Mr Abdulrahman was the assured tenant of a flat. The flat shared a communal front door and letterbox with the flat next door. In 2014, he put superglue in the lock of the communal door which prevented access to the property. In June 2015, Circle 33 obtained an injunction restraining him from blocking the landlords, their employees or contractors’ access to the property during reasonable hours to carry out repairs. The order provided that service could be effected by inserting it through the letter box of his flat. That was done. Contractors attended the property to undertake maintenance works. While repairing a fuse, the electricity was cut off for a short period of time. Mr Abdulrahman brandished his walking stick at the contractors and shouted abuse at them. The contractors were forced to leave the premises without finishing the work. The following day, having requested access the week before, one of Circle 33’s employees attended the flat. He found the unopened letter containing the injunction on the floor outside. Mr Abdulrahman did not answer the door. Circle 33 applied to commit him for contempt. HHJ Baucher found that he had breached the injunction twice and committed him to prison for 28 days, suspended for two years. Mr Abdulrahman appealed arguing that the injunction had been inadequately served.

 

Mr Lee’s mother and sister were tenants of Accent, a registered social landlord. After his sister had accused him of assaulting her, Accent obtained an injunction with a power of arrest under Housing Act 1996 s153A preventing Mr Lee from visiting either his mother or his sister or from entering the locality where they lived. Later, his sister contacted him and invited him to stay at her home. A few days later, Mr Lee was arrested for breach of the injunction, and then released. His mother then invited him to stay at her home. The next day, he was arrested for breach of the injunction. A circuit judge imposed a 28-day custodial sentence, suspended until the expiry of the injunction. Mr Lee’s mother again invited him to stay at her home. Again, he was arrested. There was evidence that his behaviour had affected other tenants of the housing association. A district judge activated the suspended sentence of 28 days, and imposed a further immediate consecutive custodial sentence of 28 days. The defendant appealed claiming that the contempt had been waived.

 

Mr Shafi lived in Birmingham. The local authority contended that he was a member of a gang that was affiliated to the Burger Bar gang (one of two rival gangs operating in Birmingham). It was alleged that Mr Shafi’s gang were responsible for public order offences, robberies and thefts. The authority sought an injunction under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 preventing Mr Shafi from entering parts of Birmingham and associating with other gang members. It was not disputed that the authority could have alternatively applied for an ASBO in the magistrates’ court. A judge in the county court held that he lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunction and dismissed the claim.

 

Secure tenants exercised the right to buy. They covenanted not to use the properties for any purpose ‘other than that of a private dwelling-house’ and that ‘no … business of any kind shall be permitted to be set up or carried on …’ The defendants bought the properties, subject to the same restrictive covenants. They placed ‘to let’ signs in the windows and let them for short-term holiday lets for one or two weeks at a time. The council sought injunctions to prevent breaches of covenant.

 

Mr James lived in Birmingham. In Birmingham, there were two rival gangs with a number of affiliates: the Johnson Crew and the Burger Bar gang. The Johnson Crew were based in Newtown and the Burger Bar gang were based in Harmondsworth. Mr James was a high ranking member of a gang affiliated to the Johnson Crew. One summer he, along with around 30 other gang members, attended a carnival in Harmondsworth. All were wearing blue (the colours of the Johnson Crew). At first instance, the judge found that the visit was deliberately provocative towards the Burger Bar gang and that they ‘were ready and looking to fight’.

 

The defendant’s grandparents lived next to a couple who owned their own home. The defendant abused one of the grandparents’ neighbours, threatened to stab him, damage his car and burn down his house. He also made threats against the neighbour’s young son and repeatedly kicked their front fence and gate. A district judge granted an injunction under Housing Act 1996 s152 (now repealed) forbidding the defendant, ‘from (1) engaging or threatening to engage in conduct causing, or likely to cause, a nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to any person residing in, visiting, or otherwise engaging in a lawful activity in the locality of [the neighbours’ house]; (2) harassing any such person; (3) using abusive or insulting or threatening behaviour against any such person; (4) using or threatening violence against any such person; (5) entering, or attempting to enter [the neighbour’s house] and/or the front and/or the rear gardens thereof.’

 

From May 2001 Ms Hartless rented a house from the claimant housing association on an assured tenancy. She lived there with her four children, who in October 2004 were aged between six and 14. She was estranged from Mr Harris, the children’s father, but he visited frequently. On 29 October 2004, without any prior notice or other warning, Moat obtained without notice anti-social behaviour injunctions (ASBIs) under Housing Act 1996 ss153A–E (as amended) from District Judge Ackner. The orders provided that Ms Hartless should leave the house by 6.00 pm that day, should not enter part of the village where she lived and should exercise proper and reasonable parental control over the children to prevent them from behaving in an anti-social manner. A power of arrest (Housing Act 1996 s153C) was attached. Similar orders were made against Mr Harris and two of Ms Hartless’s neighbours. (The neighbours subsequently vacated their house and took no part in the proceedings.) Most of the evidence before the district judge related to the neighbours. There was some evidence that Ms Hartless and Mr Harris had made threats against other people living on the estate. There was also evidence that two of the children had been involved in some incidents with the neighbours’ children. The claimant’s representatives, accompanied by police and a television cameraman, called at the house at about 9 pm that evening to serve the orders. The police declined to enforce the order and Ms Hartless obtained a stay from Stanley Burnton J at 1.30 am that night. HH Anthony Thompson QC (sitting as a deputy circuit judge) made ASBOs against both defendants on 3 December 2004. An outright possession order was also made. On 16 December 2004, Brooke LJ granted permission to appeal and a stay.

The appellant was one of seven men alleged by the police to belong to the Deepdale gang operating in Preston. The police sought a ‘gang injunction’ against the appellant under Policing and Crime Act 2009 s34. The evidence relied upon by the police, which was derived largely from police intelligence, alleged that the members of the gang were involved in the illegal drugs trade and the use of firearms and other weapons to control and intimidate gang rivals and others. The police further alleged that the appellant was involved in a violent robbery, an attack on a rival (leading to the appellant himself being ‘pistol whipped’ and having his arm broken) and an incident with one other ‘gang’ member involving a man seeking refuge from him in a convenience store.

 

The local authority claimed that dealing in drugs was going on publicly on a housing estate and the defendant was associating there with well known drug dealers, had himself been in possession of drugs and had been arrested in suspicion of dealing in drugs. Relying on Local Government Act 1972 s222, they obtained an interim injunction restraining him from entering the estate. It was their case that what the defendant had been doing and threatened to continue to do amounted to a public nuis-ance and that section 222 allowed them to issue civil proceedings ‘for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their area’. HHJ Hall struck out the action holding that the court had no jurisdiction.

 

The council issued a writ action for a permanent injunction and at the same time sought and obtained an ex parte interlocutory injunction which restrained one of its tenants from returning to his home. It acted on reports that the tenant had forced entry to a neighbour’s flat and made a racially motivated and violent assault with a knife. The tenant was subsequently arrested but the charges were dropped. The tenant’s application to discharge the injunction was allowed and an inquiry ordered into damages in respect of the undertaking the council had given in securing the order. The council appealed, contending that the council had acted properly on the information received so the undertaking ought not to be enforced; and/or any ‘damages’ suffered by the tenant were nominal because he had either been voluntarily staying away from the flat or had been on remand or in custody since the order was granted.

 

The defendants were secure tenants. It was a term of their tenancy that they should ‘not keep any animals of any kind on the premises’. Mr Lawrence suffered from multiple sclerosis and wanted the company of a dog. As a result, Mrs Lawrence’s mother left her dog at the flat. The plaintiff sought an injunction. HHJ James refused to grant an injunction because it was unlikely that it would be enforced by committal proceedings and the defendants did not have the means to pay a fine.

 

Mr Gill was an assured tenant. Swan Housing Association, his landlord, sought an anti-social behaviour injunction under Housing Act 1996 ss153A and 153D, claiming that he had done acts which were in breach of his tenancy and a nuisance to adjoining occupiers. Before doing so they did not consider whether Mr Gill’s behaviour arose because of his disability. District Judge Dudley made findings that Mr Gill had done the acts complained of, but refused the application for an injunction on grounds relating to his supposed disability under Equality Act 2010 ss6, 15 and 149 even though he had only advanced such grounds at the instigation and prompting of the judge. Swan appealed.

 

Mr Redpath was a secure tenant. In 2003, a neighbour reported him to the police for driving when under the influence of alcohol. He was arrested and imprisoned. On his release from prison, he pursued a campaign of harassment against the neighbour and his partner. It included threats towards them and damage to their property. As a result, in 2005 the council, Mr Redpath’s landlord, obtained a suspended possession order. He breached that order. In 2006, the suspension was lifted and he was evicted. At the same time, the court granted an ASBI prohibiting him from engaging in anti-social behaviour or entering the cul-de-sac where he used to live. He breached the ASBI and in 2007 he was committed to prison for eight months. The judge granted a second, similar ASBI. After his release, there were six further incidents and HHJ Wade granted a third ASBI, this time under Housing Act 1996 s153A. HHJ Wade was satisfied that, even though Mr Redpath had ceased to be a council tenant, there was a sufficient nexus between Mr Redpath, his conduct, his victims and the council for the conduct to be ‘housing-related’ within the meaning of section 153A, which provides that ‘“housing-related” means directly or indirectly relating to or affecting the housing management functions of a relevant landlord’. Mr Redpath appealed.

Birmingham claimed that, over a period of years, Mr Pardoe and other defendants ‘had repeatedly engaged in a particularly unpleasant form of anti-social behaviour by targeting elderly and vulnerable persons and charging them excessive sums for building works which were unnecessary and/or shoddy’. The council sought an injunction under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 s1. Some of the allegations related to matters occurring many years previously. The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act s21(7) states: ‘In deciding whether to grant an injunction … the court may take account of conduct occurring up to 6 months before the commencement day.’ Mr Pardoe contended that its effect was that the court was precluded from taking into account conduct prior to 23 September 2014. HHJ Worster rejected that contention, and held that section 21(7) does not limit the conduct which can be considered in deciding whether it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Mr Pardoe appealed.

He continued;

 

The lease of shop premises, which were adapted to a restaurant, contained a covenant that the defendant would not allow music to be played so as to cause a nuisance or annoyance to the occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring premises and that, if any reasonable complaints were received from occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring premises by the landlords, the defendant at the request of the plaintiffs would ‘forthwith discontinue’ the playing of music ‘until such time as effective soundproofing works to the premises … have been completed’. The defendant allowed music to be played in the restaurant and the plaintiffs received complaints. The music was not discontinued on the plaintiffs’ request and they sought interlocutory injunctions to enforce the covenant.

 

G was a schoolboy aged 14 who lived with his siblings and single mother in a property owned by the council. The council was seeking possession against his mother, a secure tenant, on the ground of rent arrears. The council and the police received numerous complaints about G’s behaviour. The council sought an injunction against him under Housing Act 1996 s152 (now repealed). HHJ Dedman granted an injunction prohibiting G from engaging in behaviour likely to cause a nuisance in the locality where he lived. He also granted a power of arrest and included in his order a penal notice warning that if G did not obey the order, he would be guilty of contempt and liable to be committed to prison. G accepted that the court had jurisdiction to make the injunction against him and that the power of arrest was properly attached, but appealed, contending that effectively the injunction was unenforceable and so ought not to have been granted.

 

Mr Thorley was the tenant of a flat in a block designed for elderly residents. The claimant housing association obtained an interim ASBI with a power of arrest, pending the trial of its claim against him for possession based on allegations of anti-social behaviour. There were two instances of breach of the injunction. The defendant was arrested but the committal application was adjourned and the defendant was released on bail. There were then two further breaches of the injunction. It was alleged that he was drunk, swore and shouted. The committal applications were tried with the possession claim. HHJ Hollis made a possession order and imposed sentences of immediate imprisonment for the breaches totalling four months.

 

The defendant undertook not to assault, threaten, harass or cause nuis-ance to anyone residing in or visiting a block of flats where his father lived. He admitted breach of that undertaking in that he had been loud and noisy, disturbing the neighbours’ sleep. The council also sought his committal for various other acts which were the subject of criminal proceedings at the time of the committal hearing. HHJ Bevington committed him to prison for nine months for the admitted breaches and adjourned the balance of the application to commit until after the criminal trial was over. The criminal proceedings were later withdrawn when the defendant and his father were reconciled shortly before the Crown Court trial. The defendant appealed against the length of the committal sentence and the council cross-appealed against the judge’s decision to adjourn the balance of its application to commit until after the criminal trial was over.

 

Mr Flatt was a secure tenant, aged 69. After various complaints of anti-social behaviour, he was arrested for assault after pouring petrol on a neighbour and threatening to set light to him. He received a community sentence. Birmingham obtained an anti-social behaviour injunction under Housing Act 1996 s153A, restraining him from committing acts of anti-social behaviour in the vicinity of his home. He breached that order by:

In 2012 Birmingham obtained an injunction preventing Mr Gill from harassing a former partner who was a secure tenant. She alleged that he breached the injunction between December 2015 and January 2016. He was arrested and charged with harassment and other public order offences. Birmingham applied to commit him for breach of the injunction in respect of those matters and other less serious complaints. He pleaded guilty in the magistrates’ court and was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment. In Birmingham’s committal application, he admitted the incidents to which had pleaded guilty but denied others. All the allegations were found proved. HHJ Wall sentenced him to 14 months and 23 days’ imprisonment. He appealed.

 

Ms Vijayatunga was the tenant of a first floor flat. Her tenancy agreement provided that she should not cause nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to other tenants. Hillingdon, her landlord, obtained an interim injunction to prevent her from going out on to the communal roof of the block to place food which had attracted birds and cats. She breached the injunction. Hillingdon made an application to commit her. After considering a number of witness statements, a judge found that she was in breach and ordered her to pay a fine and costs. She appealed, submitting that there had been a number of procedural defects, eg evidence at the committal hearing had been in the form of witness statements, not affidavits.

 

Islington Council granted Mr Doey a tenancy. After complaints of anti-social behaviour, the council obtained an interim injunction restraining him from causing nuisance to a neighbour. He breached that injunction. The court imposed a suspended sentence of 14 days’ imprisonment. Later, the court made a suspended possession order and an ASBI with a power of arrest. Mr Doey breached the ASBI by making noise, shouting, banging doors, arguing loudly with a girlfriend and threatening the neighbour. He was arrested and admitted the breach. When sentencing him, HHJ Cryan had regard to the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s Breach of an anti-social behaviour order: Definitive guideline (2008). He decided that Mr Doey’s behaviour fell towards the higher end of the middle category. He found that his conduct was so serious that a custodial sentence was required. He took 24 weeks as the starting point but, because of the defendant’s admissions, reduced it to 16 weeks, to which the earlier suspended sentence, which was activated, was added but was to be served concurrently. Mr Doey appealed.

 

The defendant was a lodger living with a secure tenant. There were allegations that the flat was used for prostitution and that many visitors used the flat for the consumption of illegal drugs. There was also an allegation of assault on a neighbour. The local authority obtained an injunction under Housing Act 1996 s152 (now repealed) excluding the defendant from the flat and from part of the estate. The order was to remain in force for twelve months, with a power of arrest for six months. Five months later a police officer attended another flat on the estate to execute a search warrant under Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The defendant was found in the flat and arrested as he was in breach of the injunction. He was brought before a judge the same day and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.

 

After allegations of aggressive and intimidating behaviour towards his landlord’s housing officers, an anti-social behaviour injunction, with an accompanying power of arrest, was made against the defendant. It required him to keep away from the street where his landlord’s houses were situated and prevented him from assaulting or abusing anyone. The order was obeyed for a period, but the defendant began frequenting the group of houses from which he was required to keep away. The defendant sent about 40 aggressive and unpleasant text messages to a woman and her boyfriend who lived in the street. Police officers found him at his partner’s house in the street. He displayed aggressive and threatening behaviour towards them and was arrested. After adjourning the case, the judge gave the defendant a clear and explicit warning that the injunction remained in force and that any further breaches would result in a substantial sentence. The defendant ignored that warning and, on that afternoon, abused the woman again, referring to her as a ‘slag’ and telling her he was ‘going to get her’. The defendant was sentenced to a total of nine months’ imprisonment for contempt. He appealed against the sentence, arguing that it was manifestly excessive.

 

The council took possession proceedings against a tenant, Mrs McCann, on the grounds of anti-social behaviour by her children. At the conclusion of his evidence one of the council’s witnesses – another tenant – was driven home by a housing officer. As he got out of the car, the defendant’s husband shouted at him, ‘I’ll fucking have you, you bastard.’ The council could have applied in the High Court to commit the husband for intimidation of a witness (RSC Order 52 now CPR Part 81) but instead applied in the county court for his committal under County Courts Act 1984 s118 which deals with ‘wilful insults’ to a witness.

 

The defendant was convicted of assault on a former partner and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. On his release he seriously assaulted his former partner and threatened her and her family. After he had kicked in their front door, in November 1998 the council obtained an injunction pursuant to Housing Act 1996 s152(3) (now repealed) restraining the defendant from anti-social behaviour, including violence and prohibiting him from entering certain geographical areas. There was a series of breaches of the injunction, including committal proceedings and imprisonment. On 12 March 1999 the police again found the defendant in the prohibited area being drunk and abusive. He was arrested and brought before a county court judge the same afternoon for three breaches of the injunction, all within the month after he had been released from prison for contempt. After a very short hearing HHJ MacMillan imposed a sentence of six weeks imprisonment suspended for 12 months. The council appealed, contending that if the history and evidence of the latest breaches had been fully considered an immediate custodial sentence would have been imposed.

 

The claimant landlord brought possession proceedings against the defendants. In the course of the proceedings the claimant obtained an interim injunction restraining the defendants from causing nuisance or annoyance or threatening residents on the estate where they lived. The injunction was to remain in force ‘until 24 June 2002’, the date of the trial. During the lunchtime adjournment on 24 July, the first defendant approached two of the claimant’s witnesses outside court, stared at them, and then said ‘I’m bad and I’m back’. The first defendant was arrested and brought before the court that afternoon. The judge told the first defendant’s solicitor that he intended to deal with the matter as an alleged contempt, as breach of the injunction, but would reserve cross-examination of the witnesses to the following afternoon to allow the first defendant’s solicitor time to prepare or instruct counsel. The judge found the contempt proved and sentenced the first defendant to six months’ imprisonment. The first defendant appealed, contending that (1) the judge had not followed the procedure laid down in CCR Order 29 r1 (now CPR Part 81) in that there was no notice of the breach and no 14-day period between service and the hearing of the matter; and (2) the first defendant was not in breach because the injunction had expired.

 

In September 2002, the claimant local authority obtained an injunction preventing the defendant, aged 19, from entering an area known as The Triangle. He breached the order. In December 2002, he was arrested and committed to prison for three months. He was released in January 2003, after serving half of the sentence. Further complaints were made that he had been riding a motorcycle irresponsibly, driving a vehicle dangerously, and selling cigarettes within The Triangle. The council applied to the county court for his committal. A notice in Form N78 requiring him to show cause why he should not be committed was served on the defendant’s mother on 2 April and on him personally on 3 April. The hearing was listed for 7 April, but that morning he was arrested for motoring offences and held at the police station. He telephoned his solicitor and told them he would be unable to attend the committal hearing. The court was informed and confirmed with the police station that he was detained. He was released without charge by 2.10 pm, but did not call his solicitor or ask the police for assistance to attend court. His case was called at 3.25 pm. No one was present on his behalf. The judge found that he had committed the breaches as alleged and ordered that he be detained for the maximum period of two years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed.

 

The defendant tenant had been ‘causing trouble’ on his housing estate since 1995. In August 1998 the council obtained an injunction protecting neighbours, other residents and its own staff from further anti-social behaviour. Within a short time the order was breached and in October 1998 the defendant was committed to prison for 42 days. On a further application to commit heard in July 1999 a neighbour gave evidence that the defendant had threatened him with violence, tried to punch him and used racist and other foul language. Another witness gave evidence that on the day before the hearing the defendant had threatened to kill him and had kicked and banged at his door and used foul and threatening language. HHJ MacDuff QC committed the defendant to prison for 12 months.

Gavin James was made subject to a ‘gang injunction’ (see James v Birmingham City Council), which he subsequently breached. He was committed to prison for contempt of court. Prior to his sentence, he had been detained in custody for one night before being brought before the court and then remanded in custody for seven days. HHJ McKenna, on sentencing Mr James to three months imprisonment, indicated that he intended the sentence to take into account the time he had spent on remand. However, his order did not reflect this. Mr James subsequently made representations to the Governor of HM Prison Birmingham that he should be released one week before his scheduled date for release. The Governor refused to do so on the basis that Criminal Justice Act 2003 s240ZA, ie the provision that deems time spent on remand to count towards a sentence, did not apply to a sentence arising from a committal for contempt of court. Subsequently, HHJ McKenna amended his order and Mr James was released, albeit later than if the order had been correctly drawn.

 

The defendant had a long-standing relationship with a vulnerable council tenant and frequently visited her home. The council received complaints about his behaviour and applied for an injunction. An interim anti-social behaviour injunction was made. The defendant breached that injunction by attending at the property and shouting abuse. He was committed to prison for 28 days, but the sentence was suspended. After that time lapsed, he again attended at the property and banged on the door. A further injunction was granted, which, among other things, prohibited him from entering the area. He again attended at the address and was committed to prison for eight weeks. Four months later he went to the address and banged on the windows. He was committed to prison for three months. Some months later, he breached the injunction by visiting the property again. He was committed to prison for 16 weeks, suspended on condition that he complied with the injunction. One month later he visited the property. Complaints were received that there were raised voices. The defendant was arrested. The judge imposed a sentence of nine months’ imprisonment, consecutive to the sixteen weeks suspended sentence which he activated.

 

The council obtained without notice injunctions under Housing Act 1996 s152 (now repealed) against a couple, who were tenants on a housing estate, and their son, following threatening and abusive behaviour towards neighbours. When housing officers accompanied by police officers sought to serve the orders, they were met with abuse and violence from the defendants. The defendants were arrested and the council applied to commit them for breach of the injunctions. At the hearing, they admitted that they had behaved in the manner alleged. HHJ Mitchell expressed concern about a number of matters, including whether housing officers could come within the protection of section 152, whether the breaches were deliberate, and whether the police intended to pursue criminal proceedings. He adjourned the applications to commit until such time as the defendants again breached the orders or criminal proceedings against them were determined. The council appealed.

 

In June 1997 the council obtained an injunction restraining the defendant tenant from causing nuisance or annoyance to, or threatening or otherwise intimidating, other residents in his close. For nine months the defendant complied but in April 1998 he began a personal vendetta against the new tenant of an adjoining flat whom he believed to be a paedophile. He engaged in a course of conduct which involved shouting abuse, ranting and raving, threats of violence and spreading rumours about the neighbour that he was a paedophile. It was described as ‘lynch mob behaviour’ although no actual violence was used. Recorder White committed him to prison for three months for contempt.

 

Mr Robson was a 59-year-old alcoholic. In June 2008, Wear Valley granted him an introductory tenancy of a flat in a block of sheltered accommodation for tenants who were vulnerable because of their age and mental health. Allegations were made that Mr Robson was involved in incidents of anti-social behaviour between July and September 2008. He was served with a notice of proceedings seeking possession of his flat. The council’s appeal committee dismissed his appeal against that decision. The council began a possession claim and, in October 2008, applied, without notice, for an ASBI under Housing Act 1996 s153D. An ASBI with a power of arrest was granted. It prohibited Mr Robson from engaging or threatening to engage in conduct causing nuisance or annoyance in the block of flats. He was also prohibited from entering a particular area of the block. Within a week, the council alleged that Mr Robson had breached the ASBI on five separate occasions by playing loud music, banging on residents’ doors, using foul language, behaving in a drunken and abusive manner, allowing other alcoholics to visit his flat and threatening to smash up the flat if he was evicted. The breaches were admitted or proved. The judge sentenced Mr Robson to six months’ imprisonment. He appealed against that decision. He argued that the judge had been wrong to consider hearsay evidence and that the sentence was excessive.

 

Ms Willoughby was a secure tenant. She suffered from mental health problems and was a recovering heroin addict and alcoholic. She was receiving support from drug and alcohol support services. Her neighbours complained that she and her boyfriend caused nuisance and annoyance by arguing, swearing, shouting and banging loudly inside the flat. Solihull obtained an interim injunction which prohibited Ms Willoughby from allowing her boyfriend into her flat or from causing a nuisance or annoyance to her neighbours. In September 2012, the council issued a committal application for breach of the interim injunction. Ms Willoughby admitted seven out of eight alleged breaches and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, suspended on terms that there was no further breach of the injunction. Solihull later obtained a final injunction in broadly the same terms as the interim injunction. Committal proceedings were issued in respect of further alleged breaches, a number of which were admitted. HHJ Pearce-Higgins QC found that the terms of the suspended sentence had been breached. He activated that sentence. He also sentenced Ms Willoughby to an additional ten months for the newly admitted breaches, to be served consecutively to the activated suspended sentence, making a total of 12 months. Ms Willoughby appealed.

 

On applications to commit for contempt for breach of a mandatory injunction, county courts cannot dispense with the need for service of the order retrospectively. However, there is nothing to prevent them from doing so where the purpose of the injunction is to restrain a party from doing something. In this case there was evidence that the defendant had been deliberately evading service.

 

The appellants were joint assured tenants of a flat owned by the landlord. They fell into arrears with their rent and received a notice purporting to terminate their tenancy on 5 January 1990. In mid December the tenants left the premises temporarily. The landlord changed the locks and re-let the premises. The tenants obtained an ex parte injunction requiring the landlord to readmit them. This was subsequently discharged because although, following American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, HL, the judge found that there was a serious issue to be tried and that damages would not be an adequate remedy, the fact that the premises had been re-let meant that the balance of convenience was that it was more appropriate to await trial than to continue the interlocutory injunction. The tenants appealed.

 

After a tenant had been evicted, she obtained an ex parte injunction that ‘the Defendant do permit the Plaintiff to re-enter the premises at 135, Tenby Drive and do have quiet enjoyment thereof until the hearing of this claim’. The landlord did not allow the tenant back into the premises and was sentenced to 14 days’ imprisonment for contempt. He appealed.

 

Landowners are prima facie entitled to injunctions preventing trespass to their land where title is not in issue, even where the acts complained of cause no harm. In such circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the balance of convenience (cf American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, HL).

 

Where an injunction has been breached, a person cannot be committed by the county court pursuant to a committal order unless a copy of the committal order has been served in accordance with the provisions of CCR Order 29 r1(5).

 

A committal order which fails to set out the breaches of an injunction which have been proved is defective and should be set aside.

 

Note: For other cases where committal orders have been set aside for procedural defects, see Clarke v Clarke [1990] 2 FLR 115, CA (order not in Form N29 and delay in serving it) and Temporal v Temporal [1990] 2 FLR 98, CA (no time specified for compliance with order). Although these were both matrimonial cases, the same principles apply in cases involving landlords and tenants.

 

A landlord evicted two tenants who were in arrears with their rent by changing the locks while they were away. He knew that what he had done was unlawful and a criminal offence. After they had been deprived of their accommodation for 30 days, he disregarded an injunction ordering him to readmit them.

 

In exceptional circumstances a court may commit a contemnor on an ex parte application if it is the only way to uphold the authority of the court or to protect the applicant. Here, the respondent was jailed for two years.

An order was made, in favour of the respondent authority, prohibiting the appellant from siting a mobile home on a piece of land on which the appellant lived, in a mobile home, with her partner and children. The appellant, in breach of the order, did not remove her mobile home. The respondent authority issued committal proceedings against her. The appellant obtained legal aid to contest the committal application. By the time of the final hearing the respondent authority no longer sought an order for her committal, because she was no longer living on the land, but instead sought a declaration against her that she had breached the order. The judge refused to grant the declaration on the ground that, since she had left the land, it would be of little use and dismissed the application and made no order as to costs. His reasons for doing so were that there had been a prima facie case against the appellant, she was legally aided and that continuing proceedings would waste public money. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.