the amount of the deposit (Housing Act 2004 ss213–214). She left the property on 14 August 2009, allegedly as a result of unlawful harassment by Mr and Mrs Nice. She did not return. At trial, HHJ Reid QC dismissed her claim relating to the deposit, finding that, since the deposit had in fact been lodged under the Deposit Protection Scheme on 20 July, before the commencement of her proceedings on 10 August, the penal sanctions in section 214(4) did not apply. Ms Suurpere appealed, contending that Mr and Mrs Nice were in breach of section 213(5) and (6)(a), in that they failed to provide the information required by subsection (5) in the prescribed form.
Cox J allowed her appeal. She said:
Whilst the primary focus in the cases involving these statutory provisions has so far been on the deposit, it is clear that a landlord’s obligations … are two-fold. Parliament regards the landlord’s obligation to provide the prescribed information as being of equal importance to his duty to safeguard the tenant’s deposit. Judges who have to determine the extent of a landlord’s compliance with these provisions will always need to consider whether the prescribed information has been supplied to the tenant, in addition to the question of protection of the deposit. The list of particulars to be provided is detailed and specific. The requirement for landlords to provide such detailed information, together with the sanction for non-compliance, demonstrate the importance attached to the giving of particulars, certified as accurate by the landlord, which will enable tenants to understand how the scheme works and how they may seek the return of their deposit. … [It] will make no difference to the landlord’s statutory obligation to provide the prescribed information if, by the date of the hearing, the tenant’s deposit has been repaid. [paras 41, 43]
The obligation is that of the landlord personally. Provision of information to a tenant by the Deposit Protection Service does not amount to compliance by the landlord personally with the section 213(5) and (6)(a) obligation. In this case, Mr and Mrs Nice did not address the obligation to give Ms Suurpere the prescribed information, despite the fact that she had pleaded this breach specifically in her Particulars of Claim.
County courts
 
Chalmiston Properties Limited v Boudia
Barnet County Court, 27 October 2015
Section 21 notice invalid where served before deposit had been deposited into tenant’s bank account
The defendant was an assured shorthold tenant. The landlord served a Housing Act (HA) 1988 s21 notice on 12 February 2015. The landlord sent a request for release of the deposit to the Deposit Protection Service (DPS) on 10 February 2015. Documentation from the DPS stated that the deposit would be released within two working days. In response, the DPS confirmed to the Landlord that the deposit was paid by direct credit on 12 February 2015. The deposit was not deposited into the tenant’s bank account until 16 February 2015. The tenant argued that Housing Act 2004 s215(2) applied and so the notice was defective.
District Judge Marin stated that the legislation was clear and that the deposit had to be returned. As it was not returned until after service of the notice was invalid. The claim for possession was dismissed.
Ireland v Norton
Brighton County Council, 17 May 2012
 
A single joint tenant was entitled to bring a claim under Housing Act 2004
Mr Ireland let the flat of which he was a housing association tenant to Mr Norton and another jointly. A deposit of £800 was paid by Mr Norton’s stepfather. In a possession claim, Mr Norton counterclaimed for the return of the deposit and for an order that he be paid a sum equal to three times the amount of the deposit. The Friday before the trial, Localism Act 2011 s184 came into force so that the court had a discretion whether or not to order payment of between one and three times the amount of the deposit. Transitional provisions gave landlords of current tenancies 30 days to comply. If they did not, the provision remained mandatory. HHJ Simpkiss adjourned the counterclaim to give Mr Ireland the opportunity to comply. He did not do so.
At the resumed hearing, it was noted that the other joint tenant had left the flat before the proceedings began. He had not joined in the counterclaim and contact with him had been lost. It was suggested that Gladehurst Properties Ltd v Hashemi [2011] EWCA Civ 604 was authority for the proposition that ‘where there is more than one tenant, the claim must be advanced by them all jointly and cannot be brought by one of the joint tenants unilaterally’.
However, after being referred to CPR 19.3 which provides: ‘Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise’, HHJ Simpkiss made an order that the joint tenant was not required to be a party for the purposes of the deposit counterclaim and ordered Mr Ireland to pay Mr Norton three times the deposit.
Yeomans v Newell
County Court at Canterbury, 25 May 2016
A landlord, by authorising the return of the deposit, had returned the deposit to the tenant on the date that the cheque had been received rather than cashed
The landlord granted an assured tenancy in 2011. A deposit of £300 was taken but not protected with the Deposit Protection Service (DPS) until November 2015. On 22 December 2015, the landlord authorised DPS to return the deposit. On 23 December 2015, a Housing Act 1988 s21 notice was served. However, the tenant did not actually receive the deposit money via DPS until 19 February 2016. The tenant defended the subsequent possession claim on the basis that the deposit had not been returned in full when the section 21 notice was served.
The court accepted the analogy of the return of a deposit by cheque even when the cheque had not been cashed. The tenant ‘had the ability’ to obtain the deposit money once it had been authorised for full repayment. The court held that the deposit had been ‘returned in full’ on 22 December 2015 because it was ‘available to the tenant’ from that date, prior to service of the section 21 notice.
Amak Property Investments (London) Ltd v Sonny
The County Court at Central London, 15 September 2016
The provision of the prescribed information was a requirement of MyDeposits tenancy deposit scheme; the failure to provide it within 30 days meant that a section 21 notice could not be served unless the deposit was returned to the tenant
The claimant landlord sought possession under the accelerated procedure. Ms Sonny filed a defence relying on the MyDeposits scheme rules (7th edition, Clause C1.5) which specified that service of the prescribed information constituted an ‘initial requirement’ of the scheme for the purposes of Housing Act 2004 s213(4). The landlord had failed to serve the prescribed information within 30 days. A possession order was made without the judge considering the defence. Ms Sonny applied to set aside the possession order but her application was dismissed as a deputy district judge felt that the defence had no reasonable prospect of success. Ms Sonny appealed.
Recorder Klein allowed the appeal, finding that the application to set aside should have been allowed. In view of the scheme rules, service of the prescribed information was an initial requirement and the failure to comply with it within 30 days meant that section 215(1A) applied and the section 21 notice could only be served if section 215(2A) (the return of deposit) was met. The landlord needed to return the deposit (with agreed deductions) or have a claim in relation to it settled, before a valid section 21 could be served.
CHAPTER M
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