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CHAPTER T
 
Long leases: ground rent, service and administration charges
Introduction
 
Residential long leases invariably contain provision for the payment of ground rent and service charges. A service charge is either a fixed or, more commonly, a variable amount in addition to rent payable for repairs, maintenance, improvements or insurance or the landlord’s costs of management. Whether a charge is payable depends upon whether it is recoverable under the lease and whether the landlord has complied with the statutory preconditions for its recovery (note, however, that fixed service charges are not regulated by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985).
An administration charge is an amount payable to a landlord by a tenant in addition to rent where either there is not a formula for its calculation or its calculation is not specified in the lease and arises from approvals, the provision of information or a tenant’s breach of covenant. As with service charges the recoverability of administration charges is regulated by statute.
Likewise the recovery of ground rent is also precluded in certain circumstances where a landlord has failed to satisfy the statutory conditions for its recovery.
Tenants may challenge whether service or administration charges are payable in the First-tier Tribunal. The Tribunal does not, however, have jurisdiction to determine whether ground rent is payable.
This chapter details cases concerning:
whether such charges are recoverable under the terms of the lease;
the statutory provisions for recovery;
jurisdiction and procedure in the First-tier Tribunal; and
cases that relate to the landlord’s ability to recover its costs of recovering service charges.
Recoverability of service charges under the lease
 
In addition to the cases set out below questions of whether works are within the landlord’s repairing covenant will also be of relevance and the cases set out at Covenants: repair or improvement? and Covenants: structure and exterior should be considered.
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
Arnold v Britton
[2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619; [2015] 2 WLR 1593; [2016] 1 All ER 1; [2015] HLR 31; [2015] 2 P&CR 14; [2015] L&TR 25; [2015] CILL 3689, 10 June 2015
 
A requirement to pay a proportion of a fixed amount was not a service charge within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18. The Supreme Court also gave guidance on the correct approach to construing service charge recovery clauses in leases
Lessees held long leases of chalets on a leisure park. There were 91 chalets held under 21 leases. Each lease contained a covenant by the lessee to pay an annual service charge, typically ‘a proportionate part’ of the cost of providing the services, expressed to be £90 in the first year, rising by 10 per cent each year thereafter. The landlord argued that the leases provided for a fixed service charge of £90 with a yearly increase of 10 per cent. The lessees argued that it meant that they had to pay a fair proportion of the cost of providing the services, up to a maximum of £90 in the first year, that maximum figure rising by 10 per cent each year thereafter. HHJ Jarman QC held that the lessees were obliged to pay a proportionate part of the expenses and outgoings incurred, but limited to the figures in the leases. Morgan J allowed the landlord’s appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the lessees’ further appeal.
The Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal. The covenants clearly referred to fixed sums increasing in a specified manner. They were not service charges within the meaning of section 18. It followed that the charges could not be challenged as being unreasonable in amount under Landlord and Tenant Act s19. Further, the interpretation of contractual provisions, including those relating to service charges, involved identifying what the parties had meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader. Except in very unusual cases, that meaning was most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Although the less clear the relevant words were, the more the court could properly depart from their natural meaning, it was not to embark on an exercise of searching for drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning. Commercial common sense was relevant only to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date on which the contract had been made. It was not the function of a court to relieve a party from the consequences of imprudence or poor advice. Lord Neuberger stated:[17] … First, the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances (eg in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101, paras 16-26) should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision.
[18]… Secondly, when it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, I accept that the less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning. That is simply the obverse of the sensible proposition that the clearer the natural meaning the more difficult it is to justify departing from it. However, that does not justify the court embarking on an exercise of searching for, let alone constructing, drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning. If there is a specific error in the drafting, it may often have no relevance to the issue of interpretation which the court has to resolve.
[19] … The third point I should mention is that commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made. …
[20] … Fourthly, while commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the court thinks that they should have agreed. Experience shows that it is by no means unknown for people to enter into arrangements which are ill-advised, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight, and it is not the function of a court when interpreting an agreement to relieve a party from the consequences of his imprudence or poor advice. Accordingly, when interpreting a contract a judge should avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party.
[21] … The fifth point concerns the facts known to the parties. When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time that the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties. Given that a contract is a bilateral, or synallagmatic, arrangement involving both parties, it cannot be right, when interpreting a contractual provision, to take into account a fact or circumstance known only to one of the parties. …
[23] … Seventhly, reference was made in argument to service charge clauses being construed “restrictively”. I am unconvinced by the notion that service charge clauses are to be subject to any special rule of interpretation. … The origin of the adverb was in a judgment of Rix LJ in McHale v Earl Cadogan [2010] HLR 412, para 17. What he was saying, quite correctly, was that the court should not ‘bring within the general words of a service charge clause anything which does not clearly belong there’.
Court of Appeal
 
Adelphi (Estates) Ltd v Christie
(1984) 269 EG 221, CA
 
‘Lessor’ in lease included anyone standing in lessor’s shoes
A long lease provided that lessors were entitled to recover as service charges 2.9 per cent of the amount spent by them. The question to be decided by the court was whether this included expenditure by both the head landlord and, after grant of a concurrent lease, the mesne landlord.
The Court of Appeal held that it did, and that the word ‘lessor’ included anyone standing in the lessor’s shoes.
Billson v Tristrem
[2000] L&TR 220, CA
 
Where lease poorly drafted function of court is to ascertain terms in accordance with intentions of parties; lease to be read as a whole
In a dispute about unpaid service charges, the Court of Appeal held that, although the lease was ‘unhappily drafted’, the function of the court was to ascertain the terms of the lease in accordance with the whole intentions of the parties evinced from the terms regardless of the use of inept words. The lease should be read as a whole.
Note, though Arnold v Britton (Arnold v Britton).
Blatherwick (Services) Ltd v King
[1991] Ch 218; [1991] 2 WLR 848; [1991] 2 All ER 874; (1991) 23 HLR 188; (1990) 62 P&CR 18; [1991] 2 EGLR 39, CA
 
Liability under lease continued when lease expired and lessee became statutory tenant
It was held that a covenant in a long lease requiring a lessee to pay service charges was a term of the tenancy ‘relating to’ the property within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 s10(1). Accordingly, when the lease expired and the lessee became a statutory tenant, that liability was not extinguished. Service charges (including a proportion of the cost of insurance, lighting, cleaning, maintenance, employment of porter, etc) were payable, in addition to the rent registered by the rent officer.
Boldmark Ltd v Cohen
(1987) 19 HLR 135; [1986] 1 EGLR 47; (1986) 277 EG 745, CA
 
Clear words necessary to charge interest on money borrowed to provide services
The Court of Appeal held that a landlord was not entitled to charge to lessees interest payments on money borrowed to finance the provision of services, unless the lease contained clear and unambiguous words to this effect. It was, however, recognised that such express provision might be sensible and that ‘in some contexts a reference in general terms to expenditure in respect of the general administration of a block of flats might perhaps, on a liberal construction, be capable of including an interest element’ ((1987) 19 HLR at 142).
Gilje v Charlegrove Securities Ltd
[2001] EWCA Civ 1777; [2002] 16 EG 182; [2002] L&TR 33; [2001] L&TR 197
 
Obligations on tenants for service charges construed restrictively (contra proferentem)contra proferentem rulecontra proferentem rule
Leases of four flats in a building included covenants that the landlord would provide a resident caretaker and that the lessees would pay service charges. A dispute arose as to whether lessees were liable to pay a notional rent of £7,800 charged in respect of the caretaker’s flat.
The Court of Appeal noted that the construction sought by the landlords was that the tenants were obliged to pay a service charge. For such an obligation to exist, its terms have to be clearly set out. Obligations on tenants for service charges are construed restrictively (contra proferentem) and are not likely to include ambiguous clauses. Mummery LJ approved the ‘obvious’ proposition that ‘courts tend to construe service charge provision restrictively and are unlikely to allow recovery for items which are not clearly included’. The leases in this case did not provide any criteria for how the notional rent would be calculated and were ambiguous in terms of the caretaker’s residence. A reasonable tenant or prospective tenant reading the leases would not perceive that the provisions for service charges obliged the tenant to contribute towards the notional cost of providing the caretaker’s flat. Such a construction did not arise clearly and plainly from the words used.
Note what was said more recently about the construction of service charge provisions in Arnold v Britton (Arnold v Britton).
Hackney LBC v Thompson
[2001] L&TR 69, CA
 
Covenant to pay service charges not void for uncertainty
The defendant exercised the right to buy under Housing Act 1985 Part 5 and covenanted to pay the council annual service charges in a sum representing the ‘due proportion’ of costs incurred in lighting, cleaning and maintaining the surrounding estate and ‘a reasonable and fair proportion’ of its management expenses. A district judge found that the covenant to pay service charges was void for uncertainty.
The Court of Appeal held that the correct approach was to ascertain the intention of the parties, having regard to the background. The covenant to pay service charges was not void for uncertainty. The term ‘due’ was sufficiently wide to embrace what was ‘fitting’, ‘proper’ or ‘reasonable’. It could not be suggested that the parties had intended that anything other than what was reasonable should have been due. The court was reluctant to hold void for uncertainty a provision that was intended by both parties to have legal effect. While it might not have been easy to determine what was reasonable, courts had nevertheless been obliged to do so in other similar cases – see eg Sheffield CC v Jackson [1998] 1 WLR 1591 (Housing Law Casebook 4th edition, E13.10) and Brown v Gould [1972] 1 Ch 53.
See also: Sutton (Hastoe) Housing Association v Williams (1988) 20 HLR 321, CA.
Morshead Mansions Ltd v Di Marco
[2008] EWCA Civ 1371; [2009] HLR 33; [2009] L&TR 15; (2009) Times 25 February, 10 December 2008
 
There is a distinction between liability under service charge provisions in a lease and under separate contracts made in accordance with Articles of Association
The Court of Appeal found that there was a distinction between the liability of a tenant to a landlord under a lease containing service charge provisions, and the liability of a member of a company to the company under separate contracts made under its Articles of Association. The two kinds of legal relationship can co-exist between the same parties, but they are different relationships, incurred in different capacities and they give rise to different enforceable obligations. In this case, the claim related only to the right to recover moneys owed by the defendant as a member of the company.
Northways Flats Management Co (Camden) Ltd v Wimpey Pension Trustees Ltd
[1992] 2 EGLR 42, CA
 
Provisions in lease a condition precedent to recovery of costs of works
The Court of Appeal considered the construction of various clauses in a lease relating to the payment of service charges, and, in particular, a covenant requiring the landlord to submit a copy of the specifications of proposed works and estimates before starting work.
The Court of Appeal held that this obligation was an essential part of the mechanism whereby disputes between the parties regarding works could be resolved and held that the obligation created a condition precedent to the recovery of a contribution towards the costs of works. As the plaintiffs had failed to comply with this provision, they were not able to recover money which they had spent on the exterior of the block.
Pole Properties Ltd v Feinberg
(1981) 43 P&CR 121; (1981) 259 EG 417, CA
 
Where situation envisaged in lease had changed radically, terms of the lease regarding heating charges disregarded and court adopted a fair and reasonable approach
See Housing Law Casebook, 5th edition, Q2.19.
St Mary’s Mansions Ltd v Limegate Investment Co Ltd
[2002] EWCA Civ 1491; [2002] 05 EG 146; [2003] HLR 24; (2002) Times 13 November
 
Construction of lease; detailed accounting of overpayments required
Leases of flats provided for the payment of service charges. Although no proper mechanism for the establishment of a reserve fund existed in the terms of the leases, lessees paid into a reserve fund sums to be used for improvements and repairs. Payments into the reserve fund regularly exceeded expenditure. The landlord kept the outstanding balance in the fund and used it to ameliorate any cash flow problems.
The Court of Appeal held that:
The terms of the leases allowed the landlord to establish and maintain a reserve fund. However, detailed accounting should be provided and appropriate provision made for overpayments to be repaid to the lessees at the end of each year. Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s42 provides that service charge contributions are held on trust. It is a breach of that provision for landlords to retain such over payments in respect of one identified expense for other, unidentified future expenses.
The natural and ordinary meaning of words in the leases meant that interest on late payment of ground rent and service charges should be paid to the landlord.
On a proper construction of the leases, the landlord was not able to charge legal costs as part of the service charge.
Sheffield CC v Oliver
[2017] EWCA Civ 225; [2017] HLR 23, 4 April 2017
 
It was not intended that a service charge provision would entitle the landlord to make double recovery; where a landlord receives money from a third party to fund the costs of works those sums should be taken into account when determining the service charge
Ms Oliver was a long lessee in a block of council flats on the Lansdowne Estate. The council carried out citywide major works, which included works on the estate. Some of the works were eligible for a contribution from a commercial energy company as part of the Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP). In total, 15 of the 25 blocks on the Lansdowne Estate were eligible to receive CESP funding. The contribution to Ms Oliver’s block was £43,570.44. The council decided not to pass the CESP directly to the leaseholders as a set-off against their service charge contributions. Rather, it decided to attribute the money to the funding of works to its citywide housing stock. The effect of this was that every leaseholder’s service charge was reduced irrespective of whether their block had been entitled to CESP funding. The Upper Tribunal (UT) held that where funding has been provided from a third party and the purpose of the funding is specifically intended to meet the cost of certain works, it is impermissible to calculate the amount a leaseholder must pay under a service charge without reference to the receipt of that money.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the council’s appeal. A construction of the service charge provisions in the lease that permitted the council to make double recovery would produce a result that reasonable parties in the position of the council and Ms Oliver could not sensibly have intended. Briggs LJ stated:
I have therefore not found it difficult to conclude that a way has to be found to interpret the lease so as to prevent all such forms of double recovery, upon the simple basis that the lease would otherwise lack common sense, as between long leaseholder and lessor. I have however found it rather more difficult to identify an appropriate means of doing so. (para 46).
The UT was right to treat the avoidance of double recovery as a necessary objective in seeking to construe the lease. The determination of a fair proportion did require the council to give credit for the relevant parts of CESP funding received. Briggs and Longmore LJJ both stated that the best way of doing this was to treat the avoidance of double recovery as a matter to be taken into account when determining a ‘fair proportion’ of the council’s incurred costs, expenses and outgoings to be paid by the lessee, under the terms of the lease. Lewison LJ, however, preferred treating the words ‘actual costs, expenses and outgoings’ in the lease as limited to those that leave the council out of pocket. The cases of Windermere Marina Village Ltd v Wild and Gater v Wellington Real Estate Ltd (Windermere Marina Village v Wild) were both correctly decided; it was therefore for the Tribunal to determine the fair proportion of the council’s costs which could be recovered as a service charge.
Southwark LBC v Akhtar and Stel LLC
[2017] UKUT 150 (LC), 20 April 2017
 
Although time was not of the essence in serving estimated service charge demands, notice had to be given before the last quarter day in a financial year
Ms Akhtar and Stel LLC held the long lease of a flat, initially granted pursuant to the right to buy. It included an obligation to pay service charges. A schedule to the lease provided that estimated service charges for each year would be paid in advance in quarterly instalments. Before 1 April each year, the landlord would give notice setting out the estimated charge for the coming financial year and that sum would be collected in equal instalments on the following four quarter days. After the following 1 April, the tenant would be given a final account setting out the actual service charge for the year.
Southwark carried out major works in 2012. It claimed to have served a notice in accordance with the lease dated 12 February 2013, headed ‘Estimate Charge: Major Works … Refurbishment 2012’. The estimated charge for the flat was £40,701.57, relating to the three financial years between 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2015. A year later, Southwark gave the lessees another notice specifying a higher figure. Both notices set out costs actually incurred by the landlord but not yet charged to the tenant, in accordance with Housing Act 1985 s20B. Breakdowns of charges for other works, professional fees and administration charges were set out in separate notices.
Ms Akhtar denied receiving the notices. Both lessees claimed that they were invalid, arguing that the separation of major works service charges from revenue charges was ‘not compliant with the requirements of the lease’ and that one notice was given ‘after the expiry of the financial period to which it related’. The First-tier Tribunal accepted these arguments. Southwark appealed.
Judge Elizabeth Cooke allowed the appeal. There was nothing in the lease to prevent Southwark from serving more than one notice in respect of each year, so long as the lessees knew or could reasonably be expected to work out what to pay. After referring to Southwark LBC v Woelke [2013] UKUT 349 (LC) (Southwark LBC v Woelke), the judge stated:
Time is not of the essence, and so the landlord has flexibility within the year; but that flexibility does not mean that time can be extended indefinitely … The late service of the … notice insofar as it related to 2012–2013 seems to me to have the effect that the landlord has failed to give such a notice for those charges in that year and therefore lost the opportunity to have that estimate paid in the way envisaged by [the lease]. It is free to make a final charge for the major works incurred in 2012–2013 [at a later date] (paras 34–35).
The sums which were estimated to be incurred for the years 2013/14 and 2014/15 had been demanded in accordance with the lease. Notifications, which included sums for the major works and the routine maintenance, for both years had been served on the first respondent before the commencement of each year. However, the notice with the estimate for 2012/13 was invalid because it was served too late in the financial year. Although time was not of the essence, the lease required Southwark to serve an estimated demand before the last quarter day; once the last quarter day had passed the lease required Southwark to demand payment of the actual service charge. However, the sums referred to were payable because Ms Akhtar had waived her entitlement to strict compliance with the lease by entering into a loan on favourable payment terms. Having regard to the incorporation of Law of Property Act 1925 s196 into the lease and Interpretation Act 1978 s7, the notices were validly served even though they were printed and posted by a third party.
Unchained Growth III plc v Granby Village (Manchester) Management Co Ltd
[2000] 1 WLR 739; [2000] L&TR 186; (1999) Times 4 November; [1999] EGCS 116, CA
 
Prohibition of set-off against maintenance charges valid
The plaintiffs were the management company for a block of flats. The defendants were the long lessees of 51 flats within the block. The leases provided that maintenance charges were payable to the plaintiffs ‘without any deduction by way of set-off’. The defendants claimed that service charges for the years 1993 to 1996 were unreasonable and that they were entitled to set off alleged overpayment during those years against the plaintiffs’ current claim. They claimed that the exclusion clause was unreasonable because of Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ss3 and 13. HHJ Howarth, sitting as a High Court judge, held that a right of set-off can be excluded by contract.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the lessees’ appeal. The obligation to pay maintenance charges was plainly a provision which related to the creation of the leasehold interest. It was an integral part of the lease, providing the administrative mechanism for the enjoyment of the leasehold interest in common with, and for the benefit of, the other tenants of the development. Even if the statutory test applied, there was no ground for saying that the prohibition was unreasonable.
See now: Consumer Rights Act 2015 Part 2.
Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc
[1999] 04 EG 158, CA
 
Where error in sums charged by freeholder, lessee liable to pay additional sums
A lease provided for payment of service charges calculated according to rateable values. The tenant paid the service charges demanded by the landlord for years 1992 and 1993. The landlord then discovered that it had been mistaken as to the rateable values and sent the tenant new demands.
The Court of Appeal held that the lessee was liable for the additional sums. Payment of a lesser sum incorrectly calculated was not a performance by the tenant of its contractual obligation.
High Court
 
Capital and Counties Freehold Equity Trust Ltd v BL plc
[1987] 2 EGLR 49; (1987) 283 EG 563, ChD
 
Lessee not obliged to pay proportion of costs of building contract entered into before lease expired when works not started
A lease included a covenant to pay a proportion of ‘all amounts sums costs and expenses of each and every kind whatsoever which may from time to time during the said term be expended or incurred or become payable by the landlord’. Before the expiry of the lease, the landlord entered into a building contract for works to be carried out, but no works were started and no sums paid by the landlord until after the lease had terminated.
It was held that the lessee was not obliged to pay a proportion of the cost of those works, as the word ‘incurred’ was synonymous with ‘expended’ or ‘become payable’.
Frobisher (Second Investments) Ltd v Kiloran Trust Co Ltd
[1980] 1 WLR 425; [1980] 1 All ER 488; (1979) 40 P&CR 442; (1979) 253 EG 1231, ChD
 
Landlord must have incurred liability before it could be recovered
The service charges clause in the lease included the words ‘to the extent that the liability incurred or amount defrayed by the landlord in respect of such items is reasonable …’
Walton J held that ‘the landlord must have defrayed the cost, or at any rate incurred liability to pay the cost, before it can be recovered from the tenant’ (at 492).
Mullaney v Maybourne Grange (Croydon) Management Co Ltd
[1986] 1 EGLR 70, ChD
 
Where works done were an improvement rather than a repair they were not covered by covenant and therefore not recoverable
See Housing Law Casebook, 5th edition, Q2.31.
New England Properties plc v Portsmouth News Shops Ltd
[1993] 1 EGLR 84, ChD
 
New and improved roof covered by terms of lease; new roof in any event a repair
A roof which had been defectively designed was damaged in the great storm of 1987. There was a risk of collapse. The landlords carried out works which resulted in a different and improved roof structure. They sought to recover the cost of the works from the lessees. The service charges provision in the lease enabled the landlord to recover the ‘cost and expense of constructing, repairing, rebuilding … and maintaining all things’ connected with the premises. Another covenant obliged the landlord ‘to keep and maintain … and to renew or replace’ the building’s exterior and structure.
Terence Cullen QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, held that the inclusion of the words ‘renew or replace’ entitled the landlord to recover the cost of the works. Furthermore, following Post Office v Aquarius Properties Ltd (Post Office v Aquarius Properties Ltd), he held that, even if the covenant had not included those words, the works were repairs and so the landlords would have been able to pass on the cost.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Assethold Ltd v Watts
[2014] UKUT 0537 (LC), 8 December 2014
There is no general rule that service charges must be construed restrictively; a service charge clause did not have to specify each and every situation in which costs could be recovered from a tenant provided that the language used was clear
Assethold was the leasehold owner of a block of flats. Ms Watts and other respondents were the under-lessees of the 14 residential flats that comprised the block. The freehold owner of an adjoining property (Freetown Ltd) served Assethold with notice under the Party Wall Act 1996 of its intention to carry out works on the boundary with the block of flats. This resulted in various legal proceedings which resulted ultimately in Assethold being ordered to pay Freetown a proportion of its legal costs, which totalled £55,000. Assethold subsequently sought to recover both Freetown’s and its own legal costs through the service charge in reliance of two clauses of the lease that required the leaseholders to pay ‘all costs expenses and outgoings whatever reasonably and properly incurred by the Landlord during the Financial Year in or incidental to providing all or any of the Services’. The services included ‘all works installations acts matters and things as in the reasonable discretion of the Landlord may be considered necessary or desirable for the proper maintenance safety amenity and administration of the Development’. A LVT, found that the legal costs were not recoverable under the lease.
Martin Rodgers QC, Deputy President, allowed an appeal. There is no general rule that service charges provision ought to be construed restrictively. Rather, the court must examine the wording of the charging provision, in its context and against all the admissible background facts and in the light of the apparent commercial purpose of the clause, and then decide what the provision means and how it operates (see Francis v Phillips (Phillips v Francis) and Arnold v Britton (Arnold v Britton) and
[58]… [it is] a general principle of interpretation [that] if contracting parties intend that a payment obligation such as a service charge should cover a particular type of expenditure they will wish to make that clear. Unclear language should therefore be read as having a narrower rather than a wider effect. Nonetheless, I do not think that principle should be pushed to the point where language which was clearly intended to encompass expenditure in a wide variety of situations which the parties have not explicitly catalogued should be so restrictively construed as to deprive it of any real effect. It seems to me to be wrong in principle to start from the proposition that, with certain types of expenditure, including the cost of legal services, unless specific words are employed no amount of general language will be sufficient to demonstrate an intention to include that expenditure within the scope of a service charge. Language may be clear, even though it is not specific.
In this case, the clauses were sufficiently clear to entitle Assethold to recover from the leaseholders the cost of engaging solicitors to take steps to ensure that the protection afforded to the block by a party wall award would not be lost.
Bedford Court Mansions Ltd v Ribiere
[2017] UKUT 202 (LC), 3 July 2017
 
Once it was no longer possible to apportion the service charge on the basis of rateable values, it was appropriate to adhere to the percentages of the previous rateable values
A number of leases in a mansion block provided that the annual amount of the service charge payable by the lessees was to be calculated by dividing the lessors’ expenditure by the aggregate of the rateable values in force at the end of such year of all the flats and then multiplying that amount by the rateable value of each flat. A number of subsequent leases also provided that in the event it became impractical or impossible to apportion the service charge on the basis of rateable values it should be apportioned on such alternative basis as was fair and equitable.
The Upper Tribunal held that the primary method of apportionment provided for in the lease was apportionment on the basis of relative rateable values. Therefore, the parties to the leases must be taken to have adopted this primary method of apportionment on the basis of a mutual recognition that this was a fair and equitable basis of apportionment for the service charge of these flats in this building under these leases. Accordingly, a value based method of apportionment was recognised as fair and equitable. The landlord was entitled from 1991 onwards to adhere to the percentages given by the previous rateable values and to make adjustments exercising judgement when it was necessary to do so in respect of newly created flats or other events. That said, once the primary method of apportionment was no longer possible, it fell to the Tribunal to decide what was a fair and equitable apportionment.
Corvan Properties Ltd v Mohamoud
[2017] UKUT 228 (LC), 2 June 2017
 
Management agreement for a period of one year that ‘continued thereafter’ until termination was a qualifying long term agreement
Corvan Properties Ltd, the freehold owner of a block of flats, entered into a management agreement with its agents. The agreement provided that it would ‘be for a period of one year from the date of signature hereof and will continue thereafter until terminated upon three months’ notice by either party’. Ms Mohamoud, a lessee, successfully argued in the First-tier Tribunal that the agreement was of indefinite duration and was accordingly a qualifying long term agreement as it was for a period of more than 12 months.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed Corvan’s appeal. The clause expressly provided that the agreement would continue after 12 months. It followed therefore that the term was for more than 12 months.
See also Poynders Court Limited v GLS Property Management Ltd [2012] UKUT 339 (LC), in which an agreement for an indeterminate duration that could be ended by giving notice was found to be for more than 12 months.
Compare Paddington Walk Management Ltd v Peabody Trust [2010] L&TR 6, in which an agreement for an ‘initial period of one year’ and which would continue ‘on a year-to-year basis with the right to termination by either party on giving three months’ notice’ was found to be an agreement for 12 months.
Edozie v Barnet Homes
[2015] UKUT 348 (LC), 25 June 2015
A local authority freeholder was not obliged to off-set the cost of major works against a grant provided by the Local Development Agency for the costs of such works
Barnet was the freehold owner of three blocks of residential flats which contained both secure tenants and long leaseholders. In 2008, Barnet decided to carry out major works in respect of the three blocks and obtained a grant in the sum of around £7m, from the Local Development Agency, to pay for some of the costs of the works with the remainder, around £2m, coming from Barnet’s own funds. The grant was said to comprise of £5.2m for improvements to flats occupied by secure tenants and £1.8m for the properties occupied by long leaseholders. Ms Edozie, who was the long leaseholder of two flats within the three blocks, contended that the total grant should have been deducted from the costs of the works so that she was only required to pay a contribution towards the remaining £2m. Barnet contended successfully before the First-tier Tribunal that as it had incurred the entire costs of the works, the leaseholders were all required to pay a contribution towards the full costs of the works (£9m) and that it was entitled to apportion the grant in any manner it saw fit.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal. The cost of the works could not be challenged on the basis that they had not been reasonably incurred; there was no dispute that the works were necessary or that the cost of £9m was reasonable. The existence of the grant was irrelevant to the question of whether the works had been reasonably incurred. The sole question was therefore whether the full cost of works had been incurred so as to be recoverable from the leaseholders. Unlike in Oliver v Sheffield CC (!!Housing Law Casebook - 7th edition:Oliver v Sheffield City Council!!), the existence of the grant did not mean that the cost of the works had not been incurred; in Oliver the grant was provided by a commercial third party for specified works. In this case, however, Barnet had a far wider discretion as to how the grant money should be spent than was available to Sheffield City Council.
Ingram v Church Commissioners for England
[2015] UKUT 0495 (LC), 15 September 2015
The Upper Tribunal considered the circumstances in which VAT may be added to service charges
Ms Ingram was the long lessee of a flat. In the First Tier Tribunal, relying on Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s27A, she challenged the inclusion of VAT in service charge. The First Tier Tribunal rejected that challenge and held that the relevant items were recoverable. She appealed.
HHJ Robinson, sitting in the Upper Tribunal, dismissed the appeal. She summarised the position as follows:
1)Mandatory service charges paid by a residential occupier to a landlord which are in the nature of rent, being directly related to the tenant’s right of occupation, are exempt from VAT by virtue of Value Added Tax Act 1994 s31 and Sch 9, Part II Group 1.
2)Mandatory service charges paid by a residential occupier which are not in the nature of rent because they are owed to a person who does not supply any accommodation fall within an HMRC Concession, referred to in an HMRC press briefing Business Brief 3/94, and are therefore exempt from VAT provided they are paid ‘towards the upkeep of the dwellings or block of flats in which they reside and towards the provision of a warden, caretakers and people performing a similar function for those occupants’ but not otherwise.
3)The Concession does not apply to optional services supplied by a landlord, managing agent or anyone else to a residential occupier.
4)The Concession does not apply to any charges paid by the landlord (or other person levying the service charge) to third parties for the supply of services even though the cost of those services is passed on to a residential occupier through a service charge.
Oliver v Sheffield City Council
[2015] UKUT 229 (LC), 21 May 2015
Where a third party pays for part, or all, of the costs of works, it is impermissible for the landlord to recover the full cost of the works from the leaseholders
Ms Oliver was the long leaseholder in a block of flats on the Lansdowne Estate, which was owned by the Council. The Council carried out city wide major works, which included works on the Lansdowne Estate. Some of the works were eligible for a contribution from a commercial energy company as part of the Community Energy Savings Programme (‘CESP’). In total 15 of the 25 blocks on the Lansdowne Estate were eligible to receive CESP funding. The contribution to Ms Oliver’s block was £43,570.44. The Council decided not to pass the CESP directly to the leaseholders as a set off against their service charge contributions. Rather, the Council decided to attribute the money to the funding of works to its city-wide housing stock. The effect of this was that every leaseholder’s service charge was reduced irrespective of whether their block had been entitled to CESP funding.
The Upper Tribunal allowed Ms Oliver’s appeal. Where funding has been provided from a third party and the purpose of the funding is specifically intended to meet the cost of certain works, it is impermissible to calculate the amount a leaseholder must pay under a service charge without reference to the receipt of that money. This is, wherever such funding is provided the landlord cannot be said to have incurred, in full, the costs of the works. The Council could not therefore treat the money as general revenue, which it could apply to the cost of works on other estates or blocks.
Pendra Loweth Management Ltd v North
[2015] UKUT 91 (LC), 19 March 2015
There was no obligation for there to be audited accounts before a demand for estimated service charges at the start of the year even though the lease required that the accounts be audited at the end of each year
In a dispute about whether a demand for estimated service charges was payable the Upper Tribunal held that:
1)The obligation under the lease to pay an estimated service charge at the start of the year was not expressed to be conditional on the landlord producing audited accounts even though the lease required the service charge account to be audited at the end of the every year.
2)Where parties agree that one of them is to be trusted to make an estimate which the other is required to pay, subject to an account being taken at a later date, and the estimate is made in good faith, there is little or no scope to challenge the estimate except by relying on Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19. Even then, section 19 will only be likely of relevance where a deliberately inflated estimate has been submitted in bad faith or an entirely arbitrary figure has been chosen.
Southwark LBC v Proktor
[2016] UKUT 504 (LC), 14 November 2016
An estimate, which was a condition precedent to a service charge becoming due, could not be rendered invalid by subsequent events
A long lease required the council before the commencement of each year to make an estimate of the amount payable by the lessee as service charges. For the year 2012/3 Southwark served an estimate including ordinary or routine expenses, but it did not include any estimate for major works which were contemplated and, in particular, some emergency lighting works which were planned. Relying on the decision of Southwark LBC v Woelke (Southwark LBC v Woelke) Mr Proktor argued that this failure meant that he was not liable to pay any service charges for the year. The First-tier Tribunal agreed and decided under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A that no services charges were due for the year 2012/13. Southwark appealed.
HHJ Huskinson allowed the appeal. It must be possible to say immediately if an estimate is valid. Its validity cannot depend on subsequent events. It could not have been contended that the estimate for 2012/13 was invalid if Southwark’s plans had been that no works to emergency lighting would be carried out until the following year. The judge rejected the proposition that an otherwise valid estimate could be rendered invalid by subsequent events. The estimate sent was valid and Southwark were entitled to recover service charges based on ordinary or routine expenses.
Southwark LBC v Woelke
[2013] UKUT 0349 (LC)
 
A demand for the payment of service charges which had not been served in accordance with the lease was not payable; such sums became payable, however, once the landlord served a valid demand
Tedworth North Management Limited v Miller
[2016] UKUT 522 (LC), 25 November 2016
Wholesale replacement of windows on a major works project is not justifiable where there is only limited evidence of disrepair
Landlords incurred costs in supplying and fitting metal sub-frames as part of a programme of replacement of the windows in 28 of the 49 flats in a building. The First-tier Tribunal found that the leaseholders were not obliged to contribute towards those costs because the former timber sub-frames which surrounded the original metal windows, and those windows themselves, had not been in a state which justified their replacement at all. The First-tier Tribunal found that no part of the cost of the work fell within the scope of the landlord’s repairing covenant or the leaseholders’ obligation to contribute to it through the service charge. The landlords appealed.
Martin Rodger QC, Deputy Chamber President, dismissed the principal grounds of appeal. He noted the principles that; (i) whether it was appropriate to look at the windows as a whole, or to consider how the covenant applied to individual windows, was a question of common sense having regard to the facts of each individual case; and (ii) where there is an obligation to repair but a choice between different methods of repair, provided it behaves reasonably, the covenanting party may choose which method to adopt and the paying party is not entitled to insist on the more limited or cheaper works being preferred. However, he did not accept the landlords’ central submission that the presence of any amount of disrepair, including simply a need for routine periodic redecoration and maintenance, was enough to bring a programme of wholesale window and sub-frame replacement within the repairing covenant. That approach paid little attention to the physical condition of the building components under consideration and relied on too legalistic an analysis of what should be a practical assessment. [paras 28 to 32] He continued:
‘A common-sense approach is required when considering what remedial work is appropriate to remedy a state of disrepair. If the greater part of a roof is in a deteriorated condition, the fact that some areas are undamaged would not of itself prevent complete replacement from being repair; on the other hand, if the only deterioration was localised to a small area and can adequately be dealt with by a localised repair, the whole roof could not be said to be in disrepair such as to require or justify its complete replacement.’ [33] ‘The general principle is that the work which the landlord is obliged or entitled to carry out is limited to that which is reasonably required to remedy the defect.’ [36]
However, the judge allowed one ground of appeal which turned on the question of whether or not the managing agents’ fees were incurred under a qualifying long term agreement.
The Anchor Trust v Corbett
[2014] UKUT 0510 (LC), 19 November 2014
There is no common law requirement that all service charges have to be fair and reasonable
The Anchor Trust was the freehold owner of a retirement complex comprising 28 flats and eight bungalows for people with low or no income. Each occupant had an assured shorthold tenancy that required them to pay rent and service charges. Anchor Trust decided to replace the fire alarm system in the complex at a cost of around £57,000. It sought to recover those costs through the service charge over a period of 15 years. This equated to each resident paying £8.85 per month. The LVT found that the work was of a reasonable standard and that the costs of the work had been reasonably incurred. The LVT, however, implied a term into the tenancy agreement that the expenditure had to be fair and reasonable. This meant that both the costs incurred and the subject matter of the charge must be reasonable. In this case it was unreasonable to expect the tenants to pay such a large amount of money for what was a repair to a ‘fixture and fitting which was part of the building’.
HHJ Huskinson allowed an appeal. There was no basis for implying a term into the tenancy agreement that any expenditure had to be fair and reasonable. Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19 already provided that service charges had to be reasonable. Moreover, the lease expressly provided for the recovery of any costs related to the replacement of the fire alarm system; the effect of the LVT’s decision was to re-write the lease impermissibly.
Statutory regulation of ground rent, service and administration charges
 
Section 18: definition of service charge
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18 defines a service charge as:
(1)… an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling as part of or in addition to the rent–
(a)which is payable, directly or indirectly, for services, repairs, maintenance, improvements or insurance or the landlord’s costs of management, and
(b)the whole or part of which varies or may vary according to the relevant costs.
(2)The relevant costs are the costs or estimated costs incurred or to be incurred by or on behalf of the landlord, or a superior landlord, in connection with the matters for which the service charge is payable.
(3)For this purpose–
(a)‘costs’ includes overheads, and
(b)costs are relevant costs in relation to a service charge whether they are incurred, or to be incurred, in the period for which the service charge is payable or in an earlier or later period.
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
Arnold v Britton
[2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619; [2015] 2 WLR 1593; [2016] 1 All ER 1; [2015] HLR 31; [2015] 2 P&CR 14; [2015] L&TR 25; [2015] CILL 3689, 10 June 2015
A requirement to pay a proportion of a fixed amount was not a service charge within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18. The Supreme Court also gave guidance on the correct approach to construing service charge recovery clauses in leases
Court of Appeal
 
Cinnamon Ltd v Morgan
[2001] EWCA Civ 1616; [2002] 2 P&CR 10; [2002] L&TR 20
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19 applied to costs incurred by management company
The defendant’s lease included a provision that she should pay service charges calculated by reference to expenditure by a management company, rather than by her landlord. She claimed that the sums charged were not reasonable and that accordingly, in view of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19, she had no obligation to pay them. In a trial of a preliminary issue, HHJ Oppenheimer held that the statutory regime did not apply where service charges were incurred by a management company, rather than by the landlord. The defendant appealed.
The appeal was allowed by consent. Although section 18 defines relevant costs for service charges as ‘costs incurred or to be incurred by or on behalf of the landlord’, the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 30 includes ‘any person who has a right to enforce payment of a service charge.’ In so far as there were comments to the contrary by the Court of Appeal in Berrycroft Management Co Ltd v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd (Berrycroft Management Co Ltd v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd) they were obiter and distinguishable.
Ruddy v Oakfern Properties Ltd
[2006] EWCA Civ 1389; [2007] Ch 335; [2007] 3 WLR 524; [2007] 1 All ER 337; [2007] L&TR 9; [2006] 3 EGLR 30; [2006] 49 EG 96; (2006) 103(43) LSG 31; [2006] NPC 114; [2007] 2 P&CR DG2; (2006) Independent, November 3, 25 October 2006
 
Subtenant could challenge maintenance charge of freeholder in LVT
Oakfern Properties Ltd was the freeholder of a building comprising, on different floors, commercial and residential premises. The upper floors contained 24 separate residential flats which were let to Publicshield Property Management Ltd, a non-profit making company, which sublet flats individually on long leases. Publicshield was owned by 15 of the subtenants. Mr Ruddy was a subtenant who was not a member of Publicshield. Under the head lease Oakfern was responsible for keeping the building in good repair, and Publicshield was obliged to pay Oakfern a maintenance charge equal to 90 per cent of the costs incurred in discharging the repairing obligations. Each subtenant was obliged to pay Publicshield one twenty-fourth of the maintenance charge. Mr Ruddy challenged the amount of the maintenance charge on the basis that it was unreasonable and applied to a leasehold valuation tribunal (LVT) for a determination of the amount properly payable. The only respondent to the application was Oakfern. The LVT determined that the maintenance charge was a service charge within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant 1985 s18 and that Mr Ruddy, in his capacity as a subtenant, had the requisite status in law to challenge the amount of the maintenance charge as against Oakfern, even though the obligation to pay Oakfern lay not on him, as subtenant, but on Publicshield as headlessee. Oakfern appealed to the Lands Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal. Oakfern appealed further to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. First, the definition of ‘service charge’ in section 18 as ‘an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling’ applied. Publicshield was tenant of part of the building. The fact that Publicshield was also the tenant of other flats and common parts did not take the charge outside the section 18 definition. Following Heron Maple House Ltd v Central Estates Ltd (2002) 13 EG 102, Jonathan Parker LJ said that the section referred to ‘tenant of a dwelling’ and not ‘tenant of a dwelling and nothing else’. Furthermore, section 38, which defines ‘dwelling,’ does not require that the tenant be in occupation of the dwelling. Second, there was no justification for implying any restriction into the general words of section 27A which give LVTs jurisdiction to determine the amount of service charge payable.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Home Group v Lewis
[2008] EWLands LRX_176, 3 January 2008
For a service charge to vary there must be a link between the sum demanded and the cost of the services provide
Ms Lewis was an assured tenant of Home Group. It was a term of her tenancy that Home Group would ‘increase or decrease the rent once a year by giving the tenant no less than one calendar month’s notice, in writing, of the increase or decrease. The notice shall specify the rent and the included service charge proposed’ and that ‘the rent shall not be increased more than once a year and no increase shall take effect less than a year after the last increase. The revised rent shall be the amount specified in the notice of increase unless the tenant exercises his/her right to refer the notice to a Rent Assessment Committee to have a market rent determined.’ The tenancy agreement did not allow Home Group, at the end of each year, to recover a balancing charge, or to make a balancing credit, in the event that the cost of providing the services to the tenants of the development exceeded, or was less than, that which was recovered from the tenants over the year. At a hearing, an LVT decided that the service charge was variable, and therefore caught by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18, because the service charge varied from year to year.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. For the sum to be a ‘variable service charge’ there needs to be a link between the sum demanded and the costs incurred for providing the services. In this case, the sum payable, in respect of the service charge, did not vary in accordance with the actual cost of providing the services; nor was there a direct relationship between the amount of the costs as a cause and the amount of the service charge as a consequence. The fact that the landlord might estimate the following year’s service charge on the basis of the costs incurred in the previous year was ‘at least one remove from a situation where a rent varies or may vary according to the relevant costs.’
See also: Chand v Calmore Area Housing Association Ltd (LRX/170/2007), 25 July 2008.
JLK Limited v Ezekwe
[2017] UKUT 277 (LC), 22 June 2017
 
Residential accommodation which was not occupied or intended to be occupied as a separate dwelling was not a dwelling for purpose of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18Times 18 October
The former headquarters of the Liverpool Fire Brigade were converted to provide 93 units of residential accommodation intended for occupation by students. All but six of the units comprised a bed-sitting room with ensuite facilities. Each was let on a long lease with the right to use communal kitchens, lounges, showers and toilets situated on the same floor. For a while, each room was occupied by a student, but the original developer went into administration and the building became entirely vacant. In April 2014, a prohibition order was made under Housing Act 2004 s20, because the communal boiler in the building had ceased to function and there was no longer any supply of hot or cold water. Lessees made applications relating to service charges to the First-tier Tribunal under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A. The tribunal decided that the units were ‘dwellings’ within the meaning of section 38 and that it therefore had jurisdiction to determine the applications. The landlords appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
Martin Rodger QC, Deputy Chamber President, noted that section 38 defines a ‘dwelling’ as ‘a building or part of a building occupied or intended to be occupied as a separate dwelling, together with any yard, garden, outhouses and appurtenances belonging to it or usually enjoyed with it’. He stated that it was ‘a word of wide import capable of having shades of meaning but it generally connotes ‘a place where a person lives, regarding and treating it as home’ (Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins (C2.3)). He did not accept that the protection of sections 18 to 30 extended only to those occupying residential accommodation as their home. Section 38 does not refer to a home or contain any express requirement of residence at all; it is sufficient that the building or part of a building be ‘intended to be occupied as a separate dwelling’. The use of the word ‘dwelling’ seemed never to have been treated as sufficient in itself to import a requirement of residence or occupation as a condition of statutory protection. Under the Rent Acts, the use of the word ‘dwelling’ signified premises which were capable of being regarded as someone’s home, but the word itself was not understood to mean that a unit of accommodation which was not occupied as someone’s home could not be a dwelling. [27,28] The judge continued:
If part of a building is physically capable of being occupied as a separate dwelling there seems to me to be nothing in the language, context or purpose of sections 18 to 30 of the 1985 Act to require additionally that it must be occupied as someone’s home. I respectfully disagree with the statement to that effect in King v Udlaw ([2008] L&TR 28).
Accordingly, the judge rejected the submission that for a unit of accommodation to be a ‘dwelling’ for the purpose of section 38 it must satisfy the additional requirement of being someone’s home.
However, he allowed the appeal because he found that the units were not occupied or intended to be occupied as separate dwellings. As the tenant of each of the units had the right to share a kitchen, lounge, shower and WC with every other tenant on the same floor, it could not be said that each tenant occupied a separate dwelling. The bed-sitting room and the right to use the communal space did not satisfy the requirement because the tenant was not tenant of the whole of that accommodation, but only of part of it; the bed-sitting room was not sufficient, because it was not occupied as the tenant’s dwelling, but only as part of it. The judge found that the First-tier Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider the applications under section 27A, and so dismissed them.
Note: cf Rent Act 1977 s22 and Housing Act 1988 s3, each of which provides that where accommodation is shared with another tenant to a degree which would otherwise prevent the tenant’s own separate accommodation from being a ‘separate’ dwelling, the separate accommodation is nonetheless to be deemed to be entitled to the protection of the Act.
Longmint Ltd v Marcus
[2004] 3 EGLR 171, [2004] EWLands LRX_25_2003, 23 January 2004
 
A management fee of 15 per cent of the service charge varied in amount and was therefore within the meaning of section 18
A lease allowed for the landlord to recovery an additional 15 per cent of the service charge for each year for the cost of employing managing agents. The landlord contended that this was a fixed amount and therefore was not a service charge within the meaning of section 18.
The Upper Tribunal held that the 15 per cent was a variable service charge because the actual amount varied depending upon the amount of the service charge each year.
Re Southern Housing Group
[2010] UKUT 237 (LC), 15 July 2010
A service charge payable under a tenancy agreement, which permitted a landlord to change a ‘fixed’ service charge in circumstances where there was a material change to the services provided or their cost, was a variable service charge within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18
Ms Hall was the assured tenant of Southern Housing Group. Her tenancy agreement required her to pay, each week, £27.93 in respect of the scheme service charge. The agreement provided that this fixed sum could be increased annually by the service of a notice, but gave Home Group the power to increase ‘the service charge more than once a year … from fixed to variable service charges or if there is a material change to the services we provide or the costing of services provided. In any event we will not increase the service charge more than twice in any 12-month period.’ The agreement also provided that in the event that ‘the cost of services we provide … in any one period of 12 months is higher or lower than the income receivable during the same period in respect of such services then surpluses and deficits will be apportioned between the tenants’. This was done by either increasing or reducing the following year’s service charge.
Ms Hall applied to the LVT for a determination that her service charges had not been reasonably incurred within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19. Home Group contended that the service charge did not vary according to the costs it incurred in providing the services. The LVT disagreed.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal. Section 18 applied because the tenancy agreement permitted the landlord to change the service charge more than once a year in the event that there was a material change to the services provided or to the costing of the services. The tenancy agreement also permitted the landlord, in circumstances where the cost of providing services in a year was higher or lower than the income received, to apportion the surplus or deficit between the tenants in the subsequent service charge year. It followed that the amount payable by the tenant in respect of the services could vary according to the actual costs incurred by the landlord so that section 19 applied.
Section 19: reasonableness
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19(1) provides that service charges are recoverable (a) only to the extent that they are reasonably incurred, and (b) where they are incurred on the provision of services or the carrying out of works, only if the services or works are of a reasonable standard. Further, where a lease provides for the recovery of estimates no greater amount than is reasonable is payable: s19(2).
Section 19: general
 
Court of Appeal
 
Hounslow LBC v Waaler
[2017] EWCA Civ 45; [2017] HLR 16, 2 February 2017
 
Guidance on approach to reasonableness; outcome, not just process, must be reasonable; views, status and financial impact on tenants of works relevant, but not determining, factors
Hounslow were the freehold owners of a block of flats. The residents comprised a mixture of secure tenants and long leaseholders who had exercised the right to buy. Miss Waaler was a long leaseholder. Her lease required her to make a contribution towards the cost of repairs and improvements made Hounslow. Hounslow decided to carry out major works, including the wholesale replacement of windows. The First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal held that such works were improvements and as such Hounslow had a discretion as to whether to or not they carried out the works. The Upper Tribunal held that where a landlord has a discretion as to whether to undertake works it must have regard to the financial impact of the works on the tenants. Hounslow appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The exercise of a contractual discretion is constrained by an implied term that the decision-making process be lawful and rational in the public law sense that; the decision is made rationally (as well as in good faith) and consistently with its contractual purpose; and the result is not so outrageous that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it. In the context of a lease which gives a landlord the right to carry out, and charge for, an improvement the rationality test applies to both the decision to carry out works and the method of doing so. It follows that a decision by a landlord to incur costs that is not rational means that such costs are not recoverable under a service charge recovery clause. However, the fact that a decision is rational does not of itself mean that the costs of works of repair or improvement have been reasonably incurred within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19. Whether costs have been reasonably incurred is not simply a question of process: it is also a question of outcome. Accordingly, even if the landlord’s decision to carry out the works was reasonable, the costs of the works may be unreasonably incurred if they are unreasonable in amount, i.e. greater than the market cost. That said, where the landlord is faced with a choice between different methods of resolving a defect within the building there may be many outcomes each of which is reasonable. In such circumstances, the landlord may recover the costs of the works even if it does not adopt the cheapest option.
Whether a decision to carry out the works is reasonable will depend on a number of factors which includes, in every case where there is an obligation to consult, the views of the tenants that have to pay for them. The landlord must conscientiously consider the tenants’ observations and give them due weight, depending on the nature and cogency of the observations, before making the final decision. That does not mean that the landlord’s decision must always be in accordance with the tenants’ views, provided that such views are taken into account and the final decision is a reasonable one. This test is the same regardless of whether the cost relates to an improvement or repair. However, different considerations as to reasonableness will be relevant depending on the type of work that the cost relates to. In some cases, the views and interest of the tenants and the financial impact upon them will be highly material to whether a cost is reasonable (eg a purely aesthetic improvement), while in others they will be less important (eg an improvement to eradicate an existing design defect that hampers the use of the building). However, a landlord is not required to investigate the means of each tenant; rather it must make itself aware of the types of people who are tenants in a particular block or on a particular estate.
Yorkbrook Investments Ltd v Batten
(1986) 18 HLR 25; (1985) 52 P&CR 51; [1985] 2 EGLR 100, CA
 
Approach to deduction from service charges where services not of reasonable standard; lessor obliged to comply with covenants despite non-payment of charges
The plaintiff company owned an estate consisting of about 280 flats. The defendant long lessee complained about the inadequate provision of services and withheld service charge contributions. The plaintiff claimed possession. Although the county court judge deducted some amounts from the money claimed as a result of the defendant’s defence and counterclaim, some arrears remained. An order for forfeiture was made but suspended.
On the lessee’s appeal, the Court of Appeal held:
1)Where services provided do not reach a reasonable standard (see now Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19, formerly Housing Act 1980 Sch 19 para 3), the judge is not bound to disallow the whole amount claimed by the freeholder, but may deduct a proportion. In this case the judge had deducted one-seventh of the lessee’s contribution towards expenditure on the garden.
2)Only in exceptional circumstances should such reductions be disallowed because they are de minimis. Although such matters may be ‘small in quantum [they] may be of considerable moment to the parties’.
3)If landlords covenant ‘to provide a good, sufficient and constant supply of hot water and an adequate supply of heating in the hot water radiators’, they must do so. The court rejected arguments that the covenant should be construed in the light of the inadequacies of the central heating system when the lessee bought the flat. It is implicit from the judgment handed down by Wood J that the lessor could and should have expended capital sums to update the system.
4)Some of the lessor’s covenants were expressed to be ‘subject to the lessees paying the maintenance contribution pursuant to the obligations’ in the lease. The lessor argued that this was a condition precedent and, as the lessee was in arrears, it had no obligation to comply with its own covenants. This approach was rejected.
As a result of these findings, the lessee’s counterclaim exceeded the arrears claimed. The order for forfeiture was set aside and the lessor ordered to pay £1,213 to the lessee.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Avon Ground Rents Limited v Cowley
[2018] UKUT 92 (LC), 21 March 2018
 
Advance service charge demand not payable where no reason to believe that a third party would not cover the costs of the works
A mixed-use development, containing 49 residential flats and some commercial units, was completed in 2008. It was let to a variety of lessees on terms requiring them to contribute through a service charge to its repair and maintenance. In March 2015, Avon Ground Rents acquired the freehold reversionary interest. Soon after its acquisition, Avon discovered that water was penetrating through the surface of the central courtyard into some of the premises. It was common ground that liability for repairing this defect fell on Avon, and that, in principle, it was entitled to recover the cost of the remedial works from the lessees. However, one of the residential lessees pointed out that the building was the subject of three separate NHBC warranties. The same month, Avon’s agents notified the NHBC of a claim under the warranties. In June 2016, the agents issued demands for the first instalment of service charges for the year which included each leaseholder’s apportioned part of the cost of the remedial works. At that time, NHBC had, whilst not accepting liability, found ‘in principle the claim to be valid’. Avon issued an application in the First-tier Tribunal to determine the liability of the leaseholders to contribute towards the service charge in respect of the works. The First-tier Tribunal determined that the contribution required from the individual lessees was the cost of the works less any deduction made by NHBC. Avon appealed.
Martin Rodger QC, Deputy Chamber President, dismissed the appeal. It was common ground that Avon must, as it had always said it would, give credit to the leaseholders for sums it received from the NHBC. It could not have been intended by any of the parties to the various leases that Avon would be entitled to recover the cost of the remedial works both as a service charge and under the NHBC warranties. Avon’s submission that an anticipated receipt from a third party could only be taken into account if the receipt was certain was too inflexible. However, the fact that a landlord’s expenditure might be covered by a warranty or insurance policy did not mean that a landlord could never include that expenditure as part of a demand for an advance payment. In this case, by the time the first advance payment was demanded, there was no uncertainty over NHBC’s attitude to its own liability, since it had said ‘in principle we find the claim to be valid.’ Accordingly, the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to conclude that a contribution equal to the full cost of the remedial works was not a reasonable advance payment, because a payment of a near-equivalent amount was anticipated from the NHBC and there was no reason to believe it would be delayed.
Garside v RFYC Ltd
[2011] UKUT 367 (LC), 15 September 2011
 
Whether charges are ‘reasonably incurred’ can include considerations of their affordability and the possibility of phasing to avoid hardship
After years of neglect of their estate by their landlords, tenants successfully applied for the appointment of a manager. The manager identified remedial works costing hundreds of thousands of pounds and notified the tenants of the service charges which were necessary to fund the works. The tenants argued that the works should be phased (and the most urgent done first) so that they could avoid the hardship of bearing the costs of the works all in one go.
The Upper Tribunal held that part of deciding whether such charges would be ‘reasonably incurred’ could include considerations of their affordability and the possibility of phasing to avoid hardship. However, HHJ Robinson said
It is important to make clear that liability to pay service charges cannot be avoided simply on the grounds of hardship, even if extreme. If repair work is reasonably required at a particular time, carried out at a reasonable cost and to a reasonable standard and the cost of it is recoverable pursuant to the relevant lease then the lessee cannot escape liability to pay by pleading poverty.
Knapper v Francis
[2017] UKUT 3 (LC), 10 January 2017
 
The reasonableness of a demand for estimated service charges is to be assessed at the date when the demand is served
A lease of a 999 year lease of a chalet in a holiday park provided that the lessee was required to pay the lessor ‘such sum or sums as the Lessor may reasonably require on account of the said service charge …’. The issue in an appeal to the Upper Tribunal was whether, in determining the reasonableness of an amount demanded on-account of relevant costs before they were incurred, a tribunal was required or permitted by section 19(2) to take into account facts which were not known at the date of the demand but became known only later.
The Upper Tribunal held that a tribunal must assess the reasonableness of a sum at the date when the demand is served. The fact that certain work was not in fact carried out or was not carried out to a reasonable standard was therefore irrelevant. This did not, however, mean that the tribunal is prohibited from taking into account any matters that were unknown to the landlord at the date of the demand. A tribunal could, for example, have regard to the fact that the provision of a particular service could have been obtained for a considerably lower sum than was estimated by the landlord.
Regent Management Ltd v Jones
[2010] UKUT 369 (LC), 15 October 2010
 
Approach to consideration as to whether expenditure reasonable
It is not for the landlord to prove that every item of expenditure incurred was reasonable. It is for the tenant to challenge an item of expenditure and only then must the landlord demonstrate that it is reasonable. Then:
… the test is whether the service charge that was made was a reasonable one; not whether there were other possible ways of charging that might have been thought better or more reasonable. There may be several different ways of dealing with a particular problem of management. All of them may be perfectly reasonable. Each may have its own advantages and disadvantages. Some people may favour one set of advantages and disadvantages, others another. The LVT may have its own view. If the choice had been left to the LVT it might not have chosen what the management company chose but that does not necessarily make what the management company chose unreasonable.
See also: Forcelux v Sweetman [2001] 2 EGLR 173.
Southall Court (Residents) Ltd v Tiwari
[2011] UKUT 218 (LC), 16 June 2011
 
Tenants who are unhappy about proposed works should make their concerns known within the period specified in the landlord’s notice under the statutory consultation process
In considering the reasonableness of works, it is incumbent upon tenants who are unhappy about proposed works on which they have been consulted to make their concerns known to the landlord within the period of time specified in the landlord’s notice. In the absence of any objection during the consultation process, a landlord is entitled to conclude that there is no serious objection to the proposed works. The tenants’ duty to participate in the consultation process applies even if, as the LVT suggested, it is plain from past experience that any observations submitted by the tenants will be ignored.
Veena SA v Cheong
[2003] 1 EGLR 175, [2003] EWLands LRX_45_2002, 20 February 2003
 
Location and type of property relevant to reasonableness
Mr Cheong was the leaseholder of a flat within a block in Mayfair. Veena SA were the landlord. The issue was whether the costs of employing a porter, which was provided for in the lease, and the cost of cleaning the block, had been reasonably incurred.
The Lands Tribunal held that the fact that a lease provided for a particular service did not necessarily mean that it was reasonable to have it. The location and type of flat was, however, relevant when determining whether the provision of a particular service was reasonable. In this case it was reasonable for a block of flats within Mayfair to have a porter. While it was plainly reasonable to employ a cleaner, in this case the cost of the cleaner had not been reasonably incurred.
Insurance
 
The cases set out below concern both reasonableness and whether charges are recoverable under the lease. They are set out together for ease of reference.
Court of Appeal
 
Berrycroft Management Co Ltd v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd
(1998) 75 P&CR 210; (1997) 29 HLR 444; [1997] 1 EGLR 47, CA
 
Landlord’s right to nominate insurance company unqualified
Lessees challenged insurance charges passed on to them by their landlord under the terms of their leases, apparently claiming that cheaper insurance could have been found with other companies.
The Court of Appeal held that there was no reason to imply any term into the covenants that the landlord’s right to nominate either the company or the agency through which the insurance was to be placed should be restricted. The insurance had been arranged in the normal course of business through an agency of repute. The right of the landlord to nominate the insurance company and agency was unqualified.
High Court
 
Williams v Southwark LBC
(2001) 33 HLR 22, 23 March 2000
 
A landlord was not required to pass on the payment of commission from an insurance company to the leaseholders where it actually covered payments for claims handling
The landlord obtained insurance for a block of flats. The insurance company reduced the sum by 25 per cent: 5 per cent was said to be a loyalty bonus and 20 per cent was consideration for the landlord’s handling and administration of the policies. The landlord charged the leaseholders for all of the premium. A leaseholder contended that the amount of premium demanded should be discounted by 25 per cent as it was commission. In advance of the hearing Southwark admitted that it should not have recovered an amount equivalent to the 5 per cent loyalty bonus.
The claim was dismissed. The 20 per cent reduction was not in law a reduction as it covered a payment for services provided by the landlord, ie claims handling.
Note: This case is not authority for the proposition that a landlord may retain a bare commission, eg just for using a particular insurance company.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Avon Estates (London) Limited v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Limited
[2013] UKUT 0264 (LC), 30 May 2013
 
Landlord’s right to nominate insurance company unqualified
Avon Estates’ lease required it to contribute a third of the service charge expenses which included, amongst other things, the cost of insuring of the property. Sinclair Gardens, the freeholder, applied to the LVT for a determination that the service charge in respect of the three flats was payable. Sinclair Gardens used its own insurance agency, which charged a 12 per cent handling fee, to deal with claims management and a broker to obtain the premium. The overall cost was £4,154.25 to insure the property. Avon Estates contended that the insurance premium was not reasonably incurred within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19. It relied upon a quotation it had obtained which would have insured the property for a quarter of the price. It also argued that the 12 per cent handling fee was, in any event, unreasonably incurred because it had not been negotiated at arms’ length in the market place; nor was there any evidence that it was representative of the market rate. The LVT decided that, while cheaper insurance may have been obtainable, Sinclair Gardens was not obliged to “shop around” to obtain the cheapest premiums; it was merely required to prove that the rate was representative of the market rate or that the contract had been negotiated at arm’s length and in the market-place (Havenridge Ltd v Boston Dyers Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 73, CA). For those same reasons, however, the 12 per cent handling fee had not been reasonably incurred.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed Avon Estates’ appeal. There was no evidence before the LVT that the insurance premium had not been arranged otherwise than in the normal course of business and Avon Estates had failed to adduce any evidence to the contrary. The LVT was entitled to reach a view that the contract had been negotiated at arm’s length and in the market place.
COS Services Ltd v Nicholson
[2017] UKUT 382 (LC), 3 October 2017
 
Cost of insurance unreasonable where landlord could not explain why it was four times more expensive than like for like cover
Cos Services were the freehold owners of a block of flats, let on long leases. Each year, the managing agents took out insurance for the building as part of a ‘block policy’, through an insurance broker, and claimed the cost of doing so from the lessees as a service charge. Two of the lessees applied to the First-tier Tribunal under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A to challenge the reasonableness of the premiums. At the hearing, the tenants adduced evidence of materially similar alternative insurance cover, albeit not under a block policy, at a quarter of the price they were being charged. Cos Services did not call any evidence to explain why its premium was so much more expensive. The First-tier Tribunal held that the insurance premium was unreasonable.
HHJ Stuart Bridge dismissed the appeal. After referring to Havenridge v Boston Dyers Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 73, CA, Berrycroft Management Co Ltd v Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd (1996) 29 HLR 444, CA, Forcelux Ltd v Sweetman (Forcelux Ltd v Binnie) and Waaler v Hounslow LBC (Hounslow LBC v Waaler), he stated that the fact that a landlord has instructed a broker to take out insurance of a building will not, of itself, mean that the premium charged is reasonable if there are ‘like for like’ quotations from alternative providers which are significantly cheaper:
The tribunal must be satisfied that the charge in question was reasonably incurred. In doing so, it must consider the terms of the lease and the potential liabilities that are to be insured against. It will require the landlord to explain the process by which the particular policy and premium have been selected, with reference to the steps taken to assess the current market. Tenants may, as happened in this case, place before the Tribunal such quotations as they have been able to obtain, but in doing so they must ensure that the policies are genuinely comparable … in the sense that the risks being covered properly reflect the risks being undertaken pursuant to the covenants contained in the lease. [48]
In the absence of an explanation as to why the premium was four times more expensive than the quotations obtained by the lessees, the First-tier Tribunal had been entitled to find that the insurance premium charged was excessive. The insurance premiums being charged by the landlord to the tenants were excessive. The judge concluded:
It remains a mystery, having heard the evidence adduced by both parties, why there is such a discrepancy between the premiums charged to tenants under the landlord’s block policy and the premiums obtainable from other insurers on the open market. It a mystery which the landlord has been wholly unable to explain. [67]
Green v 180 Archway Road Management Co Ltd
[2012] UKUT 245 (LC), 23 July 2012
 
Landlord was not entitled to recover insurance premium where landlord had not complied with the lease
The lease of a flat obliged the tenant to pay 25 per cent of the sum for which the building was insured. The lease required that the insurance be taken out in the joint names of the landlord and tenant. The tenant disputed liability to pay insurance premiums for five years. The LVT held that she was liable.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. The evidence showed that in the four most recent years the landlord had taken the insurance only in its own name and in those circumstances could not recover under the lease.
Qdime Ltd v Bath Building (Swindon) Management Co Ltd
[2014] UKUT 261 (LC), 10 June 2014
 
Landlord was entitled to insure against terrorism
Under the terms of a lease, the freehold owner of a four storey block of flats was obliged to ‘…keep the Building including the Demised Premises insured to its full reinstatement value against loss or damage by fire and the usual comprehensive risks in accordance with the [Council of Mortgage Lenders] recommendations in that respect from time to time and such other risks as the Landlord may in its reasonable discretion think fit to insure against…’. The lessee-owned management company and the leaseholders of the flats were then required to reimburse these costs as a service charge. The freehold owner obtained an insurance policy which included cover against damage caused by acts of terrorism. This added a small amount to the premium. The management company and the leaseholders issued proceedings in the LVT disputing the costs of the terrorism element, which they considered to be unreasonable. The LVT found that there was no contractual obligation to obtain terrorism insurance and that the decision to obtain terrorism insurance was unreasonable.
Judge Cousins allowed the freeholder’s appeal. The CML recommendations included insuring against ‘explosions.’ Terrorism was capable of giving rise to an explosion and was therefore within the definition. Alternatively, the freeholder’s decision was a reasonable one. The LVT apparently gave no, or no apparent weight, to the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors’ Code which provides that serious consideration should be directed to the taking out of terrorism insurance.
Managing agents and management fees
 
Court of Appeal
 
Embassy Court Residents’ Association Ltd v Lipman
(1984) 271 EG 545, CA
 
Term implied that expenses of employing management company could be recovered
The residents’ association, which had become leasehold owners of the block, claimed as service charges from lessees a contribution towards the cost of employing managing agents. The leases contained a covenant that the lessees should pay ‘a due proportion of the cost and expenses incurred … in carrying out works of maintenance, repair and renewal of the main structure’ etc, but did not contain any express provision requiring the lessee to pay anything towards the cost of employing managing agents.
The Court of Appeal held that, in view of the fact that the lessor was a residents’ association,
… it was necessary in order to give business efficacy to this transaction to imply a term that the reasonably necessary administrative expenses of the Management Association (a) should be incurred by the Association and (b) should be recovered from individual lessees pro rata pursuant to an implied covenant to do so.
However, Cumming-Bruce LJ qualified this by stating:
No doubt in the case of leases entered into between a landlord and tenant it is necessary for the landlord to spell out specifically in the terms of the lease, and in some detail, a sufficient description of every financial obligation imposed upon the tenant in addition to the tenant’s obligation for rent …
The former landlord, who was a private individual, would not have been entitled to recover a proportion of the cost of employing managing agents.
Skilleter v Charles
(1992) 24 HLR 421; [1992] 1 EGLR 73; [1992] 13 EG 113, CA
 
Interest chargeable on arrears of service charges; recovery of cost of employing managing agent allowed despite freeholder and wife being directors of company
Long lessees appealed against a county court judge’s refusal to grant declarations which they sought about the non-recoverability of service charges under their long leases.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that, on the construction of the leases, interest was chargeable by the landlord on arrears of service charges but, even in the absence of any express provision, such a term could be implied, either to give business efficacy to the lease or on the basis of the ‘officious bystander’ test. A paragraph in the lease which entitled the landlord to recover through service charges ‘the cost of employing a managing agent’ permitted him to claim the fees of a company which managed the property, even though he and his wife were the directors of the company. The position would have been different if the company was a sham or where the managing agent was a mere nominee of the landlord.
High Court
 
Lloyds Bank v Bowker Orford
[1992] 2 EGLR 44, ChD
 
Ambit of ‘any other beneficial services … by the lessors’ included the cost of employing managing agents
A lease included a provision for the payment of service charges in respect of a number of specified services, such as cleaning, caretaking, lighting, etc, and ‘any other beneficial services which may properly be provided by the lessors’.
David Neuberger QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, held that these provisions did not allow the freeholders to pass on the cost of major external repairs and internal decorations, but did allow them to recover the cost of employing managing agents and a proportion of the notional cost of providing accommodation for the caretaker.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Paul v Southwark LBC
[2013] UKUT 375 (LC), 18 September 2013
 
Costs incidental to the provision of services included the cost of management expenses
The Upper Tribunal, after considering Brent LBC v Hamilton LRX/51/2005; Wembley National Stadium Ltd v Wembley London Ltd [2008] 1 P & CR 3; Palley v Camden LBC [2010] UKUT 469 (LC), held that where a lease allows for recovery of costs that are incidental to the provision of services under the terms of the lease such costs are not limited to the direct costs of the provision of the services. The indirect costs of providing those services, for example employing staff and paying for accommodation, in arranging and managing those works, are all part of the costs and are all properly chargeable.
Waverley BC v Arya
[2013] UKUT 501 (LC), 15 October 2013
 
In the absence of an express clause the council could not recover the costs of managing the block where it had not provided services
Mr Arya was a leaseholder of the council. It was a term of Mr Arya’s lease that he must ‘pay to the council by way of additional rent a yearly sum equal to a proportionate part … of the costs, expenses and outgoings which the council have incurred in the period of 12 months … in the repair, maintenance and renewal of the building of which the flat forms part and the provision of services undertaken by the council (whether or not the tenant actually utilises those services) and of insuring the building …’. Other than insuring the block, no services were actually provided and accordingly, other than a fee for managing the block, no sums were demanded of Mr Arya for services.
The Upper Tribunal held that, as there was no separate provision for the payment of a fee for managing the block, unless services are provided the service charge cannot include a contribution towards the council’s management and overheads.
Section 20: consultation
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20 limits landlords from recovering more than £250 for the cost of works unless they comply with the consultation requirements contained in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and Service Charges (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 SI No 1987.
A landlord is also prevented from recovering more than £100 if he enters into a ‘qualifying long term agreement’, ie an agreement for more than 12 months which provides for the carrying out of works, without complying with the Consultation Regulations.
The First-tier Tribunal may dispense with any or all of the consultation requirements where it considers this reasonable: s20(ZA)(1).
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
 
Daejan Investments Ltd v Benson
[2013] UKSC 14; [2013] 1 WLR 854; [2013] 2 All ER 375; [2013] HLR 21; [2013] 2 P&CR 2; [2013] L&TR 17; [2013] 2 EGLR 45; [2013] RVR 164; [2013] 11 EG 80 (CS); (2013) 157(10) SJLB 31; Times, April 11, 2013, 6 March 2013
 
Dispensation should ordinarily be granted but on terms that compensate the tenant for any prejudice suffered
Daejan was the freehold owner of a building containing seven flats. In 2005, major works were required. The LVT found that there had been a failure to consult the lessees in accordance with Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss20 and 20ZA(2) and the Service Charges (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 SI No 1987. Daejan then applied to dispense with that requirement. The LVT refused that application. Daejan appealed first to the Lands Tribunal, and then to the Court of Appeal. Both dismissed the company’s appeal.
The Supreme Court allowed Daejan’s appeal (Lords Hope and Wilson dissenting). The consultation process is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The purpose of the statutory consultation process was to ensure that leaseholders were protected from paying for inappropriate works or paying more than would be appropriate. The LVT should focus on how any breach of the consultation regulations had impacted on those matters. If the extent, quality or cost of the works were not affected by the failure to consult, dispensation should normally be granted. It was not appropriate to approach the issue of dispensation by considering whether the breach was minor, technical or serious. The focus should be on prejudice to the leaseholders. The factual burden of identifying this lay on them. Once they had done that, it was for the landlord to rebut it. The LVT should generally, however, grant dispensation on terms that the landlord compensate the tenants for any prejudice suffered, eg by reducing the costs of the works. Generally, this would involve paying the leaseholders’ their reasonable legal and surveyor’s costs of the dispensation application. Daejan was granted dispensation on terms that the recoverable costs were reduced by £50,000 and that they paid the reasonable costs of the leaseholders in so far as those costs related to testing the application for dispensation and canvassing the question of prejudice.
See also: Re Om Property Management Ltd [2014] UKUT 9 (LC) where the Upper Tribunal held that dispensation should be granted on condition that the tenant’s legal costs of fighting the application for dispensation be paid even though it was none the less satisfied that the extent, quality and cost of the works were not in any way affected by the defective consultation.
Court of Appeal
 
Martin (and Seale) v Maryland Estates Ltd
[1999] 26 EG 151; (2000) 32 HLR 116, CA
 
Cost of additional works not included in section 20 notice disallowed
The claimants were long lessees in a house which had been divided into flats. In 1994 the landlord’s surveyor wrote enclosing a specification of proposed works. Later a notice complying with Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20 was served with accompanying estimates. On 21 March 1995 the landlord commenced works. The builders also carried out additional work that they identified and which had not been included in the section 20 notice. The tenants accepted that the landlords were entitled to recover the cost of the original works, but not the additional costs. An assistant recorder hearing a claim for service charges refused to grant the landlord dispensation under what was then s20(9), holding that the landlord had not acted reasonably in failing to inform the tenants of the need for additional works.
The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the landlord’s appeal, held that a common sense approach is required when deciding how one batch of ‘qualifying works’ is to be divided from another for the purposes of s20(1). In this case all of the works covered under one contract were said to equate to a separate batch.
Phillips v Francis
[2014] EWCA Civ 1395; [2015] 1 WLR 741; [2015] 1 P&CR 9; [2015] L&TR 4; [2015] HLR 3, 31 October 2014
It is a question of fact and degree to be answered in a common sense way whether a set of works were linked so as to require a landlord to consult
The claimants were all lessees of chalets on a holiday site, let on 999 year leases. They sought declarations concerning their liability for service charges, and in particular, whether works carried out were ‘qualifying works’ within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss20 and 20ZA(2), requiring the landlords either to comply with the prescribed consultation process or obtain a dispensation from doing so. On appeal from HHJ Cotter QC, Sir Andrew Morritt QC held that once the limit for contributions had been reached (£250 per tenant) in any year, the landlords were obliged to consult the tenants on any further service charge items, however small and irrespective of whether they were linked to the earlier works (an ‘aggregating approach’). The landlords appealed.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It was unnecessary to decide whether the reasoning in Martin (and Seale) v Maryland Estates Ltd (Martin (and Seale) v Maryland Estates Ltd) applied under section20 as amended by the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. There were compelling reasons for concluding that the aggregating approach was wrong. A landlord was not required to consult tenants on any service charge item, however small, once the limit to contributions had been reached. It was not sensible and gave rise to serious practical problems. It was a question of fact and degree whether the works carried out were all part of one planned single set of works or a series of disparate pieces of work. It was a multi-factorial question, the answer to which should be determined in a commonsense way taking into account all relevant circumstances. Relevant factors in determining what a single set of qualifying works comprises are likely to include:
(i)where the items of work are to be carried out (whether they are contiguous to or physically far removed from each other);
(ii)whether they are the subject of the same contract;
(iii)whether they are to be done at more or less the same time or at different times; and
(iv)whether the items of work are different in character from, or have no connection with, each other.
This was not intended to be an exhaustive list of factors which are likely to be relevant. In this case, HHJ Cotter had reached a conclusion on the facts with which it was impossible for the Court of Appeal to interfere.
High Court
 
BDW Trading Ltd v South Anglia Housing Ltd
[2013] EWHC 2169 (Ch); [2014] 1 WLR 920; [2014] HLR 2; [2013] L&TR 25; [2013] 3 EGLR 139; [2013] 30 EG 78 (CS), 15 July 2013
 
The consultation requirements did not apply to persons or bodies before they became landlords
The claimant was the freehold owner and developer of four residential blocks of flats. The defendant was the leasehold owner of flats within one of the blocks. The claimant, in advance of any of the units being let, entered into a 25 year agreement with a contractor to provide heating, hot water and electricity to the block as the sole supplier. The defendant contended that the agreement was a qualifying long term agreement and as the claimant had not consulted or sought dispensation from the LVT was precluded from recovering more than £100 a year from any tenant. The claimant argued that the consultation requirements did not apply in circumstances where a QLTA was entered into and there was not an existing tenancy.
The claim succeeded. The consultation requirements applied to ‘landlords’ and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 defined landlord in conventional terms, ie it did not include prospective landlords. Had the draftsmen intended it to do so he would have provided so in clear terms. Such a result did not lead to an absurdity; while landlords would be able to escape the consultation requirements by entering into such agreements before entering into leasehold agreements, prospective tenants were protected by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19, and would be aware of the agreement before choosing to become the leaseholder. Moreover, it would be absurd for the defendant’s construction to apply as it would be impossible for a prospective landlord to embark on consultation where there were no tenants to consult with.
Paddington Basin Developments Ltd v West End Quay Estate Management Ltd
[2010] EWHC 833; [2010] 1 WLR 2735; [2010] L&TR 26, 20 April 2010
 
Agreement which was not for a fixed term but which could not be terminated for 25 years was a QLTA.
A management company entered into an agreement with a separate management company to provide management services in respect of a development. The agreement was not for a fixed term but could not be terminated until 25 years had passed. The High Court was required to consider whether it was a qualifying long term agreement.
The High Court held that the agreement was a QLTA. Although it was not for a fixed term it could not be terminated until 25 years had elapsed. It was therefore an agreement for more than 12 months.
Note: See also Paddington Walk Management Ltd v Peabody Trust [2010] L&TR 6, CC, in which it was held that an agreement for 12 months which was renewed automatically on its expiry was not a QLTA.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
23 Dollis Avenue (1998) Ltd v Vejdani
[2016] UKUT 365 (LC), 16 August 2016
The £250 cap in Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20 only applies to the costs of works that had been completed and did not apply to estimated demands
The management company (23 Dollis Avenue) sought a payment on account, under a lease, from the respondent for major works to a block of flats. The First-tier Tribunal found that the management company had failed to comply with the consultation requirements and limited the amount the management company could charge in advance of the works being completed to £250 per leaseholder. The management company appealed.
The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal. The £250 limit contained in Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20 only applied where works had actually been completed and the costs had been incurred. It did not apply to demands in advance. While it was relevant to the question of whether the estimated demand was reasonable it was not determinative.
Ashleigh Court Right To Manage Company Ltd v De-Nuccio & Ors
[2015] UKUT 258 (LC), 20 May 2015
A landlord had failed to comply with the Consultation Regulations by only allowing the inspection of estimates between 9 am and 12 noon on a weekday; this was unreasonable when having regard to the resources of both the landlord and tenant
Auger v Camden LBC
LRX/81/2007, 14 March 2008
 
LVTs can make determinations dispensing with the consultation requirements in respect of qualifying works which have not yet been carried out
HHJ Huskinson, sitting in the Lands Tribunal, held that LVTs have jurisdiction under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20ZA to make determinations dispensing with the consultation requirements in respect of qualifying works which have not yet been carried out and qualifying long-term agreements which have not yet been entered into.
Note: in this case the Lands Tribunal also held that major works undertaken under public procurement contracts and subject to EU wide tendering were by their very nature reasonable as it would be unlawful to award works to anyone but the successful tenderer. In Lewisham LBC v Luis Rey-Ordieres [2013] UKUT 14 (LC), the Upper Tribunal clarified this by holding that costs incurred under such a contract were not automatically reasonable but were ‘strongly persuasive’ as to reasonableness.
Leaseholders of Foundling Court and O’Donnell Court v Camden LBC and others
[2016] UKUT 366 (LC), 10 August 2016
The head landlord was under an obligation to consult both its tenant and every sub-tenant that were required to contribute, whether to the head or intermediate landlord, towards the costs of major works
Camden was the leasehold owner of the Brunswick Centre. Allied London, in 2006, had been Camden’s landlord. The applicants were all long leaseholders of flats within the Brunswick Centre; Camden was their immediate landlord. Camden’s lease required it to pay Allied London the cost of carrying out works of repair to flats within the Brunswick Centre and the leaseholders, by the terms of their lease, were required to reimburse Camden for the cost of doing so. In 2004, Allied London decided to carry out major works to the Brunswick Centre. Allied London consulted Camden, but not the leaseholders. Camden purported to consult the leaseholders but failed to do so. The leaseholders subsequently contended that as they had not been properly consulted they were not required to pay more than £250 per leaseholder. Both Camden and Allied London argued that neither of them were under an obligation to consult the leaseholders.
Martin Rodger QC, deputy president of the Upper Tribunal, held that Allied London, as the landlord intending to carry out the works, was under an obligation to consult Camden and all the long leaseholders who were obliged to contribute towards the works. Camden had not been required to consult anyone as they were not responsible for carrying out the works.
M & M Savant Limited v Brown
LRX/26/2006; 8 August 2008, Lands Tribunal
 
Landlord failed to comply with section 20(4)(b) because the only place in which the estimates were ‘displayed’ was in offices 8 to 10 miles from the block of flats
The LVT concluded that a landlord had not complied with the consultation requirements of Landlord and Tenant Act (LTA) 1985 s20.
HHJ Huskinson dismissed an appeal and refused an application for dispensation. He concluded that the landlord had failed to comply with s20(4)(b) because the only place in which the estimates were ‘displayed’ was in offices eight to ten miles from the block of flats. They were not likely to come to the notice of all the lessees. He continued:
… having available for inspection of documents at a place where a determined tenant has the ability if he makes an effort to see the documents in due course does not constitute a display within [s20(4)(b), which] envisages the documents being displayed in a sufficiently convenient and obvious place for it to be likely that the documents will come to the attention of the tenants straight away rather than in due course (para 37).
Trafford Housing Trust Limited v Rubinstein & Others
[2013] UKUT 0581 (LC), 22 November 2013
 
Service Charges (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 Sch 1, required a landlord to give leaseholders 30 days in which to make observations from when a notice was received
Trafford Housing Trust Limited were the freehold owners of a block of flats. Trafford wanted to enter into a qualifying long term agreement so as to carry out major works to the block. To that end they purported to serve section 20 notices, in accordance with Service Charges (Consultation Requirements) (England) Regulations 2003 Sch 1, on eight long leaseholders. The notices were dated 11 March 2011, but were not posted until 16 March 2011. The notices required the leaseholders to make any written observations by 15 April 2011. The LVT decided that all of the notices were defective because they did not give the leaseholders 30 days in which to make written observations to the proposed QLTA because, while the notices had been posted 30 days before the consultation period ended, the notices were deemed to have arrived two days after posting on 18 March 2011.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal. The regulations required Trafford to give the leaseholders ‘30 days beginning with the date of the notice’ in which to make written observations. The LVT had been right to find that the date of the notice was the date that the notice was actually received. In circumstances where there was no deeming provision in the lease and no evidence had been put before the LVT as to how long it ordinarily took for a letter to be delivered by TNT (the company who had delivered the letter) the LVT had been entitled to find that the letter would have arrived two days after it had been posted. This meant that only 28 days had been given.
Limitation
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B provides that:
“(1) If any of the relevant costs taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge were incurred more than 18 months before a demand for payment of the service charge is served on the tenant, then (subject to subsection (2)), the tenant shall not be liable to pay so much of the service charge as reflects the costs so incurred.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if, within the period of 18 months beginning with the date when the relevant costs in question were incurred, the tenant was notified in writing that those costs had been incurred and that he would subsequently be required under the terms of his lease to contribute to them by the payment of a service charge.”
Limitation Act 1980 s19 limits the recovery of rent six years from the date which any arrears became due.
Court of Appeal
 
Om Property Management Ltd v Burr
[2013] EWCA Civ 479; [2013] HLR 29, 3 May 2013
 
Costs become incurred when the liability crystallises
In November 2007, Total Energy invoiced the management company for a bill of around of £100,000. This arose because the management company had mistakenly been paying EDF Energy for the supply of gas, when EDF were not responsible for the supply of gas to the block (this had arisen because the developer had told the management company that EDF supplied the gas). EDF had also been under charging. Even when EDF paid Total Energy there still remained a shortfall of £100,000. The management company demanded the sum from its leaseholders under the service charge within 18 months of being provided with the invoice. Mr Burr argued that he was not liable to pay the service charge because the cost of the gas supply had been incurred at the time it was supplied and therefore, as the demand for payment had been made more than 18 months after the cost had been incurred, the service charge was not recoverable. The LVT agreed, but their decision was overturned by the Upper Tribunal. Mr Burr appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed that appeal. There is an obvious difference between a liability to pay and the incurring of costs. As a matter of ordinary language, a liability must crystallise before it becomes a cost. This would ordinarily be when an invoice is served. Costs are not ‘incurred’ within the meaning of section 20B on the mere provision of services or supplies to the landlord or management company.
See also: Grounds Rent (Regisport) v Dowlen [2014] UKUT 144 (LC), 22 April 2014, where the Upper Tribunal held that section 20B did not apply where a landlord, who had only recently obtained the reversion of the property, was presented with an invoice for the historic use of water that had been demanded of, but not paid by, the previous landlord four years previously.
Skelton v DBS Homes (Kings Hill) Ltd
[2017] EWCA Civ 1139, 27 July 2017
 
Estimated service charges were not recoverable where the demand was served more than 18 months after the costs were actually incurred
Mr Skelton was the long lessee of a flat. DBS Homes were his lessor. The lessee was not obliged to pay a service charge until the lessor served a summary of the costs which the lessor expected to incur. The lessor failed to do this in respect of a number of demands. Around three years later, the lessor served the lessee with the summary. The lessee contended that the service charge was not payable (Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B) because a valid demand for service charges had not been served until more than 18 months after the costs had been incurred and the lessor had failed to serve the lessee with a Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B(2) notice. HHJ Huskinson sitting in the Upper Tribunal held that s20B did not apply to demands for estimated service charges.
The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Skelton’s appeal. It was clear from the definition of ‘service charge’ in section 18 that section 20B applied to service charges in respect of costs to be incurred as much as to costs which have been incurred. It followed that where a lessor served an estimated demand more than 18 months after the costs had in fact been incurred the sums were not payable. The position was different where a landlord served an estimated demand before the costs were in fact incurred. Further, it was not enough under section 20B that the tenant had received the information that the landlord proposed to make a demand. There must be a contractually valid demand for payment of the service charge.
High Court
 
Brent LBC v Shulem B Association Ltd
[2011] EWHC 1663 (Ch); [2011] 1 WLR 3014; [2011] 4 All ER 778, 29 June 2011
 
The failure to serve a valid demand for service charges in accordance with the terms of a lease meant that a demand had not been served for the purposes of section 20B(1)
Brent was the freehold owner of an estate comprising 15 flats in five blocks which were leased to Shulem B Association Ltd. Under the terms of the lease, Shulem covenanted to pay a proportion of the actual expenditure incurred by Brent in, inter alia, maintaining the exterior of the blocks of flats. Between 2004 and 2005, major works were carried out to the exterior. Brent made a series of payments to contractors. In February 2006, Brent sent a demand for payment of service charges to Shulem. The demand was expressed to be by reference to their proportion of the estimated cost of the works, as it was said that the final costs had not yet been calculated. Shulem did not pay the sums claimed and Brent issued proceedings. Shulem applied to strike out the claim on the basis that the February 2006 demand was not in keeping with the lease and/or recovery of some of the costs were barred by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B(1), which provides that a tenant is not liable to pay service charges which were incurred more than 18 months before a demand for payment was served on the tenant. A circuit judge dismissed the application.
Morgan J allowed Shulem’s appeal. The demand was not made in keeping with the lease as it referred to estimated costs rather than actual expenditure. It followed that it could not be a valid demand for the payment of a service charge, such that Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B(1) was engaged. Nor was the February 2006 demand a notification for the purposes of section 20B(2), which required written notification of the total costs that had been incurred by the landlord and a statement that the tenant would be required under the terms of his lease to contribute to those costs by payment of a service charge. Morgan J rejected an argument that a notice under section 20B(2) should also detail the proportion of those costs that subsequently the tenant will be required to pay and/or inform the tenant what the resulting service charge demand will be.
Gilje v Charlegrove Securities Ltd (No 2)
[2003] EWHC 1284 (Ch); [2004] 1 All ER 91; [2004] HLR 1; [2004] L&TR 3; [2003] 36 EG 110
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B did not apply to payments on account
Etherton J held that Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B does not apply to payments on account. It applies where costs are incurred more than 18 months before a demand for payment.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Holding and Management (Solitaire) v Sherwin
[2010] UKUT 412 (LC), 10 December 2010
 
Section 20B applied to balancing charges; time started to run on the date that additional costs were incurred
The Upper Tribunal considered the operation of section 20B in circumstances where payments on account had not been sufficient to cover the cost of works during the year so that a balancing charge was subsequently demanded. Gilje (Gilje v Charlegrove Securities Ltd (No 2)), while not strictly binding on LVTs, was plainly right and should be followed. Time started to run, for the purposes of section 20B, when the on account payments were in fact spent and the additional costs were incurred rather than at the end of the service charge year.
Johnson v County Bideford Ltd
[2012] UKUT 457 (LC), 17 December 2012
 
A demand that is invalid because it fails to comply with section 47 may be retrospectively validated for the purposes of section 20B
A landlord served lessees with a demand for service charges. The demand failed to give the name and address of the landlord (instead, naming the managing agent). The landlord subsequently issued further demands giving the correct details. The tenant contended that at the date the valid demands were given more than 18 months had passed since the costs of the works had been incurred. As a result they were no longer recoverable under section 20B.
The Upper Tribunal held that invalidity in a notice arising from non-compliance with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s47 could be made good retrospectively by late compliance with the section’s requirements. The late compliance in this case validated the earlier defective demands. It followed that section 20B had been complied with retrospectively.
One Housing Group Ltd v Wright and others
[2015] UKUT 124 (LC), 19 March 2015
A landlord had been entitled to appropriate payments to the earliest service charge debts in circumstances where there was no evidence that the tenant had specified that the payments were to be applied to the latter debts; it followed that the service charge arrears, which had been reserved as rent, had not been extinguished by the Limitation Act 1980
Westmark (Lettings) Limited v Peddle
[2017] UKUT 449 (LC), 22 November 2017
 
Where a cost is incurred by a superior landlord, the 18-month time limit in which a demand for payment must be made of each under lessee does not begin to run until the intermediate landlord is served with a demand for payment of the costs by the superior landlord
Maintenance costs incurred in relation to a development by a superior landlord were passed on in turn to an intermediate lessee and then to the lessees of individual flats. The First-tier Tribunal, construing Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20B(1), found that there was a single 18-month limit from the date on which the costs were first incurred by the superior landlord. Accordingly, individual lessees were not liable to pay service charges where the costs were incurred by the superior landlord more than 18 months before they received demands. The intermediate landlords appealed.
Martin Rodger QC, Deputy Chamber President, allowed the appeal. Where a cost is incurred by a superior landlord the 18-month time limit in which a demand for payment must be made of each under lessee does not begin to run until the intermediate landlord is served with a demand for payment of the cost by the superior landlord.
Wrigley v Landchance Property Management Ltd
[2013] UKUT 0376 (LC), 10 September 2013
 
For the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 time did not start to run until a valid section 47 or section 48 notices were served; where service charges are reserved as rent the limitation period is six years
Section 21B: summary of rights and obligations
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s21B allows a tenant to withhold payment where a demand for the payment of a service charge is not accompanied by a summary of the rights and obligations. The summary must be in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State under Service Charges (Summary of Rights and Obligations, and Transitional Provision) (England) Regulations 2007 SI No 1257.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Tingdene Holiday Parks Ltd v Cox
[2011] UKUT 310 (LC), 8 August 2011
 
Prescribed information must accompany the service charge demand
The prescribed information required by section 21B must accompany the service charge demand. It could not be served 11 days later. The service charge only became payable after a new service charge demand was served accompanied by the prescribed information.
Administration charges
 
An administration charge is defined by Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 Sch 11 para 1 as an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling as part of or in addition to the rent which is payable, directly or indirectly–
(a)for or in connection with the grant of approvals under his lease, or applications for such approvals,
(b)for or in connection with the provision of information or documents by or on behalf of the landlord or a person who is party to his lease otherwise than as landlord or tenant,
(c)in respect of a failure by the tenant to make a payment by the due date to the landlord or a person who is party to his lease otherwise than as landlord or tenant, or
(d)in connection with a breach (or alleged breach) of a covenant or condition in his lease.
A variable administration charge is defined as being charge payable by a tenant where the amount is not specified in his lease nor calculated in accordance with a formula specified in his lease.
The importance of the distinction is that a Tribunal only has jurisdiction to determine whether a variable administration charge is reasonable. A Tribunal does, however, have the power to vary the provisions of a lease if it considers that the amount, or the method of calculation, of a fixed administration charge is unreasonable: Sch 11 para 3.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Freehold Managers (Nominees) Ltd v Piatti
[2012] UKUT 241 (LC), 6 November 2012
 
A landlord may impose a reasonable charge when giving permission to sub-let irrespective of whether provision is made in the lease for doing so
A lease provided that the tenant could not sublet without consent, which would not be unreasonably withheld by the landlord. The tenant sought retrospective permission to sublet. The landlord imposed a charge. The tenant applied to a leasehold valuation tribunal, which held that there was no provision in the lease for such a charge and it was therefore not recoverable.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. The landlord was entitled to impose a reasonable charge as a condition for the grant of consent because refusal of consent would not be unreasonable if the tenant refused to pay a reasonable charge: Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 s19.
See also: Holding & Management (Solitaire Ltd) v Norton and other appeals [2012] UKUT 1 and Re: Bradmoss Ltd [2012] UKUT 3 (LC).
Proxima GR Properties Ltd v McGhee
[2014] UKUT 59 (LC), 6 February 2014
 
Fee of £95 for granting permission to sub-let unlikely to be reasonable in amount where only minimal administrative tasks were involved
A lease included a prohibition against subletting without prior written consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The tenant sublet and retrospectively sought consent. The landlord sought a consent fee of £95. The Leasehold Valuation Tribunal held that it was not entitled to charge a fee.
On appeal, Martin Rodger QC, Deputy President of the Upper Tribunal, held that while it was reasonable for a landlord to seek reimbursement of administrative expenses, it was not reasonable to treat the requirement to obtain consent as an opportunity to charge a fee unrelated to the costs of routine enquiries or administrative tasks. In a routine case, where the tenant provided details of the proposed sublease at the time of requesting consent and did not dispute the landlord’s entitlement to charge a fee, and where no other complications (such as retrospective consent) arose, a fee of £95 would not be reasonable for the minimal administrative tasks involved in granting consent. However, in view of the presence of those factors in the instant application, the sum of £95 sought was reasonable.
Demands for service charges (Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 ss47 and 48 and Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 s166)
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s47 provides that any written demand for rent or other sums payable under a tenancy which is not a business tenancy must contain the name and address of the landlord and, if that address is outside England and Wales, an address in England and Wales at which notices may be served on the landlord. If the demand relates to a claim for service charges and the required information is missing, the amount demanded is treated as not being due.
Similarly, Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48 provides that landlords must furnish tenants with an address in England and Wales at which notices may be served. Failure to provide that information means that any rent or service charges claimed is treated as not being due.
Commonhold and Leashold Reform Act 2002 s166 also provides that a tenant under a long lease of a dwelling is not liable to make a payment of rent under the lease unless the landlord has given him a notice stating a date, not more than 60 days and not less than 30 days after the day the notice was given, on which rent is payable and that date has passed.
Court of Appeal
 
Dallhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd v Lindsey Trading Properties Inc
(1995)70 P&CR 332; [1994] 1 EGLR 93; [1994] 17 EG 148, CA
 
Section 48 does apply to agricultural tenancies which include a dwelling-house
At first instance it was held that Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48 applied to an agricultural holding which consisted of 940 acres, including an Elizabethan manor house and a number of cottages. Although rent demands were served by solicitors, they did not expressly state that they were authorised to accept service of notices on behalf of the landlord, which was a company registered in Panama.
On appeal, it was confirmed that, in view of the contents of section 46, the requirements of section 48 do apply to agricultural tenancies which include a dwelling-house. The word ‘premises’ means the subject matter of the letting and may include land which is the subject matter of the same letting. The fact that a notice was not served prior to rent or service charges being demanded did not mean that such amounts would subsequently become payable when sufficient notice was given of the landlord’s name and address.
Note: In Staunton v Taylor (Staunton v Taylor) it was held that rent could become due if a landlord served a section 48 notice after proceedings had been issued.
Drew-Morgan v Hamid-Zadeh
(2000) 32 HLR 316; [1999] 26 EG 156, CA
 
Information in notice requiring possession could satisfy section 48
In possession proceedings based on arrears of rent, a judge rejected a submission by the tenant that the landlord had failed to comply with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48(1) in that he had not furnished the tenant with an address for service of notices.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the tenant’s appeal against the possession order. Until a notice is furnished there is no right to rent. However, following Rogan v Woodfield Building Services Ltd (Rogan v Woodfield Building Services Ltd) and Marath v MacGillivray (Marath v MacGillivray), a notice within the meaning of section 48(1) was furnished when the landlord served a notice under Housing Act 1988 s21, whether or not it was valid in its own right as a section 21 notice. It informed the tenant of the name and address of the landlord’s agent without limitation or qualification. The fact that it was not served for the purposes of section 48(1) and that it did not state that the address was one at which ‘notices (including notices in proceedings) may be served’ on the landlord was irrelevant. There might be cases where a suitably worded possession summons served with another document might constitute notice within section 48, but in this case the summons did not itself constitute sufficient notice.
Glen International Ltd v Triplerose Ltd
[2007] EWCA Civ 388; [2007] L&TR 28, 23 March 2007
 
Letter with address for correspondence on particular matter was not notice under section 48
A tenant sought to exercise its right to a new lease under Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 s42. Under section 99(3)(ii), such a notice should be sent to the address last furnished to the tenant as the landlord’s address for service, in accordance with a notice under Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48. The landlord disputed service of the requisite notice, claiming that it had been sent to the wrong address and that its agents had furnished the claimant with an address for service pursuant to section 48, but that the tenant had sent the notice to a different address. The landlord relied on one specific letter in which its agents had indicated an address for correspondence. The tenant argued that the solicitors to whom that letter had been written had been acting for it only in relation to dilapidations and insurance, and that the letter had been understood as giving an address for correspondence between the landlord’s agents and the solicitors on those discrete issues, not for the service of notices on the landlord. A county court judge found for the tenant, holding that the letter had not been a valid section 48 notice.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the landlord’s appeal. The correspondence, although referable to the lease and the relationship of landlord and tenant, was specifically focussed initially on matters of dilapidations, and subsequently on questions of insurance, and dealt with nothing else. There was nothing in the correspondence which either explicitly or implicitly indicated that the solicitors had any more general retainer in relation to either the property or the landlord and tenant relationship. Neither the terms of the specific letter relied on nor that letter read in the context of the correspondence as a whole could reasonably have been regarded by the recipient agents of the tenant as conveying that message. It followed that, for the purposes of section 48, the letter did not constitute notice of an address for service on the landlord.
Hussain v Singh
[1993] 2 EGLR 70; [1993] 31 EG 75, CA
 
Section 48 applies to tenancies and rent arrears in existence before Landlord and Tenant Act1987
The Court of Appeal held that Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48, which requires landlords to furnish tenants with addresses at which notices may be served, applies to tenancies created and rent arrears in existence before the Act came into force on 1 February 1988. As a result, the landlord in question was unable to recover the arrears claimed.
Rogan v Woodfield Building Services Ltd
(1995) 27 HLR 78; [1995] 1 EGLR 72; [1995] 20 EG 132, CA
 
Where landlord’s address in tenancy agreement s48 satisfied
The plaintiff was a regulated tenant under Rent Act 1977, renting a furnished flat. The tenancy agreement dated 31 October 1986 gave the landlord company’s name and registered office. When the tenant applied to the rent officer, he used the same address for the landlord and, when the landlord served notice increasing the rent, the same address was given. The proceedings concerned a claim for overpaid rent under Rent Act 1977 s57(3)(b) and a counterclaim for arrears of rent. Although the tenant had not pleaded Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48, at trial his counsel raised the section as a defence to the counterclaim. Although the landlord had not served any notice which specifically stated that the registered office was the address at which notices might be served, at first instance, it was held that the landlord had complied with section 48.
The tenant’s appeal was dismissed, although the Court of Appeal rejected the landlord’s contention that a section 48 notice could be oral. In this case, there was nothing in the tenancy agreement to suggest that the registered office was not the address at which proceedings might be served. Ralph Gibson LJ said:
In the ordinary case, where the address of the landlord is stated without qualification in the written tenancy agreement, the requirement of section 48(1) is thereby satisfied provided that the address is an address in England and Wales.
Stuart-Smith LJ agreed, saying that in such circumstances it is a necessary implication that the landlord ‘can be communicated with at that address and hence it is an address to which notices can be sent’. He distinguished Dallhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd v Lindsey Trading Properties Inc (Dallhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd v Lindsey Trading Properties Inc), where Ralph Gibson LJ had said that a section 48 notice must state at what address notices ‘including notices in proceedings’ must be served on two grounds – first, that in Dallhold the company was registered and incorporated in Panama and, second, that the only address in the jurisdiction was that of the landlord’s solicitors. He said that the decision in Dallhold should be confined to its own facts.
Russell LJ said in Rogan that the test is:
… whether the circumstances of the individual case are such that a reasonable tenant must be taken to understand the purport and purpose of the notice.
High Court
Chasewood Park Residents Ltd v Kim
[2010] EWHC 579 (Ch), 24 March 2010
 
Compliance with Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 s166, is a condition precedent to the tenant’s liability for ground rent
Arnold J held that compliance with Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 s166, which provides that tenants under long leases of dwellings are not liable to make payments of rent unless the landlord has given notice stating the amount of the payment and the date on which it is due is a condition precedent to the tenant’s liability for ground rent under a long lease. It followed that it was for the landlord claiming unpaid ground rent to plead and prove compliance with that section. There was also an arguable basis for disputing the reasonableness of the expenditure on maintenance claimed in the service charges. The case was remitted to the county court.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Beitov Properties Ltd v Martin
[2012] UKUT 133 (LC), [2012] L&TR 23, 8 May 2012
 
Section 47 was not satisfied where the name of the landlord’s agent was provided
Beitov Properties Ltd was the lessor of property let under a long lease to Mr Martin. It claimed arrears of service charges in the county court. The proceedings were transferred to the LVT. The LVT found that nothing was payable because the demands failed to comply with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s47(1) in that, while they contained the name of the landlord, the address was that of its managing agents.
George Bartlett QC, President of the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), dismissed an appeal. Section 47(1) required the demand to contain the name and address of the landlord. The purpose of this requirement was not solely to provide tenants with an address through which they can communicate with their landlords, but also to enable them to know who their landlords are: a name alone may not be sufficient for this purpose. The address of the landlord as required by section 47(1) is the place where the landlord is to be found. In the case of an individual landlord, the address would be the landlord’s place of residence or where the landlord carries on business. In the case of a company, it would be the registered office or place where it carries on business; in neither case could the requirement be satisfied by giving the address of an agent.
Pendra Loweth Management Ltd v North
[2015] UKUT 91 (LC), 19 March 2015
Section 47 did not apply to service charge demands made by management companies
Triplerose Ltd v Grantglen Ltd and Cane Developments Ltd
[2012] UKUT 0204 (LC), 7 May 2013
 
The question of prejudice was not relevant to compliance with section 47; Tribunal must decide technical points if raised
Triplerose disputed payment of a service charge on the grounds that the service charge demand did not comply with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s47, ie it specified that the landlord’s name was Paul Marsh – a director of Grantglen Ltd – rather than Grantglen. The LVT rejected this argument as Triplerose had not suffered any prejudice as the error had been rectified by Grantglen notifying Triplerose of the correct name of the landlord in its application to the LVT.
The Upper Tribunal allowed Triplerose’s appeal. It was immaterial whether Triplerose had suffered prejudice or not; section 47 required the service charge demand to specify the name of the landlord and the disputed service charge demand had failed to do so. While it was generally inappropriate for a tribunal to take a purely technical point, ie one that does not go to the merits or justice of the case, of its own motion, it could not avoid such a point if it was raised by one of the parties to the dispute.
First-tier Tribunal: jurisdiction
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A provides that the First-tier Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine whether a service charge is or would be payable, whether or not it has been paid, and if it is
(a)the person by whom it is or would be payable;
(b)the person to whom it is or would be payable;
(c)the amount which is or would be payable;
(d)the date at or by which it is or would be payable; and
(e)the manner in which it is or would be payable.
The Tribunal loses jurisdiction where a matter has been admitted or agreed by the tenant or otherwise been determined. A tenant is not to be taken to have agreed or admitted any matter by reason only of having made any payment. An agreement is void if it seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal also has jurisdiction to determine a question, of which it has jurisdiction by way of section 27A, in proceedings that are begun in the county court and transferred to it: Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 Sch 12 para3.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Birmingham CC v Keddie and Hill
[2012] UKUT 323 (LC), 25 September 2012
 
The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide questions not raised in an application and that were not in issue between the parties
Birmingham undertook window replacement and balcony works to a flat as part of a programme of major works to the block. They sought to recover £5,909.57 as the costs of the works via the service charge. Mr Keddie and Mr Hill applied to the LVT for a determination that the amount claimed was not reasonable because the works had not been carried out to a reasonable standard. The LVT did not decide whether the works were carried out to a reasonable standard and instead decided that the work had not been necessary and was therefore unreasonable for that reason and disallowed the whole charge. Birmingham appealed on the basis that the LVT had breached natural justice by reaching a decision on grounds not raised in the application without giving it an opportunity to make submissions, and that in any event the decision was perverse, as there was no evidence before it about the condition of the old windows which were replaced.
HHJ Gerald allowed the appeal and said:
[13] … It is regrettable that it appears to be a developing practice within some leasehold valuation tribunals to take it upon itself to identify issues which are of no concern to the parties and then reach a decision on issues they have not been asked to which then results in an appeal and all the waste of time and money and attendant general aggravation.…
[15]… Applications are commenced by landlord or tenant issuing a pro forma application form prescribed by the Residential Property Tribunal Service which requires that details of the questions relating to service charge expenditure requiring resolution by the LVT be set out. …
[16] … Those documents, whether they be described as pleadings or statements of case or whatever, set out the nature and scope of the issues in dispute. They operate to limit the issues in respect of which the parties must adduce evidence in support of their respective cases. They also operate to define the issues in respect of which they seek resolution by the LVT. They therefore serve five functions. First, to identify the issues. Secondly, to enable the parties to know what issues they must address their evidence to. Thirdly, to vest the LVT with jurisdiction, and focus the LVT’s attention on what needs to be resolved. Fourthly, setting the parameters of, and providing the tools within which, the LVT may case manage the application. Fifthly, by confining the issues requiring resolution to what is actually (as distinct from what might theoretically be) in dispute between the parties they will be assured economical and expeditious disposal of their dispute whilst also promoting efficient and economical use of judicial resources at first instance and appellate levels.
[17]… In this respect, it is important to bear in mind not just that the jurisdiction of the LVT is a creature of statute but that it is also a function of what the applicant and, by his response, the respondent wish the LVT to resolve. It is the jurisdiction and function of the LVT to resolve issues which it is asked to resolve, provided they are within its statutory jurisdiction. It is not the function of the LVT to resolve issues which it has not been asked to resolve, in respect of which it will have no jurisdiction. Neither is it its function to embark upon its own inquisitorial process and identify issues for resolution which neither party has asked it to resolve, and neither does it have the jurisdiction to do so.
See also: Wales & West Housing Association Ltd v Paine [2012] UKUT 372 (LC) and Sadd v Brown [2012] UKUT 438 (LC).
Cain v Islington LBC
[2015] UKUT 117 (LC), 26 March 2015
A Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim where the tenant had reached an agreement with his landlord to pay a sum towards his service chargee
Islington LBC brought a claim in the county court for unpaid service charges. Mr Cain sought to defend the matter by challenging the way his service charge had been apportioned under his lease. The county court ordered that ‘the matter be referred to the leasehold valuation tribunal … to determine the reasonableness of the service charges demanded’. The parties subsequently reached an agreement that Mr Cain would pay 50 per cent of his service charge. The First-tier Tribunal still determined the question of how his service charge was to be apportioned. On an appeal to the Upper Tribunal, Islington contended that the First-tier Tribunal had lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter on two grounds, first, the issue of apportionment had not been transferred to the First-tier Tribunal by the county court and, second, Mr Cain had admitted that he was liable to pay 50 per cent of the service charge.
Martin Rodger QC allowed the appeal in part. The jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal in a case transferred to it from the county court is confined to the question transferred and all issues comprehended within that question. However, that principle ought to be applied in a practical manner, with proper recognition of the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal in relation to residential service charges. When trying to identify which subsidiary issues ought properly to be treated as being included within the scope of the questions transferred, it is not appropriate to be too pedantic, especially where an order transferring proceedings is couched in general terms and where there is no suggestion that the court intended to reserve for itself any particular question. In this case, the question of apportionment under the lease was a necessary pre-requisite before the First-tier Tribunal could consider whether the sum payable was reasonable. The First-tier Tribunal therefore had jurisdiction to consider the issue. However, Mr Cain had, by agreement, admitted that an amount of the service charge was payable. It followed that the First-tier Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A(4) to hear the claim.
Continental Property Ventures Inc v White
LRX/60/2005, 15 February 2006
 
A breach of a landlord’s covenant to repair which results in further disrepair imposing a liability on the lessee to pay service charges, gives rise to an equitable set-off
Long lessees sought a determination in the LVT that service charges were not payable, on the ground that the costs had not been reasonably incurred. The LVT held that the works for a flat were made necessary because the landlord had neglected to carry out repairs to a leaking pipe within a reasonable time. If the landlord had complied with its repairing covenant the cost would have been far less. Accordingly, the sum reasonably incurred was only such sum as would have been incurred but for what was described as ‘the historic breach’. The landlord appealed.
HHJ Michael Rich QC dismissed the appeal. He stated that the breach of the landlord’s covenant to repair gives rise to a claim in damages. If the breach results in further disrepair imposing a liability on the lessee to pay service charges, that is part of what may be claimed by way of damages. It would give rise to an equitable set-off, and as such constitute a defence to a claim for service charges. This would not mean that the costs incurred were not reasonably incurred, but would mean that there would be a defence to their recovery. The determination of claims for damages is outside the jurisdiction of the LVT, but the tribunal does have jurisdiction to determine claims for damages for breach of covenant in so far as they constitute a defence to a demand for service charges in respect of which the LVT’s jurisdiction under section 27A has been invoked. There is no reason of principle why such jurisdiction should not extend to determining even a claim for loss of amenity or loss of health arising from breach of a repairing covenant.
See also: Daejan Properties Ltd v Griffin [2014] UKUT 206 (LC), which emphasises the evidential difficulties a tenant will face in establishing a defence of historic neglect.
Lennon v Ground Rents (Regisport) Ltd
[2011] UKUT 330 (LC), 18 August 2011
 
Where the question of the reasonableness of part of a service charge is transferred to LVT under Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2012 Sch 3 para 12 the LVT did not have jurisdiction to decide any other issues
Dr Lennon was the tenant of a flat. He disputed the amount of service charges payable in respect of an insurance premium. The landlord issued proceedings in the county court. A district judge ordered the question of the reasonableness of the insurance premium to be transferred to the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT). It determined that £350 (of £642.42 originally claimed) was reasonably incurred and payable. The LVT then proceeded to determine other issues between the parties (eg, whether Dr Lennon had overpaid service charges in earlier years and the reasonableness of certain administration fees). Dr Lennon appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), contending that the LVT had no jurisdiction to determine these other issues as it was limited by the terms of the transfer order made in the county court.
HHJ Huskinson allowed the appeal. The LVT only had jurisdiction to consider the case due to the county court order. That was limited to the issue of the insurance premium. It followed that the LVT did not have jurisdiction to decide any other issues. If the parties had wanted to enlarge the scope of the case before the LVT to other issues, then the appropriate course of action was for a separate application to be made to the LVT.
MacGregor v B M Samuels Finance Group plc
[2013] UKUT 471 (LC), 21 October 2013
 
The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine the effect of its decision on other leaseholders not a party to the application
B M Samuels Finance was the freeholder of two adjacent blocks of flats in Chatham. Mr MacGregor was the lessee of two flats. The freeholder applied to the LVT for a determination as to the amount of service charges payable by Mr MacGregor and a number of others. The freeholder’s application was largely successful. Mr MacGregor appealed to the Upper Tribunal. As a preliminary issue, he argued that, if he was successful in establishing that the relevant costs had not been reasonably incurred, the freeholder would be obliged to reimburse to the service charge account all the money that was shown not to have been reasonably incurred.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The jurisdiction of the tribunal was limited to determining the amount payable to an applicant under s27A. The tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider the effect of that determination on the other lessees.
Staunton v Taylor
[2010] UKUT 270 (LC), 9 August 2010
 
LVT is restricted to deciding matters which have been pleaded in the county court
George Bartlett QC held that the LVT’s jurisdiction on transfer derives from the order of the county court making the transfer. As the county court is restricted to deciding issues which have been pleaded so is the LVT. Although a county court may give permission to amend a statement of case, the LVT does not have that power. In Staunton this meant that the tenant was precluded from arguing that his service charges were not payable because the landlord had failed to comply with Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 s48 and Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s21B as he had not pleaded them in his defence. By deciding these matters the LVT had acted outside its jurisdiction, even though the order of transfer had asked the LVT to consider whether the service charges were payable.
Windermere Marina Village v Wild
[2014] UKUT 163 (LC), 28 May 2014
 
A provision of a lease which sought to oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was void
It was a provision of a lease that the proportion of the landlord’s expenses which the tenant was liable to pay was to be determined by the landlord’s surveyor.
Martin Rodgers QC held that this provision was void because it had the effect of providing for the manner in which an issue capable of determination under section 27A(1) was to be determined. It therefore infringed section 27A(6). Accordingly, it was for the Tribunal to determine what was a fair proportion of the service charge.
See also: Gater v Wellington Real Estate Ltd [2014] UKUT 561 (LC); [2015] L&TR 19, 5 December 2014.
Procedure
 
Court of Appeal
 
Hi-Lift Elevator Services v Temple
(1996) 28 HLR 1; (1995) 70 P&CR 620, CA
 
No right for lessee to obtain injunction restraining lessor from carrying out works
Under the terms of his lease, a lessee was liable to pay half of the lessor’s expenses in maintaining the main structure of the building. This included the roof. The lessors obtained three tenders for works to the roof. The cheapest of these cost £10,840. The lessee’s surveyor thought that only minor works, costing between £1,500 and £2,000, were necessary. The tenant applied for and obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the lessor from carrying out any works to the roof pending a determination on whether or not the works were necessary.
The Court of Appeal allowed the lessor’s appeal. If there is a landlord’s repairing covenant, it is for the landlord to decide what works to carry out and so there is no common-law right for a lessee to apply for an injunction to restrain a lessor from carrying out works under the covenant. There was no ‘serious issue to be tried’ within the meaning of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396, HL. In any event the lessee had an alternative remedy in that he could challenge the reasonableness of his service charges (Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s19).
See also: Winstone v Great Gate Management Co Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 776, 24 May 2012.
Morshead Mansions Limited v Di Marco
[2014] EWCA Civ 96; [2014] 1WLR 1799; [2014] 2 All ER 773; [2014] HLR 28; [2014] L&TR 13; [2014] 1 P&CR 20, 12 February 2014
 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss21 and 22 do not give a civil right to an injunction
Mr Di Marco was a long lessee in a block comprising 104 flats. He had a long-running dispute about service charges. Morshead issued two new claims for rent and service charges. Mr Di Marco counterclaimed, challenging the validity and propriety of the demands and the use of the money raised without complying with the provisions of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss21 (request for summary of relevant costs) and 22 (request to inspect supporting accounts). Breach of such provisions was a criminal offence. He sought mandatory injunctions under those sections. HHJ Hand QC struck out the counterclaims. Mr Di Marco appeal to the High Court succeeded.
The Court of Appeal allowed Morshead’s subsequent appeal. There is no power to grant a mandatory injunction to require a landlord to comply with its obligations under sections 21 and 22. Those sections were themselves re-enactments of earlier provisions contained in Housing Finance Act 1972 which had not provided for any injunctive relief. Given that history, it was unlikely that parliament intended there to be a civil remedy where the consequences of a breach were criminal. Where such remedies existed, parliament generally made that clear.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
Admiralty Park Management Company Ltd v Ojo
[2016] UKUT 421 (LC), 20 September 2016
A tribunal was entitled to raise an issue of its own volition, but it was required to give the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence in response
Mr Ojo was the long leaseholder of a flat. He did not pay the service charge demanded and the lessor brought proceedings in the county court. Mr Ojo defended the claim and the matter was transferred to the tribunal. At the final hearing, after the issues had been determined, the tribunal, of its own volition and without giving the lessor an opportunity to adduce evidence in response, decided that the service charge had not been calculated in accordance with the lease and as a result was not recoverable. The lessor appealed.
The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal in part. The tribunal had been entitled to raise the point as the departure from the lease was so fundamental to the issues raised at the hearing. The tribunal was entitled, especially when one party was unrepresented, to identify all of the important issues which needed to be considered even if they had been overlooked by the parties. The tribunal must, however, as a matter of natural justice give both parties an opportunity of making submissions and, if appropriate, adducing further evidence in respect of the issue.
Cain v Islington LBC (No 2)
[2015] UKUT 542 (LC), 25 September 2015
A tenant who pays service charges without protest or qualification over a long period of time is taken to have admitted that such charges are payable; neither the doctrine of laches nor any provision of the Limitation Act 1980, however, precludes an application to the tribunal under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A to determine whether historic service charges are payable
Mr Cain contended that a number of service charge demands, dating back over 12 years, were not payable because the costs had not been reasonably incurred. He had, however, at the time they had been demanded paid all such charges without any qualification or protest. The First-tier Tribunal held that it could be inferred that Mr Cain had, by paying such charges without qualification over a long period of time, admitted that the charges were payable or, alternatively, that Mr Cain was prevented from challenging service charges that had been demanded more than six years before his application to the Tribunal.
HHJ Gerald, sitting in the Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The First-tier Tribunal had been right to infer or imply from the tenant’s behaviour that he had agreed or admitted that the service charges were payable. The First-tier Tribunal was not required to identify a particular date upon which the agreement or admission of a particular service charge was or should be treated as having been made.
The First-tier Tribunal was wrong, however, to hold that the challenge by Mr Cain was barred by Limitation Act 1980 s19 (actions on a specialty or for the recovery of rent). An application to the Tribunal to determine whether a service charge was payable was not an action on a speciality within the meaning of Limitation Act 1980 s8 and so no provisions of that Act applied to prevent an application being made. Likewise, the authority could not rely on the doctrine of laches as an application to the tribunal under section 27A is not an application for equitable relief and the doctrine of laches only applies to applications for equitable relief when no limitation period is prescribed by statute.
Cowling v Worcester Community Housing Ltd
[2015] UKUT 496 (LC), 14 September 2015
The First-tier Tribunal lacks jurisdiction under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A to consider the reasonableness of a service where a county court has already entered a money judgment and decided that the cost is not a service charge within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18
Ms Cowling was an assured tenant. Her lease contained service charge provisions enabling Worcester, her landlord, to recover the costs of providing a television aerial. The service charge was a variable ‘service charge’ within the meaning of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18. Worcester issued a county court claim seeking, among other things, a money judgment for arrears of service charges. District Judge Khan held that the charges were contractually due and entered judgment for £511.51. He did not consider the issue of reasonableness, believing that Ms Cowling could issue separate proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal to have that issue determined. Mrs Cowling issued a new claim in the First-tier Tribunal to challenge the reasonableness of the charges. The First-tier Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application to challenge the reasonableness of the service charges because that had been determined by the county court.
HHJ Gerald, sitting in the Upper Tribunal, dismissed an appeal. He held that the money order or judgment remained extant. It not only resolved the question of liability but also of the amount which must be paid and by whom and the question of jurisdiction. No sensible distinction could be made between liability to pay and the amount payable. As matters stood, the appellate county court had determined that it was not a ‘service charge’ within Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s18. It followed that the First-tier Tribunal had no jurisdiction by virtue of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss27A(4)(c) and 27A(1).
Havering LBC v Smith
[2012] UKUT 295 (LC), 21 August 2012
 
A local authority was estopped from recovering more than it had promised would be recoverable
A council tenant exercised his right to buy a flat. The council gave notice under Housing Act 1985 s125 outlining future likely service charge liabilities. The sale was completed in 2001. In 2004, the flat was sold and the lease was taken by Ms Smith. Before purchasing, she sought an assurance, which was given by the council, that service charges would be limited to those in the section 125 notice. The council later sought service charges in respect of major works at amounts beyond those in the section 125 notice. Ms Smith applied to the LVT, which found that the recoverable charges were limited by the notice.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the council’s appeal. While the content of the notice would not otherwise have acted as a bar on recovery, the council was estopped by its own later representations from recovering a higher charge from Ms Smith.
Hemmise v Tower Hamlets LBC
[2016] UKUT 109 (LC), 23 February 2016
Issue estoppel applied to tribunal decisions; the fact that the first decision was, however, plainly wrong and the term of the lease still had more than 100 years to run amounted to special circumstances that justified a departure from the first decision
Mr and Mrs Hemmise were lessees of Tower Hamlets. Their lease was for a term of 125 years. The building formed part of an estate known as Lincoln Estate (North). In May 2006, Mr and Mrs Hemmise made an application to the LVT challenging the reasonableness of the service charge. The LVT decided, amongst other things, that the lease did not allow Tower Hamlets to recover costs that had been arisen from the maintenance of the estate. Tower Hamlets did not appeal against this decision. Tower Hamlets continued, however, to charge Mr and Mrs Hemmise for the cost of maintaining the estate. The LVT in 2015 held that it was not bound by the decision of the previous LVT and determined that Tower Hamlets could recover the costs of maintaining the estate. Mr and Mrs Hemmise appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
HHJ Behrens dismissed the appeal. The decision of the first LVT was obviously wrong; the lease clearly entitled Tower Hamlets to recover costs incurred in the maintenance of the estate. However, as the point had already been decided, this gave rise to an issue estoppel and as such a subsequent tribunal or court could only depart from the earlier decision in special circumstances. The second LVT had, however, been entitled to depart from the earlier decision. The following points gave rise to the necessary special circumstances:
(i) the first decision was plainly wrong;
(ii) the lease was for a 125 years and still had more than a 100 years to run;
(iii) it was unclear if the point as to the proper construction of the lease had been taken or considered by the Tribunal;
(iv) the issue of whether the estate charges were payable had not been pleaded; and
(v) Tower Hamlets did not wish to overturn the substance of the decision, ie what was payable, in 2006.
Hyslop v 38/41 CHG Residents Co
[2017] UKUT 398 (LC), 23 October 2017
 
First-tier Tribunal must serve notice of its reasons on every party to an application
The freehold applied for a determination that the appellant lessee was obliged to pay the service charge. The lessee did not respond to the application and the First-tier Tribunal decided the application in the freeholder’s favour. It asked that the freeholder serve each lessee with its decision. The lessee subsequently applied to set aside the decision on the basis that she had not been made aware of the proceedings or received the decision. The First-tier Tribunal refused to do so.
Martin Rodger QC allowed an appeal. The First-tier Tribunal was under an obligation to notify every party of its decision. ‘The proposition that justice requires that the final decision of a court or tribunal must be made available to the parties affected by it is so fundamental that it is difficult to find direct authority for it. It is obvious that the delivery of a decision is an indispensable part of dealing with a case fairly and justly.’ [60] It could not delegate that function to one of the parties. That was not permissible under the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) Property Chamber) Rules 2013 SI No 1169. Rule 36(2) must be interpreted as requiring that the First-tier Tribunal should discharge that obligation itself.
Nogueira v Westminster City Council
[2014] UKUT 327 (LC), 29 August 2014
 
The First-tier Tribunal could not accept undertakings from a landlord to carry out remedial works as opposed to making a finding that the works were not of a reasonable standard
Westminster carried out major works to six blocks of flats and sought to recover the costs under the service charge. The leaseholders sought to challenge the amount of the service charges on the basis that they had not been lawfully consulted or alternatively some of the work was not of a reasonable standard. The tribunal found that the consultation requirements had not been complied with but granted Westminster dispensation. The tribunal also held that the works were carried out properly, at a reasonable price and to a reasonable standard despite also finding that the standard of the installation in the flats they had viewed was not good. The basis for this decision was that Westminster had given undertakings promising to investigate certain defects and to carry out additional repairs arising from any such defects. The tribunal held that as there were 35 leaseholders all raising separate complaints it was unable to decide what reduction should be made to the service charge bill and to whom and this was the only practical way of disposing of the application. Ms Nogueira appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
The Upper Tribunal allowed her appeal. The tribunal was being asked to determine whether the works carried out were to a reasonable standard. It was evident from its decision that it was not satisfied that this was the case and it was not open to tribunal to hold that the works had been carried out to a reasonable standard on the basis of an assumption that further works would be undertaken. The tribunal was required to give a decision and reasons in respect of each allegation of works that were alleged not to be of a reasonable standard. It was not open to the tribunal to duck the issue because the task was too difficult; in applications that concerned a large number of leaseholders the tribunal was able to make a global reduction rather than considering each leaseholder’s case separately. While it was not necessary to determine the appeal, the Upper Tribunal held that the First-tier Tribunal was unable to accept undertakings because it had no way of enforcing them.
Parissis v Blair Court (St John’s Wood) Management Limited
[2014] UKUT 0503 (LC), 11 November 2014
The Limitation Act 1980 did not apply to applications under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A; the Limitation Act 1980 was only of application once the leaseholder sought to recover previously paid service charges in the county court
Parissis was the lessee of two separate flats, each with obligations to pay service charges. In November 2010, he made two separate applications to the LVT under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A challenging the service charges claimed for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and/or 2005. The LVT decided that the length of time that he had taken to bring the proceedings was unconscionable and that the landlord would be significantly prejudiced by the delay. It also decided that it had no jurisdiction because Parissis was time-barred for periods which were more than six years before his applications. Parissis appealed.
HHJ Huskinson allowed the appeal. By making his applications under section 27A, Parissis was not bringing an action to recover arrears of rent and so he was not barred by Limitation Act 1980 s19. Nor were they actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment. They were, accordingly, not barred by Limitation Act 1980 s9. His applications under section 27A were not actions founded on simple contract and so Limitation Act 1980 s5 did not apply. The LVT was, accordingly, wrong in finding that his applications were time-barred.
Red Kite Community Housing Limited v Robinson
[2014] UKUT 0134 (LC), 21 March 2014
 
The First-tier Tribunal could not reject a landlord’s evidence and use its own knowledge and expertise without first giving the landlord an opportunity to comment; whenever rejecting a party’s evidence the tribunal must give reasons
Ms Robinson sought, amongst other things, to challenge the amount payable under the service charge for cleaning and estate management. Red Kite supplied a detailed breakdown of what constituted the cleaning / estate management charge and the services that were provided under it. Ms Robinson did not adduce any evidence of comparable quotations from other contractors to demonstrate that the charge was unreasonable. At the hearing the tribunal inspected the block and used its knowledge and experience as an expert tribunal to reduce the relevant service charge by £100. The tribunal did not explain how it had reached its decision and did not make clear whether this was because the cost of the work was too expensive or because the standard of cleaning was not adequate.
Red Kite successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Wherever a tribunal decides to reject one party’s evidence because it does not accord with its own knowledge and expertise it must, as a matter of fairness and natural justice, inform both parties of its intention to do so and give either party an opportunity to comment or give further evidence. Whether this will require an adjournment or simply the opportunity to comment in the proceedings will depend on the circumstances of each case. As a general rule, the tribunal should not use its own knowledge or expertise to determine an issue where both parties have adduced comprehensive and cogent evidence on the subject. However, in the absence of such evidence, and where there is an unevenness between the parties, the tribunal may step in if it furthers the overriding objective in Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 r3. In any event, the Tribunal had fallen into error by failing to give reasons for its decision. Red Kite did not know if the charge was unreasonable because the cost was too high or because the work had not been carried out to a reasonable standard.
Schilling v Canary Riverside Development Ptd Ltd
[2005] EWLands LRX_26_2005, 6 December 2005
 
The burden is on the applicant (be it the tenant or landlord) to prove that work was either unreasonable or reasonable
HHJ Rich QC held that:
If the landlord is seeking a declaration that a service charge is payable he must show not only that the cost was incurred but also that it was reasonably incurred to provide services or works of a reasonable standard, and if the tenant seeks a declaration to the opposite effect, he must show that either the cost or the standard was unreasonable. In discharging that burden the observations of Wood J in the Yorkbrook Investments Ltd v Batten [1985] 2 EGLR 1000 case make clear the necessity for the LVT to ensure that the parties know the case which each has to meet and for the evidential burden to require the tenant to provide a prima facie case of unreasonable cost or standard.
Southwark LBC v Various Lessees of St Saviours Estate
[2017] UKUT 10 (LC), 12 January 2017
A tribunal is entitled, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, to find that a door is not in disrepair; in the absence of evidence the burden does not fall on an applicant lessee within an application under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A that a service charge is not payable to prove that a door was in repair
The eighty respondents were long leaseholders of flats situated within ten blocks of flats on the St Saviours Estate in Southwark. Southwark owned the freehold of each block. Each lease obliged the council, amongst other things, to keep the ten blocks of flats in repair. This included the front entrance doors and all other parts of the building retained by Southwark, eg communal entrance doors, refuse chutes and cupboard doors. Between March 2013 and April 2014, the council carried out major works to each block, which included the replacement of the lessees’ front entrance doors, most of the communal doors and other works to improve the fire resistance of the blocks such as replacing cupboard doors and refuse hatches. In advance of the works, the council carried out fire risk assessments of each block. Those assessments recommended the replacement of a small number of front entrance and communal doors that no longer complied with fire safety requirements. Generally, those assessments recommended that further assessments of each door should be undertaken before any major works programme was carried out. Southwark’s contractors did not, in advance of carrying out the works, undertake a survey of the condition of each door; instead, a surveyor took a photograph of each front entrance door. The council sought to recover the costs of those works from each of the lessees as a service charge and the lessees sought a determination that the sums were not payable. The First-tier Tribunal rejected the evidence of the authority’s surveyor as he was not an expert in fire resistance. As such, other than where the fire risk assessments had recommended replacement, there was no evidence of the front entrance doors being in disrepair. The First-tier Tribunal therefore decided that the cost of replacing each front entrance door was not recoverable other than where the authority’s own fire risk assessments had recommended a door’s replacement. The First-tier Tribunal also decided that the authority was limited to recovering 50 per cent of the costs of the works in respect of the other fire resistance measures, as while it was not disputed that some of the doors, cupboards and refuse chutes had been in a poor condition, some of the works may not have been needed if a full survey had been undertaken.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal. The First-tier Tribunal had accepted that a door which had deteriorated from its original condition and was no longer able to provide fire resistance for a period of 20 minutes was in disrepair. It had therefore identified the correct test. The First-tier Tribunal had then correctly asked itself whether there was any evidence that the condition of the front entrance doors was such that they were no longer able to provide equivalent fire resistance. It was entitled to reject the evidence of the council’s surveyor and find that, other than that set out in the fire risk assessments, there was not. The evidence of the council’s surveyor that the doors were in disrepair was inadequate as he had not assessed the fire resistance of any of the doors and did not have the expertise, knowledge or experience to do so. The fact that the lessees had not adduced any evidence of the condition of the doors was immaterial; the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to decide the question on the evidence, whatever its source, before it. This was not a case where it was necessary to resort to the burden of proof, but had there been no evidence of disrepair the consequence would have been that the cost of replacing all of the doors would not have been recoverable.
As to the fire resistance measures, the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to adopt a broad brush approach; the figure of 50 per cent was not plucked out of thin air but based on an assessment of the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal.
The Moorings (Bournemouth) Limited v McNeil
[2013] UKUT 0243 (LC), 16 May 2013
 
Parties in the First-tier Tribunal are estopped from litigating matters already determined in the county court
Mr McNeil was the leaseholder owner of a flat. The appellant was the resident management company and the freehold owner of the flat. The lease provided the freeholder with the power to make reasonable restrictions for the good running and management of the estate. There were problems with parking on the estate and the management company proposed a parking scheme to alleviate those problems. Mr McNeil parked his car in breach of the scheme. His car was clamped and he was charged. Mr McNeil paid the charge. In 2009, Mr McNeil issued proceedings in the county court for a refund in respect of the charge. He alleged that the management company was not entitled – under the lease – to impose the car parking scheme and that his right of way on the estate had been infringed. At a directions hearing, however, Mr McNeil conceded that the management company had the power to impose such a scheme, but challenged the imposition of the charges made under the scheme. Mr McNeil, subsequently, discontinued his claim. The management company sought it costs of defending the county court proceedings from Mr McNeil under the service charge. Mr McNeil refused to pay and the management company made an application under Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 s168 to the LVT for a determination that Mr McNeil was in breach of covenant. The LVT decided that the scheme was not permitted by the lease and the management company was therefore precluded from recovering its legal costs.
The management company successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Mr McNeil was estopped from contesting the legitimacy of the scheme. He had made the concession in open court, which had been recorded in the order of a district judge and which had not been appealed or set aside. It was irrelevant that he was not represented.
Wallace-Jarvis v Optima (Cambridge) Ltd
[2013] UKUT 328 (LC), 11 July 2013
 
Where there is prima facie evidence that a service charge has not been reasonably incurred it is for the landlord to show that a charge has been reasonably incurred
The leaseholder sought to challenge the amount she was required to pay in respect of water charges. The bill had been based on the consumption of around 10,000 cubic metres per annum for a development of 26 units. This equated to 11,500 showers per year for each of the 26 units. The LVT decided that while the bills were high in the absence of hard evidence that this water was not being used the service charge was payable.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. There was prima facie evidence that the water consumption being charged was unreasonably high. It was therefore for the landlord to justify the reasonableness of the charge. In the absence of any evidence that such an amount of water was actually being used the Upper Tribunal held that the payment for the water charges had not been reasonably incurred.
William & Gaydon v Island Homes Housing Association Ltd
[2013] UKUT 0153 (LC)
 
Once the LVT had admitted evidence filed late it could not ignore it
Mr Brown and Mr Gaydon were the leasehold owners of two flats. Island Homes was the freehold owner of both. Mr Brown and Mr Gaydon made an application to the LVT to challenge the reasonableness of service charges. In support of their claim Mr Lee – an accountant – gave evidence which demonstrated that there were discrepancies between the service charge account for the year 2009/10 and Island Home’s ledger’s which detailed their actual expenditure, ie the service charge accounts appeared to detail expenditure that had not been incurred. Mr Lee’s witness statement was, however, filed late and Island Homes did not respond to it. The LVT admitted the witness statement, but in its decision preferred the evidence of Island Homes because Island Homes had had insufficient notice to refute the allegations raised by Mr Lee.
The leaseholders successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal. Once the LVT had admitted the evidence of Mr Lee it was not open to the LVT to reject it simply because Island Homes had had insufficient time to respond to it. The LVT had failed to consider and have proper regard to Mr Lee’s evidence. The LVT should either have refused to admit the evidence of Mr Lee – on the basis it was filed late – or given Island Homes an opportunity to respond to it by adjourning the hearing. It could not simply ignore it once it had been admitted in evidence.
Costs
 
Costs are not recoverable in a residential property or leasehold case in the First-tier Tribunal unless a party has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings: the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 SI No 1169 para 13.
Commonly, though, leases allow landlords to recover some or all of their costs via a service or administration charge. A court or tribunal may, however, make an order under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20C preventing landlords from recovering their costs under the service charge. This does not apply if the costs are an administration charge.
Court of Appeal
 
Chaplair Ltd v Kumari
[2015] HLR 39 [2015] EWCA Civ 798; [2016] L&TR 1, 27 July 2015
A landlord was entitled to recover all of its costs in proceedings that had been transferred to the LVT and allocated to the small claims track
Mrs Kumari was a long lessee. Her lease contained provisions obliging her ‘to indemnify the Landlord … against all … costs losses expenses claims and demands arising out of any failure by the Tenant to observe or perform any of its obligations’. Chaplair brought county court proceedings to recover unpaid rent and service charges. That claim was allocated to the small claims track, but subsequently transferred to the leasehold valuation tribunal (‘LVT’). Chaplair sought to recover the costs of the claim and the proceedings in the LVT. District Judge Watson held that, as it was a small claim, the court could not award more than £200, the amount fixed by CPR 27.14. HHJ Wulwik, after referring to Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) (Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2)), and Church Commissioners v Ibrahim (Church Commissioners for England v Ibrahim) allowed Chaplair’s appeal. He held that the limitation of costs on the small claims track did not apply because the costs were not payable under the Civil Procedure Rules but under the terms of the lease.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs Kumar’s subsequent appeal. The judge had applied the correct principle. He had to deal with the landlord’s contractual right to costs. It was not suggested that that right was other than to a full indemnity for costs properly incurred. The relevant law was as it was held to be in Church Commissioners v Ibrahim.
Finchbourne Ltd v Rodrigues
[1976] 3 All ER 581, CA
 
Implied term that costs recoverable should be ‘fair and reasonable’
A clause in a lease stated that the lessor was entitled to recover as service charges a proportion of the money ‘expended’ in maintaining and running the block. The amount was to be ‘ascertained and certified by the [plaintiffs’] Managing Agents acting as experts and not as arbitrators’.
The Court of Appeal held that:
1)The certificate had to be prepared by someone other than the lessor. As the real lessor was in fact the managing agent who certified the amount due, there was no valid certificate and the sums claimed were not due.
2)In order to give business efficacy to the lease, there had to be implied a term that the costs recoverable from the lessee should be ‘fair and reasonable’. It could not have been intended that the lessors should have an unfettered discretion to adopt the highest conceivable standard of maintenance and to charge the lessees accordingly (cf, Bandar Property Holdings Ltd v J S Darwen (Successors) Ltd [1968] 2 All ER 305, QBD and Havenridge Ltd v Boston Dyers Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 73; [1994] 49 EG 111, CA).
Freeholders of 69 Marina, St Leonards-on-Sea – Robinson, Simpson & Palmer v Oram and Ghoorun
[2011] EWCA Civ 1258; [2012] HLR 12; [2012] L&TR 4, 8 November 2011
 
Freeholders’ costs before the LVT fell within the terms of the leases
The lessees were each long lessees in a building containing six flats. The lease reserved the service charge as rent and it was also a term of the lease that the lessees must ‘pay all expenses including solicitors costs and surveyors’ fees incurred by the Landlord incidental to the preparation and service of a notice under Section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 or incurred in contemplation of proceedings under Section 146 … of the Act.’ In 2005 the freeholders carried out works to rectify damage caused by water penetration. They claimed a proportion from the defendants as service charges. The claim was disputed on the basis that there had been a failure to comply with the consultation requirements of Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20. A leasehold valuation tribunal dispensed with those requirements and determined the sums payable. In a subsequent county court claim District Judge Nightingale found that the the lease required the lessees to pay the freeholder’s legal costs before the LVT. The lessees appealed. HHJ Hollis dismissed their appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed a second appeal. Given that the freeholders were required to obtain a determination in the LVT that the service charges were payable, under Housing Act 1996 s81, before serving a section 146 notice it followed that the lessee’s costs were incidental to the preparation of a section 146 notice and were therefore recoverable under the lease.
Note cf Escalus Properties v Robinson (Escalus Properties Ltd v Robinson) and Mohammadi v Anston Investments (Mohammadi v Anston Investments). See also Barrett v Robinson (Barrett v Robinson).
Holding and Management Ltd v Property Holding and Investment Trust plc
[1989] 1 WLR 1313; [1990] 1 All ER 938; (1989) 21 HLR 596; [1990] 05 EG 75, CA
 
A maintenance trustee, responsible for managing a block of flats, could not use a fund contributed to by leaseholders to pay for his costs of unsuccessfully defending proceedings brought against him
The defendant was a ‘maintenance trustee’ appointed under the lease to manage a block of flats on behalf of the landlord and held a maintenance fund which was provided by contributions from the lessees. The tenants brought proceedings against both the landlord and the maintenance trustee to enforce repairing covenants.
The proceedings were largely successful. It was held by Mervyn Davies J that the maintenance trustee, in defending the proceedings, had acted as agent for the landlord and not as trustee for the tenants, and so was not entitled to recover from the maintenance fund its legal costs in unsuccessfully defending proceedings brought by lessees. He also found that a proposed scheme, which involved the complete removal of the brick skin to the building, was not a repair but part of a scheme of improvements. The Court of Appeal dismissed appeals and cross-appeals.
Iperion Investments Corporation v Broadwalk House Residents Ltd
(1995) 27 HLR 196; (1996) 71 P&CR 34; [1995] 2 EGLR 47; [1995] 46 EG 188, CA
 
Where tenant had successfully challenged service charges, order made that costs of proceedings not to be added to service charge
A lease provided that the lessee was to pay, as service charges, a proportion of ‘all costs, sums, payments, charges and expenses properly incurred by the landlord in carrying out its obligations … and in the proper and reasonable management of in and about’ the property. The lessor claimed as service charges the costs of largely unsuccessful litigation against the lessee.
Although the Court of Appeal found that such costs were recoverable within the terms of the lease, it upheld an order made under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20C that the costs of the proceedings were not to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by the tenant or any other person. Peter Gibson LJ said that, in general, the landlord should not ‘get through the back door what has been refused at the front’. It was unattractive that a tenant who had been substantially successful in litigation against his landlord and who had not only been told by the court that he need pay no part of his landlord’s costs but also had an award of costs in his favour should find himself having to pay the landlord’s costs through service charges.
Littlestone v MacLeish
[2016] EWCA Civ 127; [2016] 1 WLR 3289, 10 March 2016
A standard section 146 cost recovery clause required the court to assess costs on the indemnity basis
A clause in a lease which required the lessee ‘to pay to the lessor all costs and expenses (including legal costs and fees payable to a surveyor) which may be incurred by the lessor in or in contemplation of any proceedings under sections 146 and 147 of the Law of Property Act 1925 notwithstanding forfeiture is avoided otherwise than by relief granted by the court’ entitled the lessor to an indemnity for all his costs and required the court to assess his costs accordingly.
Sella House Ltd v Mears
(1989) 21 HLR 147; [1989] 1 EGLR 65; [1989] 12 EG 67, CA
 
Cost of employing solicitors to recover arrears from other lessees not recoverable unless clear and unambiguous clause
Construing a service charges covenant in a long lease, the Court of Appeal held that a freeholder was not entitled to pass on to lessees as a whole the cost of employing solicitors and counsel to recover arrears of rent and service charges from particular lessees, since the clause in question did not contain any specific mention of lawyers, proceedings or legal costs, but was, rather, concerned with maintenance, safety and administration. There must be a clear and unambiguous clause to persuade the court that costs of such proceedings can be recovered from lessees as a whole.
High Court
 
Primeridge Ltd v Jean Muir Ltd
[1992] 1 EGLR 273, Official Referees’ Business
 
‘All proper costs’ did not entitle lessor to indemnity costs
Underlessees who had been defending a claim for service charges made a payment into court, which was accepted by the plaintiff landlord. As a result, in accordance with RSC Order 62 r5 (see now CPR 36.13) the plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the action ‘up to the time of giving notice of acceptance’. The plaintiffs, relying on a provision in the underlease which entitled them to recover ‘all proper costs charges and expenses … incurred … in connection with any breach of covenant’ sought those costs on an indemnity basis.
HHJ Esyr Lewis QC held that the contractual term did not ‘plainly and unambiguously’ entitle the plaintiffs to indemnity costs rather than costs on the standard basis. The words ‘all proper costs’ meant no more than such costs as may be recovered under an order of the court. The plaintiffs were, accordingly, not awarded costs on an indemnity basis.
R (Khan) v Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)
[2012] EWHC 2301 (Admin), 26 June 2012
 
The fact that costs had been reduced on a detailed assessment did not prevent the landlord recovering such costs through the service charge
The claimant held a long lease in a block of flats. A resident-owned management company incurred legal costs of £75,000 in earlier litigation against him. The claimant referred those costs to a costs judge for assessment and they were reduced to £25,000. The company then sought to recover the full £75,000 from all the residents by way of service charges. The LVT held that the lease entitled the company to recover its full costs. The Upper Tribunal refused permission to appeal from that decision. The claimant sought judicial review of the refusal of permission.
The High Court refused permission to bring a claim for judicial review. The £25,000 assessment simply capped what the company could recover from the paying party in the litigation. It did not prevent the company recovering its full costs through the service charge.
Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (formerly Lands Tribunal)
 
87 St George’s Square Management Ltd v Whiteside
[2016] UKUT 438 (LC), 10 October 2016
A landlord who had been awarded a proportion of his costs of the proceedings by the tribunal under rule 13 could recover the balance under the lease
The First-tier Tribunal ordered Mr Whiteside to pay 20 per cent of the landlord’s costs of proceedings in the Tribunal under rule 13 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013. The landlord subsequently sought to recover the remaining 80 per cent as an administration charge under an indemnity clause in the lease. A tribunal held that the landlord could not do so as it had, by obtaining an order under rule 13, exhausted its remedies for recovering the costs it had incurred.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. A landlord who first sought the recovery of its costs under rule 13 was not precluded or estopped from recovering any remaining balance under an indemnity covenant in the lease.
Barrett v Robinson
[2014] UKUT 0322 (LC), 29 July 2014
 
A standard forfeiture cost recovery clause did not entitle a landlord to recover costs before the LVT where there was no evidence that forfeiture had been contemplated
It was a term of the lease that Miss Barrett was required ‘to pay all reasonable costs charges and expenses (including solicitors’ costs and surveyors’ fees) incurred by the Lessor in or in contemplation of any proceedings or the preparation of any notice under section 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 notwithstanding forfeiture is avoided otherwise than by relief granted by the Court.’ Miss Barrett was also required to contribute towards the cost of insuring her flat. The lease did not reserve the payment of that sum as rent. Miss Barrett applied to the LVT for a determination as to the amount she should have paid for insurance over the preceding six years. The LVT decided, on a concession, that a small sum should be deducted. It declined to make an order under section 20C. Mrs Robinson sought to recover all her legal costs as an administration charge relying on that clause and she sought a determination from the LVT that the legal costs were payable. The LVT held that Miss Barrett was liable to pay Mrs Robinson’s costs relying on Freeholders of 69 Marina, St Leonards-on-Sea v Oram (Freeholders of 69 Marina, St Leonards-on-Sea – Robinson, Simpson & Palmer v Oram and Ghoorun).
Martin Rodgers QC allowed an appeal and commented that the decision of 69 Marina had ‘come as a surprise’ to landlord and tenant practitioners and had been subject to criticism. However,
[57]… If a service charge or administration charge is reserved as rent the decision of the Court of Appeal in 69 Marina is binding authority that a determination by the First-tier Tribunal is nonetheless a pre-condition to the service of a notice under section 146.  But the decision does not require that whenever a lease includes such a clause the landlord will necessarily be entitled to recover its costs of any proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal to establish the amount of a service charge or administration charge.  It is always necessary to consider the terms of the particular indemnity covenant and whether any relevant contemplation or anticipation existed in fact in the circumstances of an individual case.
In this case, Miss Barrett had brought the application in the LVT and there was no evidence that Mrs Robinson had contemplated forfeiture at that time. The costs were therefore not recoverable.
Bretby Hall Management Company Ltd v Pratt
[2017] UKUT 70 (LC), 17 February 2017
 
The costs of defending threatened proceedings were recoverable as a service charge
A long lease entitled the lessor to recover as service charges ‘All other expenses (if any) incurred by the Manager in and about the maintenance and proper and convenient management and running of the development.’ The lessor included as part of the service charge the sum of £11,100 in respect of its legal fees in a dispute with Mr and Mrs Pratt. The First-tier Tribunal disallowed that item in its entirety because proceedings had not commenced.
HHJ Behrens allowed the lessors appeal. The clause was wide enough to cover the costs of intended proceedings. It was plainly contemplated that the reasonable costs of managing the development should be recoverable under the service charge. Further, the First-tier Tribunal was wrong to have prevented the costs being recovered under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20C. Section 20C is concerned with proceedings before a court, tribunal or arbitral tribunal. In this case, the threatened proceedings did not materialise and so the jurisdiction under s20C did not arise.
Christoforou v Standard Apartments Ltd
[2013] UKUT 586 (LC), 17 December 2013
 
A landlord was entitled to recover its legal costs incurred in previous tribunal proceedings as an administration charge
Mr Christoforou was a lessee. He covenanted to pay service charges and, as a separate covenant, to indemnify the freeholder in respect of costs arising out of any breach of covenant by him. Standard, the freeholder issued a claim in the LVT for a determination that unpaid service charges were due. It was largely successful. Standard then claimed the legal costs it had incurred in respect of the proceedings, stating that they were costs due under the terms of the lease as they arose from Mr Christoforou’s breach of covenant. Mr Christoforou refused to pay those costs. The freeholder issued further proceedings in the LVT. It found that the costs were payable under the lease and were reasonable.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed Mr Christoforou’s appeal. The costs were contractually due under the terms of the lease and were administration charges. They arose directly out of a breach or non-observance of the covenants in the lease. The costs were reasonable in their amount. The purpose of Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 Sch 12 para 10(4) was to restrict the power of the LVT to award costs. It did not override a contractual right to costs and could not prevent costs being recovered under the lease.
Conway v Jam Factory Freehold Ltd
[2013] UKUT 0592 (LC), 10 December 2013
 
A term of a lease that allowed for employment of an ‘adviser of whatever nature’ covered legal costs
It was a term of a lease that a lessor was ‘In the management of the building and the performance of the obligations of the landlord hereinafter set out the landlord shall be entitled to employ or retain the services of any appropriately qualified or experienced … advisers of whatever nature as the landlord may reasonably require in the interest of good estate management and the proper expenses incurred by the landlord in connection therewith shall be deemed to be an expense incurred by the landlord in respect of which the tenant shall be liable to make a contribution in accordance with the service chargepercentage …’.
The Upper Tribunal held that the clause was sufficiently wide to allow the lessor to recover the legal costs it had incurred in successfully resisting an application for a manager to be appointed.
Daejan Properties Ltd v Griffin
[2014] UKUT 206 (LC), 14 May 2014
 
A tribunal must consider whether costs are payable under the lease and if they are a service charge before deciding whether to make an order under section 20C
Dougall v Barrier Point RTM Company Ltd
[2017] UKUT 207 (LC), 16 May 2017
 
Failure to pay the service charge did not constitute unreasonable conduct for purposes of Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 r13
It was a term of Mr Dougall’s lease that he would indemnify the lessor ‘in respect of charges for other services payable in respect of the Demised Premises’. The RTM company successfully argued before the First-tier Tribunal that this clause entitled it to the recovery of its legal costs incurred in obtaining a determination that Mr Dougall was liable to pay a service charge and that the failure by Mr Dougall to pay his service charge over a number years amounted to unreasonable conduct and as such should result in an order for costs being made against him under Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 r13.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. The clause was not couched in language which expressed clearly an intention that the lessee would indemnify the lessor against costs incurred in legal proceedings between them. It was limited to charges which the lessor would be obliged to pay to a third party. Nor was it appropriate to make an order for costs under rule 13; the failure by Mr Dougall to pay his service charge did not amount to him having conducted the proceedings unreasonably, not least in circumstances where he had some success in reducing the service charge payable.
Fairbairn v Etal Court Maintenance Ltd
[2015] UKUT 639 (LC), 30 November 2015
Lessor unable to recover legal costs under the service charge incurred in proceedings brought against it by a leaseholder for breach of covenant
Etal Court Maintenance Ltd (‘the company’) was the lessee owned freehold company of Etal Court. Mrs Fairbairn was the leasehold owner of a flat within the estate. Her lease required the lessor ‘to do all other acts and things for the proper management administration and maintenance of the blocks of flats as the Lessor in its sole discretion shall think fit’. It also required her to pay a contribution towards the service charge, which included any expenditure incurred by the lessor in performance of the preceding obligation.
In 2011, another leaseholder – Mrs Stevenson – sent the company a letter before claim alleging that it had failed to comply with its repairing obligations under her lease. The company, after taking legal advice, admitted liability. Notwithstanding this admission, Mrs Stevenson’s solicitors issued proceedings which were subsequently settled and the company was ordered to pay Mrs Stevenson damages and her costs. The company subsequently sought to recover these costs from the other lessees under the service charge. Mrs Fairbairn subsequently disputed her liability to pay. A tribunal decided that the sums were payable under the service charge. Mrs Fairbairn appealed.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. While the company’s approach to the litigation had been reasonable, it was not entitled to recover its costs of the litigation under the service charge. Responding to litigation that had arisen as a result of its own failure to manage the block properly could not be classed as proper management or administration of the block. In principle, the company could recover professional fees for advice relating to what it was obliged to do under the lease as opposed to responding to the consequences of a failure of compliance. The fact that the company was of limited means and owned by all of the lessees was relevant to background circumstances in which the meaning of the lease has to be considered. However, in this case it did not justify a radical departure from the natural meaning of relatively standard words.
Cf Assethold v Watts (Assethold Ltd v Watts); Iperion Investments Corporation v Broadwalk House Residents Ltd (Iperion Investments Corporation v Broadwalk House Residents Ltd); Conway v Jam Factory Freehold Ltd (Conway v Jam Factory Freehold Ltd)
See also: Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd v Avon Estates (London) Ltd [2016] UKUT 317 (LC), 4 August 2016.
Fairhold Freeholds No 2 Ltd v Moody
[2016] UKUT 311 (LC), 31 August 2016
An indemnity covenant did not entitle a lessor to recover its own costs of enforcement; the costs must have been incurred by, and owed to, a third party
It was a term of a lease that the lessee ‘indemnify the lessor against all actions proceedings costs claims and demands in respect of any breach non-observance or non-performance thereof’. The lessor sought the recovery of £50, as an administration charge, arising from the lessee’s failure to pay the ground rent. The lessee paid the ground rent, but refused to pay the administration charge. The lessor subsequently instructed solicitors to recover the unpaid administration charges. The First-tier Tribunal held that such charges were not recoverable. The lessor appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal. In the context of a leasehold covenant, one essential characteristic of a covenant of indemnity, is that the lessee’s breach must have given rise to an obligation on the part of the lessor to make a payment to some third party. It followed that the lessor could not recover its own costs, in this case the administration charge, which it did not owe to a third party. It also followed therefore that the lessor was not entitled to recover the costs of instructing solicitors to recover the administration charge.
Geyfords Ltd v O’Sullivan
[2015] UKUT 0683 (LC), 17 December 2015
A clause that entitled a lessor to its costs incurred in the ‘proper and convenient management and running’ of a development did not extend to the recovery of its legal costs in proceedings to determine whether service charges were payable; clear and unambiguous terms were required to impose such an obligation
Geyfords Ltd were the freehold owners of a block of flats. Ms O’Sullivan was the leasehold owner of a flat within the block. Ms O’Sullivan, and a number of other lessees, contended before the LVT that the service charge for a number of years was not payable. Geyfords, after instructing solicitors and counsel, successfully resisted the application. Geyfords subsequently sought the recovery of its legal costs from those proceedings as an administration charge under the lease. In doing so they relied on a clause of the lease which required the lessees to pay a proportion of ‘all other expenses (if any) incurred by the lessors or their managing agents in and about the maintenance and proper and convenient management and running of the Development’. Ms O’Sullivan and the other lessees contended before the LVT that legal costs incurred in the previous proceedings were not recoverable under this clause. The LVT agreed and Geyfords appealed to the Upper Tribunal.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Clear and unambiguous terms are required to impose what is an onerous and unusual payment obligation and the court should not bring within the general words of a service charge clause anything which does not clearly belong there.
The words ‘proper and convenient management and running’, used in the context of a mixed residential and commercial building, are not words that have a precise meaning which either clearly includes or clearly excludes the activity of litigating over the collection or quantification of sums required to repair the building. While ‘management’ may sometimes include obtaining professional advice, including legal advice, and even litigation, the words ‘management and running’ were not sufficiently clear to include proceedings to enforce the obligation of an individual leaseholder to make a payment to the landlord. Moreover, commercial sense dictated that one would expect the employment of clear language for onerous and unpredictable burdens to be imposed on a lessee.
Liverpool Quays Management Ltd v Moscardini
[2012] UKUT 244 (LC), 25 July 2012
 
Legal advice was not recoverable under the terms of the lease
A property management company sought to recover, through service charges, legal costs it had incurred in respect of legal advice about action that could be taken against the developer of its blocks of flats in relation to structural defects. The LVT held that no provision in the leases entitled the company to recover those charges.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the company’s appeal in respect of that item. The legal advice did not relate to matters of ‘maintenance’ or the ‘running’ of the property (which the lease did cover) but was about prospective action the leaseholders themselves might take against the developers.
Matier v Christchurch Gardens (Epsom) Ltd
[2017] UKUT 56 (LC), 15 February 2017
 
An unrepresented party taking misconceived points in good faith does not amount to unreasonable conduct for the purposes of rule 13
In the context of an appeal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal to award the respondent landlord a proportion of its costs, Martin Rodger QC, Deputy Chamber President, held:
[17] … The FTT suggested that it would only be in very rare cases that a leaseholder would be found to have acted unreasonably in seeking to resist a dispensation application. I agree with that suggestion, and would go further. I would suggest that it will be equally rare for reliance by an unrepresented individual acting in good faith on points of defence, even if they are misconceived, to amount to unreasonable conduct. The FTT has ample powers to control the taking of manifestly bad points by striking them out or determining them summarily. It is preferable that the incurring of unnecessary costs be controlled by the exercise of those powers, rather than by penalising unrepresented parties who cannot tell a good point from a bad one.
Primeview Developments Ltd v Ahmed
[2017] UKUT 57 (LC), 7 March 2017
 
A lessor had not acted unreasonably by encouraging a lessee to enter into an agreement that a service charge was payable
Primeview were the freehold owners of a block of flats. Mr Ahmed was the lessee of one of the flats. Primeview obtained a written admission from Mr Ahmed’s predecessor that the costs of works to the block were payable as a service charge. Primeview sought a determination in the First-tier Tribunal that the admission meant that the First-tier Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A(4), to determine whether the service charge was payable. Before seeking its determination, Primeview refused to mediate with the lessee. The First-tier Tribunal subsequently decided that the admission was in fact an agreement for the determination of the amount of the service charge that was payable and was therefore void by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A(6). In total, the First-tier Tribunal only reduced the sum that the lessee was required to pay by 5 per cent, but made an order against Primeview requiring it pay to pay a third of the lessee’s costs under Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 r13 on the basis that it should have sought to mediate the dispute and should not have sought a determination from the First-tier Tribunal that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue. Primeview appealed against the decision to make the costs order.
The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal. Neither Primeview’s decision not to mediate nor to seek a determination that the First-tier Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the amount of the service charge that was payable constituted unreasonable conduct. A landlord’s desire to clarify its entitlement to recover significant but contentious service charge expenditure is understandable. Nor had Primeview acted unreasonably by encouraging the lessees to enter into an agreement; this was clearly envisaged by Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s27A(4) and was a legitimate objective for parties seeking to avoid the need to refer service charge disputes to the First-tier Tribunal.
SCMLLA (Freehold) Ltd, Re Cleveland Mansions and Southwold Mansions
[2014] UKUT 58 (LC), 11 February 2014
 
The First-tier Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to impose section 20C orders in respect of leaseholders who have not applied for the benefit of a section 20C order
A LVT determined substantive issues regarding disputed service charges raised by five of 140 tenants of two blocks of flats. The LVT also made an order under Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s20C limiting the landlord’s costs to 50 per cent and holding that they were to be regarded as relevant costs to be taken into account in determining the amount of any service charge payable by all (140) of the tenants.
Martin Rodger QC allowed an appeal. An LVT does not have jurisdiction to make an order in favour of any person who has not made an application under section 20C nor been specified in an application made by someone else. He varied the order to relate to the five applicants only.
Seacon Residents Company Ltd v Oshodin
[2012] UKUT 54 (LC), 22 February 2012
 
Where a landlord or a management company is owned by all of the lessees the rule that provisions of a lease are to be construed restrictively did not apply
The freeholder was a lessee owned company. Each flat was subject to a tri-partite lease in which a management company was responsible for, amongst other things, recovering the service charge. Each lease contained a provision that ‘all costs expenses and other liabilities which are incurred by the Manager shall be the subject of reimbursement recoupment or indemnity by the lessees of the Apartments so that no residual liability for any such costs expenses or liabilities shall fall upon the Manager’. The LVT held that this provision did not entitle the freeholder or the management company to recover its costs of proceedings before the LVT.
The Upper Tribunal allowed an appeal. Where the freeholder or management company is owned by all of the lessees with no assets of its own the rule in Gilje v Charlgrove Securities Ltd (Gilje v Charlegrove Securities Ltd) that service charge provisions are to be construed restrictively did not apply.
See now Arnold v Briton (Arnold v Britton).
Sinclair Gardens Investments (Kensington) Ltd v Clemo
[2015] UKUT 573 (LC), 3 November 2015
A landlord may, where a county court claim has been transferred to the Tribunal, recover its Tribunal costs as an administration charge unless the county court has already decided whether such sums are payable
Sinclair Gardens brought a claim in the county court for a money judgment arising from the non-payment of service and administration charges. The claim was transferred to the LVT who decided that all of the sum claimed was payable. After the proceedings had returned to the county court the parties agreed a consent order in which Mr Clemo agreed to pay ‘the claimant’s costs of the action’ in the sum of £811. The sum of £811 did not, however, cover Sinclair Gardens’ costs before the LVT. Sinclair Gardens subsequently sought to recover those costs as an administration charge. Mr Clemo refused to pay them and argued that the county court had already dealt with the question of costs in the consent order. The First-tier Tribunal agreed. Sinclair Gardens appealed.
The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal. In principle, in cases where the county court has transferred the claim to the tribunal, a landlord may recover the costs of proceedings before the tribunal as an administration charge unless the county court has already expressly dealt with that entitlement. In this case, the consent order had, by using the words ‘of the action’, dealt with the costs in the county court and the tribunal. It followed that Sinclair Gardens could not recover the costs of the tribunal as an administration charge.
The Church Commissioners v Derdabi
[2010] UKUT 380 (LC), 27 September 2011
 
The Upper Tribunal gave guidance on the correct approach to section 20C applications
[18]… The usual starting point will be to identify and consider what matter or matters are in issue, whether the tenant has succeeded on all or some only of them, whether the tenant has been successful in whole or in part …
[19]… Where the tenant is successful in whole or in part in respect of all or some of the matters in issue, it will usually follow that an order should be made under s20C preventing the landlord from recovering his costs of dealing with the matters on which the tenant has succeeded because it will follow that the landlord’s claim will have been found to have been unreasonable to that extent, and it would be unjust if the tenant had to pay those costs via the service charge.  By parity of reasoning, the landlord should not be prevented from recovering via the service charge his costs of dealing with the unsuccessful parts of the tenant’s claim as that would usually (but not always) be unjust and an unwarranted infringement of his contractual rights.
[20]… However, whether and if so to what extent such an order should be made may depend on many factors. In some cases, “proportionality” will be material.  If the reduction is but a fraction of that sought by the tenant, it may follow that the landlord should only be prevented from recovering the costs of dealing with that fraction. If the tenant succeeds on only one of three issues, it may be that the landlord should only be prevented from recovering his costs of dealing with the successful issues.  …
[21]…    In other cases, “conduct” will be relevant: even though the tenant has succeeded and perhaps substantially, has he unnecessarily raised issues with which the landlord has had to deal such that the landlord should not be prevented from recovering any associated costs via the service charge.  There will also be cases where “circumstances” may be relevant – such as the landlord being a resident-owned management company with no resources apart from the service charge income.
[22]…    Where the landlord is to be prevented from recovering part only of his costs via the service charge, it should be expressed as a percentage of the costs recoverable.  The tenant will still of course be able to challenge the reasonableness of the amount of the costs recoverable …
[23]…    In determining the percentage, it is not intended that the tribunal conduct some sort of “mini taxation” exercise.  Rather, a robust, broad-brush approach should be adopted based upon the material before the tribunal and taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances including the complexity of the matters in issue and the evidence presented and relied on in respect of them, the time occupied by the tribunal and any other pertinent matters.  It will be a rare case where the appropriate percentage is not clear. It is the tribunal seized with resolving the substantive issues which is best placed to determine all of these matters.
Union Pension Trustees Ltd v Slavin
[2015] UKUT 103 (LC), 11 May 2015
Legal costs not recoverable under the terms of a lease
It was a term of a lease that the lessor could recover from the lessee ‘any other costs and expenses reasonably and properly incurred in connection with the Landlord’s Property including without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing (a) the cost of employing Managing Agents and (b) the cost of any Accountant or Surveyor employed to determine the Total Expenditure and the amount payable by the Tenant hereunder’
The Upper Tribunal held that this did not entitle the lessor to recover its legal costs from previous litigation before the LVT. The clause had to be read in the context of the lease as a whole. It was telling that another clause expressly referred to the recovery of legal costs, whereas the above clause did not.
Willow Court Management Company (1985) Ltd v Alexander
[2016] UKUT 290 (LC), 21 June 2016
The Upper Tribunal gave guidance as to the application of rule 13 (ie the power of the First-tier Tribunal to award costs against parties that have behaved unreasonably within the proceedings).
‘Unreasonable’ conduct includes conduct which is vexatious, and designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case. It is not enough that the conduct leads in the event to an unsuccessful outcome. Conduct will only be unreasonable where there is no reasonable explanation for it. The unreasonable behaviour must also be related to the proceedings and is therefore unlikely to include an unreasonable refusal to pay service charges.
The behaviour of an unrepresented party with no legal knowledge should be judged by the standards of a reasonable person who does not have legal advice. The failure to take legal advice or form a view before issuing proceedings does not of itself amount to unreasonable conduct. Likewise, the withdrawal of a claim, even at a late stage in the proceedings, ought to be encouraged not discouraged by an order for costs. The withdrawal of a claim would only amount to unreasonable behaviour if it could be shown that the claim was fanciful or without merit from the outset. While lying to the tribunal will constitute unreasonable conduct, a poor understanding or recollection of events will not.
Once the tribunal has established that conduct has been unreasonable it must then consider whether or not it is appropriate to make an order. It does not automatically follow that unreasonable behaviour will result in a costs order being made. At the second stage it is essential for the tribunal to consider whether, in the light of the unreasonable conduct, it ought to make an order for costs or not; it is only if it decides that it should make an order then a third stage is reached when the question is what the terms of that order should be. It is not limited to awarding the costs occasioned by the unreasonable conduct, albeit that will be a relevant factor in deciding the amount to be awarded. Moreover, it does not follow that an order for the payment of the whole of the other party’s costs assessed on the standard basis will be appropriate in every case of unreasonable conduct.
Such applications should not be regarded as routine, should not be abused to discourage access to the tribunal, and should not be allowed to become major disputes in their own right. They should be determined summarily, preferably without the need for a further hearing, and after the parties have had notice of the application and been given a reasonable opportunity to make submissions. Those submissions are likely to be better framed in the light of the tribunal’s decision, rather than in anticipation of it, and applications made at interim stages or before the decision is available should not be encouraged. The applicant for an order should be required to identify clearly and specifically the conduct relied on as unreasonable, and if the tribunal considers that there is a case to answer (but not otherwise) the respondent should be given the opportunity to respond to the criticisms made and to offer any explanation or mitigation. A decision to dismiss such an application can be explained briefly. A decision to award costs need not be lengthy and the underlying dispute can be taken as read. The decision should identify the conduct which the tribunal has found to be unreasonable, list the factors which have been taken into account in deciding that it is appropriate to make an order, and record the factors taken into account in deciding the form of the order and the sum to be paid.
CHAPTER T
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