Islington Council, as freehold owner, let certain properties to Alamo, a housing association. Alamo sublet them. The lease between the council and Alamo was for a term of two years but permitted the council to serve notice to determine Alamo’s interest ‘except for the purpose of enabling eviction if required by the council’. The council served notices to quit on Alamo, which then served notices to quit on the subtenants. After the expiry of the council’s notices to quit, Alamo took possession proceedings. The subtenants argued that, when proceedings were commenced, Alamo did not have a sufficient interest in the properties to entitle it to possession as against the subtenants. A district judge gave judgment for Alamo on that preliminary issue. The subtenants appealed.

 

A managing agent does not have locus standi to obtain a possession order of a property against a tenant. Only a landlord can obtain such an order. The Court of Appeal allowed the tenant’s appeal against a possession order.

 

The defendant was admitted to Finchley Memorial Hospital as an in-patient in December 2002. By March 2006 he had three medical problems, namely, severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (which was stable and did not significantly impair his activities of daily living), hernias (which were extremely large and caused discomfort) and a left foot drop (which was helped by a foot splint). However, he required no treatment by trained medical staff and was generally capable of taking care of himself. The hospital sought to facilitate the orderly discharge of the patient to an alternative setting where there would be an appropriate social package of care which would meet his needs. Three residential homes indicated that they were willing to take him. However, the patient refused to leave hospital. The Primary Care Trust took possession proceedings in the High Court. The defendant did not acknowledge the proceedings, produce any evidence or argument against the claimant’s case, or appear in court.

 

Mr Phoenix and a number of other people squatted in premises that had been vacated by Enfield’s Children’s Services Unit. Enfield made an application for possession in Barnet County Court. Its application contained a number of procedural failings and irregularities. Also, although counsel and legal representatives were at court on the hearing day, they failed to appreciate that their case had been called on, and it was apparently dealt with by a deputy district judge in their absence. He took the various procedural points that arose and for those reasons he dismissed the application.

 

In 1980, Polarpark became the owner of a property pursuant to a tax saving scheme under which its shares were held by the trustees of a discretionary settlement. The main beneficiaries were Mr and Mrs Allason’s children. Mr and Mrs Allason used the property as licensees as one of their homes with the oral permission of the trustees until they divorced in 1996. Mrs Allason then left the property, but Mr Allason remained there. The trustees gave notice to quit and obtained a possession order in the High Court (CPR 55.3(2), 55.5 and 55.8). Subsequently, Briggs J made an order by which he permitted the claimants to issue a writ of possession. Mr Allason then made an application under CPR 3.1(7) for that part of the order to be revoked on the ground that it had been made without jurisdiction. He relied on County Courts Act 1984 s21 which gives the county court jurisdiction in relation to claims for possession, Protection from Eviction Act 1977 s3 which makes it unlawful in such circumstances to enforce a right to recover possession otherwise than by proceedings in court and Protection of Eviction Act s9(1) which provides that for the purposes of Protection of Eviction Part 1, ‘the court’ means the county court.

 

The claimant brought a possession claim based on arrears of rent. The statement of truth in the claim form was not signed personally by anyone on behalf of the claimant. It bore the rubber stamp of a signature of a Mr Tatlow, an employee in Birmingham’s legal services department. He had no personal knowledge of the case. He never saw the papers. He never checked the facts nor read any of the source documents. He merely authorised more junior employees, who applied the rubber stamp to the paper. District Judge O’Regan found that the statement of truth had not been signed within the meaning of CPR 22.1 and adjourned the claim to enable the defect to be remedied. Birmingham appealed.

Birmingham granted an introductory tenancy to Ms Crosby for a trial period of one year. Rent arrears accrued and Birmingham served a Housing Act 1996 s128 notice. Ms Crosby did not request a review. Nevertheless, the council carried out a review and wrote to Ms Crosby stating that it would go to court to evict her. It issued a claim form through the Possession Claims Online (PCOL) procedure (CPR 55.10A). A district judge made a possession order and a warrant was issued. Ms Crosby applied to suspend the warrant. Although the court had no power to do so, it adjourned that application and in the meantime Ms Crosby appealed the possession order.

 

In September 1999, the council issued possession proceedings against Ms Bates, relying on 53 allegations of nuisance to neighbours. She sought legal aid but her application was initially refused owing to insufficient information. She made a further application. At an interlocutory hearing in February 2000, she applied for an adjournment because her legal aid entitlement had not been determined. That application was refused and the substantive hearing date set. That hearing date was, however, moved forward, with the result that Ms Bates was given three days to read witness statements produced by the council and to prepare for the hearing. She disclosed witness statements from herself and her brother, which questioned the credibility of the council’s witnesses. At the substantive hearing, she represented herself and a possession order was made. She appealed to a circuit judge, but that appeal was dismissed because the judge concluded that Ms Bates did not have a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the claim.

 

Mr Lloyd was the respondent in an appeal against an order dismissing his landlord’s claim for possession. At the hearing he told the Court of Appeal that he had been refused legal aid because of his means. He had, however, appealed against that decision and, the then, Legal Services Commission was in the process of reconsidering its decision.

 

The council sought possession on the basis that the tenant was not occupying his home in London NW6 as his only or principal home (as required in order to preserve secure status by Housing Act 1985 s81 – see section C3) but was in fact living in London NW10. At the hearing, it produced and was given leave to rely on, documentary evidence not previously disclosed to the tenant. The judge granted possession.

 

 

A recorder adjourned possession proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal to the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick v Sterling HA (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association).

 

 

The claimants were a mutual housing association registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965. After problems caused by Mr O’Sullivan, it obtained an injunction. It then began a possession claim against him. The trial was adjourned on three occasions (once because no judge was available, once at Mr O’Sullivan’s request, and once by consent). On the day before the fourth hearing, Mr O’Sullivan received a letter from his solicitors stating that they had no alternative but to apply for the discharge of his public funding certificate. It was clear that they believed that he had no defence. Mr O’Sullivan applied for an adjournment. HHJ Wakefield refused the application. Mr O’Sullivan sought permission to appeal.

 

The landlord brought possession proceedings, claiming that the tenant had abandoned the premises and that he had assigned or sublet in breach of the terms of the tenancy agreement and without the landlord’s consent. At the hearing the original tenant gave evidence that the agent of the previous landlord had agreed to the transfer of the tenancy to the current occupants. Counsel for the landlord applied for an adjournment to call the previous landlord’s agent. The application was refused and the claim for possession dismissed.

 

A landlord brought possession proceedings against a tenant, who was Spanish and spoke little English, alleging arrears of £912. Although the tenant consulted solicitors, he was not represented at the hearing because his solicitor was ill. The tenant’s request for an adjournment was refused and a possession order made. The tenant appealed, submitting that the assistant recorder should have granted an adjournment and did not consider reasonableness.

 

 

A lessor brought county court proceedings seeking forfeiture of a lease granted for a term of 25 years, on the ground of rent arrears. At the initial hearing on 2 October 1975, the lessee admitted the arrears. The lessee did not defend the proceedings or seek an adjournment. However, the judge, of his own motion and without the plaintiffs’ consent, adjourned the proceedings generally because the defendant had an expectancy of receiving money under a trust. The plaintiffs restored the hearing on 4 December 1975 and the judge, again of his own motion and without the plaintiffs’ consent, adjourned to 6 February 1976. The landlords sought an order of mandamus requiring the judge to hear and determine the case.

 

Hackney LBC, ‘a very busy housing authority’, brought at least 3,000 possession claims each year in Clerkenwell and Shoreditch County Court. In late 1998, as a cost saving exercise, it began developing the practice of housing officers presenting cases to the court without the use of solicitors. Between 1999 and 2004, the council entered into housing management contracts. The effect of these contracts was effectively to pass the housing management role, and in particular key responsibility for arrears recovery, to ‘housing partner organisations’. In 2006, Hackney’s housing directorate became Hackney Homes Ltd, an arm’s length management organisation (ALMO), which was a ‘not for profit’ organisation wholly owned by Hackney LBC. This change offered opportunities for increased central government funding which were not available to local government. The result was to transfer the housing management role from the council to Hackney Homes, including all matters relating to possession claims and the responsibility for presenting cases in court. Hackney sought permission under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 for employees of Hackney Homes, their agents, or employees of subcontractors to appear in rent arrears possession cases without instructing lawyers.

Mr Stephenson was the introductory tenant of a flat. He suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The council received complaints about noise coming from his flat, including loud music and television, arguments and the moving of furniture at night. The council decided to terminate his tenancy and seek possession. It served notice of seeking possession. Mr Stephenson requested a review of that decision, but the decision was upheld on review. The council issued a claim for possession. At the first hearing, the council accepted that Mr Stephenson was disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, but said that there were no substantial grounds for defending the claim and that the council’s action in terminating the tenancy was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Mr Stephenson was not present, but his solicitor explained to Deputy District Judge O’Connell that he had only been able to see Mr Stephenson on the Friday before the hearing when he was able to take initial instructions, but set out, in general terms, the basis of a defence under the Equality Act 2010. He asked for a short adjournment in order to file and serve a fully pleaded defence. That request was refused and the judge made a possession order, stating that there was no more than a tenuous possibility of a defence with ‘nothing concrete’ but ‘plenty from the council about the difficulties that they had had’. Mr Stephenson ‘had had ample time to seek advice from solicitors and put in some form of defence but he thought [the solicitor] had no real argument to advance’ [para 9]. An appeal to a circuit judge was dismissed.

 

HHJ Lamb QC concluded that a claim for possession of a garage ‘was not genuinely disputed on substantial grounds’ (CPR 55.8(2)) (para 2). He rejected the contents of the defendant’s witness statement that there was a sub-tenancy and made a possession order. Peter Smith J allowed the defendant’s appeal. He stated:

 

A council tenant died. His daughter claimed that she had succeeded to his tenancy. The council decided that she did not meet the succession conditions under Housing Act 1985 s87. It refused to grant her a discretionary tenancy and sought possession. Her defence asserted that: (a) she did meet the 12-months qualifying condition for succession; (b) if not, the decision to bring the claim was vitiated by a public law irregularity in refusing the discretionary tenancy; and (c) eviction would infringe her rights under Article 8. A judge decided that none of the issues gave rise to an arguable defence (see Civil Procedure Rules r55.8) and made a possession order at a summary hearing.

Ms Cutler was a secure tenant. Barnet claimed possession, alleging that Ms Cutler had ceased to occupy the property as her only or principal home. She did not comply with a disclosure order. Barnet applied for summary judgment and an order to strike out her defence. A judge made an order that unless she provided the required disclosure within 14 days she would be debarred from defending the claim. Subsequently, the judge found that her disclosure had been incomplete. Ms Cutler made an oral application for relief from sanctions, but the judge found that any such application had to be filed formally under CPR Pt 23, which had not been done, and so he had no power to consider it and no discretion to grant relief. Ms Cutler was debarred from defending the claim. Ms Cutler appealed.

 

An assured shorthold tenancy included a clause that the tenant would ‘pay and compensate the landlords fully for any costs, expense, loss or damage incurred or suffered by the landlords as a consequence of any breach of the agreements on the part of the tenant in this agreement’. After the tenant had fallen into arrears with the rent, the landlords obtained a possession order. Relying on the terms of the tenancy agreement, they sought costs on an indemnity basis. However, they were only awarded costs to be taxed on Scale 1. They appealed.

 

After default on mortgage payments, receivers were appointed by the lenders. However, the borrowers were able to raise sufficient sums to meet their liabilities. The lenders, in accordance with the terms of the mortgage, submitted mortgage accounts and receivers’ costs to the borrowers. These included costs, charges and expenses involved in litigation. The total amount challenged was £1.8 million.

 

Hackney claimed possession of a flat against a tenant and her son. The tenant defended and counterclaimed, saying that she had exercised her right to buy. Her son made a number of counterclaims, including the right to buy, and alleging nuisance, breach of repairing covenants, trespass and human rights violations. The trial judge dismissed Hackney’s possession claim and upheld the counterclaim in respect of the tenant’s right to buy. He dismissed all of the son’s counterclaims except the one relating to the right to buy. He ordered Hackney to pay the costs of both defendants. Hackney appealed.

The landlord issued a claim for rent arrears, which at trial were £16,000, and damages for physical damage to the property in the sum of £20,000. The amount of arrears was not disputed. The tenant counterclaimed for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and disrepair and argued that his damages should be set-off against the arrears. The trial judge dismissed the landlord’s claim for damages and awarded the tenant £7,000 which he set-off against the arrears of £16,000. In awarding costs, the judge held that the counterclaim had really been a defence and that the landlord had therefore succeeded as the amount it had been awarded had exceeded the set-off. Accordingly, he ordered that the tenant pay the landlord’s costs. The tenant appealed.

 

The borrower’s husband unsuccessfully sought to set aside an order in favour of the bank for sale of the premises. The Court of Appeal held that the mortgagee bank could not add the costs of that action to the security but confirmed that, as a general rule, a lender is entitled ‘to reimburse himself out of the mortgaged property for all costs, charges and expenses reasonably and properly incurred in enforcing or preserving his security’. That right occurs as a result of the relationship between lender and borrower and not out of the proceedings. Any dispute is usually determined on the taking of an account between the lender and the borrower although, if the borrower is involved in the proceedings, it may be convenient for any questions arising to be determined by the judge who tried the proceedings.

 

Mr Philips was the owner of two residential premises both of which were the subject of mortgages in favour of Barclays Bank. He subsequently granted a further two second charges in favour of the Co-operative Bank (‘the Bank’) after it lent a company, of which Mr Philips was a director, a large sum of money. It was a term of the loan and the second charges that the amounts were due on demand. It was also a further term of the charge that ‘all costs charges and expenses incurred by the Bank and all other monies paid by the Bank in connection with the charge or the charged property were recoverable from Mr Phillips and/or the company as a debt and were to be charged on the charged property.’

In 1974, Mr and Mrs Lawal were granted a joint tenancy of a four bedroom property by the Holloway Tenant Co-operative. The tenancy became a secure tenancy under Housing Act 1985. In 2005, the freehold was sold to Circle 33 Housing Trust. Mr and Mrs Lawal’s six children were raised in the property. From 1981, Mr Lawal spent most of his time in Nigeria. Whenever he returned to the UK Mr Lawal lived at the property. Mrs Lawal died in 2002. In the years following her death, Mr Lawal spent even less time in the UK. One daughter spent significant amounts of time at the property, while living elsewhere, and then returned to live at the property in 2010. She and Mr Lawal were the only persons living there. After serving a notice to quit, Circle 33 began a possession claim, arguing, inter alia, that Mr Lawal was not occupying the property as his ‘only or principal home’ for the purposes of Housing Act 1985 ss79(1) and 81 and so had lost his status as a secure tenant. HHJ May concluded that the property was not Mr Lawal’s only or principal home and had not been for some considerable time. She made a possession order. In closing submissions Mr Lawal and his daughter for the first time advanced a defence under Article 8, but HHJ May did not make any reference to that defence in her judgment. Mr Lawal and his daughter sought permission to appeal. That was refused, partly on the basis that they could raise their defence when applying to suspend the warrant. Subsequently, they then applied to set aside the possession order under CPR 3.1(7). HHJ John Mitchell dismissed that application because there had been no change in circumstance. He also refused to stay or suspend the warrant on Article 8 grounds. Mr Lawal and his daughter appealed against HHJ Mitchell’s order and applied to re-open the appeal from HHJ May’s order pursuant to CPR 52.17.

 

Ms Richardson was a secure tenant. Substantial rent arrears accrued. Ealing obtained a possession order and then made eight applications for execution of the order. On each occasion Ms Richardson successfully applied to suspend. The rent arrears again increased and a further warrant of execution was obtained. Ms Richardson again applied for suspension of the warrant. District Judge Allen suspended on terms that Ms Richardson paid £588 by the end of the day and £10 per week to reduce her rent arrears. Ealing appealed and sought to have a rehearing on the ground that the court file, giving details of all the previous proceedings, had not been before the district judge. HHJ Oppenheimer reheard the matter and set aside the suspension. Ms Richardson appealed, contending that the judge had been wrong to order a rehearing.

 

Mrs Grunshaw lived in Lincolnshire. She owned a house in Gwynedd. The council considered that the house was unfit and on 18 July 1998 served a demolition order. Mrs Grunshaw had 21 days after that date to appeal to the county court. She attempted to file notice of appeal in Skegness County Court, but was told by the court manager that under CCR Order 4 r9 she had to file her notice of appeal in Caernarfon County Court. She faxed a notice of appeal to Caernarfon County Court on Saturday 8 August and posted a copy, even though she knew that it would not arrive in time.

 

The landlord respondent made an application to strike out the tenant’s appeal against a possession order based on the availability of suitable alternative accommodation, on the ground that it was frivolous and vexatious. Refusing the landlord’s application, Purchas LJ stated:

 

Ms Hartless was an assured tenant of rented premises where she lived with her four children aged six to 14. Mr Harris was the children’s father and, although separated from Ms Hartless, was deeply involved in his children’s lives. The claimants brought possession proceedings after a history of neighbour disputes. On 3 December 2004 HHJ Thompson QC made an order for possession with the effect that Ms Hartless and the four children had to leave their home by 4 pm on 17 December. He also made an ASBO excluding Ms Hartless and Mr Harris from properties owned by the claimant and a wide area of their home town. The defendants appealed and sought a stay.

 

At an earlier hearing the Court of Appeal allowed the landlord’s appeal against a suspended possession order and substituted a 28-day outright order (Taj v Ali (No 1) (Taj v Ali (No 1))). The day before the order was due to take effect the tenant applied to the Court of Appeal, seeking to suspend the possession order and produced new evidence that he could pay money regularly towards the arrears. Although not formally deciding the issue, Robert Walker LJ considered that the Court of Appeal probably has a residual power to review an unexecuted order for possession which it has made, just as a lower court would under Rent Act 1977 s100(2). However, he did not wish to encourage repeated applications to stave off the execution of possession orders and indicated that the power should ‘be exercised only if there is some unexpected and significant change in circumstances of which the Court of Appeal has proper evidence … It may be that the rule as to the admission of new evidence in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, no longer strictly applies. But, under the new procedure also, the court will always be reluctant to look at new and late evidence and inquire as to why it was not produced before’.

 

A judge made an order for possession, based on the availability of suitable alternative accommodation. The tenant applied for permission to appeal against that decision and for permission to adduce fresh evidence which allegedly demonstrated that there were anti-social behaviour problems in the area where the alternative accommodation was situated. The local authority attended the permission proceedings but did not participate in them. The judge made no determination on the permission to appeal application but ordered the case to be remitted for reconsideration in the light of the fresh evidence. The local authority appealed.

In August 1999, Mr and Mrs Brill leased a house they owned to an American company, Lockson Holdings Inc. That company employed Mr Vucinic. The company fell into financial difficulties and it stopped paying the rent. It also stopped paying Mr Vucinic, who, as a result, was unemployed and dependent on state benefits. Mr and Mrs Brill agreed to allow Mr and Mrs Vucinic and their family to continue living in the premises. In September 2001, Mr and Mrs Brill granted a new lease of the premises to Mr and Mrs Vucinic. The rent was £3,687 per calendar month. However, Mr and Mrs Brill only ever received payments of the housing benefit that the local authority paid on behalf of Mr and Mrs Vucinic. The amount of that housing benefit was very considerably less than the contractual rent. As a result, Mr and Mrs Brill issued a claim for possession and for arrears of rent, relying on Housing Act 1988 Sch 2 Grounds 8, 10 and 11. In October 2015, Deputy District Judge Wootton made an order for possession and ordered Mr and Mrs Vucinic to pay £167,114 arrears of rent. Mr and Mrs Vucinic gave notice of appeal against that decision. Their application for permission was heard and refused by HHJ Hand QC in December 2015. He also refused an application for a stay of the warrant of possession. He concluded that, even on the most optimistic appraisal of Mr Vucinic’s submissions, he could have no defence based on an estoppel because any estoppel was ended by the issuing of the notice claiming possession. Nothing that Mr Vucinic had put before the court could amount to a defence, because Mr Vucinic had not demonstrated anything other than a very long suspension of the Brills’ rights under the tenancy agreement. They were always entitled to end that suspension. In January 2016, Mr and Mrs Vucinic applied for judicial review seeking to challenge HHJ Hand QC’s decision.