Dean Gibbs was a secure tenant. He died in August 2009. Some time during the next month, Mr Gibbs’s brother, Richard Lloyd, moved into the flat without the knowledge or consent of those responsible for Mr Gibbs’s estate or the council. Mr Lloyd was already a council tenant of another property, but an order for possession had been made against him for non-payment of rent. In November 2009, Mr Lloyd visited the council’s neighbourhood offices, informed a housing officer that he was living in Mr Gibbs’s flat, and sought to raise a claim for housing benefit. He was told that he would remain liable for the rent on the other property until he served a notice to determine his tenancy, but he was warned that if he did so, and then was not allowed to take a tenancy of the flat, he would be likely to be held to be intentionally homeless. In the subsequent possession claim, Mr Lloyd served a defence which effectively accepted that he was a trespasser in the flat, but contended that he should be allowed to remain on the ground that evicting him would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his home under Article 8.

 

 

Lindblom J made a possession order and granted injunctions in respect of the unlawful occupation of land around St Paul’s Cathedral ([2012] EWHC 34 (QB); March 2012 Legal Action 22). The occupiers sought permission to appeal, arguing that the orders represented a disproportionate interference with their rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the convention.

 

In 2009, the council accepted that Mr Miller, a 30-year-old man with a long history of persistent criminal offending, was homeless and in priority need and that he had not become homeless intentionally. He was granted a non-secure tenancy under Housing Act 1985. In 2011, other tenants complained about the behaviour of another man living in the flat. In April 2011, while Mr Miller was serving a prison sentence, the council served a notice to quit. In May 2011, a housing officer met Mr Miller’s probation officer and a representative from the Drug Intervention Programme and agreed to give him another chance. The conditions for his release on licence were tightly drawn so as to require him to live at the flat alone. However, the flat became a ‘running sore of criminal behaviour which … so upset some of the neighbours that they have requested anonymity in respect of their complaints for fear of reprisals [and] made their lives intolerable’ (para 15). The council claimed possession, relying on the April 2011 notice to quit. Mr Miller served a defence denying that he had committed any breaches of the tenancy agreement. He also raised an Article 8 defence based on his vulnerability as an ex-offender and drug addict. Recorder Wood dismissed the claim for possession. He was satisfied that service of the notice to quit was a reasonable and proportionate exercise of the council’s powers of estate management having due regard to its duty under the Housing Act 1985, but that ‘the correct legal interpretation of the events that happened … [was] that, the notice [to quit was] revoked [and] the tenancy was reinstated in its original terms’ (para 28).

 

See Housing Law Casebook 4th edition, L1.5.

 

In January 2003, Mr Davies became the resident caretaker of a school. He was granted a service occupancy of a bungalow where he and his family lived. Hertfordshire owned the bungalow but was not a housing authority. In June 2015, Mr Davies was dismissed for gross misconduct. His licence to occupy the bungalow ended. He and his family (his wife and four children now aged 19, 17, 15 and 11) had no private law right to remain but continued to live there as trespassers. Hertfordshire served a notice to quit and began a county court possession claim. One of Mr Davies’s defences was that the service of the notice to quit was unlawful ‘in a public law sense’ because Hertfordshire did not have regard to the best interests of the children and the need to safeguard and promote their welfare. The claim was transferred to the High Court. Laing J held that the council’s failure to comply with its statutory duties under Children Act 2004 s11 and Equality Act 2010 s149 could not provide a defence to its claim for possession. Mr Davies appealed on the section 11 point.

If Hertfordshire had considered the best interests of the children by reference to section 11 before serving the notice to quit, the outcome would inevitably have been the same.

Mr Holley was 34 years old and had anxiety, panic attacks and depression. He had lived in a three-bedroom house, that was the subject of possession proceedings, for his whole life. He had originally lived with his grandmother, Mrs Hudson, who had been a secure tenant of the house until her death in March 2009. Her husband, Mr Hudson, then became a secure tenant by succession. He died in May 2012. Mr Holley therefore had no right of statutory succession (Housing Act 1985 ss87 and 88). At the date of the possession claim Mr Holley lived at the property with his brother. There was evidence that the house was suitable for a family of six. Mr Holley defended the claim on the grounds that (i) his eviction was a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his home because he had lived in the property all his life and had mental health difficulties; and (ii) in deciding not to afford him an extra-statutory second succession, Hillingdon had without justification discriminated against him upon the grounds of his age. The judge rejected both those defences as not even seriously arguable and made a possession order.

 

Mr Jones was a canal boat owner who lived on his boat, which was called ‘The Mrs T’. The trust terminated his continuous navigation licence and brought proceedings for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that it was entitled to remove the boat from the waterway and to prevent its return. HHJ Denyer QC struck out a defence based on Human Rights Act 1998 Sch 1 Article 8 (right to respect for a home). He concluded that the trust could not be expected to investigate or deal with Mr Jones’s Article 8 rights, as the burden imposed would be too great. McGowan J dismissed an appeal against that order ([2015] EWHC 534 (QB); June 2015 Legal Action 42).

 

Mrs Baxter was a secure tenant. Her son, Mr Shearer, lived with her. In April 2005, he married and his wife came to live in the house with her young daughter. In May 2005, Mrs Baxter died and Mr Shearer succeeded to her tenancy. Mrs Shearer then had a baby. In January 2010, Mrs Shearer left the property due to Mr Shearer’s violence. She and the children went to live at another house where she was given an assured shorthold tenancy. In February 2011, Mr Shearer committed suicide. Mrs Shearer and her children moved back into Mr Shearer’s house. She told a council officer that she would like to continue living in the property as a tenant following her husband’s death. She was informed that that would not be possible and that she should complete an application form seeking other council accommodation. Council officers decided to require her to leave, rather than make a direct let of the house to her. The council served a notice to quit on the Public Trustee and the personal representatives of Mr Shearer, and began a possession claim. Mrs Shearer defended the claim, relying to some extent on Article 8 ECHR, but principally on a public law defence that the council’s decision to bring possession proceedings was flawed, because it had not given any, or any proper, consideration to the possibility of making a direct let under its allocations policy. Recorder Maxwell QC dismissed the possession claim.

Ms Mohamoud applied to Kensington and Chelsea RLBC for assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. She was provided with a non-secure tenancy of a flat in Wandsworth pending inquiries into her homelessness. The authority subsequently notified her that she had a priority need, by her young son, but was not owed the main homelessness duty because she had become intentionally homeless from accommodation in Bristol. At the same time, in an accompanying letter, the authority informed Ms Mohamoud that she could remain in her accommodation for a further six weeks and provided her with advice on how she could go about finding accommodation in the private sector. This accompanying letter, also advised Ms Mohamoud that she could approach Wandsworth’s Children’s Services for assistance. Ms Mohamoud’s request to review the decision that she was intentionally homeless out of time was refused. Ms Mohamoud did not leave her accommodation and, after the period of six weeks had elapsed, the authority served her with a notice to quit and around two months after the expiry of the notice to quit brought a claim for possession. Ms Mohamoud defended the claim on a number of grounds, which included a claim that her eviction would infringe her Article 8 rights and a public law challenge based on an allegation that the authority had failed to discharge its duty under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 because the authority had failed to carry out an assessment so as to identify the best interests of her child and had therefore not treated her child’s interests as a primary consideration. In the intervening period, the authority referred Ms Mohamoud’s case to Wandsworth’s Children’s Services and carried out its own Children Act 1989 assessment. Eventually at a trial, Ms Mohamoud’s defence was dismissed, but the deputy district judge gave her permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

 

Mr Malik owned land near Heathrow airport. He ran a taxi business and had previously used the land for parking and storing cars. In March 2010, the defendants went on to Mr Malik’s land and established their homes there. In July 2010, Mr Malik issued proceedings against them, contending that they were squatters and that he was entitled to a possession order forthwith. The occupiers defended the claim on the basis that their eviction would not be proportionate and would infringe Article 8. HHJ Walden-Smith held that Article 8 applied as between private parties, but that, on the facts, it was proportionate to make a possession order. The defendants appealed.

 

The defendants took possession of Parliament Square Gardens in London to establish a ‘Democracy Village’ peace camp. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 vested title to the gardens in the Queen, but gave management and control to the Greater London Authority, acting through the mayor. The mayor sought a possession order. The defendants argued that the mayor could not maintain a possession claim in the absence of a right to possession or, alternatively, that a possession order would infringe their rights to assemble and protest. Griffith Williams J made a possession order and granted injunctions ordering the occupants to dismantle structures which they had erected.

 

Tower Hamlets LBC granted Ms Donoghue a weekly non-secure tenancy, acting under Housing Act 1985 Sch 1 para 4, pending a decision as to whether she was intentionally homeless. The property was later transferred to Poplar HARCA, which was created by the council to administer some of its former housing stock. Ms Donoghue became an assured shorthold tenant. The council decided that Ms Donoghue was intentionally homeless and Poplar commenced proceedings for possession, having served notice under Housing Act 1988 s21(4). Before a district judge Ms Donoghue argued that section 21 was incompatible with her rights under Article 8 ECHR. The district judge declined to adjourn the hearing in order to allow Ms Donoghue to adduce evidence on the issue of incompatibility. He dismissed her arguments in relation to the ECHR. She appealed directly to the Court of Appeal under CPR 52.14.

 

 

Ms Sharp lived in a flat which her mother rented from Brent. In February 2000, following her mother’s death, Ms Sharp applied to succeed as the tenant under the provisions of Housing Act 1985. Brent rejected that application, contending that Ms Sharp had lied about her entitlement to become a tenant by succession. Ms Sharp did not accept that she had deceived Brent, but did accept Brent’s entitlement to find that she did not meet the necessary criteria. Accordingly, a possession order was made by consent. Ms Sharp then applied for housing as a homeless person. Brent made an offer of suitable accommodation which Ms Sharp rejected, claiming that the flat where she had lived with her mother was suitable accommodation, and that the property offered was unsuitable because it required her to move. Brent rejected that contention and upheld that decision on a Housing Act 1996 s202 review. HHJ Latham allowed Ms Sharp’s section 204 appeal, finding that the decision letter was irrational and that it confused the statutory scheme for succession of tenancies under Housing Act 1985 with Housing Act 1996 Parts 6 and 7. He also found that the eviction of Ms Sharp from her mother’s flat breached her rights under Article 8 ECHR. He remitted the matter for a further section 202 review.

 

Mrs Begum was accepted for the full housing duty (s193). The council provided her with a non-secure tenancy of a council flat (Housing Act 1985 Sch 1 para 4). In January 2002 it made her an offer of a secure tenancy of a different flat under Housing Act 1996 Part 6 and, at the same time, gave notice to quit the non-secure tenancy. Mrs Begum refused the offer. The council considered that it had discharged its duty and in August 2002 began a claim for possession of the flat. Mrs Begum defended the claim on the basis that the council had not fulfilled its homelessness duty as it had not complied with a requirement, in the version of section 193(7) then in force, to serve a notice containing certain information on her within 21 days of the refusal of the offer. After the Court of Appeal hearing, but before judgment, Mrs Begum applied for judicial review of the decision to bring the possession proceedings.

 

In 1967, Thurrock granted a weekly joint tenancy to George and Violet West. They were Aaron West’s grandparents. In 2007, Aaron West, his son and his partner moved in to live with his grandparents. George West died in 2008. The tenancy automatically vested in Violet West as successor under the provisions of the Housing Act 1985 ss87 and 89(2). She died in 2010. As she was a successor, section 87 precluded any further right of succession. Accordingly, the weekly tenancy vested in Violet’s estate. It was terminated in October 2011 by notice to quit served on the Public Trustee. In November 2011, the council issued a claim for possession on the ground that Aaron West had never been a tenant or subtenant and had no right to statutory succession. He defended the claim, arguing that, since he, his partner and his son had lived in the property and paid rent for four years, an order for possession would be disproportionate and so an infringement of his right to respect for his home under Article 8. The case was assigned to the multi-track. District Judge Hodges dismissed the claim. Thurrock appealed.

 

Mrs Flynn was one of many Travellers that lived on a caravan site at Dale Farm. She had lived at the site since 2003. While the land was privately owned, the occupiers did not have permission to use it for the siting of a caravan. In 2003, she was served, along with occupiers, with a notice under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requiring her to remove her caravan from the site. She did not appeal against this notice. Instead, she, along with other occupiers, made two applications for planning permission to allow her, and others, to site caravans at Dale Farm. These applications were refused and the refusals were upheld on appeal. Subsequent to those failed appeals, in December 2007 Basildon sought to enforce their earlier notices requiring the removal of the caravans under Town and Country Planning Act 1990. This decision was the subject of a judicial review and the decision to undertake enforcement action was upheld in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered and decided that the removal of Mrs Flynn, and other occupiers from Dale Farm, did not amount to a breach of Article 8. Basildon resolved finally to carry out the eviction of occupiers from Dale Farm on 1 September 2011. Mrs Flynn sought to challenge that decision on the basis that before she could be evicted the procedural requirements of Article 8 required that a court assess whether her eviction would be proportionate.

 

The claimants owned various plots of open land along a road. They wanted to allow Igas Energy plc to carry out exploratory drilling to discover whether there was natural gas under the land. The defendants were protestors who were opposed to the drilling. The claimants sought possession. The defendants resisted the claim, arguing that it would be a violation of their rights under Articles 8, 10 and 11 if a possession order were made.

 

A secure tenant of a local authority fled the country, abandoning his children in the property. His partner, from whom he was separated, moved into the premises to care for the children.

Mr Macleod was granted a tenancy by the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC), but became Peabody’s tenant when it purchased the property, and a number of others, with funds acquired from a bond issue. The terms of the transfer of the reversion restricted Peabody from letting the property to anyone other than key workers, at no more than 80 per cent of the current market rent. Mr Macleod notified Peabody that he wished to exchange his tenancy with the tenant of a property in Edinburgh. Peabody refused to approve the exchange. Mr Macleod sought a judicial review of that decision and argued that Peabody was amenable to judicial review as a public body.

 

Michael O’Brien and his sister Winifred were travellers. For many years, they lived in separate bricks and mortar houses in Cardiff. In 2013, they moved to Bristol with her son Patrick and were allowed to station their caravan for three months on a transit site provided by Bristol CC. They applied for a permanent pitch but were unsuccessful. The council offered “bricks and mortar” accommodation, but that was refused. However, Mr O’Brien and his sister were allowed to remain on the transit site for a further period, owing to his poor health. They then left the transit site and parked their caravan on council land under a motorway bridge. The council issued a possession claim. Mr O’Brien and his sister sought judicial review of the decision to issue the possession claim arguing that the council had failed to take into account their welfare needs and that eviction would be a violation of Article 8.

Mr Plant was 72 years old. He lived in a motorhome on land owned by Somerset as a trespasser. He suffered from arthritis, hearing loss, hyperacusis (sensitivity to sound), glaucoma, chronic fatigue syndrome, multiple food allergies and heightened sensitivity to smells. He also had Asperger’s syndrome resulting in ‘a triad of impairment’: impairment of social function, social interaction, and flexibility of thought. He experienced sensory overload if exposed to too much noise or too much smell, or both. Psychiatric and other professionals recognised that there was a serious risk (ie more likely than not) of suicide if he was not accommodated suitably (ie in a quiet and undisturbed home environment where he could keep his dogs and engineering workshop). The threat of suicide was not due to mental health issues and was not susceptible to treatment.

Any differential treatment or discrimination of tenants of fully mutual housing co-operatives was not the consequence of any ‘other status’ within the meaning of Article 14. Further, it did not automatically or necessarily follow that the defendants’ treatment was less favourable, in the round, than that of secure or assured tenants. Any difference in treatment, if not eliminated, was much attenuated. In any event, the distinction and any difference of treatment accorded by statute to tenancies entered into by fully mutual housing co-operatives and other forms of tenancy was not irrational or manifestly inappropriate. Further, Southward were not exercising functions of a public nature for the purposes of Human Rights Act 1998 s6(3)(b) and so was not a public body. Hildyard J also rejected the argument that a defence to the possession claim based on Articles 8 and 14 could be maintained even though Southward was not a public body acting as such. Finally, reading down Housing Act 1985 or Housing Act 1988 in accordance with Human Rights Act 1998 s3 so as to treat the agreement as a secure or assured tenancy would subvert the will of Parliament. Nor was there any justification for the making of a declaration of incompatibility.

In May 2005, Defence Estates, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence, granted Squadron Leader Nicholas a licence of a house. Mrs Nicholas, his then wife, moved into the house with him. Some time before April 2008, the marriage broke down and Squadron Leader Nicholas moved out. On 22 May 2008, Defence Estates gave notice requiring Mrs Nicholas to vacate the property by 24 August 2008. Later, Defence Estates sent her a questionnaire about her personal circumstances in order to conduct what they described as a ‘Proportionality Exercise’. Mrs Nicholas did not reply to that questionnaire. The claimant then began possession proceedings against her. She argued that the fact that Crown licensees have no security of tenure amounted to unlawful discrimination as a result of Article 8 in combination with Article 14 and that the Ministry of Defence is acting unlawfully in seeking possession. Burton J made a possession order ([2013] EWHC 2945 (Ch), October 2013 Legal Action 32). Mrs Nicholas appealed.

 

New Age Travellers occupied land in Hethfelton Wood which was owned by the claimant but managed by the Forestry Commission. Some of them had children who attended local schools. The claimant sought possession against a number of named defendants and persons unknown of the wood which they were occupying and other sites. The defendants accepted that they were trespassers. Some had camped previously at Moreton Plantation, less than five miles from Hethfelton. The only defence advanced related to the Human Rights Act 1998. Recorder Michael Norman made forthwith possession orders, but refused to extend the possession orders to other sites or grant an injunction in relation to other land. The claimant appealed the latter part of his order. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and made a possession order in respect of land which was not occupied ([2008] EWCA Civ 903; [2009] 1 WLR 828; October 2008 Legal Action 35). The occupiers appealed to the Supreme Court.

 

Ms Tugwell and her friends set up a protest camp in woodland. The claimant, a developer, had an option to purchase part of the land for residential development. The option agreement gave the claimant a licence permitting access to carry out surveys. The claimant brought possession proceedings under RSC Order 113 (summary proceedings for possession) and obtained a possession order.

Note: cf Mayor of London v Hall (Mayor of London v Hall and others)

 

The Court of Appeal held that a licensee had power to bring possession proceedings against trespassers under RSC Order 113. It was not necessary for an applicant in such proceedings to have a title or estate in land or even a right to exclusive possession.

 

In proceedings brought against trespassers under RSC Order 113, a judge made an immediate possession order. The respondents appealed, seeking a stay for four weeks.

 

Mr Moore owned several vessels (including one which he occupied as his home) moored long term in the tidal part of the Grand Union Canal, adjacent to his riparian land. The British Waterways Board (BWB) gave notice that the vessels were moored ‘without lawful authority’ within the meaning of the British Waterways Act 1983 and requiring that he remove them. Hildyard J found that Mr Moore had not demonstrated any right under the general law to moor vessels permanently, either in association with his riparian ownership or possession, or otherwise and that therefore they were present ‘without lawful authority’.

 

 

Where an injunction has been granted under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s187B in respect of the occupation of land in breach of planning control by persons unknown, a person moving on to the land who learns of the injunction is in breach of it and in contempt of court. However, the court must balance environmental and other public interest considerations against the defendant’s Article 8 ECHR rights to a private and family life. Accordingly, courts should grant such injunctions only where it was impossible for the applicant to identify the persons concerned or likely to be concerned. In those circumstances, the proper course for anyone finding out that occupation is in breach of such an injunction is to apply for the injunction to be varied or set aside. Then the court can take into consideration both the public interest issues and the personal circumstances of the applicant. See South Bucks DC v Porter (South Bucks DC v Porter) and Mid-Bedfordshire DC v Brown [2004] EWCA Civ 1709; [2005] 1 WLR 1460.

 

A county court judge made an order for possession under CCR Order 26 (predecessor of CCR Order 24) which was not to be executed for 14 days.

 

Mr Reedy, a manager of a public house, was sacked and possession proceedings were instituted.

 

 

The claimants owned and operated several waste incineration sites. Environmental protestors had in the past invaded those sites with the result that plants were shut down, causing considerable loss to the claimants and danger to the protestors and others. Information from the internet indicated that 14 July 2003, a ‘Global Day of Action Against Incinerators’ was the next date designated for such activity. The claimants sought an injunction restraining any people from entering or remaining on any of the sites without their consent.

 

Carnwath J held that a local authority seeking to obtain possession against trespassers under CCR Order 24 had no obligation to carry out investigations under Children Act 1989 Part 3 or Housing Act 1996 Part 7, as recommended in Department of the Environment Circular 18/94. Landowners have a right to obtain possession against trespassers. The circular was an indication of good practice but did not impose any legally binding obligation on local authorities seeking to evict trespassers. It was, however, a relevant matter which is material for the purpose of deciding whether the exercise of that power is Wednesbury unreasonable.

 

The Maloneys were a family of Travellers. A number of them suffered from severe health problems. Mrs Maloney had cancer. Mr Maloney’s 85-year-old mother was sick, infirm and suffered from arthritis. She also had heart and circulation problems. One of the children was deaf. They were evicted from the council’s authorised site because of disturbances. They moved on to industrial land owned by the authority which was already the subject of county court proceedings to evict other Travellers who were unauthorised occupiers on that site. The authority’s Travellers liaison officer made enquires and found that none of the Travellers already living there was in apparent need of help. He visited again after the Maloneys had moved on to the land and decided that there was nothing to cause him to change his decision to proceed with the eviction.

 

The applicants were Travellers camped on land owned by the respondent. The respondent’s solicitors wrote to the district council for the area stating that the respondent wanted to remove the applicants from the land and asking it to make enquiries to ascertain whether there were any people on the land to whom the council might owe obligations under any of the enactments listed in the Department of the Environment Circular 18/94, Gypsy Sites Policy and Unauthorised Camping. The applicants sought judicial review of the respondent’s decision to evict.

 

The claimants were Irish Travellers. They camped in two unauthorised places in Crawley. Crawley BC began possession proceedings on the basis that the Travellers were trespassers and the council had an absolute legal entitlement to the land. It was not under any statutory duty to supply caravan sites and in any event had no such sites, either temporary or permanent. The Travellers sought judicial review of the decision to bring possession proceedings.

 

The claimant owned a block of flats which it intended to demolish. It secured possession on one flat in July 2000, but on 9 July 2001 learnt that squatters had entered the premises. It applied for an interim possession order (IPO) under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and CCR Order 24 Part II. One squatter attended court and relied on an affidavit in which she stated that a housing officer had told her that, as a squatter, she could reside in the flat until the court ordered otherwise. HHJ Cotran refused to make an IPO on the ground that (1) the claimant had given consent to the squatters being in the premises (and so the condition in CCR Order 49 r9(c) was not met) and (2), in any event, he had a discretion whether or not to make an IPO. The squatters should be allowed to leave without the threat of being arrested. He made a forthwith possession order under CCR Order 24 Part I.

 

The local authorities made directions under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s77 for the removal of Travellers who had been unlawfully camped on land. In the first applications for judicial review under the Act, the applicants sought to quash the directions, on the basis that the respondents had failed to carry out enquiries before making them.

 

The council made a decision to issue a notice under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s77(1), requiring Travellers to leave land, without first making enquiries about their circumstances. A magistrate adjourned the subsequent proceedings so that enquiries could be made.

 

Travellers moved on to a rubbish tip site owned by a borough council in July 2001 and camped there without permission. After a number of meetings involving the county council’s Gypsy and Traveller Liaison Service, the police and the Travellers, a representative of the borough council informed the Travellers that they were being treated as trespassers and that they were required to leave two days later, on 31 August 2001. At the same time, the police gave notice under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s61 (power to remove trespassers) to leave on 31 August 2001.

 

The respondent lived for several years in a caravan on land which was part of the highway. The council, relying on Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s77, asked him to leave. When he did not do so, they sought an order in the magistrates’ court under section 78. A stipendiary magistrate (now District Judge (Magistrates Court)) declined to make an order, stating that, on the facts, it was unreasonable to do so and that he had a discretion not to make an order.

 

Mr Ward, a Traveller, challenged the local authority’s decision to issue removal directions against him and his family under Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s77(1), requiring them to vacate a plot in a caravan site owned and operated for occupation by Travellers. He claimed that the local authority had failed to make any or sufficient enquiries into his and his family’s situation and needs, that the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable, that section 77 violated ECHR Articles 6 and 7 because it reversed the burden of proof, and that an implementation of the decision would amount to a disproportionate infringement of his human rights when compared to the benefit to the local authority.

 

 

A landowner claimed that Mr Farrar was a trespasser in a flat. In December 2012, it began an action seeking a possession order. It did not include a claim for mesne profits. In February 2014, HHJ Dight made a possession order. Mr Farrar vacated the flat in March 2014. In August 2014, the landowner began a new claim seeking mesne profits. HHJ Walden-Smith awarded mesne profits. Mr Farrar appealed, submitting that by virtue of principles relating to the doctrine of res judicata the landowners had lost the right to claim mesne profits. He relied on the speech of Lord Sumption JSC in Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2013] UKSC 46; [2014] AC 160 at [17].

 

The defendants lived in RAF married quarters. The open market rental value of the premises was £472 per month, but, as a serviceman, Mr Ashman was charged a ‘concessionary licence fee’ of £95 per month. After he became estranged from his wife, the Ministry of Defence obtained an order for possession. In the county court it was held that the Ministry of Defence was estopped from claiming the full market rental value for the period after termination.

 

An army sergeant and his wife occupied service quarters for which they paid a licence fee of £104 per month. Possession proceedings were brought against the wife after her husband had left home. The trial judge disregarded evidence given by the Ministry of Defence about the market rent and instead calculated the rate of mesne profits by reference to the previous concessionary rent. There was no evidence before the court about what the defendant would have paid had she been rehoused by the local authority.

 

Mr Shi was employed by the defendant company. He was also given a bare licence to occupy premises. Mr Shi sued for arrears of salary. The company then terminated his licence and counterclaimed in the court proceedings for mesne profits. There was a joint experts’ report from a valuer which stated that the rental value of the property for the appropriate period was £114,345. HHJ Ryland dismissed the claim for arrears of salary and the counterclaim for mesne profits, holding that there were exceptional circumstances. Both parties appealed.

 

Where a person remains as a trespasser on residential property, the owner is entitled to damages for trespass without bringing evidence that it could or would have let the property to someone else if the trespasser had not been there. The measure of damages is the value to the trespasser of the use of the property. In most cases, that is the ordinary letting value of the property.

 

It is settled law that forfeiture of a head lease also terminates the interests of any underlessees. In such circumstances, a landlord is entitled to mesne profits by way of damages for being kept out of the property, whether or not the actual lessee is physically present on the premises. A claim for mesne profits against a former head lessee is not undermined by the occupation of parts of a property by underlessees. Following Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet (Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet), the Court of Appeal assessed the mesne profits as the letting value of the premises, without the landlord having to prove that the property would have been let if there had been vacant possession.

Mr Akerman-Livingstone had severe prolonged duress stress disorder (‘PDSD’). In 2010, he was homeless. Mendip District Council (‘MDC’) agreed that they owed him the main housing duty to secure that housing was available (Housing Act 1996 s193(2)). The council ensured that he was given temporary accommodation with what later became Aster Communities Ltd, a housing association. Aster held the property under a lease with a third party. Subsequently, MDC wanted Mr Akerman-Livingstone to choose another property as his permanent accommodation. He could not cope with what was involved. Eventually, MDC informed him that they had discharged their duty and required Aster to take proceedings to evict Mr Akerman-Livingstone from the temporary accommodation. Mr Akerman-Livingstone defended the claim, arguing that the bringing of the proceedings amounted to discrimination against him by reason of his disability in breach of Equality Act 2010 s15. HHJ Denyer held that, in the light of Aster’s aims in getting back possession of the property to comply with MDC’s direction, Mr Akerman-Livingstone did not have a seriously arguable case that Aster had breached the Equality Act. He held that there was no need for a trial and that Aster should have an immediate possession order. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Akerman-Livingstone’s appeals and he appealed to the Supreme Court. In the intervening period Aster’s lease of the property came to an end and the landowner informed Aster that he was in arrears with his mortgagee and required vacant possession of the property so that it could be sold.