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CHAPTER V
 
Allocations
General
 
Times 6 March, 4 March 2009Housing Act 1996 Part 6 governs how local housing authorities may allocate housing accommodation. Housing accommodation includes the allocation of accommodation that an authority may hold under Housing Act 1985 Part 2 as well as where it nominates a person to be an assured tenant of a registered provider of social housing: ss159(2). In England, it does not include the allocation of housing to tenants who are already secure or assured tenants of registered providers of social housing: s159(4A). An authority is prohibited from allocating such accommodation other than in accordance with its own allocation scheme: s166A(14) (in England) and s167(8) (in Wales). An authority’s scheme must give certain groups a reasonable or additional preference under its scheme: s166A(3) (in England) and s167(2) (in Wales), otherwise an authority has an absolute discretion to determine how it allocates accommodation under its scheme and (s159(7)) and may determine the priority to be given to applicants with a reasonable preference: s166A(5) (in England) and s167(2A) (in Wales). An authority is prohibited from allocating accommodation to certain classes of person that the Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers have determined shall not be eligible for accommodation (eg certain persons from abroad subject to immigration control): ss160ZA(2–4) (in England) and ss160A(3–5) (in Wales). In England, an authority has the power to exclude other classes of persons from its own scheme: s160ZA(7).
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
 
Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CC
[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009
 
Allocation policy giving homeless households remaining in their own homes lower priority than those placed in temporary accommodation was irrational
Court of Appeal
 
Birmingham CC v Qasim
[2009] EWCA Civ 1080; [2010] HLR 19; [2010] LGR 253, 20 October 2009
 
Allocations made outside an allocation scheme not voidTimes 19 April
The council adopted a housing allocation scheme based on priority bands, for the purposes of Housing Act 1996 Part 6. A clerical officer employed in one of the council’s area housing offices improperly manipulated the council’s computer system to grant tenancies of more than six separate council properties without reference to the allocation scheme. The council sought possession against the defendants who had been granted those tenancies on the basis that they had not been allocated in line with its allocation scheme and were therefore void: Housing Act 1996 s167(8). In the alternative, the council claimed possession under the statutory grounds in Housing Act 1985 Sch 2. The claims were struck out. The secure tenancy regime had to be treated as a complete code under which possession could only be claimed on statutory grounds. These claims were doomed to fail because there was no evidence that any of the families had given any false information to obtain the tenancies or paid any premium for them. The council appealed against the rejection of its claim that the tenancies were void for want of compliance with the allocation scheme.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The council’s powers to grant tenancies lay in Housing Act 1985 Part 2. Failure to comply with the allocation scheme under Housing Act 1996 Part 6 did not render the tenancies void. Part 6 is concerned with selection and nomination and not with the grant of tenancies. Lord Neuberger MR said that allocation of housing under an allocation scheme and the granting of specific tenancies were distinct exercises:
It seems to me that Part II of the 1985 Act and Part 6 of the 1996 Act are concerned with different, if in practice often closely connected, activities. Part 2 of the 1985 Act regulates the power of a local authority, such as the council, to effect disposals (including sales and lettings) of housing accommodation, and prescribes the consequences of any failure to comply with its regulatory regime. On the other hand, Part 6 of the 1996 Act is concerned with requiring local housing authorities, such as the council, to prepare housing allocation schemes and to allocate housing in accordance therewith. In other words, Part 6 of the 1996 Act is concerned with, indeed limited to, establishing and then managing priorities between applicants for residential accommodation (which may or may not be owned by the local authority in question) as it becomes available for letting, which effectively is preliminary to, and not part of, the actual letting of such accommodation, which is governed by Part 2 of the 1985 Act (para 18).
The fact that the tenancies had been granted without reference to the allocation scheme did not render them void. That did not empty section 167(8) of effect because:
… if an authority failed to allocate housing accommodation in accordance with their allocation scheme, an applicant who was prejudiced thereby could apply to the Administrative Court, seeking for instance, an order that the allocation in question be set aside. Such an applicant would, of course, have to act quickly if he wanted to stop a specific tenancy being granted; but, even if the application was made too late (or failed on grounds of discretion), it would still presumably have the effect of ensuring that the authority observed the terms of their scheme in the future (para 39).
R (Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC
[2009] EWCA Civ 1218; [2010] HLR 13, 21 October 2009
 
Allocation schemes are to be read in common sense way; authority entitled to ignore applicant’s children living with her as part of her household, where children were adults and ineligible
Islington had a choice-based letting scheme that assessed housing needs by the use of points. Its scheme provided that ‘the needs of all individuals in the applicant’s household will be taken into account when points are awarded’. The claimant lived with her husband, five children (aged 31, 29, 27, 24 and 22) and three young grandchildren. The council declined to take the five adult children into account when assessing the claimant’s points as they were all independent adults and were each subject to leave to remain in the UK which was conditional on not having recourse to public funds. The claimant complained that the scheme did not define ‘household’ and, on an ordinary meaning of the word, the whole family lived as one household. Cranston J dismissed a claim for judicial review. The claimant appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The allocation scheme was not an enactment and had to be read in a practical, common sense and non-legalistic way. The scheme had to be given an interpretation that ‘allows a sensible degree of flexibility when it comes to dealing with individual cases’ (para 31). The council had been entitled to take account of the fact that none of the five adult children would have qualified for social housing in their own right. It had applied the scheme correctly, interpreted in a common sense fashion, to the particular circumstances of the claimant.
Compare R (Kimvono) v Tower Hamlets LBC (R (Kimvono) v Tower Hamlets LBC).
R (Bibi (No 1) and Al-Nashed) v Newham LBC
[2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237; (2001) 33 HLR 84; (2001) Times 10 May, CA
 
Legitimate expectation resulting from the promise of council accommodation to homeless applicants required to be considered
R (Faarah) v Southwark LBC
[2008] EWCA Civ 807; [2009] HLR 12; [2008] LGR 894, 11 July 2008
 
Unpublished administrative practice unlawful; for authority to decide whether or not to allow priority to run from before date of new scheme
In September 2005, the council’s arrangements for letting homes changed from a points-based allocation scheme to a banded choice-based lettings scheme. It had to decide how to deal with applicants who had been assessed for points under the old scheme and were to be banded under the new one. The claimant had medical priority under the old scheme (20 points) but was not given the equivalent medical priority (Band 3) in the banding scheme, although the wording of the medical priority categories was virtually the same. The council was, in fact, operating unpublished administrative criteria for medical assessments that could not be squared with the criteria for the new scheme and a decision in the claimant’s case was made pursuant to that. In judicial review proceedings, HHJ Mackie QC held that the old and new schemes for assessment of medical need were indistinguishable in substance. He quashed the decision that the claimant should not be accorded Band 3 medical priority, and granted a declaration that the transitional provisions for those with 20 medical points were unlawful. He also declared the new scheme unlawful because it did not specify accurately the basis on which priority dates within bands could be computed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the first declaration. Not only was there no material difference between the two relevant categories, but the claimant’s case (and others) had been dealt with by applying an unpublished administrative practice not part of the published allocation scheme. The second declaration was set aside. The new scheme did not make any provision for priority dates within bands to be earlier than the date of commencement of the new scheme. It was for Southwark to consider whether or not to allow priority to run from a date earlier than the commencement of the new scheme. Once that decision was made, the arrangements for according any such priority dates had to be published as part of the scheme.
Compare Van Boolen v Barking and Dagenham LBC (R (Van Boolen) v Barking and Dagenham LBC).
R (H and others) v Ealing LBC
[2017] EWCA Civ 1127, 28 July 2017
 
Scheme that allocated 20 per cent of lettings to working households and model tenants did not unlawfully discriminate against disabled or women applicants
In 2012, Ealing amended its allocation scheme so that 20 per cent of its lettings would be made available only to applicants from working households and those council tenants who had complied with their tenancy agreement. The claimants were disabled and / or single mothers who did not work. The amended scheme was quashed by the High Court on the grounds that it unlawfully discriminated against the claimants and Ealing had failed to comply with either Equality Act 2010 s149 or Children Act 2004 s11. Ealing appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The part of the scheme which allocated 20 per cent of Ealing’s lettings to working households and model tenants was indirectly discriminatory within the meaning of Equality Act 2010 s19. The judge had, however, been wrong to hold that the discrimination could not be justified as he had failed to consider the allocation scheme as a whole when determining the impact that the amended scheme had had on women and the disabled and had been wrong to take into account the schemes of other local authorities to support his conclusion that Ealing’s scheme could be less intrusive. The other schemes were radically different from Ealing’s scheme and sought to achieve different aims.
The majority doubted, without deciding, that the amended scheme engaged Article 8 for the purposes of establishing a claim for unlawful discrimination under Article 14, as Article 8 did not give rise to a right for a ‘settled home’. In any event, the judge had failed to weigh in the balance the nature and extent of the discrimination against the aims and operation of the allocation scheme as a whole.
The judge had also been wrong to find that the amended scheme breached Children Act 2004 s11. Ealing’s evidence disclosed that the amended scheme had made no difference to the number of allocations made to single mothers.
Although Ealing had failed, when devising the scheme, to carry out a sufficient analysis of the impact that the amended scheme would have on the disabled or women in order to comply with Equality Act 2010 s149, there was evidence that the amended scheme was under review and it was therefore inappropriate to quash the scheme.
R (Jakimaviciute) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC
[2014] EWCA Civ 1438; [2015] HLR 5, 6 November 2014
Allocation schemes cannot exclude classes of person who are owed a reasonable preference
The council adopted a new social housing allocation scheme pursuant to Housing Act 1996 Part 6. The scheme designated certain classes of applicant as non-qualifying (Housing Act 1996 s160ZA(7)). They included a class comprising homeless applicants whom the council had provided with suitable temporary accommodation under its homelessness functions (Housing Act 1996 Part 7). The claimant fell into that class. As a result she would normally be entitled to a statutory ‘reasonable preference’ in any allocation scheme (Housing Act 1996 s166A(3)) but the council told her she did not qualify for its scheme at all. She brought a claim for judicial review contending that it was unlawful to exclude from an allocation scheme a person who would otherwise be entitled to a reasonable preference. She was refused permission to judicially review the decision and appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of appeal allowed her appeal. The duty under section 166A(3) to frame the allocation scheme so as to secure that reasonable preference is given to certain classes of people is a fundamental requirement which applies to the arrangements for allocation as a whole, including the setting of any qualification criteria under section 160ZA(7). That duty required all applicants with a reasonable preference to be given some priority under the scheme and they therefore could not be excluded from an authority’s scheme other than ‘by reference to factors of general application, such as lack of local connection or being in rent arrears’.
X and Y v Hounslow LBC
[2009] EWCA Civ 286; [2009] PTSR 1158; [2010] HLR 4; (2009) 12 CCLR 254; [2009] 2 FLR 262; [2009] Fam Law 487, 2 April 2009
 
Authority not negligent in failing to give urgent transfer to vulnerable tenant who was later subject to an attack in her home
High Court
 
Darby v Richmond upon Thames LBC
[2015] EWHC 909 (QB), 18 March 2015
A local housing authority does not owe applicants for housing under Housing Act 1996 Part 6 a duty of care
In April 2010, Mr Rabbets was diagnosed as suffering from acute myeloid leukaemia. Mr Rabbets requested that he be re-housed because his health was at risk while he lived with his sister and her daughter. He submitted medical evidence in support which showed that it would be very dangerous for him to remain living where he was. Richmond’s allocation scheme provided that 200 points, which would result in an allocation being made very quickly, would be awarded where an applicant’s medical condition was life threatening and their accommodation was undermining their health. In December 2010, Richmond only awarded Mr Rabbets 50 points. Mr Rabbets subsequently died of an infection he caught from his sister’s child in January 2011. Ms Darby, as executor of Mr Rabbets estate, brought a claim in negligence against Richmond. Richmond applied to strike out the claim.
HHJ McKenna sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge struck out the claim. Richmond, when operating its allocation scheme under Housing Act 1996 Part 6, did not owe Mr Rabbets a duty of care. The House of Lords had previously held in O’Rourke v Camden LBC (O’Rourke v Camden LBC) that a breach of, what is now, Housing Act 1996 Part 7 was not actionable in private law. The principle applied equally to Part 6.
Dixon v Wandsworth LBC
[2007] EWHC 3075 (Admin), 20 December 2007
 
Council entitled to find claimant ineligible on basis that his behaviour would justify the making of an outright possession order
The claimant was a joint tenant of council flat with his sister. The property became unsuitable for his sister and she was required to serve a Notice to Quit in order to be re-housed by the council. The claimant applied to the council for alternative accommodation and was informed that he would be granted a tenancy of a one-bed flat when one became available. He remained in the original flat awaiting an offer. Following a subsequent police raid on 10 February 2006, the claimant was convicted for possession of a small amount of cocaine. On 16 March 2006 a further police raid resulted in the claimant being cautioned for possession of a small amount of herbal cannabis. The council then decided that the claimant was ineligible for the allocation of accommodation under Housing Act 1996 Part 6 on the basis that he was guilty of unacceptable behaviour (s160A). He applied for a review of that decision under section 167(4)(d). During the course of further enquiries police records indicated that the claimant had previously been cautioned for similar offences in 1996. In a detailed letter the review officer informed the claimant that he considered that all the elements for exclusion for unacceptable behaviour under section 160A were satisfied. In accordance with the Code of Guidance (in force 31 January 2003) he found that the county court would grant an outright possession order. The claimant was told that he would be evicted from his original flat. He applied for judicial review.
Michael Supperstone QC dismissed his application. He found little assistance on whether an outright order for possession would be made on the basis of the established case-law. It was necessary to examine the facts of the individual case with care. He found that the review officer’s decision was not unlawful. Furthermore, the decision under challenge, concerning as it did the system for allocating accommodation in the future, did not interfere with the claimant’s right to respect for his home under Article 8 ECHR. The possession order that had been obtained and that was now to be enforced resulted from the service of the notice to quit.
El Yemlahi v Lambeth LBC
[2002] EWHC 1187 (Admin), 29 May 2002
 
Policy designed to prevent leapfrogging within queues not unlawful
The applicant and his partner applied under Lambeth’s allocation scheme and were placed in the queue for one-bedroom accommodation. His partner then became pregnant and Lambeth reassessed his needs and placed him in the two-bedroom queue (which he chose over remaining in the one-bedroom queue). Under the scheme, his waiting time on the two-bedroom list ran from the date of the reassessment, rather than from the date of his initial application. He had nearly reached the top of the one-bedroom queue but would have to wait a minimum of two years for a two-bedroom property. He sought judicial review of the allocation policy, claiming that it was unreasonable because a family could be constantly relegated to the bottom of the housing queue as it grew.
Sullivan J dismissed his application. Lambeth’s policy of linking priority to waiting time for a particular size accommodation rather than date of application was designed to prevent leapfrogging within queues. This was not in principle unreasonable. What the applicant perceived as unfair might be regarded as entirely fair when considered from the perspective of other applicants. Lambeth’s approach was within the ambit of its discretion under Housing Act 1996 s167.
Jones v Luton BC
[2016] EWHC 2036 (Admin), 3 August 2016
Authority had been entitled to conclude that an applicant for a non-statutory succession was not a dependent of the deceased and therefore did not fall within the authority’s policy for granting non-statutory successions
Mr and Mrs Jones were joint secure tenants of a two-bedroom council house. Mrs Jones died in 2012. Mr Jones died in May 2015. Their son, the claimant, remained in occupation with: (1) his civil partner; and (2) that partner’s brother. The brother had complex health issues including diabetes. He was looked after by the claimant and by his own brother (the claimant’s partner). In addition, the claimant and his partner each suffered from chronic depression. The claimant applied to the council for the grant of a fresh tenancy of the house to him. The council’s housing allocation scheme stated:
Non-successors
If a tenant of the Council dies and there is another member of the household who does not have the right to succeed but who:
Had been living with the tenant for the year before the tenant’s death (this does not include lodgers or B&B guests) or
Had been resident and looking after the tenant for the year before the tenant’s death or
Has lawfully accepted responsibility for the tenant’s dependants
The Council will consider offering a new tenancy where the landlord is satisfied this is a priority when viewed in the context of other demands on housing needs in the area. If a new tenancy is considered, this could be either in the same accommodation or in suitable alternative accommodation.
The council’s housing appeals and review panel (HARP) decided not to offer a tenancy of the property, but instead to offer the tenancy of a one-bedroom property elsewhere for the claimant and his partner. The HARP considered that the partner’s brother was not a dependant of the claimant or a member of his household.
Judicial review was sought on the basis that the decision that the brother was not a dependent member of the household was wrong in law and/or that it failed to respect the brother’s right to respect for his ‘family life’: Article 8 ECHR.
Mr Ter Haar QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) dismissed the claim. He said at para 32:
In my judgment, the HARP was entitled on the evidence before it to take the view that [the partner’s] medical condition was not sufficient to render him a dependent member of the family of the claimant.
The brother had only moved into the home shortly before the late Mr Jones died. The medical evidence did not establish that he could not live independently from the claimant and his partner. Given the limited time he had resided with them, the HARP was entitled to find that he was not a member of the claimant’s household.
M and A v Islington LBC
[2016] EWHC 332 (Admin), 25 February 2016
A unitary authority’s housing department had an obligation to assist the children’s services department perform its functions even though Children Act 1989 s27, did not apply; Islington’s scheme, which governed when housing would provide alternative accommodation, was lawful
Islington’s housing department operated a scheme in which any professional employed, inter alia, in children services could request that a child be provided with immediate re-housing if an ordinary transfer application would be likely to lead to delay which was considered detrimental to a child’s welfare. While the director of children’s services was entitled to make only 15 nominations a year, this did not preclude children’s services from making additional referrals to housing. Wherever a child was deemed to be at an immediate risk of severe injury or a fatality the head of housing was required to consider the case within 24 hours and to keep the case under review. Were there was a risk of harm, an occupational therapist was required to draw up a risk management plan and both housing and children’s services were required to keep the case under review.
M and A were severely autistic children. Both of their mothers, who they lived with, were secure tenants of Islington. They both lived in flats on the first floor. M, as a consequence of his autism, lacked any sense of danger. He contended that the two-bedroom maisonette he lived in with his mother and brother was unsuitable because, as it was located on the first floor, he could not be left to play on his own as there was a risk that he would climb out of a window and fall to the ground injuring himself. In October 2014, Islington’s children’s services department decided that a transfer to alternative accommodation was not an urgent or high need and that any risk was being met by a risk management plan. It decided that it was not necessary to ask the housing department for assistance in re-housing M and his family immediately (although the housing department did subsequently increase the number of points M’s mother was entitled to under its allocation scheme).
A, despite also being very active and lacking any sense danger, was unable to climb the stairs without assistance. She had on one occasion tried to escape through a window. As a result her mother had to keep all of the windows closed which exacerbated problems of condensation and mould. A contended that the flat was therefore unsuitable. Islington social services department agreed that the property was unsuitable and that A would benefit from a ground floor flat with an enclosed garden. After a meeting with the housing department, A’s points under the allocation scheme were increased, but not to a level that enabled her to immediately bid successfully for alternative accommodation, it was subsequently decided by the social services department that a transfer to alternative accommodation was not an urgent or high need and that any risk was being met by a risk management plan.
Both M and A argued that Children Act 1989 s27 required Islington’s housing department to assist the children’s services department discharge its functions under Children Act 1989 s17 by providing both families with alternative accommodation. Alternatively, if section 27 did not apply, guidance – ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ – could be read as requiring local housing authorities to comply with a request from a children’s services department for help in the exercise of their functions.
The claim was dismissed. Section 27 did not apply as Islington was a unitary authority; R (C1 and C2) v Hackney LBC (!!Housing Law Casebook - 7th edition:R (C1 and C2) v Hackney LBC!!) had not been wrongly decided. However, Parliament had clearly intended, through the ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ guidance, that housing departments in unitary authorities should assist social services authorities in the exercise of their functions. It was, however, for the authority to determine the manner in which the department’s co-operated and judicial review was not the way to obtain co-operation. In the circumstances, Islington’s scheme was lawful. The fact that neither M nor A had been provided with alternative accommodation did not render the scheme unlawful. Nor could it be said that the housing department’s failure to provide alternative accommodation was irrational.
R v Canterbury CC ex p Gillespie
(1986) 19 HLR 7, QBD
 
Policy which excluded consideration of individual circumstances unlawful
The council, following a policy not to accept on to its housing waiting list anyone who held a tenancy with another local authority, refused the applicant’s request to be put on its waiting list.
Granting an order of mandamus requiring the council to reconsider its decision, Simon Brown J held that its policy, which allowed ‘no exceptions beyond those expressly provided for’, had been ‘applied without proper consideration of the individual considerations of the applicant’s case’. The policy, although not ‘intrinsically irrational’, was a ‘rule which requires to be followed slavishly rather than merely a stated general approach which is always subject to an exceptional case and which permits each application to be individually considered’.
R (C) v Islington LBC
[2017] EWHC 1288 (Admin); [2017] HLR 32, 31 May 2017
 
The failure to explain the circumstances in which a direct offer would be made to someone who was permitted to bid for accommodation under an authority’s scheme was unlawful; a local lettings policy that applied only to existing tenants was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim
C originally lived in Southwark with her husband and three children. She left Southwark after suffering domestic violence and applied to Islington for accommodation under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. Islington subsequently provided C, who was deaf, and her three children with a three bedroom property in Islington. She subsequently applied to join Islington’s housing register and was awarded 110 points. Under Islington’s scheme, those with less than 120 points were prevented from bidding for accommodation. In practice, and in apparent contrast to the wording of the scheme, such applicants could be provided with accommodation under a ‘direct offer’. C sought to judicially review the lawfulness of the scheme. The scheme also operated a local lettings policy that gave existing tenants of Islington priority, over other applicants, to bid for newly available accommodation that had been built by Islington that was either located on applicant’s estate or within an applicant’s ward.
The claim for judicial review was allowed in part. The existence or operation of the discretion to make direct offers to applicants with less than 120 points was not properly explained and appeared to contrary to the wording of Islington’s scheme. Accordingly, as this was central to the operation of the scheme, the scheme was unlawful. The local lettings policy was, however, lawful. Although, the local lettings policy discriminated against applicants who did not reside on an estate or ward in which new housing was being built, the discrimination was in pursuance of a legitimate aim, i.e. to make it easier for existing social tenants to move to new housing, and was a proportionate means of achieving that aim. The scheme did not prevent other non-council tenant applicants from being allocated accommodation; it actually freed up accommodation to be provided to non-council tenants. Although the scheme could have been less intrusive to C, the scheme was not manifestly without reasonable foundation and was a proportionate means of achieving Islington’s legitimate aim.
R v Lambeth LBC ex p Njomo
(1996) 28 HLR 737, QBD
 
Rigid application of policy relating to rent arrears unlawful
The council’s policy of not approving transfer requests from people in arrears of rent was subject to a number of exceptions. Examples of them were set out in the policy.
It was held that there was nothing inherently wrong in this approach. However, the evidence showed that the council’s consideration of the claimant’s application had been confined to a consideration of whether she came within the specified exceptions set out in the policy, which she did not. The claimant’s particular individual circumstances warranted consideration by the council but had not been considered. The council, in rigidly applying its policy, had failed to take a relevant matter into consideration. The decision was quashed.
See: Comment in R v Wolverhampton MBC ex p Watters (R v Wolverhampton MBC ex p Watters). See also R v Southwark LBC ex p Melak (1997) 29 HLR 223 QBD.
R v Lambeth LBC ex p Trabi
(1998) 30 HLR 975, QBD
 
Applicant had legitimate expectation that policy (to grant tenancies to child-caring partners left in possession) would be applied
See Housing Law Casebook 3rd edition, E1.16.
R v Macclesfield BC ex p Duddy
[2001] JHL D16, 17 October 2000, QBD
 
Allocation made outside the published rules unlawful but relief refused due to delay
See Housing Law Casebook 4th edition, S1.5.
R v Newham LBC ex p Miah (Askir)
(1996) 28 HLR 279, QBD
 
Policy not to move people with rent arrears to permanent accommodation lawful
R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Khalique
(1994) 26 HLR 517, QBD
 
Policy to defer allocation of permanent accommodation unlawfully made and rigidly applied
See Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T51.24
R (Adow) v Newham LBC
[2010] EWHC 951 (Admin), 14 April 2010
 
Out-sourcing of medical assessments in breach of policy unlawful; declaration made despite applicant having obtained alternative accommodation
Newham’s housing allocation scheme, made under Housing Act 1996 Part 6, provided that medical assessments of applications for housing accommodation would be carried out by the ‘medical assessment officer in the quality and review team’. The claimant made an application for housing supported by the reports of a GP, a paediatrician and an environmental health officer. The application needed a medical assessment. The council had no employee in post as a ‘medical assessment officer’ and sent the claimant’s application for assessment to an external adviser, a Dr Keen. He advised that no change to the claimant’s medical priority status was required and the council accepted that advice and declined further medical priority. The claimant sought judicial review. Prior to the hearing she secured alternative accommodation through her landlord. She pursued her application for a declaration.
McCombe J, granted a declaration that the council had acted in breach of the terms of its scheme by having ‘out-sourced’ its medical assessment The declaration was in part made due to the authority’s lack of candour in its dealings with the applicant’s solicitors.
R (Alansi) v Newham LBC
[2013] EWHC 3722 (Admin); 2014 HLR 25; [2014] PTSR 948; [2014] HLR 25; [2014] BLGR 138, 27 November 2013
 
An authority was not prevented from amending its allocation scheme where the effect was to reduce the priority afforded to certain applicants where those applicants had relied to their detriment on the priority given to them under the previous scheme
The claimant applied to Newham for homelessness assistance: Housing Act 1996 Part 7. It accepted that she was owed the main housing duty (section 193) and she was provided with temporary accommodation. The claimant registered herself on the council’s housing allocation scheme for social housing accommodation: Housing Act 1996 Part 6. She was one of about 400 homeless applicants who were each told that if they took a qualifying offer of an assured shorthold tenancy in the private rented sector they would still retain their priority status under the council’s housing allocation scheme. The claimant and the other applicants acted on those assurances, left their temporary council accommodation and took private rented sector tenancies.
The council later changed its allocation scheme. The change removed priority status from the group of 400, subject only to an individual right to a review of their ranking on the allocation scheme. The claimant brought a claim for judicial review, contending that she had a legitimate expectation that the council would honour the commitment it had made.
Stuart-Smith J dismissed the claim. Although the claimant had enjoyed a legitimate expectation that she would retain priority status, and had relied on the council’s promise to her detriment, the council had not acted unlawfully in changing its policy given the demands on it to shape its allocation scheme in order to meet competing priorities for a limited stock of social housing.
R (Bauer-Czarnomski) v Ealing LBC
[2010] EWHC 130 (Admin), 18 January 2010
 
Decision on banding relying on medical advisers’ opinions that went beyond medical remit was unlawful
The council operated a choice-based lettings scheme with bands, adopted for the purposes of Housing Act 1996 s167(1). The claimant applied for an allocation but was only placed in Band D (the lowest band). Band C would apply if ‘the household’s current housing conditions are having an adverse effect on their medical condition which creates a particular need for them to move’ (para 3). The claimant considered that, for medical reasons, he should be placed in a higher band and submitted a report from his doctor. The council commissioned medical advice that confirmed the GP’s view that an adverse health effect arose in the current accommodation. However, the medical adviser (Dr Keen) went on to advise adversely about what priority should be afforded and about the necessity to move. The council obtained a further opinion from a psychiatric adviser who expressed the view that other housing applicants were in more unpleasant situations. The council relied on those reports and confirmed Band D status.
In proceedings for judicial review, Collins J quashed that decision. The council had relied on the advisers’ expressions of opinion in respects which went well beyond a true medical advice remit. The judge held that the claimant should have been in at least Band C, if not Band B, and said at paragraph 12:
The problem here is that the doctors went beyond their medical remit. They agreed with the effect that the situation was having on Mr Bauer-Czarnomski. They then went on to give opinions as to whether he should be put on whatever band was considered appropriate, which was not, as I repeat, a matter for them and was an opinion which the council should not have relied on because it was an immaterial consideration and it rendered their decision irrational in the Wednesbury sense. I say ‘in the Wednesbury sense’, in fact in the sense that is indicated by Lord Diplock in the CCSU case: not perverse, but having regard to an immaterial consideration. But, in fact, having regard to the medical evidence, it would also, and indeed was, in my judgment, a perverse decision to keep him in Band D.
R (C1 and C2) v Hackney LBC
[2014] EWHC 3670, 7 November 2014
Children Act 1989 s27 does not apply to unitary authorities
C1 and C2 were a brother and sister aged four and five. They both had behavioural difficulties and lived with their mother in a one bedroom flat owned by Family Mosaic, but facilitated by Hackney, after they had been forced to flee domestic violence. It was not in dispute that the one bedroom flat was unsuitable and that the family required a three bedroom property. Previous judicial review proceedings had been settled on the basis that Hackney’s children’s services should make a request under Children Act 1989 s27, that the housing department provide the family with suitable accommodation. No accommodation was provided and the family brought a judicial review.
The judicial review was dismissed. Section 27 did not apply to a unitary authority as it required one authority to make a request of another. In any event, when a social services authority made a request for assistance under section 27 it could not compel a housing authority to provide accommodation if it was not minded to do so. The circumstances in which section 27 could undermine an otherwise rational decision by a housing authority would be few and far between.
R (Cranfield-Adams) v Richmond Upon Thames RLBC
[2012] EWHC 3334 (Admin); [2012] All ER (D) 114 (Jun), 19 June 2012
 
It was not unlawful for an allocation scheme to suspend applications for a period of two years where an applicant had refused an offer of suitable accommodation
The claimant was a private sector tenant. He applied for social housing under the council’s housing allocation scheme. He was made an offer of accommodation but refused it. The council’s allocation scheme provided that the effect of refusing a suitable offer would be that the application would be cancelled and any further application would be deferred for a period of two years.
The claimant was then made homeless and applied for accommodation under the homelessness provisions of Housing Act 1996 Part 7. The effect of his being homeless was that he was entitled to a reasonable preference in the allocation of housing under the council’s scheme: Housing Act 1996 s167(2)(a). The council decided that he remained subject to a deferral.
Jeremy Stuart Smith QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed a claim for judicial review of that decision. Both the scheme and the decision to apply it were lawful given:
the extreme pressure on social housing;
the fact that the council had no housing stock of its own;
the need for co-operation with the local providers of social housing;
the legitimate interests of those housing providers in maximising rent; and
the administrative burden on the council when an applicant refused an offer.
R (HA) v Ealing LBC
[2015] EWHC 2375 (Admin), 7 August 2015
An allocation scheme that excluded any person who had not been resident in the borough for more than five years was held to be unlawful
HA suffered domestic violence at an address in Hounslow. She left this address and applied to Ealing for assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. Ealing decided that it owed her the full duty under section 193(2). She subsequently applied to join Ealing’s housing register. Her application was, however, rejected because Ealing’s allocation scheme provided that, absent exceptional circumstances, applicants who had not lived in Ealing for the last five years could not apply for accommodation under Part 6 and HA had not lived in Ealing for the last five years. HA challenged the lawfulness of the scheme on the grounds that it did not give her a reasonable preference, unlawfully discriminated against women and victims of domestic violence and Ealing had failed to apply Children Act 2004 s11 when devising the scheme. Alternatively, Ealing had fettered its discretion and not considered whether her facts were exceptional so as to allow her to bid.
The claim for judicial review succeeded. Part 6 required all allocation schemes to be framed to give people, falling within the reasonable preference categories, some preference over those who did not. The five year residence qualification excluded whole categories of applicants with a reasonable preference, eg those owed a duty under Part 7, and was therefore unlawful. The allocation scheme also unlawfully discriminated against women under both Article 14 and Equality Act 2010 s29. In any event, there was no evidence that Ealing had, when refusing HA’s application, considered HA’s personal circumstances and it had therefore unlawfully fettered its discretion.
R (Hillsden) v Epping Forest DC
[2015] EWHC 98 (Admin), 7 January 2015
There was no requirement that an authority’s allocation scheme should contain a residual discretion to allow applicants to bid for housing where they did not otherwise meet the qualifying requirements of the scheme
Mrs Hillsden had originally applied to join the authority’s housing register when she was a secure tenant of Newham. In May 2012, however, she decided to relinquish her secure tenancy following advice from social services and moved to Epping Forest to stay in privately rented accommodation. In May 2013, Epping Forest adopted a new allocation scheme. It provided, amongst other things, that a person could not join the housing register and be eligible for an allocation of a secure tenancy unless they had resided in the authority’s area continuously for a period of three years or more. As a result, Mrs Hillsden was removed from the housing register. Mrs Hillsden challenged the decision on the basis that the authority had failed to consider exercising its discretion under the scheme to allow her to remain on the housing register or, in the alternative, insofar as the authority’s scheme prevented such a discretion to be exercised, it was unlawful
McCloskey J dismissed the claim for judicial review. The scheme did not allow for any person who had not resided in the authority’s area continuously for a period of three years to be admitted to the housing register. The decision was reached on a proper construction of the scheme as a whole. The witness statements of the authority’s assistant director as to the intent of the scheme were disregarded as there was a risk that they could be self-serving and they had not been subject to cross examination. Nor was the scheme itself unlawful. There is no public law requirement that the scheme contain a residual discretion to allow persons who did not qualify for an allocation, such as Mrs Hillsden, to be admitted to the housing register. The insertion of a discretion of this kind is only required where the decision maker is exercising a statutory discretion. In this case, the authority was not required to exercise a statutory discretion under Housing Act 1996 Part 6; the authority had no choice but to operate an inflexible and rigid scheme.
R (Kabashi) v Redbridge LBC
[2009] EWHC 2984 (Admin), 20 November 2009
 
Not unfair to have start date based on date of re-assessment for larger propertyTimes 6 March, 4 March 2009
Ms Kabashi was homeless. The council accepted that it owed her the main housing duty in Housing Act 1996 Part 7 s193 and provided her with temporary accommodation. It placed her on its choice-based lettings allocation scheme with an effective registration date of 11 September 2003 and with an assessed need for a three-bedroom property. In 2007, Ms Kabashi’s household circumstances changed. She informed the council and it reassessed her as needing a two-bedroom property. It amended her registration date to 1 August 2007 under a provision in its scheme that:
For new applicants … their registration date is when we receive their application. However, should an applicant’s assessed housing need change necessitating the provision of a particular type of accommodation or property with more or less bedrooms than originally needed, the effective date will be when the new need arose (para 8).
The scheme contained no discretion enabling council officers to depart from that rule. The effect was that any bid from Ms Kabashi for a two-bedroom property would attract less priority than a bid from a person who had been registered for two bedrooms from, for example, 2006. She sought judicial review claiming that the provision in the scheme was irrational because it penalised an applicant where the change of circumstances had diminished the extent of accommodation needed.
HHJ Thornton QC dismissed the claim. Having had regard to R (Ahmad) v Newham LBC (R (Ahmad) v Newham LBC) and El Yemlahi v Lambeth LBC (El Yemlahi v Lambeth LBC), he held that the scheme was not rendered unlawful by the omission of any residual discretion. The council had advanced its reasons for adopting the rule in the scheme that it had applied. It was not the role of the court to evaluate those reasons provided the scheme complied with the statutory requirement to give a reasonable preference to the categories of applicant identified in Housing Act 1996 Part 6 (as it did).
R (Kimvono) v Tower Hamlets LBC
(2001) 33 HLR 78, QBD
 
Unlawful to ignore ineligible members of eligible applicant’s household when allocating accommodation
The council’s allocation scheme provided that three-bedroomed accommodation would be allocated if a household comprised children of the opposite sex at least one of whom was aged seven or over. The applicant fulfilled those criteria but one of his children was still waiting for her application for indefinite leave to remain in the UK to be granted. The council considered that, because she was not a ‘qualifying person’ as a result of her immigration status, it was prevented by Housing Act 1996 s161 from including her as part of the applicant’s household when assessing his housing needs and allocating accommodation. It advised him that he would only be offered two-bedroomed accommodation.
Collins J quashed the decision. On a true construction, section 161 was only concerned with whether an applicant for accommodation (rather than another member of his household) was a qualifying person. The immigration status of the applicant’s daughter was irrelevant and she was to be taken into account by the council when making an allocation to the applicant.
Compare: R (Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC (R (Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC).
R (Maali) v Lambeth LBC
[2003] EWHC 2231 (Admin); [2004] HLR 12
 
Decision based on assumptions irrational
The claimant was the secure tenant of a second/third floor maisonette which she occupied with her four young children. There was no lift. She and her eldest daughter suffered from severe asthma. She applied to Lambeth for a transfer. Her doctor stated that ‘when [her] asthma is bad, it would be impossible for her to climb stairs alone, let alone with children and shopping’. She was assessed as being within group D of Lambeth’s allocation scheme, a ‘mainstream’ group which covered a number of the categories of applicants listed in Housing Act 1996 s167(2). She asserted that she should be in group B, covering emergencies, and applied for judicial review asserting that the assessment was unlawful.
Crane J allowed the application. The medical assessment of whether the claimant was eligible for inclusion in group B contained assumptions which rendered the assessment flawed. The council’s medical adviser had attributed the claimant’s stays with friends to the need for assistance with child care, rather than to her difficulty at times in climbing the stairs, as she had asserted. There was no basis for the medical adviser’s substitution of different reasons. Furthermore, there was no basis for concluding that, because exercise was beneficial for asthma sufferers, the climbing of stairs was a positive aspect. The fact that the claimant might climb the stairs carrying a child and shopping had been ignored. The assessment was so flawed as to be irrational and Wednesbury unreasonable. It was quashed and an order made for the claimant to be reassessed in relation to the group B criteria.
See also: R (Wakie) v Haringey LBC [2003] EWHC 2107 (Admin), 2 July 2003 (medical assessment not irrational); R v Westminster CC ex p Hussain (1999) 31 HLR 645, QBD (offer of bedsit failed to have regard to community care assessment) (see Housing Law Casebook 3rd edition, E1.27); R v Oxford CC ex p Crowder (1999) 31 HLR 485, QBD (decision that applicant’s daughter no longer lived with her based on inadequate enquiries) (see Housing Law Casebook 3rd edition, E1.19); R (Sleith) v Camden LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 347 (refusal of tenancy to carer of deceased tenant justified under policy).
R (McDonagh) v Hackney LBC
[2012] EWHC 373 (Admin), 15 February 2012
 
It was not irrational for an authority to restrict the allocation of Traveller’s sites to applicants with a connection to the borough or to require applicants to re-register every year
In 2008, the council adopted a new allocation policy for pitches on its official Gypsy and Traveller sites. The policy required applicants to re-register every year and to provide documentary evidence of a residential connection with the borough. The claimant, an Irish Traveller, sought a judicial review of the policy claiming that it imposed unrealistic and bureaucratic requirements on a mobile and vulnerable group and was therefore irrational. Kenneth Parker J dismissed the claim:
… I discern no irrationality in the starting point of Hackney’s policy that requires a residential connection with the borough, nor in the requirement that residence must be contemporary, in the sense that the Traveller can show either continuing physical presence, or that the Traveller has retained a c/o address in the borough. It must make sense to afford priority to those who are in fact living in Hackney, or who have lived there and have retained a firm point of contact with Hackney (para 27); …
Nor, in my view, is it irrational to require that registration on the list must be renewed. Given the small number of pitches and the intense competition for the few pitches that do become available, it is essential that those on the list have a continuing interest and continue to meet the criteria. Without an effective sift of that nature, the list could well become unmanageable and would retain on it those who either had no serious interest in securing a pitch in Hackney, or who had far inferior claims in terms of connection with Hackney (para 29).
R (Moore) v Wandsworth LBC
[2012] EWHC (Admin), 17 January 2012
 
A decision to refuse an application for the allocation of a tenancy was quashed where the decision had not been taken in accordance with the authority’s allocation scheme
The claimant’s father and mother both died. They had been, in turn, the secure tenants of the family home. The claimant had no statutory right to succeed to the secure tenancy as he would be a second successor: Housing Act 1985 s87. He applied to the council for a discretionary tenancy under section 5 of the council’s allocation scheme. This set qualifying criteria and provided that:
Such decisions are taken by the area housing manager and the rehousing manager jointly. Where agreement cannot be reached the matter will be referred to the head of housing management and head of housing services for a final decision.
The claimant’s application was refused by the area housing manager on the ground that he did not satisfy the qualifying criteria. He sought a judicial review on the basis that because the decision had been taken by the area manager acting alone it was ultra vires. Stadlen J allowed a claim for judicial review and quashed the decision. He held that:
the rehousing manager had not been involved as required by section 5 of the scheme;
the application had not been handled with procedural fairness; and
there had been a failure to take account of material considerations.
R (O) v Newham LBC
[2010] EWHC 368 (Admin), 27 January 2010
 
A decision to apply a ‘no rent arrears’ policy to a tenant who had suffered domestic violence was not unlawful because it did not expressly set out the tenant’s circumstances
Miss O was the secure tenant of Newham and was in arrears of rent. She was the victim of domestic violence and she applied for a transfer to alternative accommodation. Newham assessed Miss O’s housing needs and determined that she had a need for emergency re-housing because of the violence she had suffered. Under Newham’s allocation scheme this would ordinarily have resulted in her being awarded additional preference which would have entitled her to a direct let. Newham’s scheme also provided, however, that an applicant’s priority may be reduced where an existing tenant had arrears of rent. Newham told Miss O that it operated ‘a no debt policy’ and until the arrears were cleared she would not be offered a direct let. In response to a letter before the claim, which set out Miss O’s personal circumstances, an officer responded that he was not minded to exercise his discretion to waive the policy because Miss O had not taken any steps to reduce the arrears. Miss O judicially reviewed this decision on the basis that Newham had applied its policy rigidly and failed to have any regard to her circumstances. Alternatively, inadequate reasons had been given explaining why Newham was not minded to exercise the discretion to waive the policy.
The claim for judicial review was dismissed. The decision letter under review did not need to set out Miss O’s circumstances. It was obvious that the officer had taken such circumstances into account because he was responding to a letter of Miss O’s solicitor which had set out such circumstances in detail. Nor was the decision letter insufficiently reasoned.
R (Osman) v Harrow LBC
[2017] EWHC 274 (Admin), 21 February 2017
 
Scheme which gave greater priority to overcrowded secure tenants than overcrowded private sector tenant was not unlawful
Harrow’s amended housing allocation scheme reduced the priority previously given to applicants from overcrowded households in privately rented accommodation (described in the scheme as ‘homeseekers’), while preserving high priority for its own overcrowded council tenants who were making transfer applications. The claimant was an overcrowded private tenant who had been in Band A. Following the amendment to the scheme, she was placed in lower Band C. She sought a judicial review of the amended scheme on the basis that it: (a) unlawfully discriminated against those in the private rented sector contrary to Human Rights Act 1998 Sch 1 Articles 8 and 14; and (b) in consequence did not secure that a reasonable preference was given to applicants occupying overcrowded housing or otherwise living in unsatisfactory housing conditions: Housing Act 1996 s166A(3).
Robin Purchas QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the claim. As to whether such a claim might be advanced at all under Article 14 read with Article 8, he held that ‘for the purposes of the present scheme there is a relevant comparison to be made between the transfer and homeseeker groups in that arbitrary discrimination between the two so as to affect their Article 8 rights would in principle come within Article 14’ (para 65). However, on the facts, the council’s evidence had advanced a logical and legitimate reason for the difference in treatment: ‘The intention was that by reducing the priority preference [for those in the private sector] to the same as homeless cases the incentive to decline offers through [the homelessness] route would be removed. There is no evidence before the court to challenge that advice or its basis as reported by the officers. Moreover, that was in my judgement a legitimate aim for the purposes of Article 14 and otherwise’ (para 66). The means of securing that objective was not ill-founded and was not manifestly unfair or otherwise disproportionate so as to render the scheme unlawful. The claimant had been given some preference in the scheme by placement in Band C and the claim that this was not a ‘reasonable’ preference had not been made out.
R (Van Boolen) v Barking and Dagenham LBC
[2009] EWHC 2196 (Admin), 31 July 2009
 
Part 6 did not require an authority’s allocation scheme to contain every detail of the way a discretion under the scheme would be exercised
The authority operated a choice based lettings scheme. The authority’s allocation scheme provided that applicants might receive less priority under the scheme if they lacked a local connection to the borough. The authority, however, had a separate policy, which was not published or included within the scheme, that prescribed how this discretion would ordinarily be exercised. That policy provided that applicants with a reasonable preference and a local connection would always be preferred to applicants without a local connection. Miss Van Boolen did not live in Barking and Dagenham, but applied to the authority for accommodation. Miss Van Boolen’s priority under the scheme was, however, reduced every time she bid for accommodation. There were 78 occasions where, but for this fact, she would have obtained accommodation from the authority. The successful applicants all had a local connection to Barking and Dagenham. Miss Van Boolen brought a judicial review against the authority on the ground that it was not allocating accommodation in accordance with its scheme.
The judicial review was dismissed. It was not a requirement of section 167(8) that each scheme must contain every detail of the way in which a discretion under the scheme would be exercised; it was a matter for the authority to determine the level of detail to be contained within its scheme. This was not a case like R (Faarah) v Southwark LBC (R (Faarah) v Southwark LBC) where the unpublished practice was inconsistent with the published scheme.
R (YA) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC
[2016] EWHC 1850 (Admin); [2016] HLR 39, 27 July 2016
Authority was not entitled to rely on spent convictions when it decided to exclude the claimant from applying for accommodation under Housing Act 1996 Part 6
When aged 19, YA applied to the council for social housing. His application was supported by his social worker and the care leavers’ housing panel but was refused. The council’s allocation scheme excluded from qualification for housing (see Housing Act 1996 s160ZA(7)) the following class of applicants (para 4): ‘Applicants who have been guilty of unacceptable behaviour which makes them unsuitable to be a tenant. Examples of such unacceptable behaviour include: … illegal or immoral behaviour …’ The council refused to consider the claimant for housing allocation because he was not a qualifying person under its scheme. Judicial review was sought on the basis that: (1) it was unlawful for the council to take account of the spent convictions; and (2) there had been discrimination against the claimant – as a care leaver – contrary to Article 14 ECHR.
Peter Marquand (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) allowed the claim on the first ground but rejected the second. He said (para 49):
In my judgement, in this case, it was not lawful to base a decision about the claimant on the offences that he was convicted of and it was not lawful to base a decision on the conduct constituting those offences because section 4 of the ROA [1974] prohibits it where the convictions are spent and section 7(3) is not applicable.
On that basis, the decision was unlawful, as it relied on the convictions which were spent. Article 14 was applicable because: (1) the housing allocation scheme was within the ambit of Article 8; (2) the status ‘care leaver’ was an ‘other’ status for Article 14 purposes; and (3) the exclusion in the scheme discriminated against care leavers as they were statistically more likely to engage in criminal/anti-social behaviour. However, there had been no infringement of Article 14 because, on the facts, the discrimination was ‘justified’.
‘The evidence is that [the qualifying class] is designed to minimise the risk of those with behaviours that would have an adverse impact on others being allocated housing through the housing register. Not only does this improve the environment for relevant residents in general but it reduces the risk of the defendant expending limited resources on legal proceedings in the event that [it] is necessary to take proceedings …’ (para 84).
R (KS and AM) v Haringey LBC
[2018] EWHC 587 (Admin), 21 March 2018
 
Decision of Children’s Services to close applicant’s file after simply referring her application for a transfer to new accommodation to housing department was irrational where the housing department had decided that the applicant was not in immediate need of re-housing
The claimants were a mother and her six-year-old daughter. Both had disabilities. The mother had prolapsed discs in her back, a very painful condition in both shoulders, susceptibility to chest infections (as a consequence of a bout of pneumonia), and she suffered anxiety and panic attacks. The daughter had autistic spectrum disorder, language disorder and significant difficulties with adaptive function. She had problems with going to the toilet, with diet, with disturbed sleep and with speech. She also had no sense of danger, did not understand risk and did not know how to keep herself safe. She enjoyed running and climbing but was aggressive and violent towards other children, including her older brother, JM. He had the heart condition, pulmonary regurgitation. The mother cared for AM and JM on her own.
The claimants and JM lived in a two-bedroom, first floor, council flat. The flat was not suitable, given AM’s disabilities, because it had balconies at the front and back with a drop to the ground of over four metres. The mother applied to the authority’s children’s services department for her to be provided with a property on the ground floor. A children’s services assessment in February 2017 recognised the risk and that the family were in need of a three bedroomed ground accommodation with a garden. The authority’s children’s services department sought the assistance of its housing department in meeting its duty under Children Act 1989 s17, but then closed its file and took no further steps to develop a plan to find alternative accommodation. In November 2017, the housing department commissioned a report from Dr Keen of NowMedical who advised that there was not a serious medical need to relocate ‘given a fall from a first floor is unlikely to be fatal, and that availability of ground floor properties may be so scarce as to potentially delay a relocation, then I think that a first floor property is an acceptable alternative.’ In December 2017, the council’s Housing Decisions Panel concluded that practical measures, such as window locks could be utilised to manage the risk, and therefore ‘the current housing situation is not so serious or critical as to warrant band A or band B priority’ and that ‘a direct offer was not considered appropriate because there isn’t a critical medical/welfare needs or serious safeguarding concern’. In February 2018, the head of housing need reported that between April 2016 and February 2018 the council had let 157 three bedroom properties of which only nine were on the ground floor. There were hundreds of families in band C and hundreds more in bands A and B ‘with an even greater need’.
The claimants sought judicial review of the decision not to formulate a plan for re-accommodating the claimants and failing to consider providing alternative accommodation under Children Act 1989 s17.
HHJ Walden-Smith, sitting as a judge of the High Court, allowed the claim. It was irrational for Children’s Services to refer the matter to the housing department and then close its file in circumstances in which the housing department had effectively reached a decision which would result in the claimants not being re-housed in the immediate future. Moreover, the decision of the housing department to place the claimants in Band C was also irrational. Both departments had failed to give any sufficient weight to the very real risk to AM’s safety; In particular, the difficulties that AM posed to her own safety; and that parental supervision could not be sufficient to prevent AM from getting on to the balconies and harming herself. The council’s decisions were quashed and mandatory orders made for the family’s needs to be reassessed for the purpose of providing appropriate accommodation.
Reasonable preference
 
Supreme Court (formerly House of Lords)
 
R (Ahmad) v Newham LBC
[2009] UKHL 14; [2009] 3 All ER 755; [2009] HLR 31; [2009] LGR 627; (2009) Times 6 March, 4 March 2009
 
There is no requirement to afford priority within class by reference to gravity of need; reserving 5 per cent of allocations for transfers did not offend reasonable preference requirement
Newham operated a choice-based letting scheme with three bands. The largest band (from which 75 per cent of lettings were made) contained applicants who were entitled to a ‘reasonable preference’ under one or more of the categories in Housing Act 1996 s167(2). When bids from members of that band were received for an available property they were ranked by registration date. The property would be allocated to the bidder with the oldest date. Two smaller bands dealt with (a) existing council tenants who had no grounds for ‘reasonable preference’ – transfer cases (able to bid for up to five per cent of lettings) and (b) non-council tenants with no reasonable preference (able to bid for sheltered and hard-to-let homes only). The council also operated a ‘direct lets’ scheme for ‘decants’ (households requiring re-housing as a result of council action) and others requiring an urgent move in exceptional circumstances. The claimant had multiple housing needs spanning a number of reasonable preference categories and several members of his household had medical needs. His application for ‘direct let’ status was unsuccessful and he remained in the choice-based letting main band, queuing by date. He sought judicial review of Newham’s scheme on the basis that: (a) it irrationally grouped the vast bulk of applicants into a single band distinguishing between them by date of registration rather than housing need; and (b) giving five per cent of lettings to the transfer band was incompatible with giving applicants who were within section 167(2) a reasonable preference.
The Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal upheld his claim but the House of Lords allowed the council’s appeal. It held that:
The language of Housing Act 1996 s167, as substituted by the Homelessness Act 2002, gave local housing authorities greater flexibility than hitherto. It no longer required that those in the reasonable preference categories who were in the greatest need should be housed first. Waiting time was a relevant factor in determining who should be allocated social housing. Newham’s scheme could not be described as irrational for giving that factor pre-eminence. Cases of the most serious nature were still capable of being addressed by the ‘direct let’ arrangements.
Allowing transfer tenants to bid for up to five per cent of lettings, when they themselves would be releasing council property for allocation to others, did not amount to a denial of a ‘reasonable’ preference to those in the statutory categories because they did not ‘dominate’ the scheme at the expense of those owed a reasonable preference.
Court of Appeal
 
R v Wolverhampton MBC ex p Watters
(1997) 29 HLR 931
 
Reasonable preference meant giving a ‘reasonable head start’; preference could be nullified by other factors, including rent arrears
The applicant was married with five children. She was evicted from her council home because of rent arrears. She obtained accommodation in the private rented sector which was overcrowded and unsatisfactory. She applied to go on the council’s waiting list but was excluded because of its policy to exclude those who owed more than two weeks’ rent arrears. She appealed to an appeals panel that could reverse a decision where there was a social or medical need or substantial efforts had been made to reduce the arrears or ‘exceptional circumstances’ applied. Her appeal failed. She applied for judicial review, contending that, despite falling within three of the statutory reasonable preference categories in Housing Act 1985 s22, she had not been granted a preference.
Her application and her appeal to the Court of Appeal failed. Section 22 did not require ‘preference’ to be given but merely ‘reasonable preference’. That envisaged that other factors could weigh against and so diminish and even nullify the preference. Rent arrears could properly be taken into account in the process of selecting tenants and a council could decide that an applicant’s rent arrears were such as to outweigh a reasonable preference. Sedley J’s comment in R v Lambeth LBC ex p Njomo (R v Lambeth LBC ex p Njomo) that a council must not ‘eclipse or distort’ the priority that section 22 accords was wrong if he meant that statutory preference cannot be outweighed by other relevant considerations. The scope of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the council’s policy was unfettered and the policy was sufficiently flexible to comply with Housing Act 1985 s22. The council’s appeals panel had not erred in balancing against the applicant’s obvious housing need the history of past rent default, very substantial arrears and eviction from an earlier council tenancy.
R (Lin) v Barnet LBC
[2007] EWCA Civ 132; [2007] HLR 30; [2007] LGR 454, 22 February 2007
 
Scheme did not fail to accord reasonable preference to homeless applicants; points granted to transfer applicants unlawful; scheme failed to set out procedures clearly
Barnet accepted that it owed the claimant the main housing duty under Housing Act 1996 s193. It placed her in private sector leasing (PSL) accommodation. Barnet’s allocation scheme provided, inter alia, for applicants to be awarded: 200 local residency points, 100 income points, 100 transfer points and 10 points for each year waiting up to a maximum of 50. Furthermore, homeless applicants waiting for family size accommodation were also awarded 10 points, with 300 points being awarded when their PSL accommodation was about to be returned to the landlord. In the context of the scheme, the claimant, with 350 points in total, was unable to be in a position to bid successfully for a property until she received 300 points at the end of her lease (which was of ten years).
The Court of Appeal held that 10 points, even in a scheme requiring successful bidders to have hundreds of points, was capable of giving a reasonable preference. The council had been entitled to take into account in setting those points the fact that a person owed the main homelessness duty would, by definition, be occupying ‘suitable’ accommodation. When such accommodation came to an end, the scheme reflected that new housing need by an additional 300 points.
Although some applicants outside the reasonable preference categories might have accumulated more points than the statutory homeless, that was not unlawful ‘provided that such non-statutory preferences do not dominate the scheme at the expense of the statutory preference categories’ (para [36]). It was necessary to look at how the scheme operated as a whole, rather than individual cases, in assessing this.
However, the scheme did not clearly set out the procedure whereby a withdrawal of PSL accommodation would trigger the 300 extra points. That was a failure to comply with the requirement in s167(1) that a published scheme must spell out procedures relating to allocation and to that extent the appeal was allowed.
High Court
 
R (Alemi) v Westminster CC
[2015] EWHC 1765 (Admin), 22 June 2015
An allocation which excluded persons with a reasonable preference (those owed the full duty under Housing Act 1996 Part 7) from bidding for accommodation under Part 6 for a period of 12 months was unlawful
Ms Alemi applied to Westminster for assistance under Part 7. Westminster decided that it owed her the full duty under section 193(2) and she was provided with accommodation in Enfield and placed on Westminster’s housing register. Westminster’s allocation scheme provided that those who had joined its housing register after a successful homeless application were suspended from being eligible for an allocation of a secure tenancy for a 12-month period. In the interim they would only be eligible for offers of accommodation in the private rented sector.
Ms Alemi’s claim for judicial review succeeded. The scheme was unlawful because it failed to give those owed a duty under Part 7 any preference, let alone a reasonable preference, for the 12-month period that they were prevented from bidding for secure tenancies.
R (Babakandi) v Westminster CC
[2011] EWHC 1756 (Admin), 6 July 2011
 
Operating ad hoc quota scheme lawful; suspension of applicants in rent arrears lawful
The claimant, his wife and his two young daughters occupied a small studio flat he rented from the council. He applied for a transfer to a larger property and was placed in Band B of the council’s Choice Based Lettings Scheme and awarded over 500 priority points. Three years later, he had not been successful in bidding for any properties. For part of that period, he had been suspended from bidding because of his rent arrears. During another period, a limited number (or ‘quota’) of overcrowded Band B applicants had been given additional priority and moved to Band A. He sought judicial review of the council’s allocation scheme, contending that:
operating a quota scheme was inconsistent with the notion of statutory reasonable preference in relation to all the council’s stock (Housing Act 1996 s167(2));
there was no reference to the quota in the published scheme itself (Housing Act 1996 s167(1));
the scheme was not ‘transparent’ because the ad hoc operation of quotas meant that applicants could never know when they might actually get an allocation even if they knew what band they were in and what points they had; and
the provision in the allocation scheme that tenants in rent arrears would all be suspended from bidding was an unlawfully strict fetter on the discretion to take account of past tenant behaviour (Housing Act 1996 s167(2A)(b)).
Nicol J dismissed the claim. He held that:
The reasonable preference requirement did not mean that such preference must be given at all times and in relation to all properties. ‘It is sufficient if such preference is given over the course of a reasonable period’ (para 22).
The quota was dealt with in the council’s annual report to which the allocation scheme made reference. It may be cumbersome to have to look at two (or possibly more) documents but it was not unlawful.
Confining bidding for specific properties to particular groups did mean that the operation of the scheme was not as transparent as it might otherwise be, but the council was entitled to decide that this disadvantage was outweighed by the advantage of a more equitable distribution of its scarce accommodation.
Although applicants in arrears were normally suspended from bidding, the scheme provided that the director of housing could exercise discretion ‘in exceptional circumstances’ (para 24) to allow applicants with rent arrears to bid or to receive offers. This was a lawful application of Housing Act 1996 s167(2A)(b). Automatic suspension had practical advantages. It took effect swiftly and effectively, and at a time when the arrears were likely to be at a relatively modest level so that there was a better chance of them being paid off. The scheme was not unlawful simply because it did not set criteria for what were exceptional circumstances in which the rule could be waived.
R (Onuegbu) v Hackney LBC
[2005] EWHC 1277 (Admin), 22 June 2005
 
Decision whether to reduce preference on basis of rent arrears could be deferred until applicant at top of waiting list
See Housing Law Casebook 4th edition, S2.7.
R (Woolfe) v Islington LBC
[2016] EWHC 1907 (Admin); [2016] HLR 42, 15 July 2016
Authority was entitled to prevent an applicant with insufficient points from bidding for accommodation under its allocation scheme
The claimant lived with her mother in a private rented one-bedroom flat. She was 22 and pregnant. Because two of the mother’s children had been taken into care, the council’s children’s services department told the claimant that it would apply for a care order for the new baby if she continued living in the flat with her mother. The claimant applied for homelessness assistance (Housing Act 1996 Part 7). The council accepted that it owed her the main housing duty under Housing Act 1996 s193(2) and provided her with temporary accommodation in the private sector. The claimant also applied for social housing under the council’s allocation scheme. She was awarded 110 points (10 homeless points and 100 residence points). That was too few points to bid successfully for any properties that became available (the threshold was 120 points). The claimant argued that she was entitled to an additional 90 points under the council’s ‘new generation scheme’, which was open to the adult children of tenants living in the council’s area with their parents.
Judicial review was sought on the basis that:
(1)the points threshold for bidding was unlawful as it prevented applicants to whom a ‘reasonable preference’ must be given (Housing Act 1996 s166A), but who had less than 120 points, from bidding for properties and it in operated in breach of the Children Act 2004 s11(3) for applicants with children; and
(2)the council had misapplied its policy by failing to award the additional 90 ‘new generation’ points.
Holman J rejected the first ground but allowed the claim on the second. As to the first, the scheme accorded ‘reasonable preference’ by points. It was not unlawful thereafter to set a minimum number of points before an applicant could bid. The council’s housing allocation arrangements had also been informed by a regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children and therefore satisfied Children Act 2004 s11. As to the second ground, the council had misapplied the ‘new generation scheme’ rules in the claimant’s case. Although the claimant presently lived independently, the scheme was open to an applicant who had been ‘living continuously as an agreed member of the household of an Islington resident for at least three out of the last five years’. The refusal to award her 90 points under that scheme was quashed.
R (XC) v Southwark LBC
[2017] EWHC 736 (Admin); [2017] HLR 24, 6 April 2017
 
A scheme which gave applicants in work a greater priority did not unlawfully discriminate against women or people who were disabled
The claimant was a council tenant. She was a disabled woman living alone. She applied to Southwark for a transfer. Its housing allocation scheme, adopted in November 2013 under Housing Act 1996 Pt 6, gave preference to applicants within the statutory ‘reasonable preference’ groups and afforded some of those applicants a ‘priority star’. That star rating was available to applicants in work and to those making a community contribution by way of voluntary work. The claimant contended that she could not undertake either paid or voluntary work and challenged the council’s scheme. The issues arising on her claim for judicial review were whether the design or operation of the council’s priority star scheme indirectly discriminated, contrary to the Equality Act 2010, against the disabled or against women whose caring responsibilities prevented or reduced their ability to work, either for pay or as volunteers.
Garnham J held that ‘it is perfectly plain that the effect of the priority star scheme in the present case is indirectly to discriminate against those with disabilities and against women. It is beyond argument, in my view, that to make available a benefit, here a ‘star’ which increases the prospect of achieving preferential housing, which can more readily be acquired by those without a disability, is to discriminate against the disabled by subjecting them to a detriment’ (para 74). However, the policy had a legitimate aim (the creation of sustainable and balanced communities and encouraging residents to make a contribution to the local community) and the priority star scheme had a rational connection to that objective. The determinative question was therefore whether ‘a priority scheme like the defendant’s was the least intrusive measure which could be used without unacceptably compromising the objective’ (para 86). The judge held that it was and dismissed the claim. He said:
Here, the council has devised a scheme which seeks to address the needs of all the classes of applicant in its area. It has made provision for those with priority need, for the homeless and vulnerable, for those who need to move on medical or welfare or hardship grounds. It is entitled, consistent with the secretary of state’s guidance, to favour those in work and those who volunteer. I can see no measure less intrusive, less likely to be detrimental to the claimant, which would not undermine the legitimate objective identified by the council and to which I have referred above (paras 97–98).
CHAPTER V
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