[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CCN5766N200515[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CC [2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 20090N200525N12410N1630Ali and Aweys: applicants are homeless if it would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy their present unsatisfactory home indefinitely; It is not necessary that conditions are such that they cannot continue in occupation for one day longerMoran: A womens refuge is not accommodation reasonable to continue to occupy indefinitelyBirmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CC

[1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HLR v Brent LBC ex p AwuaN5766N200515[1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HLR v Brent LBC ex p Awua [1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HL0N200525N12410N1630Whether it is reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation that is unsatisfactory may depend on the time that a person is expected to stay in itR v Brent LBC ex p Awua

[2007] EWCA Civ 623; [2008] HLR 11, 4 July 2007Denton v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 623; [2008] HLR 11, 4 July 2007Denton v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 623; [2008] HLR 11, 4 July 20070N200525N12410N1630Cause of homelessness was applicants bad behaviour towards mother; that conduct to be ignored in considering whether reasonable to continue to occupy family homeDenton v Southwark LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 374; [2011] HLR 25; 2 March 2011Hemans v Windsor and Maidenhead RBCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 374; [2011] HLR 25; 2 March 2011Hemans v Windsor and Maidenhead RBC [2011] EWCA Civ 374; [2011] HLR 25; 2 March 20110N200525N12410N1630Accommodation provided to wife who wanted to reunite with husband was available to husband but council needed to consider whether it was reasonable to occupyA married couple and their child lived in Ministry of Defence (MoD) accommodation provided to the husband as a serviceman. He was later discharged from the Army and the MoD gave notice to quit. The wife fled the accommodation with the child and social services helped her find a two-bedroom property let on an assured shorthold tenancy. After she had lived there for some time, the couple reconciled and wished to be reunited. They applied to the council for accommodation. It decided that they were not homeless because they could live in the wifes accommodation. On appeal, HHJ Harris QC found that the accommodation was not available for the husband and that he was homeless: Housing Act 1996 s175. The council appealed. The wife cross-appealed on the ground that it was not reasonable to continue to occupy the accommodation (s175(3)) as it had been provided only as temporary accommodation in a crisis and she needed to return to her job in the councils area.The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The judge had erred in holding, on the facts, that the husband could not occupy the wifes property. However, the reviewing officer had not dealt adequately with the question of whether or not it would be reasonable for the wife to remain in occupation of the property.Hemans v Windsor and Maidenhead RBC

(2001) 33 HLR 5, CAKacar v Enfield LBCN5766N200515(2001) 33 HLR 5, CAKacar v Enfield LBC (2001) 33 HLR 5, CA0N200525N12410N1630Applicant could have stayed in isolated accommodation longer while alternative accommodation soughtMr Kacar, a Kurdish refugee from Turkey, lived among the Turkish speaking community in Enfield for six years. After he became unemployed he took up a job in Aylesbury in March 1997. He moved there with his wife and young child and obtained an assured shorthold tenancy. He lost his job after a few days owing to his poor English and was unable to find other employment. He and his wife became extremely socially isolated in Aylesbury as there was no Turkish community and neither of them had a good command of English. His wife became very depressed. In June 1997 they returned to Enfield and he later applied as a homeless person. The council made an intentionally homeless decision which was upheld on review, primarily on the basis that the appellant could have waited in the Aylesbury accommodation at least until he had made enquiries about finding his own accommodation in Enfield. HHJ Riddell quashed the decision. He held that the council had failed to make adequate enquiries into Mrs Kacars medical condition and the decision-making process was flawed as the central proposition that the family could have held on while they looked for their own housing was never put to the appellant in clear terms.The councils appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed. The court held that:a)The council had made sufficient enquiries to enable them to assess the seriousness of Mrs Kacars depression. She was not receiving any medical treatment and was not taking prescribed drugs. She had not consulted her GP or social services. Mr Kacars solicitors had made representations for the purposes of the review and had not suggested that further enquiries should be made.b)The council had adequately put to Mr Kacar that he could have stayed on longer in Aylesbury and he had been given ample opportunity to deal with it.Kacar v Enfield LBC

[2001] EWCA Civ 905; [2002] HLR 54Noh v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCN5766N200515[2001] EWCA Civ 905; [2002] HLR 54Noh v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 905; [2002] HLR 540N200525N12410N1630Council entitled to balance general circumstances against applicants personal circumstances and find her intentionally homeless despite psychiatric evidenceMs Noh fled Somalia after witnessing the murder of her parents and being subjected to sexual violence. Newham LBC provided her with accommodation but after nine months she left and went to stay with her sister in Hammersmith and Fulham. A few months later she applied to Hammersmith and Fulham as a homeless person but was found intentionally homeless. She requested a review. She said that she felt isolated in Newham and needed the support of her brother and sister, both of whom lived in the councils area. She submitted a report from a consultant psychiatrist who described her as one of the most vulnerable people that he had ever seen and as seriously mentally ill. He considered that it was wholly unreasonable for her to continue to live in Newham. The review was unsuccessful and her appeal to the county court was dismissed.The Court of Appeal dismissed her second appeal. It was clear that the council had taken account of the medical issues arising from the psychiatric report. However, the issue of reasonableness to continue to occupy was a matter for the council itself to decide and it would have been wrong for it to simply adopt the opinion of the psychiatrist on this point. The approach of the council was to accept the psychiatrists medical opinion but not to accept his views about the effects of the applicants medical condition on the question of reasonableness. The council had been entitled to adopt this approach. It had taken into account the individual circumstances of the applicant. The case was not exceptional. There was one medical report based on a single consultation and the applicant had not received any treatment for her condition. It was not irrational for the council to balance the general housing circumstances against the applicants personal circumstances. The council was entitled to take into account the demands for housing in its area and its capacity to absorb homeless families.Noh v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 609; [2011] HLR 35, 18 May 2011Oxford CC v BullN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 609; [2011] HLR 35, 18 May 2011Oxford CC v Bull [2011] EWCA Civ 609; [2011] HLR 35, 18 May 20110N200525N12410N1630Single room in shared house was reasonable to continue to occupy by father who became intentionally homeless when he allowed his children to live with him and which resulted in his evictionOxford CC v Bull

(1999) 31 HLR 50, CAR v Brent LBC ex p BariiseN5766N200515(1999) 31 HLR 50, CAR v Brent LBC ex p Bariise (1999) 31 HLR 50, CA0N200525N12410N1630It is for authority to assess general housing circumstances in its areaThe applicant gave up her privately rented accommodation in a house in multiple occupation (HMO). She claimed that the two other residents in the house left the common parts dirty, stole her food from the communal kitchen and shouted at her children. The council decided that she was intentionally homeless as it had been reasonable for her to continue to occupy the accommodation and she had left it without making adequate arrangements to secure alternative accommodation. The council observed that her situation was not unusual; it had experience of persons who had other similar complaints; and there were bound to be conflicts of lifestyle in multi-occupied homes.Popplewell J quashed the decision and held that the applicants specific circumstances needed to be considered before being balanced with general circumstances in the borough (Housing Act 1985 s60(4), now Housing Act 1996 s177(2)).The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal. The council had made sufficient enquiries and had taken into account all relevant matters. In relation to the applicants contention that the extent of the theft of her food had not been adequately considered by the council Millet J commented:I recognise that it may not be sufficient for the decision-maker merely to state that he has considered all the material put before him. If there is something which is so startling that one would not expect it to pass without individual comment, the Court may be justified in drawing the inference that it has not received any or sufficient consideration. But in this case it is very much a matter of degree. The fact that when told of the extent of the alleged thefts the [council] did not react with astonishment suggests to me that this is may indeed be a not uncommon situation in Brent.The council had a housing crisis and was in the best position to assess the seriousness of the general conditions in its area and the extent to which the respondents complaints took her case out of the norm and made it unreasonable for her to remain in occupation of the property, having regard to the general conditions in the borough.R v Brent LBC ex p Bariise

(1993) 25 HLR 643, CAR v Brent LBC ex p McManusN5766N200515(1993) 25 HLR 643, CAR v Brent LBC ex p McManus (1993) 25 HLR 643, CA0N200525N12410N1630Reasonable to continue to occupy is a subjective testThe applicant lived in an area in Belfast which was the scene of a lot of sectarian violence. She became very anxious and depressed and was prescribed tranquillisers. She left her home in fear, following the explosion of a petrol bomb nearby. She gave up the accommodation and later came to the UK and applied to Brent as a homeless person. Brent decided it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the Belfast accommodation and that she was intentionally homeless for leaving it without making arrangements to secure alternative accommodation.Tuckey J quashed the finding that the applicant was intentionally homeless. The test of reasonableness to continue to occupy was a subjective one. Brent should have considered how the applicants particular situation affected her and her daughter. Brents generalisations in its decision letter about the situation in Belfast and the difficulties for the residents as a whole suggested that it had adopted an objective approach. Brents approach to decision-making was flawed. Ms McManus was not given the opportunity to comment on a number of matters which it decided against her and which were significant. It did not carry out sufficient enquiries, particularly about the psychiatric state of the applicant and her daughter. It should have delayed making a decision until Ms McManus had the opportunity of obtaining specialist reports. The council was wrong to consider that it had enough medical evidence before it and to conclude that the applicants nervous condition could be attributable merely to her homelessness.The Court of Appeal dismissed Brents appeal.R v Brent LBC ex p McManus

(1990) 22 HLR 118, CAR v Broxbourne BC ex p WillmothN5766N200515(1990) 22 HLR 118, CAR v Broxbourne BC ex p Willmoth (1990) 22 HLR 118, CA0N200525N12410N1630Reasonableness not limited to consideration of physical conditions of accommodationThe applicant left her council flat in Hackney because of violence from her ex-partner, which continued even after she excluded him from the flat. She applied to Broxbourne, which decided that she was not homeless, considering it reasonable for her to live in Hackney.The Court of Appeal quashed the decision on the ground that the council had misdirected itself in law. The applicant was the tenant of premises in Hackney which she had been driven to leave by the violent actions of her former (non-resident) partner. Broxbourne BC argued that she was not homeless because she was still the tenant and that the test of reasonable to continue to occupy under Housing Act 1985 s58(2A) (now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)) was confined to consideration of the physical attributes of the accommodation (eg overcrowding and disrepair) only. It claimed that to allow section 58(2A) to cover acts of violent behaviour would make section 58(3)(b) (violence within the home; see now the wider section 177(1)) redundant. The Court of Appeal (following and applying R v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Hammell [1989] QB 518) held that s58(2A) required consideration of all matters related to continued occupation. Sir John Megaw said the reasonableness test is: not necessarily or solely confined to looking at the actual quality of the accommodation within the four walls of the house or the room or flat which is the accommodation available. It may be the duty of the housing authority to consider also circumstances, matters and factors which may fall outside the limited consideration of the actual quality of physical accommodation itself Just as the difficulties created by a staircase or other approach to accommodation, to an applicant with physical infirmities, is relevant to reasonableness, so also are threats of violence, even though those threats come from one who is not resident in the accommodation. (p127)Note: See now Housing Act 1996 s177(1), as amended by Homelessness Act 2002.R v Broxbourne BC ex p Willmoth

[1991] 1 WLR 1032; [1992] 2 All ER 767; (1991) 23 HLR 62; (1992) LGR 123, CAR v Newham LBC ex p Tower Hamlets LBCN5766N200515[1991] 1 WLR 1032; [1992] 2 All ER 767; (1991) 23 HLR 62; (1992) LGR 123, CAR v Newham LBC ex p Tower Hamlets LBC [1991] 1 WLR 1032; [1992] 2 All ER 767; (1991) 23 HLR 62; (1992) LGR 123, CA0N200525N12410N1630An authority considering an applicant who would be referred to another authority is required to consider the general housing conditions in that other authorityMr Ullah applied as a homeless person to Tower Hamlets. It decided that he was intentionally homeless as a result of leaving accommodation he owned in Bangladesh. He then applied to Newham. In determining whether it would have been reasonable for Mr Ullah to have continued to occupy the accommodation in Bangladesh (Housing Act 1985 s60(1), now Housing Act 1996 s191(1)), Newham had regard to housing conditions in its own area (s60(4), now Housing Act 1996 s177(2)). It compared these conditions with the very unsatisfactory state of the applicants accommodation in Bangladesh and decided that he was not intentionally homeless. However, since he did not have any local connection with Newham, it referred his application to Tower Hamlets under the local connection provisions.Nolan J quashed the referral and the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Newhams decision that Mr Ullah was not intentionally homeless was so flawed as to vitiate its decision to refer. It should have considered the housing conditions in Tower Hamlets under section 60(4) because Mr Ullah had first applied there and Newham were considering his application on the basis of a referral to Tower Hamlets. Furthermore, Newham had failed to take account of the extent to which the accommodation in Bangladesh conformed to accepted local standards and to the applicants employment prospects in the UK. It had failed to ascertain and consider the reasons for Tower Hamlets decision. Even if the decision that Mr Ullah was intentionally homeless had been lawfully made, Newham had a discretion whether to refer. Comity and good administration required Newham to consider whether, in the circumstances, it was in the public interest for the duty to be accepted by it, notwithstanding that the conditions for referral were met.R v Newham LBC ex p Tower Hamlets LBC

[2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin); (2003) Times 30 July, 4 July 2003R (B) v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin); (2003) Times 30 July, 4 July 2003R (B) v Southwark LBC [2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin); (2003) Times 30 July, 4 July 20030N200525N12410N1630Not reasonable for prisoner to occupy a prison cell when entitled to releaseR (B) v Southwark LBC

[2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 2014Temur v Hackney LBCN5766N200515[2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 2014Temur v Hackney LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 20140N200525N12410N1630When considering if it was reasonable to continue to occupy a property an authority did not have to consider whether it was suitable within the meaning of section 210Temur v Hackney LBC

[2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 2007Waltham Forest LBC v MalobaN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 2007Waltham Forest LBC v Maloba [2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 20070N200525N12410N1630It must be reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation regardless of whether it is currently occupied by an applicantTimes 9 November, CAMr Maloba was born in Uganda and came to the UK in 1989 at the age of 27. He became a British citizen in 1997. On a visit to Uganda in 1999 he met his wife. They had a daughter in 2001 and married in 2002. Mr Malobas wife and child lived in an annex to a family home in Kampala, also occupied by two of his siblings and their families. In December 2004 his wife and child joined him in the UK and in March 2005 he applied to the council as a homeless person. The council decided that he was not homeless as he and his family could live in the accommodation in Kampala. Mr Malobas review, based on his wish to remain in Britain where he had settled, failed. On appeal to the county court, Hornby HHJ held the councils decision that it was reasonable for Mr Maloba to continue to occupy the accommodation in Kampala was Wednesbury unreasonable and the decision was quashed. The council appealed contending:(1)as Mr Maloba was not already occupying the accommodation in Kampala it was immaterial whether it was reasonable to continue to occupy it, all that mattered was that it was available (following the majority (obiter) view in Begum (Nipa) v Tower Hamlets LBC ());(2)if it was necessary to consider reasonableness all that needed to be considered was reasonableness in terms of size and facilities, not location; and(3)if it was necessary to consider location it was reasonable to expect Mr Maloba to live in Kampala.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.(1)Accommodation had to be reasonable, even when an applicant was not already living in it. The words reasonable for him to continue to occupy in s175(3) should be construed as synonymous with reasonable for him to occupy for a continuing period ie, for the future. Nipa Begum was disapproved on this point.(2)Reasonableness was not solely to be judged in terms of the quality of accommodation. An applicants personal circumstances had to be taken into account.(3)The council had adopted an over restrictive approach on review. Nowhere was it considered whether it was reasonable for Mr Maloba to relocate to Uganda.Note: See also regarding the issue of costs that arose in this case.Waltham Forest LBC v Maloba

(1997) 29 HLR 48, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p YusufN5766N200515(1997) 29 HLR 48, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p Yusuf (1997) 29 HLR 48, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Pregnant applicant who left accommodation unsuitable for a baby (but not a pregnant woman) was intentionally homelessThe applicant was a single woman from Somalia who had been granted exceptional leave to remain in the UK. She moved into a shared house and had a brief relationship with one of the other occupiers. She became pregnant. The house was dirty, noisy and constantly full of the drunken friends of her former boyfriend. She decided that it would be impossible to bring up her expected baby in such an environment and she left. The council decided that she had become homeless intentionally.Turner J dismissed an application for judicial review. The authority was correct in assessing the applicants circumstances at the time when she became homeless. It was not required to have regard to future events. The applicant had left the accommodation four months before the baby was due. In those circumstances, the council had not erred in considering the question of whether it would have been reasonable for her to continue in occupation at that date even if the accommodation may later have been rendered inappropriate by the imminent birth of the child.R v Brent LBC ex p Yusuf

(1994) 26 HLR 194, QBDR v Croydon LBC ex p JarvisN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 194, QBDR v Croydon LBC ex p Jarvis (1994) 26 HLR 194, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Reasonable for applicant with an assured shorthold tenancy to remain until court orderThe applicant had an assured shorthold tenancy. The landlord gave the requisite two months notice requiring possession. Within 28 days of the date when the landlord required possession, the applicant applied to Croydon as a homeless person. It decided that she was not homeless or threatened with homelessness because it was reasonable for her to remain until a court order was obtained. The then current Code of Guidance issued under Housing Act 1985 s71 (now Housing Act 1996 s182) recommended, inter alia, at paragraph 10.12, that authorities should not require tenants to fight possession actions where the landlord had a certain prospect of success. Authorities need only be satisfied that proper notice had been served and that the landlord intended to proceed. The applicant applied for judicial review. Before her application could be heard, the landlord obtained an order for possession and costs. The council accepted the applicant as unintentionally homeless. The applicant pressed ahead with her application to seek a declaration that the council had acted unlawfully and for damages.Andrew Collins QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, held that the council had not acted unlawfully since, in reaching its decision, it had considered fully the question of whether it would have been reasonable for the applicant to continue in occupation (Housing Act 1985 s58(2A), now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)). It had expressly considered:(a) the respective positions of the landlord and tenant and the expense of possession proceedings;(b) its own costs of providing temporary accommodation;(c) the general housing circumstances in the area (which effectively had been treated as determinative, but all relevant matters had been considered and it was for the council to decide what weight to attach to any particular matter); and(d) the then current Homelessness Code of Guidance, which the council did not follow. The decision was not manifestly perverse. The judge considered that the result would not necessarily be the same if an applicant applied as a homeless person after leaving accommodation without a court order ignorance of a relevant fact might negate intentionality and the council should adopt a sympathetic approach.The judge concluded by stating I am not saying that in all circumstances a council can say wait until you are evicted. It is lawful for them to adopt that attitude if they consider all the individual circumstances. The council had given careful thought to what it was going to do and detailed reasons for its decision.But I do not say that the same would necessarily apply in other cases where proper reasons were not given, as they have been here. I am not intending to give carte blanche for a general approach to be adopted and to be upheld that in all cases it is right to insist on deferment.He indicated that, if he had found the decision unlawful, he would have awarded the amount of costs the applicant had to pay her landlord (175) and a little bit extra for the trauma, a sum probably not exceeding 250 in all.Note: See paras 8.3032 of the current Code of Guidance in England (published July 2006).R v Croydon LBC ex p Jarvis

(1997) 29 HLR 289, QBDR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p MoncadaN5766N200515(1997) 29 HLR 289, QBDR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Moncada (1997) 29 HLR 289, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Applicant could reasonably be expected to reside with ex-wifeMr and Mrs Moncada were joint tenants of a four-bedroomed house. They had three children. Their marriage broke down but they both continued to live in the house. A Mr Williams, who had a relationship with Mrs Moncada, then went to live there and Mr Moncada was imprisoned for a drugs related offence. In 1993 Mr Williams assaulted one of the children and, partly as a result of this, they were put on the at risk register. Mr and Mrs Moncada divorced after his release from prison. He obtained custody of their two sons while Mrs Moncada was given custody of their daughter. In 1995 Mr Moncada applied as a homeless person. At that time there had been no further incidents of violence. Mr Williams, if not living with Mrs Moncada, was a frequent visitor. The council decided that Mr Moncada was not homeless because he was still the joint secure tenant of the former matrimonial home. Having regard to the prevailing shortage of housing, it decided that the house was large enough for Mr and Mrs Moncada and their children and that it was reasonable for him to reside there.Popplewell J dismissed Mr Moncadas application for judicial review. The authority had taken into account all relevant factors. Although it was undesirable for a divorced couple to have to live together, the council had addressed that issue and taken its decision in accordance with the shortage of accommodation in London. Furthermore, there had been no incidence of violence against the sons since 1993.R v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Moncada

(1983) 10 HLR 115; (1984) LGR 184, QBDR v Portsmouth CC ex p KnightN5766N200515(1983) 10 HLR 115; (1984) LGR 184, QBDR v Portsmouth CC ex p Knight (1983) 10 HLR 115; (1984) LGR 184, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Not reasonable for a service licensee to remain in occupation as a trespasserThe applicant managed a wine merchants shop and lived with his family in tied accommodation above the shop. He lost his job and was asked to vacate. He left without waiting for a possession order. The local authority decided that he was intentionally homeless.Woolf J quashed the decision. The applicant was a service licensee. On termination of his licence he became a trespasser and had no legal right of occupation. Even on the assumption that the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 applied, it did not create rights but placed a fetter on the owners right to recover possession without a court order. Also, the authority had failed to distinguish between a service licence and a service tenancy. In deciding whether it was reasonable for the applicant to remain, the authority had failed to take account of the difficult position the employers would have been put in where they required the accommodation for another employee and would be put to the expense of obtaining a possession order. It would be a case having some special quality or feature before an authority could conclude that it would be reasonable for a service licensee to remain in occupation as a trespasser.R v Portsmouth CC ex p Knight

[2007] EWCA Civ 332; [2007] HLR 36, 23 March 2007Elrify v Westminster CCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 332; [2007] HLR 36, 23 March 2007Elrify v Westminster CC [2007] EWCA Civ 332; [2007] HLR 36, 23 March 20070N200525N12410N1630Authority had misapplied the test of overcrowding in Housing Act 1985The claimant, a home owner, applied for homelessness assistance on the basis that his home was so overcrowded that it was no longer reasonable for him to continue to occupy it: s175(3). He occupied a three-bedroom flat with his wife and seven children aged between 5 and 18. The council decided that, although the premises were statutorily overcrowded, using the room standard (Housing Act 1985 s326 Table I), the excess was only by one person. On review, it upheld a decision that the claimant was not homeless. Taking into account the housing conditions in its area, it was reasonable to occupy a property with only one more person than the statutory permitted maximum. The county court dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal quashed the decision. The space standard for statutory overcrowding (Housing Act 1985 s326 Table II) had not been considered by the council. It indicated that the excess was two and a half people. That was a relevant matter because section 326(3) directed attention to whichever was the lesser permitted number. The decision would need to be reconsidered.Elrify v Westminster CC

[2007] EWCA Civ 1000; [2008] 1 WLR 797; [2008] HLR 16; [2008] LGR 605; (2007) Times 12 November, 17 October 2007Harouki v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 1000; [2008] 1 WLR 797; [2008] HLR 16; [2008] LGR 605; (2007) Times 12 November, 17 October 2007Harouki v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2007] EWCA Civ 1000; [2008] 1 WLR 797; [2008] HLR 16; [2008] LGR 605; (2007) Times 12 November, 17 October 20070N200525N12410N1630It was reasonable to continue to occupy statutorily overcrowded propertyThe applicant and her husband occupied a three-bedroom flat with their five children. It was statutorily overcrowded and the applicant was committing an offence by permitting it to be overcrowded. She applied to the council as a homeless person on the ground that it was not reasonable to continue to occupy. The council decided and confirmed on review that, although the accommodation was statutorily overcrowded, it was reasonable to continue to occupy it where overcrowding was a prevailing housing condition within the authoritys area. There were many families in the authoritys area who were more severely overcrowded than the applicant. Her county court appeal was dismissed.The Court of Appeal dismissed a second appeal. In assessing whether it had been reasonable to continue to occupy the flat, the council had been entitled to take account of the fact that there were many families even more severely overcrowded in its area.Harouki v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

[2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 2007Osei v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 2007Osei v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 20070N200525N12410N1630Reasonable to continue to occupy overcrowded accommodation in Spain rather than giving it up for more overcrowded accommodation in UKOsei v Southwark LBC

(1995) 27 HLR 564, CAR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Ben-El-MabroukN5766N200515(1995) 27 HLR 564, CAR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Ben-El-Mabrouk (1995) 27 HLR 564, CA0N200525N12410N1630Not homeless despite inadequate fire safety where council taking steps against landlord to do worksThe applicants and their very young child occupied a small room at the top of a house in multiple occupation with inadequate fire prevention and escape facilities. An independent environmental health officer classified the property as unfit for human habitation and prejudicial to health. The council served statutory notices on the owner. The applicants applied to the council as homeless persons on the basis that it was unreasonable for them to continue to occupy (Housing Act 1985 s58(2A) now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)) on account of the fire risk and inadequacy of the premises. The council rejected the application, having regard to housing conditions in its area and the fact that it was already taking steps to enforce housing and fire safety standards. At first instance Roger Henderson QC held that the risk to the family was such that the councils decision was Wednesbury unreasonable and should be quashed.The Court of Appeal reversed his decision. The council had taken account of all relevant matters. The deputy judge had been wrong to find the decision so plainly irrational or perverse as to justify judicial intervention. Sir Thomas Bingham MR indicated that the position might be different if, having served the notices, the council took no or only dilatory steps to enforce them.R v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Ben-El-Mabrouk

(1992) 24 HLR 562; (1992) Times 30 March, QBDR v Medina BC ex p DeeN5766N200515(1992) 24 HLR 562; (1992) Times 30 March, QBDR v Medina BC ex p Dee (1992) 24 HLR 562; (1992) Times 30 March, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Accommodation unsafe for newborn baby on medical adviceThe applicant occupied a beach chalet which was affected by damp and mould growth. She had a baby. Her doctor advised that the accommodation was inappropriate for a newborn baby. On her application as a homeless person, the council decided that the chalet was fit for human habitation and reasonable to continue to occupy.Henry J quashed the decision. The council could not have expected the applicant to override the clear medical advice she had received and so could not properly find it reasonable under Housing Act 1985 s58(2A) (now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)) for her to continue to occupy the chalet.R v Medina BC ex p Dee

(1989) 21 HLR 477, QBDR v Westminster CC ex p AlouatN5766N200515(1989) 21 HLR 477, QBDR v Westminster CC ex p Alouat (1989) 21 HLR 477, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Non-statutory overcrowding should be considered by authorityA married couple and several children were living in a two-bedroomed maisonette. The council decided that it was reasonable for them to continue to occupy the accommodation because, although it was cramped, it was not statutorily overcrowded.Schiemann J quashed the decision and held that Housing Act 1985 s58(2A) (now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)) reasonableness is not limited to statutory factors non-statutory overcrowding, medical need and other matters should also be considered by the council.R v Westminster CC ex p Alouat

January 2003 Legal Action 20; 20 November 2002, Woolwich County CourtSabah Mohamoud v Greenwich LBCN5766N200515January 2003 Legal Action 20; 20 November 2002, Woolwich County CourtSabah Mohamoud v Greenwich LBC January 2003 Legal Action 20; 20 November 2002, Woolwich County Court0N200525N12410N1630Authority could not rely on general assertions about overcrowding in its districtSee Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T9.7.Sabah Mohamoud v Greenwich LBC

[2001] EWCA Civ 1831; [2002] HLR 46Bernard v Enfield LBCN5766N200515[2001] EWCA Civ 1831; [2002] HLR 46Bernard v Enfield LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1831; [2002] HLR 460N200525N12410N1630Decision letter did not need to contain detailed assessment of applicants resourcesBernard v Enfield LBC

[2012] EWCA Civ 1913; [2013] HLR 19, 4 December 2012Carthew v Exeter City CouncilN5766N200515[2012] EWCA Civ 1913; [2013] HLR 19, 4 December 2012Carthew v Exeter City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 1913; [2013] HLR 19, 4 December 20120N200525N12410N1630The authority had failed to consider whether accommodation was affordable at the date of the act that the authority decided had caused the applicants homelessnessMs Carthew and her partner jointly bought a home. In 2008 they separated and her partner left. He bought out her share of the home but he let her remain living there as his tenant. Later, Ms Carthew became homeless and applied to Exeter Council for homelessness assistance. She told the Council that back in 2008 she had struggled to pay rent and money for repairs to her ex-partner. The council decided that she had become homeless intentionally because she had sold her share of the home in 2008. That decision was upheld on a review and in the county court on appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal and quashed the review decision. The council had failed to address the question of whether it would have been reasonable for the appellant to have remained in occupation as joint owner in 2008, given her assertion that she could not afford to live there at that time.Carthew v Exeter City Council

[2014] EWCA Civ 359; [2014] HLR 24, 26 March 2014Farah v Hillingdon LBCN5766N200515[2014] EWCA Civ 359; [2014] HLR 24, 26 March 2014Farah v Hillingdon LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 359; [2014] HLR 24, 26 March 20140N200525N12410N1630A reviewing officer had to give reasons explaining what items of expenditure were non-essential or excessive when finding that an applicants rent had been affordableMs Farah was a single, disabled parent with three children. She was evicted from privately rented accommodation as a result of rent arrears. She applied for homelessness assistance. The council accepted that she was homeless and had a priority need. The question whether she had made herself homeless intentionally depended on whether it had been reasonable to continue to occupy her accommodation: Housing Act 1996 s191. More particularly, on whether, on her income, she could afford to pay the rent. She said she did not pay because she could not afford it. The council conducted an income and expenditure assessment and decided that she could have afforded the rent. A reviewing officers decision upheld that finding. Mr Recorder Widdup dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. The reviewing officer had failed to engage with the representations made by Ms Farah and merely upheld the earlier decision without giving sufficient reasons other than asserting that the rent would have been affordable had Mrs Farah priortised her expenditure. No reasons were given as to why certain items of expenditure were not essential or excessive when it had been Mrs Farahs case that all of her expenditure was essential. In the absence of those reasons the review decision had to be quashed.Farah v Hillingdon LBC

[2013] EWCA Civ; [2014] HLR 17, 21 November 2013Huzrat v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2013] EWCA Civ; [2014] HLR 17, 21 November 2013Huzrat v Hounslow LBC [2013] EWCA Civ; [2014] HLR 17, 21 November 20130N200525N12410N1630Children Act 2004 s11 did not impose any additional criteria when determining if an applicants accommodation was affordableMs Huzrat was evicted from her accommodation for rent arrears. She applied for homelessness assistance. She said that she had been unable to meet her housing costs as well as the costs of raising her three children. The council decided that she had become homeless intentionally because an income and expenditure assessment showed she could have met the rent and her basic living expenses. Her challenge to that decision was rejected on review and an appeal to the county court was dismissed. She then pursued a second appeal on the basis that the council had failed to to take into account the interests of her three children as a primary consideration, in determining her application.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The obligation under s11 applied but it did not add any additional criteria for determining whether an applicant had become intentionally homeless. The council had taken into account the cost of looking after children but was satisfied that her housing costs were none the less affordable.Huzrat v Hounslow LBC

[2013] EWCA Civ 1602; [2014] HLR 10, 21 November 2013Noel v Hillingdon LBCN5766N200515[2013] EWCA Civ 1602; [2014] HLR 10, 21 November 2013Noel v Hillingdon LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1602; [2014] HLR 10, 21 November 20130N200525N12410N1630The authority was entitled to find that it was the applicants failure to apply for an increase in housing benefit which was the operative cause of his homelessness (See )Noel v Hillingdon LBC

(1997) 29 HLR 915, CAR v Brent LBC ex p BaruwaN5766N200515(1997) 29 HLR 915, CAR v Brent LBC ex p Baruwa (1997) 29 HLR 915, CA0N200525N12410N1630It is for an authority to decide whether applicant had deliberately failed to pay rent or had been unable to pay after paying for the necessities of lifeMs Baruwa was accepted by Brent for the main housing duty. She was moved into accommodation leased by the council from a private landlord. She fell into arrears and, after breaking a number of agreements to pay, was evicted. She applied again as a homeless person. Enquiries revealed that she had spent her available money on a university course, car maintenance and nursery fees, even when she was not working. The council decided that she was intentionally homeless.The Court of Appeal held that, although eviction as a result of rent arrears is not intentional if it is the result of spending assets on the necessities of life, the necessities of life may vary from family to family. It is for an authority, not the court, to consider whether a failure to pay rent is deliberate or whether it is due to a tenant having insufficient money to pay for the necessities of life. It is not for the authority to investigate every detail in an applicants figures of income and expenditure and it is not necessary for it to put to applicants its opinion that certain items are not a necessity. In relation to the duty to give reasons, Schiemann J commented:where an authority is required to give reasons for its decision, it is required to give reasons which are proper, adequate and intelligible and enable the person affected to know why they have won or lost. That said, the law gives decision-makers a certain latitude in how they express themselves and will recognise that not all those taking decisions will find it easy to express themselves with judicial exactitude. (p920).The finding of intentional homelessness was upheld.R v Brent LBC ex p Baruwa

(1996) 28 HLR 9, CAR v Brent LBC ex p GrossettN5766N200515(1996) 28 HLR 9, CAR v Brent LBC ex p Grossett (1996) 28 HLR 9, CA0N200525N12410N1630It is for an authority to assess difficult question of whether applicant could afford the rentThe applicant was a council tenant whose rent was paid by housing benefit. She accumulated substantial arrears of amenity charge (for water rates, heating and hot water). In 1990 the council obtained a suspended possession order on terms that the applicant paid the amenity charge and 1.85 per week towards the arrears. She failed to do this and in 1993 a warrant was obtained and she was evicted. Brent decided that she had become intentionally homeless and an internal appeal panel upheld that decision. The applicant sought judicial review from the High Court and then the Court of Appeal, arguing that all her benefit income had been committed to necessary essentials and so her non-payment had not been deliberate.The Court of Appeal dismissed the application. Dillon LJ said that it was for the local authority, not the court, to assess the difficult question of whether the applicant could or could not have afforded the payments. There was no deficiency of enquiries or breach of natural justice.R v Brent LBC ex p Grossett

(1994) 26 HLR 286, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p GrahamN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 286, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p Graham (1994) 26 HLR 286, CA0N200525N12410N1630Applicant had not acted unreasonably in moving, without any prospect of homelessness, to cheaper accommodationThe applicant gave up an expensive assured shorthold tenancy to move to the house of a friend, from whom she rented a room at a substantially lower rent. When she later became pregnant, she was given notice to quit and became homeless. The council found that she was intentionally homeless because (a) she had left accommodation which it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy as she could, on her income, have continued to meet the rent and (b) the accommodation to which she moved was not settled, as she had herself confirmed that she did not intend it as her permanent home.The Court of Appeal (Hoffmann LJ dissenting) quashed the decision. On the first question Sir Thomas Bingham MR said that the council was entitled to find that the applicant could have afforded to stay where she was but the question of reasonableness of leaving or staying was not to be judged on a Micawber test as to whether ones income exceeds, or fails to measure up to, the rent one is required to pay. The applicant had not acted unreasonably in moving to cheaper suitable accommodation, unless by doing so she exposed herself to the threat of finding herself homeless. The crucial consideration was therefore whether, on the facts that appeared to her at the time, the move was one which put her in a precarious and vulnerable position. The applicants admission that she did not regard the new home as permanent did not indicate that she regarded the new premises as being precarious. It was doubted that any single woman in her mid-twenties would regard rented accommodation as a permanent home. The fact that the new tenancy was a monthly tenancy did not, of itself, convey that the tenancy was precarious many short tenancies continue for years. Furthermore, the fact that she was required to leave after three months was something the council could not properly rely on as it was viewing the story with hindsight. The councils conclusion that it was unreasonable for the applicant to move because there was no prospect of settled accommodation was not justified on the facts. Its reasoning was flawed and the matter should be remitted to the council for reconsideration.R v Croydon LBC ex p Graham

[1994] 1 WLR 1442; [1995] 2 All ER 331; (1995) 27 HLR 59; (1994) 68 PCR D11; (1994) 93 LGR 20, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p HawthorneN5766N200515[1994] 1 WLR 1442; [1995] 2 All ER 331; (1995) 27 HLR 59; (1994) 68 PCR D11; (1994) 93 LGR 20, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p Hawthorne [1994] 1 WLR 1442; [1995] 2 All ER 331; (1995) 27 HLR 59; (1994) 68 PCR D11; (1994) 93 LGR 20, CA0N200525N12410N1630Authority had failed to consider why applicant had not paid the rentThe applicant was evicted from her council home for rent arrears of over 3,000. She claimed that she had been unable to afford the rent because her income was so low after her husband left her that she had been driven to chose between maintaining her children and paying the council. She was found intentionally homeless for wilfully and persistently failing to pay her rent. She succeeded in her application for judicial review (see [1994] COD 228) and the council appealed.The Court of Appeal dismissed the councils appeal. The court rejected the contention that, since the applicant had exercised the positive choice to spend the money on her children rather than the rent, she had deliberately omitted to pay for the purposes of Housing Act 1985 s60(1) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(1)). Nourse LJ stated:The purpose of Part III of the 1985 Act [now Housing Act 1996 Part 7] is to house the homeless. Admittedly, it is not part of that purpose to house those whose homelessness has been brought upon them by their own fault. But equally it is no part of it to refuse housing to those whose homelessness has been brought upon them without fault on their part, for example by disability, sickness, poverty or even a simple inability to make ends meet.The council had not considered the matters which had caused the applicant not to pay her rent. That was a fatal omission. It was no answer to assert that there had been a considered decision not to pay. The true question is What caused that decision?. The relevant paragraph of the then Homelessness Code of Guidance (para 7.4(b)) correctly stated the law.R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Hawthorne

[2015] EWCA Civ 1051; [2015] HLR 47, 27 October 2015Samuels v Birmingham City CouncilN5766N200514[2015] EWCA Civ 1051; [2015] HLR 47, 27 October 2015Samuels v Birmingham City Council [2015] EWCA Civ 1051; [2015] HLR 47, 27 October 20150N2398,N200525Ms Samuels was the assured shorthold tenant of a house. She lived in the property with her four children. Ms Samuels received housing benefit, but the award was not sufficient to pay all of her rent and she was obliged to pay the remaining 151 every month. Ms Samuels failed to do so and accrued rent arrears which resulted in her landlord bringing a possession claim to evict her. After sheN12410N1630Reviewing officer was entitled to take into account income support, child benefit and child tax credit when assessing whether a property was affordable and was entitled to find that spending 750 on food per month for a family of five was excessiveMs Samuels was the assured shorthold tenant of a house. She lived in the property with her four children. Ms Samuels received housing benefit, but the award was not sufficient to pay all of her rent and she was obliged to pay the remaining 151 every month. Ms Samuels failed to do so and accrued rent arrears which resulted in her landlord bringing a possession claim to evict her. After she was evicted she applied to the authority for assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. A reviewing officer decided that she had become homeless intentionally because she had sufficient income from other sources, such as child tax credits, child benefit and income support, so as to be able to afford the sum of 151. In doing so he rejected Ms Samuels contention that she required 750 per month to spend on food and found that such a sum was excessive. Before the county court appeal, the reviewing officer, in response to a ground of appeal that had been raised shortly before the hearing, emailed Ms Samuels solicitors to confirm that he had taken into account the fact that Ms Samuels was required to provide for four children as opposed to two when reaching his decision. Ms Samuels, after unsuccessfully appealing to the county court, appealed to the Court of Appeal.She contended that the reviewing officer had reached his decision unlawfully by: i) treating income support, child tax credits and child benefit as being sufficient to cover her housing costs; ii) failing to have regard to paragraph 17.40 of the Code of Guidance, ie accommodation should not be deemed as being affordable if the applicant would be left with a residual income which would be less than the level of income support or income-based jobseekers allowance that she would have been entitled to or if she would be unable to afford the housing costs without being deprived of basic essentials such as food, clothing, heating, transport and other essentials; and iii) failing to give proper reasons for explaining why, on the basis of her income and expenditure, the property was affordable. She also argued that the county court should not have considered the email sent by the reviewing officer in advance of the hearing.The appeal was dismissed. The Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 1996 SI No 3204 and paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Code of Guidance make clear that in determining whether accommodation is affordable all forms of income (including social security benefits of all kinds) must be taken into account. The reviewing officer was therefore not only entitled but required to take into account the income Ms Samuels received from income support, child tax credit and child benefit when considering whether her former accommodation had been affordable. The reasoning of Henderson J in Burnip v Birmingham City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629, [2013] PTSR 117 (ie that the availability of disability living allowance could not be used as a means of justifying discrimination arising from the application of housing benefit legislation) could not be applied to the very different context of this case.Moreover, the reviewing officer had considered and applied paragraph 17.40 of the Code of Guidance. Ms Samuels residual income was well above that which she would have received from income support or job-seekers allowance and the reviewing officer had decided that her income was such that she could afford the basic essentials such as food, clothing, heating and transport. He was entitled, in the absence of any reasoning from Ms Samuels solicitors as to why Ms Samuels required 750 per month to spend on food, to find that such a sum was excessive for a family of five. It was unnecessary for the reviewing officer to give any more detailed reasons. Finally, the county court judge had been entitled to take into account the email of the reviewing officer. The email merely clarified and elucidated the reasons already given in the review decision and was not a case of fundamental alteration or contradiction of those reasons or the plugging of a gap in the reasons.Samuels v Birmingham City Council

[2013] EWCA Civ 1764; [2014] HLR 13, 11 December 2013Viackiene v Tower Hamlets LBCN5766N200515[2013] EWCA Civ 1764; [2014] HLR 13, 11 December 2013Viackiene v Tower Hamlets LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1764; [2014] HLR 13, 11 December 20130N200525N12410N1630A reviewing officer was entitled to find that the cause of the applicants homelessness was the failure to take up the offer of help to find a new joint tenant to help pay the rent rather than finding that the property was unaffordableMs Viackiene held a joint tenancy of private rented accommodation. She fell into rent arrears when the other tenant stopped contributing towards the rent. The landlord suggested that she consider taking a different joint tenant and offered to help her find one. She declined. The arrears continued to accrue and she was eventually evicted. The council decided that she had become homeless intentionally. That decision was upheld on review and an appeal to the county court was dismissed.The Court of Appeal dismissed a second appeal. There had been no error of law. The reviewing officer had been entitled to decide that the homelessness had resulted from the applicants own deliberate omission (Housing Act 1996 s191), ie the failure to take up the landlords offer of help to find a more reliable joint tenant.Viackiene v Tower Hamlets LBC

[2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 JuneWilliam v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 JuneWilliam v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 June0N200525N12410N1630Failure to use money from remortgage to pay mortgage instalments a deliberate actWilliam v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBC

(1988) 20 HLR 305, QBDR v Hillingdon LBC ex p TinnN5766N200515(1988) 20 HLR 305, QBDR v Hillingdon LBC ex p Tinn (1988) 20 HLR 305, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Not reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation where resources so strained as to deprive family of the ordinary necessities of lifeJoint secure tenants bought their flat on a long lease with a council mortgage. The break-up of their marriage left Mrs Tinn in the property, unable comfortably to afford the mortgage. She asked the council to repurchase the property and grant her a tenancy. The council refused.An application for judicial review based on duties owed under Housing Act 1985 Part III (now Housing Act 1996 Part 7) was dismissed as too precipitate because Mrs Tinn was neither homeless nor threatened with homelessness. She would have to surrender the lease formally or sell it to a willing purchaser before any issues under homelessness legislation would arise.Note: This decision is based on Housing Act 1985 s58 before the amendment which inserted section 58(2A) (now Housing Act 1996 s175(3)). This extended the definition of homelessness to include those having accommodation which it would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy. Referring to the new provision, in Tinn, Kennedy J said, This would in appropriate circumstances include owner-occupiers. He added: it cannot be reasonable [within the meaning of s60 of the Act (now Housing Act 1996 s191)] for a person to continue to occupy accommodation when they can no longer discharge the fiscal obligations in relation to that accommodation without so straining their resources as to deprive themselves of the ordinary necessities of life, such as food, clothing, heat, transport and so forth. ((1988) 20 HLR at 308)Note also: Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 1996 SI No 3204.R v Hillingdon LBC ex p Tinn

(1993) 25 HLR 613, QBDR v Shrewsbury and Atcham BC ex p GriffithsN5766N200515(1993) 25 HLR 613, QBDR v Shrewsbury and Atcham BC ex p Griffiths (1993) 25 HLR 613, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Where payments from income support not paid towards mortgage, council should have considered whether homelessness was a likely result of that non-paymentR v Shrewsbury and Atcham BC ex p Griffiths

[1980] QB 460; [1980] 2 WLR 664; [1980] 1 All ER 913; 78 LGR 180, CADe Falco v Crawley BCN5766N200515[1980] QB 460; [1980] 2 WLR 664; [1980] 1 All ER 913; 78 LGR 180, CADe Falco v Crawley BC [1980] QB 460; [1980] 2 WLR 664; [1980] 1 All ER 913; 78 LGR 180, CA0N200525N12410N1630Authority entitled to conclude reasonable to remain in accommodation in ItalySee Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T58.1.De Falco v Crawley BC

[2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 2007Osei v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 2007Osei v Southwark LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 787; [2008] HLR 15, 25 July 20070N200525N12410N1630Reasonable to continue to occupy overcrowded accommodation in Spain rather than giving it up for more overcrowded accommodation in UKThe claimant and his family rented a room in a shared flat in Spain. When he lost his job and accrued rent arrears, the claimant came to the UK to find work. He stayed with a friend. When he found a job and had accumulated some funds over several months, he returned to Spain and cleared his arrears, terminated his tenancy and brought his wife and children to the UK. The friend could not accommodate the whole family and asked them to leave. The claimant then applied to Southwark for homelessness assistance. The council decided that he had become homeless intentionally: Housing Act 1996 s191. That decision was upheld on review and on appeal. The claimant pursued a second appeal, contending that the council had failed to have regard to the overcrowding of the flat in Spain that had been occupied by two other households in addition to the claimants family.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The council had proceeded on the basis of assuming (without detailed enquiry) that the flat had been overcrowded. It had been entitled to find that, even if overcrowded, it was reasonable for the claimant to continue to occupy rather than giving it up to bring his family to even more overcrowded accommodation with the friend in London. In making that assessment the council had been entitled to have regard to the circumstances relating to housing in its own area: Housing Act 1996 s177(2).Osei v Southwark LBC

(1998) 30 HLR 76, CAR v Camden LBC ex p ArandaN5766N200515(1998) 30 HLR 76, CAR v Camden LBC ex p Aranda (1998) 30 HLR 76, CA0N200525N12410N1630Not reasonable to remain in accommodation in Colombia due to financial circumstancesIn 1994 the applicant and her husband surrendered their London council flat under a scheme involving the receipt of a substantial sum to help them to buy privately. They acquired a bungalow in Colombia and moved there. The move was a disaster. The applicant could not find work, her husband did not try and he then abandoned her without financial support. The applicants capital was quickly depleted. Her expenditure exceeded her income. There was no social security available in Colombia and she used her remaining resources to bring herself and her child back to the UK. Camden Councils finding of intentional homelessness was quashed.The Court of Appeal dismissed the councils appeal. Any finding that giving up the Colombian home was intentional was impossible no reasonable authority could have found, given the financial circumstances, that it would have been reasonable to continue in occupation. In relation to the decision to leave the UK accommodation in 1994, the applicant had gone reluctantly in an attempt to keep her family together and in ignorance of her husbands intention to abandon her there. Either that ignorance prevented her actions from being described as deliberate (Housing Act 1985 s60(3), now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)) or the husbands actual abandonment of the family broke the chain of causation running from the initial departure from the UK.R v Camden LBC ex p Aranda

(1988) 20 HLR 529; (1988) 86 LGR 709, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p MonafN5766N200515(1988) 20 HLR 529; (1988) 86 LGR 709, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Monaf (1988) 20 HLR 529; (1988) 86 LGR 709, CA0N200525N12410N1630Not sufficient consideration of applicants pattern of life and reasons for coming to the UKThe applicants were Bangladeshis settled in the UK. They returned to Bangladesh before coming back to the UK with their families. The local authority decided that the applicants did not have settled accommodation in the UK but that they had left settled accommodation which it was reasonable for them to occupy in Bangladesh and were intentionally homeless.The Court of Appeal held that the authority was entitled to conclude that the accommodation in Bangladesh was settled. However, the decision letter did not show that it had properly carried out the balancing act between housing conditions in Tower Hamlets and the applicants pattern of life. This would be a factor justifying the applicants leaving accommodation in Bangladesh which it would otherwise be reasonable to expect them to continue to occupy. The court stated that the decision letter does not disclose as it should that the Council has considered the factors necessarily involved in deciding whether or not it is reasonable to expect [the applicant] to continue to occupy the settled accommodation available to him in Bangladesh. For that reason, the decision was quashed.R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Monaf

[2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 2007Waltham Forest LBC v MalobaN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 2007Waltham Forest LBC v Maloba [2007] EWCA Civ 1281; [2008] HLR 26; [2008] LGR 409; (2008) Times 16 January, 4 December 20070N200525N12410N1630Location of accommodation relevant to question of whether it is reasonable to continue to occupyWaltham Forest LBC v Maloba

(1983) 9 HLR 71; (1983) 81 LGR 702, QBDR v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Duro-RamaN5766N200515(1983) 9 HLR 71; (1983) 81 LGR 702, QBDR v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Duro-Rama (1983) 9 HLR 71; (1983) 81 LGR 702, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Employment prospects and loss of benefits relevant when considering reasonablenessMr Duro-Rama was a Spanish national with a right of abode in the UK. He returned to the UK with his family after a period living in Spain as he could not find employment there and, under Spanish law, his entitlement to social security benefit lapsed. He had no other means of support. He was found intentionally homeless for leaving accommodation which the council considered to be reasonable for him to occupy. In deciding this, it limited its consideration of reasonableness to housing issues. It did not consider his lack of employment and loss of benefit as relevant matters.Woolf J quashed the decision. In considering whether or not it is reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation, authorities are not limited to housing issues and can have regard to factors like employment prospects and loss of benefits in that locality. The matter was remitted to the council for reconsideration.R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Duro-Rama

(1990) 22 HLR 406, CAR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p BayaniN5766N200515(1990) 22 HLR 406, CAR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Bayani (1990) 22 HLR 406, CA0N200525N12410N1630Sufficient enquiries made of applicants financial circumstances in the PhilippinesR v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ex p Bayani

(1996) 28 HLR 25, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p AjayiN5766N200515(1996) 28 HLR 25, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p Ajayi (1996) 28 HLR 25, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Returning citizen needed to be considered in light of social history and national statusThe applicant was a British citizen born in London. In May 1990 she left her parents home in Nigeria and came to stay with her cousin. When her children arrived in December 1990 she was asked to leave and applied as a homeless person. The council found her intentionally homeless for leaving the accommodation in Nigeria.Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC quashed the decision. He found that the council had failed to deal with the applicant fairly. The councils enquiries had treated the applicant as a newly arrived immigrant. There had been no proper consideration of her personal circumstances, her social history or her national status and the burden had, in effect, been cast on the applicant to show, unaided, that she was not intentionally homeless.R v Newham LBC ex p Ajayi

[2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 WLR 433; [2011] 1 All ER 912; [2011] HLR 16; 26 January 2011Yemshaw v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 WLR 433; [2011] 1 All ER 912; [2011] HLR 16; 26 January 2011Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC [2011] UKSC 3; [2011] 1 WLR 433; [2011] 1 All ER 912; [2011] HLR 16; 26 January 20110N200525N12410N1630Violence not limited to physical violence and threats of physical violence; could include abuse giving rise directly or indirectly to psychological harmMs Yemshaw left her matrimonial home with her two young children and applied for homelessness assistance from the council. She said that she had left because of her husbands behaviour. Although he had not assaulted her physically, or threatened to do so, he had shouted at her in front of the children to such extent that she had had to retreat to a bedroom with the children and she had not been given housekeeping money. She was worried that if she returned home she would be hit or that he would take the children away. Hounslow decided that this was not enough to amount to violence or threats of violence sufficient to deem her to be homeless under Housing Act 1996 s177(1) and that it was reasonable for her to remain in the matrimonial home: s175(3). This decision was upheld on a review and on appeal in the county court and in the Court of Appeal. The reviewing officer and the courts had been following and applying the judgment in Danesh v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1404; in which the Court of Appeal had held that violence referred only to physical contact.The Supreme Court allowed a further appeal and expressly overruled Danesh. It held that the word violence was not a term of art and its meaning could change and develop over time. Whatever violence had meant in 1977, when it was first used in homelessness legislation, it should now be taken to embrace physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may give rise to the risk of harm. In short, it covered deliberate conduct that may cause psychological harm. The word bore the same meaning when used in Housing Act 1996 s198 (dealing with local connection referral). The modern guidance contained in the English Homelessness code of guidance para 8 accordingly represented the correct legal position. The review decision was quashed and remitted to Hounslow to reconsider and to decide, as Lady Hale put it:Was this, in reality, simply a case of marriage breakdown in which the appellant was not genuinely in fear of her husband; or was it a classic case of domestic abuse, in which one spouse puts the other in fear through the constant denial of freedom and of money for essentials, through the denigration of her personality, such that she genuinely fears that he may take her children away from her however unrealistic this may appear to an objective outsider? (para 36).Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC

[2001] EWCA Civ 1544; [2002] HLR 6; (2001) Times 23 NovemberBond v Leicester CCN5766N200515[2001] EWCA Civ 1544; [2002] HLR 6; (2001) Times 23 NovemberBond v Leicester CC [2001] EWCA Civ 1544; [2002] HLR 6; (2001) Times 23 November0N200525N12410N1630For the purposes of section 177(1) the sole question is whether violence is probable, not what the applicant should or should not doMs Bond was forced to leave two properties because of domestic violence from her former partner. She was then rehoused by a housing association. She resumed contact with her former partner but he assaulted her. She then excluded him from her home but he continued to harass her. She found the situation intolerable and fled the property. She later applied to the council as a homeless person. The council decided on review that she was intentionally homeless because she had failed to take any preventive measures, whether legal or practical, to stop the harassment. HHJ ORourke dismissed her section 204 appeal. She appealed.The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. When considering whether it was reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation, the question of reasonableness was not at large in domestic violence cases. Section 177(1) provided that it was not reasonable to continue to occupy accommodation if is was probable that this would lead to domestic violence. Hale LJ, giving the judgment of the court, held that:The only test is what is probable. This in my view is a pure question of fact, devoid of value judgements about what an applicant should or should not do. If there are measures which have been taken or probably will be taken which will probably prove effective in preventing actual or threatened violence, then that may reduce the level of risk below one of probability. But those are questions which the authority must ask themselves, rather than assume that such measures will be taken or will be effective if taken.The council did not ask the right question and there was no finding that violence was not probable. It followed that the council had erred in law. It was likely that if it had asked the right question it would have reached a different conclusion. The appropriate course was to vary the decision to one that Ms Bond had not become intentionally homeless.Bond v Leicester CC

(1988) 20 HLR 576, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p TothN5766N200515(1988) 20 HLR 576, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p Toth (1988) 20 HLR 576, CA0N200525N12410N1630Applicant could reasonably have remained in accommodation by seeking police protectionMrs Toth left her council property after being threatened by associates of her husband, who had disappeared and was being sought in relation to an armed robbery. She later applied to Croydon. It decided that she was intentionally homeless for leaving her accommodation, which she could reasonably have remained in by seeking police protection.The Court of Appeal rejected her appeal. The council had applied the right test and the decision was not perverse. In the alternative, the appellant asserted that her former joint tenancy had continued (notwithstanding her departure) because it had not been surrendered. The council had found the flat empty apart from bags of rubbish, had taken possession by changing the locks and had re-let to another tenant. OConnor LJ held that the facts established a surrender of the tenancy:In my judgment the evidence that this tenancy had been surrendered in law was overwhelming. A subsequent assertion by the tenant that she had no intention of leaving permanently is not relevant. One must look at the situation as at the time that the local authority accepted the surrender.An argument that Mrs Toth acted in good faith in ignorance of a relevant fact that by going she was losing her secure tenancy was rejected. It was not a relevant fact but the legal result of the factual departure.R v Croydon LBC ex p Toth

(1994) 26 HLR 159, CAR v Greenwich LBC ex p PattersonN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 159, CAR v Greenwich LBC ex p Patterson (1994) 26 HLR 159, CA0N200525N12410N1630Mandatory duty to enquire into the risk of violence in another areaR v Greenwich LBC ex p Patterson

[2015] EWCA Civ 14; [2015] 1 WLR 2912; [2015] HLR 16; (2015) Times February 19, 20 January 2015Waltham Forest LBC v HussainN5766N200514[2015] EWCA Civ 14; [2015] 1 WLR 2912; [2015] HLR 16; (2015) Times February 19, 20 January 2015Waltham Forest LBC v Hussain [2015] EWCA Civ 14; [2015] 1 WLR 2912; [2015] HLR 16; (2015) Times February 19, 20 January 20150N2398,N200525Mrs Hussain was an assured tenant of a property in Waltham Forest. In 2012, she became the victim of racist harassment and serious anti-social behaviour by one of her neighbours. This conduct did not involve any actual or threats of physical violence. Neither her landlord nor the police took any action against the perpetrator because she refused to make a formal complaint. Mrs Hussain subsequentlyN12410N1630Other violence includes abuse or other threatening or intimidating behaviour if such behaviour may give rise to psychological harmMrs Hussain was an assured tenant of a property in Waltham Forest. In 2012, she became the victim of racist harassment and serious anti-social behaviour by one of her neighbours. This conduct did not involve any actual or threats of physical violence. Neither her landlord nor the police took any action against the perpetrator because she refused to make a formal complaint. Mrs Hussain subsequently applied to Waltham Forest for assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. She contended that she was homeless because it was no longer reasonable for her to occupy her assured tenancy as it was probable that this would lead to other violence against her. Waltham Forest found that she was not homeless because other violence, within the meaning of section 177(1), required actual or threats of physical violence. Mrs Hussain appealed successfully to the county court. Waltham Forest appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC (), the Supreme Court held that domestic violence included physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may give rise to the risk of harm. For the purposes of section 177(1) the definition of violence was the same whether it applied to domestic violence or other violence. It followed therefore that other violence covered not only physical violence (actual or threatened) but other threatening or intimidating behaviour or abuse, if it is of such seriousness that it may give rise to psychological harm. Psychological harm meant something more than transient upset or distress and, while not always necessary, would be likely to overlap with a diagnosed psychiatric injury or illness such as depression. As the reviewing officer had failed to apply the correct test the matter was remitted to him to reconsider.Waltham Forest LBC v Hussain

(1991) 23 HLR 570, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p McIlroyN5766N200515(1991) 23 HLR 570, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p McIlroy (1991) 23 HLR 570, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Applicants could have stayed in accommodation pending an urgent transferAuld J upheld a finding of intentional homelessness against a family fleeing sectarian violence in Northern Ireland which had led to one of the applicants being shot at. On the facts, the council was entitled to conclude that the family could have continued in their home or in temporary accommodation in Belfast pending an urgent transfer application to the Northern Ireland Housing Executive.R v Newham LBC ex p McIlroy

[2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 45R (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBCN5766N200515[2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 45R (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBC [2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 450N200525N12410N1630Policy that former tenancy, which applicant fled because of violence, had to be relinquished before she would be accepted as a homeless person unlawfulR (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBC

[2013] EWCA Civ 786; [2013] HLR 34, 25 March 2013Chishimba v RBKCN5766N200515[2013] EWCA Civ 786; [2013] HLR 34, 25 March 2013Chishimba v RBKC [2013] EWCA Civ 786; [2013] HLR 34, 25 March 20130N200525N12410N1630It was the discovery of an applicants fraud, rather than the fraud itself, which was the operating cause of her homelessness; that did not amount to a deliberate act or omission on behalf of the applicantMs Chishimba was a Zambian national. She was not eligible for homelessness assistance: Housing Act 1996 s185. She deceived the council into believing that she was eligible by producing a false British passport. The council accepted that she was owed the main housing duty (section 193) and provided her with temporary accommodation. It later discovered the deception and notified her that its duty had been discharged because she had ceased to be eligible: section 193(6)(a). It gave notice to quit and obtained a possession order. Ms Chishimba then applied as a homeless person again. This time she was eligible because she had been granted leave to remain. The council decided that she had become homeless intentionally from the temporary accommodation because it had been gained and lost by her deception. That decision was upheld on review and HHJ Bailey dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. Ms Chishimba could not have become homeless intentionally from the temporary accommodation within the meaning of Housing Act 1996 s191 because:she ceased to occupy it in consequence of the fact that she was ineligible and not in consequence of any act or omission on her part; andonce the deception was discovered, it was not reasonable for her to continue to occupy accommodation she ought never to have been occupying and which she had obtained by deception (applying R v Exeter CC ex p Gliddon [1985] 1 All ER 493).Chishimba v RBKC

(1983) 8 HLR 54, CADevenport v Salford CCN5766N200515(1983) 8 HLR 54, CADevenport v Salford CC (1983) 8 HLR 54, CA0N200525N12410N1630No requirement of a deliberate intention to become homelessMr and Mrs Devenport were council tenants. The council received a petition signed by 237 other tenants calling for them to be removed from their estate as a result of vandalism, assaults and violent misconduct by their children. A possession order was made. Mr and Mrs Devenport then applied to the council as homeless persons. The council decided that they were intentionally homeless. On an application for judicial review, the councils decision was quashed because it had not considered whether Mr and Mrs Devenport had deliberately decided not to try to control their children.The local authoritys appeal was allowed. It was not necessary for the authority to show that the Devonports had deliberately done or failed to do something with the intention of being evicted and becoming homeless. The words deliberately in Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 s17 (now Housing Act 1996 s191) govern only the act or omission. There was ample evidence on which the authority could conclude that the Devonports had failed to take any steps to control their children and that that conduct resulted in the making of a possession order. The authority was not limited to the findings in the county court possession claim. Its task was to review all the facts as it knew them, including the decision of the county court, and reach a conclusion accordingly.Devenport v Salford CC

[2003] EWCA Civ 692; [2003] HLR 72Hijazi v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200515[2003] EWCA Civ 692; [2003] HLR 72Hijazi v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2003] EWCA Civ 692; [2003] HLR 720N200525N12410N1630Medical evidence that applicant incapable of managing affairs did not relate to relevant periodMr Hijazi was an assured shorthold tenant. In May 2001 he was evicted for non-payment of rent. The council decided that he was intentionally homeless. On a review he relied on a doctors report to support his contention that he suffered from psychological problems which meant that he would have been incapable of deciding to make himself intentionally homeless. The reviewing officer confirmed the decision, stating that Mr Hijazi was in a position to know how to manage his affairs and pay his rent at the date of his eviction. Mr Hijazi appealed that decision on the ground that the reviewing officer failed to take into account the medical report from his doctor. HHJ Knowles allowed in further evidence that the reviewing officer had taken the doctors report into account but had found that it did not take matters further because it did not deal with Mr Hijazis medical condition at the time of the eviction.The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Hijazis further appeal:1)While further evidence ought not to be considered where it added to, or supplemented, the reasons given in a review decision (see R v Westminster CC ex p Ermakov ()), the statement in this case simply elucidated the reasons already given. It had been properly adduced in evidence.2)It was unfortunate that the decision letter did not specifically refer to the doctors report, but the judge was entitled to find that the principles set out in Ermakov were not infringed.3)The reviewing officer was entitled to conclude that the medical evidence did not refer to Mr Hijazis medical condition when he was evicted and to conclude that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that he should have sought clarification in order to justify his conclusions.Hijazi v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

[2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 JuneWilliam v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 JuneWilliam v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 535; [2006] HLR 42; (2006) Times 6 June0N200525N12410N1630Failure to use money from remortgage to pay mortgage instalments a deliberate act; sale of jointly owned home a deliberate actMr William became homeless as a result of repossession by a mortgage lender. Ms Bellamy sold the home jointly owned by herself and her mother, in which she had lived. In both cases, county court judges quashed findings of intentional homelessness made by reviewing officers. In Mr Williams case the judge found that the reviewing officer had failed clearly to decide whether the deliberate act had been the taking-out of an unaffordable mortgage or the subsequent failure to make repayments. In Ms Bellamys case, the judge held that she had been a simple bare trustee of her mother and had had no alternative but to comply with her mothers instruction to sell. He varied the decision to one of not intentionally homeless.The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals by the local authorities. Neither review decision had contained any error of law and the jurisdiction under s204 had not justified the judges interfering with either of them. In the William case, the deliberate act identified in the decision was the failure to use the monies available to Mr William from the remortgage to pay the mortgage instalments, and that had been stated in unequivocal terms. In the Bellamy case, it was impossible to support the judges conclusion that, as a matter of law, if one joint owner wished to sell the property, the other joint owner was compelled to comply with that wish. On an application for an order that trustees of land concurred in a sale, the court could make such order as it thought fit. It was not inevitable that a court would have ordered a sale. It was open to the authority to take the view that it would have been reasonable for Ms Bellamy to remain in the property and contest any application for sale.William v Wandsworth LBC; Bellamy v Hounslow LBC

(1995) 27 HLR 234, QBDR v Wirral MBC ex p BellN5766N200515(1995) 27 HLR 234, QBDR v Wirral MBC ex p Bell (1995) 27 HLR 234, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Applicant can be both vulnerable and capable of managing his own affairsThe applicant was evicted from accommodation for behaviour which was a nuisance and annoyance. The council found him to have a priority need as a result of vulnerability caused by mental illness (Housing Act 1985 s59(1)(c), now Housing Act 1996 s189(1)(c)). However, it also decided that his homelessness was intentional.Harrison J dismissed an application for judicial review. The council had been entitled to find both that the applicant was presently vulnerable in the housing context and that at the time of the loss of his last accommodation he had been capable of managing his own affairs.R v Wirral MBC ex p Bell

[2004] 142 Housing Aid Update 3, 28 July 2004, St Helens County CourtGriffiths v St Helens MBCN5766N200515[2004] 142 Housing Aid Update 3, 28 July 2004, St Helens County CourtGriffiths v St Helens MBC [2004] 142 Housing Aid Update 3, 28 July 2004, St Helens County Court0N200525N12410N1630Applicant who had tried to stop her children causing nuisance had not been guilty of a deliberate act/omission nor had she acquiesced in their actionsSee Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T23.5.Griffiths v St Helens MBC

[2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 2005Aw-Aden v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 2005Aw-Aden v Birmingham CC [2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 20050N200525N12410N1630Belief in prospect of finding work in UK based on a wing and a prayer and not a relevant factMr Aw-Aden lived in Belgium. He came to the UK to look for work after his employment there ended. He was later joined by his wife and child. He applied as a homeless person after staying with friends in Birmingham for almost a year. The council decided that he had become homeless intentionally from his last settled home in Belgium. That decision was upheld on review and an appeal to the county court was dismissed. On a second appeal, Mr Aw-Aden contended that he had been unaware of a relevant fact the true prospect of being able to find work in Birmingham sufficient to provide the means for him to pay for his own accommodation and that the council had failed to consider whether that ignorance had been in good faith for the purposes of Housing Act 1996 s191(2). That subsection had not been referred to in the original decision or review decision (or in his solicitors correspondence).The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The correct legal approach to facts such as these was stated by Carnwath J in R v Westminster CC ex p Obeid (), ie, that ignorance of the true prospect for future employment could constitute a relevant fact provided it was sufficiently specific (that is related to specific employment) and based on some genuine investigation and not mere aspiration. Mr Aw-Adens prospects when leaving Belgium did not meet that threshold and rested on little more than a wing and a prayer. Accordingly, there had been no error by the council in not addressing the good faith issue in section 191(2).Brooke LJ noted that early in the course of the councils review, Mr Aw-Adens solicitors had requested a copy of the documents on the homelessness file (and the interview notes) so that they could make effective representations in the review. Those had not been provided. Brooke LJ said: if the law entitles an appellant to make representations and if solicitors acting for an appellant make a reasonable request for documentary material before they can make their representations, then the review decision should certainly not be made without complying with that request. [para22]Aw-Aden v Birmingham CC

[2006] EWCA Civ 1427; [2007] HLR 18, 2 November 2006F v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 1427; [2007] HLR 18, 2 November 2006F v Birmingham CC [2006] EWCA Civ 1427; [2007] HLR 18, 2 November 20060N200525N12410N1630Section 191(2) not relevant where applicant did not know whether or not HB would pay rentIn 2002, the claimant, then a young single parent, gave up her council tenancy to move into a privately rented house. She failed to secure full housing benefit (HB) to pay the rent and was evicted in 2003. On her subsequent homelessness application, the council found that she had become homeless intentionally on giving up her flat and had found no subsequent settled accommodation. That decision was upheld on review and in the county court on appeal. A second appeal was pursued on the basis that the council had not dealt with the claimants contention that she had thought (in ignorance of the true position) that HB would pay the full rent on her new home.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The council had expressly rejected the suggestion that the claimant had been told that the full rent would be covered by HB or that she genuinely thought it would be. The facts showed that the claimant moved home at best without knowing whether HB would be paid or being bothered about the rent. After analysis of section 191(2) and the authorities it was held that, as the applicant had proceeded on a wing and a prayer, no need had arisen for the council to consider ignorance, in good faith, of a material fact.F v Birmingham CC

[2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 2010Gibbons v Bury MBCN5766N200515[2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 2010Gibbons v Bury MBC [2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 20100N200525N12410N1630Authoritys failure to consider whether applicant ignorant of Housing Benefit/whether this was in good faithMr Gibbons was an assured shorthold tenant in rent arrears. His landlords gave him two months notice seeking possession: Housing Act 1988 s21. Mr Gibbons completed an application form for council housing (Housing Act 1996 Part 6) in which he stated that he could not afford his rent, had to move out of his home 15 days later (when the notice expired) and would then become homeless. When the notice expired, he left the property and later applied for homelessness assistance (Housing Act 1996 Partt 7). The council decided that he had become homeless intentionally on the ground that he had left at a time when he had 7,000 in capital which he could have paid towards his rent. On review of that decision, it became plain that there had not been 7,000 capital available to clear the arrears. Following a meeting with Mr Gibbons and his representatives, the reviewing officer gave notice that she was minded to, nevertheless, uphold the decision on the basis that the tenancy had been given up voluntarily and Mr Gibbons had expended his savings frivolously instead of using them to pay rent. The representatives sought a further meeting but none was held. HHJ Tetlow allowed an appeal and quashed the review decision. The councils appeal from that decision was dismissed.The Court of Appeal held that:The reviewing officer had failed to take account of a relevant consideration, namely that the Part 6 housing application disclosed information triggering an obligation on the council to provide advice and assistance such as might have helped the claimant avoid homelessness. Jackson LJ said:When the council received that application form, the council clearly had reason to believe that Mr Gibbons and his daughter were threatened with homelessness. That, in my view, is sufficient to trigger the obligations of the council under Part 7 of the 1996 Act (para 31).The failure by the council to give appropriate advice was relevant to the question of whether Mr Gibbons became homeless intentionally.The reviewing officer had also failed to decide the question of whether or not Mr Gibbons had been ignorant of his entitlement to housing benefit and if he had been ignorant of that matter no finding had been made on whether or not he had acted in good faith: Housing Act 1996 s191(2).There had been a deficiency in the original decision (the mistake in relation to the 7,000) and once the reviewing officer had notified an intention to uphold the decision on a different factual basis, she should have held an oral hearing as his representatives had sought: Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2).Gibbons v Bury MBC

(1994) 26 HLR 132, CAHobbs v Sutton LBCN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 132, CAHobbs v Sutton LBC (1994) 26 HLR 132, CA0N200525N12410N1630Bad faith putting adverse material to applicantThe applicants were private tenants, who were evicted following rent arrears. They contended that there had been confusion about payment of the rent, the whereabouts of their landlord and of their entitlement to, and subsequent claim for, housing benefit. The council took into account various findings resulting from its enquiries and concluded that the applicants had not conducted themselves reasonably and were intentionally homeless. In the course of proceedings for judicial review, the councils officer swore a second affidavit indicating that the council was not considering the reasonableness of the applicants belief, but whether they had acted in good faith. It was suggested that the shift of emphasis was caused by the decision in R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Rouf (). If the council had genuinely been considering good faith it would or should have re-interviewed the applicant.By a majority the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants appeal. The reasonableness or otherwise of the applicants conduct had been properly regarded as relevant to the consideration of good faith. The council had applied the right test of good faith and the second affidavit had explained why this was so. In the interests of fairness, an applicant must be given the opportunity to explain matters that an authority was minded to take against them (R v Gravesham BC ex p Winchester ()). However, this did not mean that, having come to the conclusion that the applicant had not been telling the truth on essential matters or had not been acting bona fide, the authority must recall him for a further interview and put those matters to him again and seek his reaction. Nor did the court in Rouf rule that in every case where bad faith arises the matter must specifically be put to the applicant. It was not a requirement that the applicant be heard by the actual decision-maker whenever credibility was in issue. Appropriate enquiries had been made and the substance of the case had been put to the applicants.Hobbs v Sutton LBC

[2004] EWCA Civ 394; [2004] HLR 37OConnor v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 394; [2004] HLR 37OConnor v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2004] EWCA Civ 394; [2004] HLR 370N200525N12410N1630Requirement to consider whether omission deliberate, despite issue not being raisedMr and Mrs OConnor left their housing association property in London to travel to Ireland to visit Mr OConnors father who was very ill. He died shortly after their arrival in November 2000. Mr OConnor, who already suffered with depression, was particularly affected by his fathers death. The family stayed on temporarily in Ireland and arranged for a family friend to occupy their home and pay their rent. In May 2002 Mrs OConnor returned to find that: (a) the rent had not been paid; (b) the friend had not forwarded the post which contained a possession claim; (c) a suspended possession order had been made; and (d) the friend would not move out. When she excluded the friend and changed the locks, he broke back in. She reduced the arrears from almost 2,000 to 83 but her application to stay a warrant was refused and the possession order executed. Mr and Mrs OConnor applied as homeless persons but the council confirmed on review that they were intentionally homeless. They appealed but by the date of the appeal had obtained an assured shorthold tenancy elsewhere in London. HHJ Behar dismissed the appeal but held that, even if the review decision had been defective, he would have refused any remedy because the couple were not homeless.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. It held:1)Although an erroneous decision would ordinarily be quashed or varied, in a rare case it would be open to the court to refuse relief on the basis that it was an abuse of process for a pointless appeal to be pursued. Here the appeal was not pointless as the applicants might need to make a further application as homeless persons.2)The application for the review (and the solicitors representations in support of it) had asserted that no act or omission by the couple had caused their homelessness. Unsurprisingly, the thrust of the review concentrated on that submission. The omission relied on by the reviewer was the couples failure during their 16 month absence to protect their tenancy.3)Even though it had not been raised, the reviewer was obliged to have considered whether that omission was deliberate or whether it could not be treated as such because the couple had, in good faith, been in ignorance of a relevant fact: Housing Act 1996 s191(2). On the facts, the couple had not known of their friends default, the mounting arrears or the possession proceedings. The action they took in mid 2002 demonstrated what they would have done had they known. There is no requirement that ignorance of any relevant fact must be reasonable, although wilful ignorance must fail the good faith test.OConnor v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

(1993) 25 HLR 607, CAR v Barnet LBC ex p RughooputhN5766N200515(1993) 25 HLR 607, CAR v Barnet LBC ex p Rughooputh (1993) 25 HLR 607, CA0N200525N12410N1630Where mortgage taken out fraudulently s191(2) did not applyThe applicant was made homeless following mortgage possession proceedings. The deliberate act which caused the loss of the home was the applicant taking out a mortgage in 1987 beyond her means she was unemployed, but had claimed to have an earned income of 18,000.The councils finding of intentional homelessness was upheld on appeal. Taking out the mortgage was the act that caused the homelessness. It had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation and so Housing Act 1985 s60(3) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)) could not apply to prevent the act from being deliberate.R v Barnet LBC ex p Rughooputh

(1998) 30 HLR 76, CAR v Camden LBC ex p ArandaN5766N200515(1998) 30 HLR 76, CAR v Camden LBC ex p Aranda (1998) 30 HLR 76, CA0N200525N12410N1630Applicant not intentionally homeless where applicant went to Colombia with husband to keep family together and in ignorance of husbands plans to desert herR v Camden LBC ex p Aranda

(1988) 20 HLR 576, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p TothN5766N200515(1988) 20 HLR 576, CAR v Croydon LBC ex p Toth (1988) 20 HLR 576, CA0N200525N12410N1630An applicants lack of awareness that in abandoning accommodation she could potentially lose her tenancy by a surrender was not ignorance of a relevant fact but of the law; she was therefore intentionally homelessR v Croydon LBC ex p Toth

(1994) 26 HLR 244, CAR v Exeter CC ex p TranckleN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 244, CAR v Exeter CC ex p Tranckle (1994) 26 HLR 244, CA0N200525N12410N1630Prospects of business venture a relevant factThe applicants became homeless as a result of default on a business loan secured on their home. The council decided that the question of whether the business was or was not originally a sound investment was not relevant and decided that the applicants were intentionally homeless.The Court of Appeal held that the decision should be quashed, approving the decision in R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Lusi and Lusi (). What the applicants knew or ought to have known of the prospects of the business venture were matters relevant to the question of intentional homelessness and should have been investigated.R v Exeter CC ex p Tranckle

(1991) 23 HLR 460, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p RoufN5766N200515(1991) 23 HLR 460, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Rouf (1991) 23 HLR 460, CA0N200525N12410N1630Ignorance of a relevant fact; question is whether applicant acted in good faith, not whether acted reasonablyThe applicant went to Bangladesh with his family. During his absence he arranged for a friend to occupy his council flat and pay the rent. The friend did not pay the rent and the flat was repossessed. Over three years later the applicant returned to the UK and found his flat boarded up. He applied to the authority as a homeless person. It decided that he was intentionally homeless as a result of ceasing to occupy his accommodation in Bangladesh. In its decision letter the authority stated that it had taken into account that the length of your absence in Bangladesh was over three years and that it was not therefore reasonable for you to suppose that the [council flat] would still be available for you.The Court of Appeal quashed the decision. By Housing Act 1985 s60(3) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)), an act or omission in good faith is not to be treated as deliberate if an applicant is unaware of a relevant fact. The question of whether an applicant was unaware of a relevant fact is a straightforward question of fact for the authority. Where an applicant was unaware of a relevant fact the question is simply whether the applicant acted in good faith, not whether he or she acted reasonably. The authority had not enquired into whether the applicants actions were in good faith. The matter was remitted for reconsideration by the authority. Dillon and Stoker LJJ both considered that if the authority concluded that the applicant was acting in bad faith then this should be put to him for his comment.Note: see Hobbs v Sutton () on the latter point.R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Rouf

(1994) 26 HLR 302, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p OnwudiweN5766N200515(1994) 26 HLR 302, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p Onwudiwe (1994) 26 HLR 302, CA0N200525N12410N1630Business mortgage default; knowledge of risk relevant to good faithThe applicant lost his home as a result of default on a mortgage taken out to finance a business venture. The council found him intentionally homeless because he took the mortgage at a time when his business plan was not finalised and he had obtained the loan by misrepresenting his earnings. The decision letter expressly referred to the housing pressures in Wandsworth as a factor in reaching the decision.Laws J dismissed the application for judicial review (see [1994] COD 229). He held that (a) the council had misdirected itself and should not have had regard to housing conditions in the borough as these were only relevant to the issue of whether it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy the former home (Housing Act 1985 s60(4), now Housing Act 1996 s177(1)); but (b) the error was not material, as the authority was entitled to find on the information before it, canvassed over six interviews with the applicant, that he had misled the mortgagees and had realised he was putting his home at serious risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed an application for leave to appeal as not even arguable. In a business mortgage default case it is not enough simply to find that he was a hopeless businessman or that the venture was ill advised, but it is necessary to look at all the circumstances to decide whether on the one hand, he honestly believed he was acting sensibly, or on the other, he knew perfectly well the risk he was taking, namely that his house might be repossessed [305]. Only in the latter category would the defaulter be intentionally homeless. Here, the facts of the case took it beyond the stage of honest incompetence to a stage where the applicant could be said to be deliberately putting his house at risk.R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Onwudiwe

(1992) 24 HLR 520, CAR v Winchester CC ex p AshtonN5766N200515(1992) 24 HLR 520, CAR v Winchester CC ex p Ashton (1992) 24 HLR 520, CA0N200525N12410N1630Applicant who moved to take up employment, initially with accommodation to go to, was not intentionally homelessMrs Ashton rented accommodation in Tunbridge Wells which was not satisfactory. It was in a state of disrepair and she had been harassed by her landlord. She moved to Winchester because she had been offered permanent employment there. However, 16 months later she lost her job and was evicted from the temporary accommodation she had been living in. She applied to Winchester Council for accommodation. It contacted the police in Tunbridge Wells, who had no record of any complaint of harassment, and her former landlord, who was critical of her as a tenant. It decided that she was intentionally homeless for giving up the rented accommodation in Tunbridge Wells which she could have reasonably been expected to continue to occupy.The decision was quashed at first instance. Kennedy J found that it was nonsense to say that a middle-aged woman in poor health, who left her home in Tunbridge Wells in October 1987 to take up in Winchester the only job she had been offered for six years despite continuing searches, with accommodation to go to and with hopes of improving her status that year, should be held to have become intentionally homeless in March 1989 because her hopes in relation to employment and accommodation were not realised. However, Kennedy J rejected her contention that her accommodation in Winchester (initially bed and breakfast accommodation and then just over a year in temporary council accommodation which did not enjoy security of tenure) was settled accommodation. The councils appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.R v Winchester CC ex p Ashton

[2017] EWCA Civ 942, 6 July 2017Trindade v Hackney LBCN5766N200514[2017] EWCA Civ 942, 6 July 2017Trindade v Hackney LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 942, 6 July 20170N200525N12410N1630An applicant who gives up accommodation cannot rely on their ignorance of the fact that there was a chance that they would subsequently become homeless from unsettled accommodation where the applicant has made no investigations about their ability to remain in occupation of the accommodation they move toMs Trindade was from Sao Tome. In 2013, she moved to the UK with her disabled daughter to live with her sister, after her sister, who lived in the UK, had told her that her daughter would receive better treatment in the UK. However, Ms Trindade became homeless when her sisters tenancy was terminated. She applied to Hackney for housing assistance. Hackney decided that she was intentionally homeless because she had given up accommodation that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy in Sao Tome and that her accommodation in the UK had not been settled accommodation. This decision was upheld on review and by the county court. Ms Trindade appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that she had been unaware, at the date that she left Sao Tome, that she could be evicted from her sisters accommodation.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Where an applicant gives up accommodation and the future has not worked out as expected, to avoid being found to have become intentionally homeless, she must, show at the time that she gave up accommodation that her belief that a specific state of affairs would arise or continue in the future was based on a genuine investigation about those prospects, and not on mere aspiration. In this case, Ms Trindade had made no investigations as to the prospect of being accommodated by her sister indefinitely. She could not therefore rely on her ignorance of the fact that there was a chance that her sister could be evicted. Moreover, an applicant who leaves accommodation with reckless disregard of what her housing prospects would be in the future cannot have acted in good faith. The fact that Ms Trindade left Sao Tome to obtain better healthcare for her daughter was irrelevant.Trindade v Hackney LBC

[2009] EWCA Civ 31; [2009] HLR 35; (2009) Times 18 February, 10 February 2009Ugiagbe v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2009] EWCA Civ 31; [2009] HLR 35; (2009) Times 18 February, 10 February 2009Ugiagbe v Southwark LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 31; [2009] HLR 35; (2009) Times 18 February, 10 February 20090N200525N12410N1630Departure from property when unaware that landlord needed court order was in good faith despite failure to follow advice to go to HPUThe claimant was an assured shorthold tenant with a fixed-term (one-year) tenancy. When that expired, the landlord gave her a little more time but then told her to leave and she did so. She applied for homelessness assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. The council accepted that she had been in ignorance of the landlords need to obtain a possession order to secure her eviction but decided that she had become homeless intentionally because her ignorance of that relevant fact had not been in good faith: Housing Act 1996 s191(1) and (2). It found that she had had advice that she should go to the councils Homeless Persons Unit (HPU) for assistance before leaving. She had not done that. Had she taken that step, she would have been advised not to leave without a court order. The decision was upheld on review and HHJ Welchman dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. The claimant had been in ignorance of a relevant fact and had acted in good faith. She had not ignored the advice given but simply decided not to approach the HPU because she had not, at the time, wished to become homeless or be treated as homeless. After reviewing authorities on good faith in homelessness cases spanning 25 years, Lloyd LJ said:26. Her failure to go to the HPU for help could be said to have been foolish or imprudent. But neither of those would be sufficient to put her conduct into the category of not being in good faith, nor would it even if she were regarded as having been unreasonable.27. The subsection provides relief against the otherwise potentially harsh consequences of subsection (1) for those who act in relevant ignorance, but subject to the safeguard of the requirement of good faith. It seems to me that the use of the phrase good faith carries a connotation of some kind of impropriety, or some element of misuse or abuse of the legislation.Ugiagbe v Southwark LBC

(1985) 17 HLR 168, QBDR v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2)N5766N200515(1985) 17 HLR 168, QBDR v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2) (1985) 17 HLR 168, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Ignorance of legal consequences of non-payment of mortgage was not ignorance of a relevant factR v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2)

(1991) 23 HLR 260, QBDR v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Lusi and LusiN5766N200515(1991) 23 HLR 260, QBDR v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Lusi and Lusi (1991) 23 HLR 260, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Good faith; distinction between honest blundering/carelessness and dishonestyMr Lusi lived and worked in England but then sold his home and went with his wife and child to take up a business opportunity in Turkey. They stayed with his parents, intending to find a new home in Turkey, but the business opportunity failed. They left his parents home and returned to Britain and applied as homeless persons. The council based a decision of intentional homelessness on, inter alia, the deliberate giving up of accommodation in Britain to go to Turkey.Roch J quashed the decision. The accommodation in England had been left in the belief that the applicant was going to a sound business opportunity in Turkey. The business had not been as described and so the applicant had been in ignorance of a relevant fact. The authority had failed to consider whether that ignorance had been in good faith (Housing Act 1985 s60(3), now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)). Roch J held that, when considering that question: there is a distinction between honest blundering and carelessness on the one hand, where a person can still act in good faith, and dishonesty on the other, where there can be no question of the person acting in good faith.Note: This decision was approved in R v Exeter CC ex p Tranckle ().R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex p Lusi and Lusi

(1988) 20 HLR 479, QBDR v Mole Valley DC ex p BurtonN5766N200515(1988) 20 HLR 479, QBDR v Mole Valley DC ex p Burton (1988) 20 HLR 479, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Inaccurate assurance by husband of prospects of rehousing a relevant factThe applicants partner resigned from his employment and so lost the family home, which was tied accommodation. The applicant applied in her own right for housing, asserting that, although she had known of her partners intentions, she had relied on his assurance that the family would qualify for rehousing under a special council allocation policy. The council found her to be intentionally homeless because her partners application had already been rejected.This decision was quashed for failure to take into account relevant considerations. The council was required on reconsideration to have regard in particular to Housing Act 1985 s60(3) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)), ie, that an act or omission done in good faith in ignorance of a material fact should not be treated as deliberate.R v Mole Valley DC ex p Burton

(1983) 11 HLR 105, QBDR v Wandsworth LBC ex p RoseN5766N200515(1983) 11 HLR 105, QBDR v Wandsworth LBC ex p Rose (1983) 11 HLR 105, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Ignorance of lack of satisfactory accommodation with father in England relevant factMs Rose had been born in England but lived with her mother in Jamaica. Her father, who lived in England, paid the air fares for her two brothers and sister to come to England, where they had lived with him at different times. Later her father wrote to say that, although he could not pay her air fare, she could come to England. She understood this to mean that he had adequate accommodation where she and her daughter could stay indefinitely. She stayed with her father for a week but he only had a one-bedroom flat and he asked her to leave and started to make her stay difficult. Wandsworth Council decided that she was intentionally homeless.Glidewell J quashed this decision because the authority had not taken into account the fact that the applicant had been unaware of the lack of satisfactory accommodation with her father. The council was not entitled to assume, without making proper enquiries, that, simply because she had failed to ask her father about accommodation, she had acted other than in good faith in ignorance of a relevant fact.R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Rose

(1997) 29 HLR 389, QBDR v Westminster CC ex p ObeidN5766N200515(1997) 29 HLR 389, QBDR v Westminster CC ex p Obeid (1997) 29 HLR 389, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Applicants belief that housing benefit would cover rent needed considerationThe applicant was accepted for the main housing duty by Wandsworth LBC. She was offered and reluctantly accepted council accommodation provided in discharge of duty. She then found a preferable private flat to rent in Westminster. She made enquiries of friends in the area and satisfied herself that that the rent would be met by housing benefit. She took the tenancy. The rent was 210 but housing benefit was limited to 180 per week. The applicant was unable to make up the shortfall and applied to Westminster as a homeless person. She was found to be intentionally homeless from her previous accommodation.Carnwath J quashed the decision. The effect of the Court of Appeals decisions in R v Exeter CC ex p Trankle () and R v Ealing LBC ex p Sukhija (1994) 26 HLR 726 was that an applicants appreciation of the prospects of future housing or future employment can be treated as awareness of a relevant fact provided it is sufficiently specific (that is, related to specific employment or specific housing opportunities) and provided it is based on some genuine investigation and not mere aspiration. The test under Housing Act 1985 s60(3) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)) is not the reasonableness of an applicants actions, but whether they are taken in ignorance of relevant facts. It was a relevant fact that the applicant had believed that her entitlement to housing benefit would cover the full rent. If the authority thought that she had made no genuine investigation of the matter it might have dismissed her stated belief as mere aspiration. The issue was one for the authority to decide but they had not considered the correct question.Note: Approved by CA in Aw-Aden v Birmingham CC ()R v Westminster CC ex p Obeid

1988 SC 329; 1988 SLT 847; [1988] CLY 4365, Court of Session (Outer House)Wincentzen v Monklands DCN5766N2005151988 SC 329; 1988 SLT 847; [1988] CLY 4365, Court of Session (Outer House)Wincentzen v Monklands DC 1988 SC 329; 1988 SLT 847; [1988] CLY 4365, Court of Session (Outer House)0N200525N12410N1630Ignorance of fathers intention not to allow applicant to return if she left was relevant factThe applicant was a single homeless teenager who suffered from epilepsy. Until the age of 16 she lived with her father but she decided to move to stay with her mother temporarily while at college. Her father warned that, if she went, he would not allow her to return, but she did not believe him. She was unaware that her father was sincerely expressing his true intentions and genuinely thought that he was bluffing. When she returned, he refused to have her back. The authority accepted that her belief was genuine but that this was irrelevant in the light of her fathers clear warning and so found her intentionally homeless.In the Outer House, Lord Clyde, quashing the decision, held that the council had misdirected itself. The fathers state of mind had been a relevant fact and the daughters action taken in genuine ignorance of her fathers true intent could not be classed as deliberate (Housing Act 1985 s60(3), now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)). This decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Session First Division.Wincentzen v Monklands DC

(1983) 8 HLR 54, CADevenport v Salford CCN5766N200515(1983) 8 HLR 54, CADevenport v Salford CC (1983) 8 HLR 54, CA0N200525N12410N1630Failure to take any steps to control children whose conduct resulted in a possession order resulted in intentional homelessnessDevenport v Salford CC

(1996) 28 HLR 374, CAR v Nottingham CC ex p CaineN5766N200515(1996) 28 HLR 374, CAR v Nottingham CC ex p Caine (1996) 28 HLR 374, CA0N200525N12410N1630Council entitled to infer that applicant was aware that partner was withholding rentThe applicants partner decided to withhold rent, for which housing benefit was being paid, because of the landlords failure to repair the couples home. As a result, they were evicted. They applied as homeless people. Her partner was found to have become homeless intentionally. The applicant denied knowing about the withholding of rent and there was no direct evidence that she was aware of this. However, the council decided that it was likely that she did have knowledge of the withholding of rent. She was found to have acquiesced in the non-payment and to be intentionally homeless. Her application for judicial review was dismissed.The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. It found that the council had undertaken careful enquiries and given the applicant ample opportunity to make representations. The council had a great deal of background information about the nature of the family unit and was entitled to look at the family as a whole. The family received housing benefit of 238.33 for eight months continuously, which was not paid to the landlord. It was open to the council to conclude that the family had used that money with the applicants knowledge and consent for the benefit of the family and not for the purpose of paying the rent. It was considered unlikely, if not inconceivable, that the applicant was unaware of her partners dissatisfaction with the state of disrepair and lack of hot water and of the landlords alleged failure to rectify the defects. The council was entitled to infer that the couple would have discussed the matter including the withholding of the rent.R v Nottingham CC ex p Caine

(1995) 27 HLR 344, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Khatun (Asma)N5766N200515(1995) 27 HLR 344, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Khatun (Asma) (1995) 27 HLR 344, CA0N200525N12410N1630Wife content to leave decisions to husband acquiesced in his decisionsThe applicant was from Bangladesh and came to the UK in 1987 after marrying her husband. In 1991 she was pregnant and living with her husband and two children in her husbands brothers house in a single room with shared use of the kitchen and bathroom. As a result of the overcrowding and tensions in the house, the applicants left. The husband applied as a homeless person but was held to be intentionally homeless as a result of leaving his brothers house. His application for judicial review was dismissed. His wife (the applicant) then applied to the council and said that her husband had, without warning or discussion, told her that they were leaving the brothers accommodation and that if she wanted them to stay together she had to follow him. She too was held to be intentionally homeless. That decision was challenged on the basis that the applicant had not agreed with or acquiesced in her husbands decision.The Court of Appeal dismissed a renewed application for leave. Ralph Gibson LJ said that:If a wife is content in a marriage to leave decisions as to where the family will live to the husband, then a decision to move, in which the wife co-operates and plays her part may properly be regarded as a decision in which the wife has joined unless there is some reason for holding that she did not.The fact that Ms Khatun, after the issue of proceedings, said that she did not agree with her husbands decision did not oblige the authority to accept what she said. It was entitled to conclude that she made her own decision to go and, although she did not like it, nevertheless joined in the decision to leave the accommodation instead of remaining in the accommodation herself with the children.R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Khatun (Asma)

(1985) 17 HLR 168, QBDR v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2)N5766N200515(1985) 17 HLR 168, QBDR v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2) (1985) 17 HLR 168, QBD0N200525N12410N1630In absence of explanation for rejecting wifes evidence council could not conclude acquiescenceFollowing their earlier application for judicial review (see R v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 1) (1983) 10 HLR 134, QBD) Mr and Mrs Beattie, who were evicted as a result of mortgage arrears, made separate applications to the council. Mr Beattie argued that it was not reasonable to continue to occupy the property on the basis of overcrowding and on the failure to pay the mortgage as not being deliberate because it was based on inaccurate legal advice (confirmed in writing by his solicitors) that he would be rehoused if he did not make the payments. Mrs Beattie claimed that she had not been a party to her husbands decision not to pay the mortgage and that she had done all that she could to persuade him to maintain the payments.Webster J found that:1)The decision not to pay the mortgage was based on an error of law rather than an error of fact and so was not saved from being deliberate by Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 s17(3) (now Housing Act 1996 s191(2)). In any event, it was unlikely that the good faith limb of section 17(3) would have been satisfied.2)The authority had been entitled to conclude that it would have been reasonable for the family to remain in the house despite the overcrowding.3)Mrs Beattie had sworn an affidavit in the earlier proceedings that she had protested with her husband about his non-payment of the mortgage. In those circumstances, if the council wished to reject her evidence, it had to put before the court evidence explaining why it had done so. As there was no such evidence, the decision was varied to one of not homeless intentionally.R v Eastleigh BC ex p Beattie (No 2)

[1981] 1 WLR 328; [1981] 1 All ER 27; (1980) 79 LGR 289, QBDR v North Devon DC ex p LewisN5766N200515[1981] 1 WLR 328; [1981] 1 All ER 27; (1980) 79 LGR 289, QBDR v North Devon DC ex p Lewis [1981] 1 WLR 328; [1981] 1 All ER 27; (1980) 79 LGR 289, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Application by partner of intentionally homeless applicant must be considered in its own rightMs Lewis lived with her partner in tied accommodation. He gave up his job, with the result that the family were forced to leave their home. He applied as a homeless person and included Ms Lewis in his application. He was found intentionally homeless. Ms Lewis then made an application in her own name, including her partner in her application. The council decided that Ms Lewis had acquiesced in her partners decision to give up his job and was intentionally homeless. It contended that it was to the family unit as a whole that it had to look and that, where one member of a family became homeless intentionally, the whole family was to be treated as intentionally homeless.Woolf J held that a woman who lives with a man who becomes intentionally homeless is not necessarily barred from relief by his conduct or by the fact that he may benefit undeservingly. The council had to consider an application from Ms Lewis and consider whether, by her conduct (rather than that of her partner), she was intentionally homeless: it would be readily understandable if parliament had provided expressly that the application should be made by the family unit and the question should be whether or not the family should be regarded as having become homeless intentionally. However there are no express words which provide that where a man and a woman are living together, if one of the couple becomes homeless intentionally, the other should be treated as becoming homeless intentionally. The Act does not place any express limitation on who can make an application or as to how many applications can be made. [[1981] 1 WLR 328 at 333B]However, he considered that: the fact that the Act requires consideration of the family unit as a whole indicates that it would be perfectly proper in the ordinary case for the housing authority to look at the family as a whole and assume, in the absence of material which indicates to the contrary, where the conduct of one member of the family was such that he should be regarded as having become homeless intentionally, that was conduct to which the other members of the family were a party If, however, at the end of the day because of material put before the housing authority by the wife, the housing authority are not satisfied that she was a party to the decision, they would have to regard her as not having become homeless intentionally. [at 333GH]There was ample material before the council to support its decision that Ms Lewis had acquiesced in her partners conduct and her application was dismissed.R v North Devon DC ex p Lewis

(1985) 17 HLR 526, QBDR v Penwith DC ex p TrevenaN5766N200515(1985) 17 HLR 526, QBDR v Penwith DC ex p Trevena (1985) 17 HLR 526, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Where wife left her husband, terminated the tenancy but later reconciled with him, he was not intentionally homelessMrs Trevena was a council tenant. She took her children and left her husband to live with another man. She surrendered the tenancy. Mr Trevena unsuccessfully applied to have the tenancy transferred into his name. When he refused to leave, the authority obtained a possession order. Later, Mr and Mrs Trevena became reconciled and lived in a series of premises on short lettings. They applied jointly to the council for accommodation; it determined that they were intentionally homeless. Mr Trevena applied for judicial review.McNeill J quashed the decision. There was no material on which the authority could conclude that Mr Trevena had been a party to the surrender or that it was a joint surrender or abandonment.R v Penwith DC ex p Trevena

(1983) 9 HLR 56, QBDR v Swansea CC ex p JohnN5766N200515(1983) 9 HLR 56, QBDR v Swansea CC ex p John (1983) 9 HLR 56, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Failure to remove partner who was a nuisance could amount to acquiescenceMs John was a 67-year-old council tenant. Her partner was an alcoholic and, when drunk, was a nuisance and annoyance to neighbours. This only occurred when Ms John was away from the flat. He was larger and younger than she was and she was unable to control his behaviour. The council brought possession proceedings and Ms John was evicted. She applied to the council, which determined that she was intentionally homeless on the basis that she had acquiesced in her partners behaviour in not asking him to leave.Her application for judicial review was dismissed by Woolf J. It was open to the council to find that by failing to take action to terminate her partners right to remain she had acquiesced in his conduct.See also: R v Swansea CC ex p Thomas (1983) 9 HLR 64, QBD.R v Swansea CC ex p John

(1985) 17 HLR 336, QBDR v West Dorset DC ex p PhillipsN5766N200515(1985) 17 HLR 336, QBDR v West Dorset DC ex p Phillips (1985) 17 HLR 336, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Council failed to make further enquiries in light of evidence of non-acquiescenceAn application was made by Mrs Phillips as a homeless person. She and her husband attended an interview with the council. The family had financial problems as a result of Mr Phillips drinking. Arrangements had been made for Mr Phillips to pay arrears of rent on his tenancy by instalments but, unbeknown to Mrs Phillips, he failed to keep up with the payments. When the interviewing officer referred to the arrears of rent, Mrs Phillips attacked her husband, knocking him off his chair and shouting that she had always said that his drinking would lead to trouble. The interviewing officer considered that no further enquiries were necessary and found Mrs Phillips intentionally homeless.Hodgson J found it astonishing that the council had concluded that no further enquiries were necessary. It appeared that the authority had wrongly come to the conclusion that there was a burden of proof on Mrs Phillips and that it had failed to appreciate that the application was made by Mrs Phillips and not her husband. Enquiries should have been made of the social services department, which had had contact with the family. Mrs Phillips conduct during the interview could hardly have been construed as acquiescence by the most hard-hearted of officers. The council had failed to make its enquiries in a caring and sympathetic way as required by the then Homelessness Code of Guidance. A declaration was made that Mrs Phillips was owed the full housing duty.R v West Dorset DC ex p Phillips

(1999) 31 HLR 50, CAR v Brent LBC ex p BariiseN5766N200515(1999) 31 HLR 50, CAR v Brent LBC ex p Bariise (1999) 31 HLR 50, CA0N200525N12410N1630Something startling not commented on may lead to inference it had not been consideredR v Brent LBC ex p Bariise

[2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 2006Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 2006Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 20060N200525N12410N1630Decision not necessarily made at the same time as notification of reasons; not lawful to postpone making decision simply to avoid a duty; mediation is independent of the enquiry process and not a reason to delay enquiries or a decisionRobinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC

(1978) Times 26 October, DCR v Beverley BC ex p McPheeN5766N200515(1978) Times 26 October, DCR v Beverley BC ex p McPhee (1978) Times 26 October, DC0N200525N12410N1630Not homeless decision after a referral request had been made was flawedMs McPhee was living in a hostel with her children and applied to Beverley as a homeless person. In December 1977 Beverley wrote to Hull City Council, stating that it accepted that Ms McPhee was homeless and in priority need, but suggested that she should be rehoused by Hull. However, in August 1978 Beverley Council wrote to Ms McPhee stating that it was not satisfied that she was homeless because she had accommodation.The court found that that decision was flawed. The authority had obligations to provide accommodation or to refer to another authority from the moment that it was satisfied that Ms McPhee was homeless.R v Beverley BC ex p McPhee

(1997) 29 HLR 628, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p MiyangerN5766N200515(1997) 29 HLR 628, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p Miyanger (1997) 29 HLR 628, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Delay in making lawful decision led to order of mandamusThe applicant applied as a homeless person in March 1996. He was provided with temporary accommodation but on 20 May 1996 he was notified that the council owed him no duty because he had entered the country as a sponsored immigrant. A subsequent decision of 18 June 1996 alleged that no duty was owed because the applicant could not have recourse to public funds. Following the grant of leave to challenge those decisions (neither of which could be sustained in law), the council indicated in August 1996 that it did not adequately convey the reasons for the decision that [the applicant] is not entitled to assistance and indicated that a fresh decision would be made. By the date of trial three months later, no new decision had been made but the council invited the dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that the two decisions impugned had each been withdrawn.Harrison J allowed the application for judicial review with costs and granted an order of mandamus to compel the council to determine the application within 28 days and to notify the decision within three days thereafter. If there were any doubts about the applicants immigration status, the council had had sufficient time in which to obtain evidence.R v Brent LBC ex p Miyanger

(2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CACrawley BC v BN5766N200515(2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CACrawley BC v B (2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CA0N200525N12410N1630After conceding that decision that applicant not in priority need was wrong, authority can go on to consider whether applicant intentionally homelessTimes 4 November, CAThe council decided that the applicant was not in priority need and confirmed that decision on review. She appealed to the county court. Before her appeal was heard the council conceded that she was in priority need. It did not withdraw the review decision (as it could have done see Demetri v Westminster CC ()). Instead it carried out what it called an extra-statutory review and decided that the applicant had a priority need but had become homeless intentionally (this issue had not been addressed in its previous decisions). The appeal against the original statutory review decision came on for hearing, was dismissed by a district judge but on appeal to a circuit judge was allowed. The judge did not simply quash the decision on priority need but also declared that the council owed the applicant the full housing duty under s193. He considered that the councils duty under s184 when making enquiries was not only to satisfy itself whether or not an applicant was homeless, eligible and in priority need but also to determine whether or not the applicant had become homeless intentionally. He held that the omission of any reference in the decision letter to intentionality meant that the council had to be treated as if it had considered the question and had decided that the applicant had not become homeless intentionally. It could not later reopen its decision and determine against the applicant an issue which, in effect, had been decided in her favour, at least in the absence of fraud or deception.Allowing the councils appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the declaration could not stand. The council did not have to decide the issue of intentional homelessness if it decided an applicant was not in priority need. It had determined what duty it owed, as required by section 184, without having to address that issue. It was not debarred from considering that issue if it later decided that the applicant was in priority need. Decisions under Housing Act 1996 as to whether applicants are in priority need or whether they are intentionally homeless are questions of public law. The application of the jurisprudence of public law to the process of decision-making does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a decision, once taken, cannot be revisited. To the extent that the decision in R v Southwark LBC ex p Dagou () may have held otherwise, it was wrong.Where there is an appeal to a county court, the question for the court is whether the whole of the circumstances justify any relief in public law. A new ground for refusing accommodation should only be ignored if it can be faulted on public law grounds. The extra-statutory review demonstrated that the council was not satisfied of one of the key pre-requisites of the section 193 duty that the applicant was unintentionally homeless. The correct course, after quashing the first review decision, was to leave the applicant to seek a review of the councils subsequent finding of intentional homelessness. The Vice-Chancellor indicated that he would issue a Practice Direction making it clear that section 204 appeals should only be listed before circuit judges. (See now CPR PD2B para 9.)Crawley BC v B

[2004] EWCA Civ 244; [2004] HLR 30; [2004] LGR 577Porteous v West Dorset DCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 244; [2004] HLR 30; [2004] LGR 577Porteous v West Dorset DC [2004] EWCA Civ 244; [2004] HLR 30; [2004] LGR 5770N200525N12410N1630Council entitled to revisit its decision when based on a fundamental mistake of factTimes 28 March, CAIn October 2002 Ms Porteous, a single parent with three children, left her secure tenancy in Hounslow and went to live in Germany. She thought she had transferred the tenancy to her sister but in fact the tenancy remained in her name. In February 2003 she returned to the UK and applied to West Dorset. The council notified her that she was owed the full housing duty (s193(2)). That decision was later purportedly rescinded when West Dorset found out about the accommodation in Hounslow and a not homeless decision made. On 3 September 2003 the council upheld its decision on review on the basis that Ms Porteous still had the tenancy in Hounslow. However, by that date Hounslow had served a notice to quit which had expired. Hounslow had said that it would allow a further period of grace for Ms Porteous to return but that too had expired. A possession order had not been obtained. Ms Porteous appealed to the county court on the grounds that it was not open to the council to revisit its original decision and that, at the date of the review, the property was no longer available to her. HHJ Beashel dismissed an appeal, holding that West Dorset had been entitled to rescind the decision and upholding the review officers finding that Ms Porteous had not been homeless.The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. The judge had been entitled to find that at the date of the review decision it was open to Ms Porteous to return to the Hounslow property as she had at the very least a licence to do so. Although the review officer had mistakenly thought that she was still a tenant, when at best she then had what in all probability was no more than a licence, that was nothing to the point. She was not homeless. Second, the judge was correct to have found that the council was entitled to revisit and rescind its first decision. It would be surprising if a local authority could not revisit and change an earlier decision if that earlier decision resulted from a fundamental mistake of fact. In this case, without there being any suggestion of bad faith on either side, unknown to either party, there was accommodation available at the date of the original decision (see Crawley BC v B ())Porteous v West Dorset DC

(1998) 30 HLR 760, CAR v Hackney LBC ex p KN5766N200515(1998) 30 HLR 760, CAR v Hackney LBC ex p K (1998) 30 HLR 760, CA0N200525N12410N1630Change in law did not apply retrospectively to applicant already accepted for main housing dutyThe applicant, a post-entry asylum-seeker, applied to the council for accommodation. In July 1996 it decided that he was owed the full housing duty under Housing Act 1985 s65(2) (now Housing Act 1996 s193(2)) which was modified by Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 s4. The effect of s4 was that only temporary accommodation was to be provided until the applicants asylum claim was finally determined. The applicant was provided with temporary accommodation and his asylum application remained outstanding. After the implementation of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 s9 (on 19 August 1996) the council decided that the new Act (placing responsibility for accommodating asylum-seekers with NASS) relieved it of any further duty and it gave notice to quit the tempor-ary accommodation. Dyson J refused leave to move for judicial review, having regard to the decisions in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Shelter [1997] COD 49, QBD, R v Southwark LBC ex p Bediako and R v Westminster CC ex p Zafru (1997) 30 HLR 22, QBD.The Court of Appeal allowed a renewed application for leave, granted the motion for judicial review and quashed the councils decisions. Lord Woolf MR stated that (a) the new Act could not apply retrospectively to negate a duty already owed and (b) the coming into force of the Act was not itself a change in circumstances entitling the council to consider whether it still owed a duty (disapproving ex p Shelter on this point).R v Hackney LBC ex p K

(2001) 33 HLR 525; (2000) Times 27 July, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p SadiqN5766N200515(2001) 33 HLR 525; (2000) Times 27 July, QBDR v Brent LBC ex p Sadiq (2001) 33 HLR 525; (2000) Times 27 July, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Decision that applicant was owed main housing duty cannot be revisited on applicants loss of priority needTimes 9 November, CATimes 28 March, CAMr Sadiq was accepted for the main housing duty under Housing Act 1996 s193(2) on the basis that he was in priority need because his son lived with him. Later, as a result of a court order, his son went to live with his mother. The council reconsidered its decision and informed Mr Sadiq that it was unable to provide him with further assistance because he was no longer in priority need. Mr Sadiq requested a review of that decision but later withdrew that request and sought judicial review of the decision on the basis that the council had no power to make it.Moses J granted his application. He reviewed the High Court authorities on revisiting decisions under Housing Act 1985. These showed that where a change in circumstances occurred after a lawful decision had been made, the council had no power to reconsider the decision, in the absence of fraud. The specific statutory provisions on when an authority ceases to be under a duty, introduced in Housing Act 1996 s193(6), made the instant case even stronger. Section 193 was a complete code as to the circumstances in which a local housing authority ceases to be under the duty under section 193. Loss of priority need was not listed under section 193(6) and the council could not revisit its decision.A contention that Crawley BC v B () overruled the previous authorities was rejected. The real basis for Crawley BC v B was that once the decision that the applicant was not in priority need had gone (the authority having conceded that its s184 and review decisions were wrong) and it was plain that no decision had been made as to intentional homelessness, the authority was entitled and, indeed, required under s184, to make a decision.Brent also contended that the applicant should have sought a review of its decision under section 202, rather than seeking judicial review. Moses J held that the decision was one that came within section 202(1)(b) and carried the right of review. However, as the matter was not altogether clear and the point was an important one and as the High Court retained residual discretion (see Begum (Nipa) v Tower Hamlets ()) it was appropriate to exercise the discretion to grant relief.R v Brent LBC ex p Sadiq

(1992) 24 HLR 401, QBDR v Dacorum DC ex p WalshN5766N200515(1992) 24 HLR 401, QBDR v Dacorum DC ex p Walsh (1992) 24 HLR 401, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Authority could revisit decision made on basis of applicants fraudThe applicant was accepted for the full housing duty. Subsequently, the council obtained further information from her former landlord and her neighbour, revealing that the application was made on the basis of false or fabricated material. A second decision of intentional homelessness was made.Macpherson J stated that, if an applicants circumstances do not change, the authority cannot simply serve a different notice based on the same facts as the former notice. However, just as a local authority may be obliged to review an unfavourable decision in the light of new evidence, it is entitled to reverse an earlier favourable decision if it was obtained fraudulently.R v Dacorum DC ex p Walsh

(1995) 27 HLR 21, QBDR v Lambeth LBC ex p MiahN5766N200515(1995) 27 HLR 21, QBDR v Lambeth LBC ex p Miah (1995) 27 HLR 21, QBD0N200525N12410N1630After making section 184 decision council have no power to reopen inquiriesIn February 1992 the applicant was accepted for the full housing duty. Pending an offer of permanent accommodation, the council secured temporary accommodation from a housing association. Subsequent monitoring by the council of the temporary accommodation suggested that the applicant was not living there, had sublet it, and was probably living at the address from which she had originally been accepted as a homeless person. In February 1993 the council issued a new Housing Act 1985 s64 (now Housing Act 1996 s184(3)) notice, containing a decision that the applicant was not homeless.Latham J granted certiorari to quash the new decision. He held that:(a)the council had purported to be making enquiries pursuant to s62 (now Housing Act 1996 s184) and to have issued a new s64 notice;(b)since the application for rehousing had been resolved by the earlier section 64 notice, there was no room for further enquiries into it or the issue of a further decision on it; and, therefore;(c)in conducting such enquiries and issuing a new decision, the council was exercising powers that it did not have. If the authority considered that the applicant was abusing the temporary accommodation, it had rights to recover possession of that property from her.Note: Housing Act 1996 s193(6)(d) now specifically provides for the duty to end in such circumstances.R v Lambeth LBC ex p Miah

(1996) 28 HLR 72, QBDR v Southwark LBC ex p DagouN5766N200515(1996) 28 HLR 72, QBDR v Southwark LBC ex p Dagou (1996) 28 HLR 72, QBD0N200525N12410N1630A council cannot rescind its decision in the absence of fraud or deception; decision to refer without reasons given quashedThe council notified the applicant that she was owed the main housing duty but was to be referred to Newham Council under the local connection provisions. It failed to give reasons for the decision to refer. On being given notice of the referral, Newham invited Southwark to reopen its enquiries on intentional homelessness. Southwark agreed and, having reconsidered the matter with the assistance of material provided by Newham, reversed its earlier decision and found the applicant to be intentionally homeless.Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC allowed an application for judicial review. He held that (a) the decision to refer had to be quashed in the absence of any reasons in the May 1994 decision letter and (b) the May 1994 decision on non-intentional homelessness was final because, fraud or deception apart, material coming into the hands of a council post-decision could only influence the manner in which the duties owed were to be discharged, rather than enable a council to rescind a decision that it owed a duty.R v Southwark LBC ex p Dagou

[2017] EWHC 1190 (Admin); [2017] HLR 31, 19 May 2017R (Sambotin) v Brent LBCN5766N200514[2017] EWHC 1190 (Admin); [2017] HLR 31, 19 May 2017R (Sambotin) v Brent LBC [2017] EWHC 1190 (Admin); [2017] HLR 31, 19 May 20170N200525N12410N1630Authority was not permitted to revisit its decision that the applicant was eligible for assistance where it had not properly assessed the facts; claim for judicial review allowed despite the availability of an appeal to the county courtThe claimant, a Romanian national, applied to Brent for assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. Brent decided that the claimant was homeless, eligible for assistance, had a priority need and had not become homeless intentionally. Brent declined to provide him with accommodation and instead referred his case to Waltham Forest because he had a local connection to Waltham Forest and not Brent. Waltham Forest declined to accept the referral on the grounds that the claimant was not eligible. Brent subsequently withdrew the referral to Waltham Forest and notified the claimant that he was not eligible for assistance. The claimant requested a review of that decision. Brent refused to accommodate the claimant pending the outcome of that review. The claimant brought a claim for judicial review on the grounds that Brent was lacked the power to revisit its earlier decision that the claimant was eligible for assistance.The claim for judicial review was allowed. Although there was an alternative remedy to bringing the claim for judicial review, ie the statutory review and appeal procedure, it was not appropriate to refuse to hear the claim because the issue was a discrete legal point that the court had heard argument on and it would be a waste of resources to require the point to be re-argued in the county court at a later date.The claimant had concluded its enquiries and notified the claimant of the duty that he was owed. In the absence of a fraudulent representation, Brent lacked the power to revisit its decision. The fact that Brent may have reached its decision without properly assessing the facts that were presented to it was not a ground for it revisiting its decision.R (Sambotin) v Brent LBC

[2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 2006R (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 2006R (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 20060N200525N12410N1630Where applicant, accepted as homeless and in priority need on basis of domestic violence, returned to matrimonial home, authority could rescind its decisionR (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBC

[2009] UKHL 7; [2009] 1 WLR 413; [2009] 3 All ER 277; [2009] HLR 34; [2009] LGR 730, 4 February 2009Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames RLBCN5766N200515[2009] UKHL 7; [2009] 1 WLR 413; [2009] 3 All ER 277; [2009] HLR 34; [2009] LGR 730, 4 February 2009Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames RLBC [2009] UKHL 7; [2009] 1 WLR 413; [2009] 3 All ER 277; [2009] HLR 34; [2009] LGR 730, 4 February 20090N200525N12410N1630Courts should adopt a benevolent approach to reviewsLord Neuberger gave the following guidance[47] A judge should not adopt an unfair or unrealistic approach when considering or interpreting such review decisions. [R]eview decisions are prepared by housing officers, who occupy a post of considerable responsibility and who have substantial experience in the housing field, but they are not lawyers. It is not therefore appropriate to subject their decisions to the same sort of analysis as may be applied to a contract drafted by solicitors, to an Act of Parliament, or to a courts judgment.[48] If the courts are too critical in their analyses of such decisions, it will tend to discourage reviewing officers from expressing themselves so fully.[49] In my view, it is therefore very important that, while circuit judges should be vigilant in ensuring that no applicant is wrongly deprived of benefits under Part VII of the 1996 Act because of any error on the part of the reviewing officer, it is equally important that an error which does not, on a fair analysis, undermine the basis of the decision, is not accepted as a reason for overturning the decision.[50] Accordingly, a benevolent approach should be adopted to the interpretation of review decisions. The court should not take too technical a view of the language used, or search for inconsistencies, or adopt a nit-picking approach, when confronted with an appeal against a review decision. That is not to say that the court should approve incomprehensible or misguided reasoning, but it should be realistic and practical in its approach to the interpretation of review decisions.[51] Further, as the present case shows, a decision can often survive despite the existence of an error in the reasoning advanced to support it. For example, sometimes the error is irrelevant to the outcome; sometimes it is too trivial (objectively, or in the eyes of the decision-maker) to affect the outcome; sometimes it is obvious from the rest of the reasoning, read as a whole, that the decision would have been the same notwithstanding the error; sometimes, there is more than one reason for the conclusion, and the error only undermines one of the reasons; sometimes, the decision is the only one which could rationally have been reached. In all such cases, the error should not (save, perhaps, in wholly exceptional circumstances) justify the decision being quashed.Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames RLBC

[2001] UKHL 57; [2002] 1 AC 547; [2001] 3 WLR 1339; [2002] 1 All ER 176; [2002] HLR 7; (2001) Times 2 NovemberMohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCN5766N200515[2001] UKHL 57; [2002] 1 AC 547; [2001] 3 WLR 1339; [2002] 1 All ER 176; [2002] HLR 7; (2001) Times 2 NovemberMohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2001] UKHL 57; [2002] 1 AC 547; [2001] 3 WLR 1339; [2002] 1 All ER 176; [2002] HLR 7; (2001) Times 2 November0N200525N12410N1630The circumstances existing at the time review conducted should be considered; review officers role is to consider matter afreshNote: this does not apply to cases where at the date of the review the applicants circumstances have changed from the date of the original decision to the applicants detriment and the original decision was unlawful (see Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ()).Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC

[2017] UKSC 36; (2017) Times 16 May, 10 May 2017Poshteh v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200514[2017] UKSC 36; (2017) Times 16 May, 10 May 2017Poshteh v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2017] UKSC 36; (2017) Times 16 May, 10 May 20170N200525N12410N1630Approach to county court appeals settled by Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC / Ali v Birmingham CCPoshteh v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

[2010] UKSC 8; [2010] 2 WLR 471; [2010] UKHRR 417; [2010] HLR 22; (2010) Times 19 February, 17 February 2010Tomlinson v Birmingham CC (Ali v Birmingham CC)N5766N200515[2010] UKSC 8; [2010] 2 WLR 471; [2010] UKHRR 417; [2010] HLR 22; (2010) Times 19 February, 17 February 2010Tomlinson v Birmingham CC (Ali v Birmingham CC) [2010] UKSC 8; [2010] 2 WLR 471; [2010] UKHRR 417; [2010] HLR 22; (2010) Times 19 February, 17 February 20100N200525N12410N1630Homelessness decisions are not a determination of civil rights and there is no requirement that the statutory scheme comply with Article 6Tomlinson v Birmingham CC (Ali v Birmingham CC)

November 2007 Legal Action 38, 21 June 2007Abdullah v Westminster CCN5766N200515November 2007 Legal Action 38, 21 June 2007Abdullah v Westminster CC November 2007 Legal Action 38, 21 June 20070N200525N12410N1630Review decision was not to be construed as strictly as a will or statuteIn the context of a challenge to the suitability of accommodation, Wilson LJ saidReviewing officers are not judges and have no legal training. They are decision makers, often overworked. Reviews of reviewing officers, when subject to appeal to the county court under section 204 , are not to be subject to the degree of analysis apt to an appeal to this court from a judgment of a professional judge; and the appeal to the circuit judge is only on a point of law. [para 15]Abdullah v Westminster CC

[2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 2005Aw-Aden v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 2005Aw-Aden v Birmingham CC [2005] EWCA Civ 1834, 7 December 20050N200525N12410N1630Review decision should not be made before complying with request for documentsAw-Aden v Birmingham CC

[2009] EWCA Civ 930; [2010] 1 WLR 990 [2010] HLR 8; [2009] LGR 937; (2009) Times 12 October, 20 August 2009De-Winter Heald v Brent LBCN5766N200515[2009] EWCA Civ 930; [2010] 1 WLR 990 [2010] HLR 8; [2009] LGR 937; (2009) Times 12 October, 20 August 2009De-Winter Heald v Brent LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 930; [2010] 1 WLR 990 [2010] HLR 8; [2009] LGR 937; (2009) Times 12 October, 20 August 20090N200525N12410N1630Authority may contract out review functionThe four claimants sought reviews (under Housing Act 1996 s202) of initial adverse decisions made by the council on their applications for homelessness assistance. The decisions related to homelessness, priority need and the suitability of accommodation. In each case, the review was conducted by Mr Perdios of Housing Reviews Limited (HRL). The claimants each unsuccessfully appealed to the county court against the review decisions. The Court of Appeal considered whether the contracting-out of the review function was permissible and (if it was) whether or not such an arrangement for review by a third party infringed under Article 6 ECHR.The Court of Appeal held that:the conduct and determination of a section 202 review was a function of a housing authority under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. Notwithstanding the views expressed by Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Millett in Begum (Runa) v Tower Hamlets LBC (), contracting-out of that function was permitted by the Local Authorities (Contracting Out of Allocation of Housing and Homelessness Functions) Order 1996 SI No 3205 Article 3; andthe evidence adduced did not support the proposition that the company did not reach review decisions fairly or that Mr Perdios displayed bias.De-Winter Heald v Brent LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 312; [2011] PTSR 1523; [2011] HLR 18, 24 January 2011Dharmaraj v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 312; [2011] PTSR 1523; [2011] HLR 18, 24 January 2011Dharmaraj v Hounslow LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 312; [2011] PTSR 1523; [2011] HLR 18, 24 January 20110N200525N12410N1630Review decision may be notified to applicant or their authorised agent; only substance of requirements of s203 need be referred toDharmaraj v Hounslow LBC

[2004] EWCA Civ 1307; [2005] HLR 9; [2005] LGR 411; (2004) Times 26 OctoberFeld v Barnet LBC; Pour v Westminster CCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 1307; [2005] HLR 9; [2005] LGR 411; (2004) Times 26 OctoberFeld v Barnet LBC; Pour v Westminster CC [2004] EWCA Civ 1307; [2005] HLR 9; [2005] LGR 411; (2004) Times 26 October0N200525N12410N1630In circumstances where a second review was conducted there was no unfairness in this being conducted by the same reviewerBarnet owed Mr Feld the full housing duty (s193). He was offered a one-bedroom flat and sought a review of the suitability of the accommodation on the basis that he needed more than one bedroom. The review officer decided that the accommodation offered was suitable but directed that a further offer of a one-bedroom property be made. Mr Feld rejected the further offer and requested another review. The same review officer (Barnet only had one) upheld the councils decision. Mr Feld appealed under s204 on the basis that the same officer who had conducted the first review (and decided against him) had conducted the second review and that that was unfair.Ms Pour was owed the s193 duty by Westminster. She sought a review of the suitability of property offered to her. One of the councils three review officers upheld a decision that it was suitable. Ms Pour brought a s204 appeal but that was compromised by the council agreeing to review the matter again. The same review officer then conducted the fresh review and reached the same decision as previously. Miss Pour appealed again under s204 on the ground that a new review officer should have conducted the fresh review.Mr Felds appeal was dismissed by HHJ Mayer, but Ms Pours appeal was allowed by HHJ Crawford Lindsay QC. Permission was granted in both cases for second appeals.The Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of any exceptional circumstances, there was nothing objectionable in the same officer conducting a review and then subsequently a re-review or second review. This was because the reviewing officer was not reviewing his or her own earlier decision but, in what would in any event have to be unusual circumstances (because there is no right to a second review (see s202(2)), would be starting afresh to review a decision made by a more junior officer. There was nothing unfair about that. Furthermore, as the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 gave no guidance on who was to conduct a review the second time and there was nothing to suggest that it had to be someone who was not involved in the first decision, there was no breach of those regulations.Feld v Barnet LBC; Pour v Westminster CC

[2002] EWCA Civ 751; [2003] HLR 6Goodger v Ealing LBCN5766N200515[2002] EWCA Civ 751; [2003] HLR 6Goodger v Ealing LBC [2002] EWCA Civ 751; [2003] HLR 60N200525N12410N1630Delay in providing copy of housing file did not render review decision unfairMr Goodger was a secure tenant of Hounslow LBC. He was convicted of drug offences committed at the premises and sentenced to six years imprisonment. Relying on the conviction, Hounslow obtained a possession order. After his release from prison Mr Goodger applied to Ealing as a homeless person. Ealing decided that he had made himself intentionally homeless. He requested a review of that decision and asked for a copy of his housing file. A review date was set but he was not given the file until six working days before the hearing. The review panel upheld the councils decision but Mr Goodgers appeal to the county court was allowed on the basis that there had been a procedural unfairness in the councils delay in providing the housing file. The council appealed.The Court of Appeal allowed the councils appeal. The judge had been wrong in approaching the failure to provide the housing file as conclusive in itself of unfairness without identifying the issue before the review panel and the respect in which the perceived unfairness undermined the decision on that issue. The only issue before the review panel was whether Mr Goodger had made himself intentionally homeless. That was a factual issue and the file was of no relevance to that issue. The councils delay in providing the housing file earlier did not render its decision on the issue of intentional homelessness unfair.Goodger v Ealing LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 283; [2011] HLR 20, 26 January 2011Nzamy v Brent LBCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 283; [2011] HLR 20, 26 January 2011Nzamy v Brent LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 283; [2011] HLR 20, 26 January 20110N200525N12410N1630A letter requesting a review had to be read in a broad, commonsense wayThe council owed Mr Nzamy the main housing duty (Housing Act 1996 s193(2)) and had secured temporary accommodation for him. In 2008, he told the council that his wife was in fear of violence at the accommodation and asked to be transferred. It offered alternative temporary accommodation, which he refused. He was then told that if he did not sign a tenancy agreement for the refused accommodation the council would be released from its duty under section 193(5). Mr Nzamy sought a review explaining why he had refused the offer, that the circumstances at his present accommodation had improved, and that he wished to stay there until permanent accommodation could be provided. A reviewing officer upheld a decision that the offered accommodation had been suitable. HHJ Higgins dismissed an appeal on the basis that the council had lawfully discharged its duty.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. Mr Nzamys letter seeking a review had set the agenda of issues that the reviewing officer had to address. The letter had to be read in a broad, commonsense way. It was difficult to construe the request to stay in his current accommodation as anything other than a request for a review of the councils prospective decision to discharge its duty, which review had never been carried out. The fact that a final decision on discharge had not been notified until after Mr Nzamy had requested the review was not material, given that such a discharge decision was itself reviewable. The council still needed to undertake a review of the discharge decision.Nzamy v Brent LBC

[2008] HLR 36; (2008) Times 25 March, 3 March 2008Omar v City of WestminsterN5766N200515[2008] HLR 36; (2008) Times 25 March, 3 March 2008Omar v City of Westminster [2008] HLR 36; (2008) Times 25 March, 3 March 20080N200525N12410N1630Review of whether offer suitable and whether or not reasonably refused to be based on the facts as at the date of the refusalOmar v City of Westminster

[2007] EWCA Civ 1108; [2008] LGR 260; [2008] HLR 18, 5 October 2007Osseily v Westminster CCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 1108; [2008] LGR 260; [2008] HLR 18, 5 October 2007Osseily v Westminster CC [2007] EWCA Civ 1108; [2008] LGR 260; [2008] HLR 18, 5 October 20070N200525N12410N1630On review, suitability of offer to be judged at time it was refused; withdrawal of offer of accommodation not relevant to issue of suitability on reviewOsseily v Westminster CC

[2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 2010Ravichandran v Lewisham LBCN5766N200515[2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 2010Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 20100N200525N12410N1630Guidance on requirements of notification of, and reviews of, suitability of offers of accommodation under s193(7)Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC

[2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 2006Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 2006Robinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1122; [2006] 1 WLR 3295; [2007] HLR 7; [2006] LGR 822; (2006) Times 5 September, 28 July 20060N200525N12410N1630Where original decision unlawful, review decision should restore applicants rights to what they would have been at time of original decision if the applicants circumstances have changed to his detrimentRobinson v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC

[2004] EWCA Civ 1485; [2005] HLR 11Sahardid v Camden LBCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 1485; [2005] HLR 11Sahardid v Camden LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1485; [2005] HLR 110N200525N12410N1630Review of suitability must take into account facts known at date of reviewTimes 2 NovemberIn November 2000 Camden accepted the applicant and her young child (aged two) for the full housing duty (s193(2)). It provided temporary accommodation and registered the application under its Part 6 housing allocation scheme. That scheme stated that homeless applicants living in temporary housing with a single child would be offered one-bedroomed council homes if the child was under five and two bedrooms if the child was five or over. The applicant claimed that she needed two bedrooms for medical reasons. Camden did not accept that and in April 2003 offered her a one-bedroom flat, as her child was by then only four. The applicant accepted the offer but also exercised her right to seek a review on the ground that the flat was unsuitable for medical reasons. The reviewing officer rejected her arguments and on 5 November 2003 notified her of a decision that the accommodation was suitable. Three days earlier the applicants son had turned five. HHJ Dean QC dismissed her appeal brought under s204.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. It held that the reviewer had to consider the facts known at the date of the review: Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC (). Although Mohamed had been decided under preceding (1996) review regulations (rather than the 1999 regulations) and concerned local connection rather than suitability, the court considered that the principle applied equally. At the time of the review the applicants son was five. The reviewing officer had overlooked this and had failed to consider the changed position under the councils allocation policy. The policy had to be taken into account when deciding suitability and the failure to do so was an error of law. The councils decision was quashed.Sahardid v Camden LBC

[2003] EWCA Civ 351; [2003] HLR 54; (2003) Times 9 AprilSareen v Hackney LBCN5766N200515[2003] EWCA Civ 351; [2003] HLR 54; (2003) Times 9 AprilSareen v Hackney LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 351; [2003] HLR 54; (2003) Times 9 April0N200525N12410N1630No right to review of decision not to refer under local connection provisionsMr Sareen applied to Hackney as a homeless person. Hackney decided that it owed him the full housing duty under section 193(2). Mr Sareen sought a section 202 review of Hackneys decision not to refer his application to Ealing under section 198 on the basis that he had no local connection with Hackney but had a connection with Ealing based on relatives and his need to be near a Sikh community. Hackney informed him that there was no right to review a decision not to refer an application to another authority. (Hackney also reconsidered the issue on a non-statutory basis but decided that there was no local connection with Ealing.) Mr Sareen appealed under s204 from that refusal to review. HHJ Cotran held that there was a right to review a decision not to refer and that he had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under s204. He held that the councils decision was flawed and should be quashed. Hackney appealed.The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. There was no statutory right under section 202, or elsewhere in Part 7, to review a decision not to refer an application under section 198. Section 202(1)(b) provided a right to review any decision as to what duty (if any) is owed under sections 190 to 193 and 195 to 197. This expressly limited the ambit of the review procedure to the duties owed under those sections and did not extend to decisions in the exercise of the power of referral under section 198. Section 202(1)(c) related to a decision to refer, not a decision not to refer. Nor did the other categories in section 202(1) apply. Since there was no right of review it followed that there was no right of appeal under section 204.Sareen v Hackney LBC

[2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 2014Temur v Hackney LBCN5766N200515[2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 2014Temur v Hackney LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 877; [2015] 1 All ER 311; [2014] HLR 39, 26 June 20140N200525N12410N1630A reviewing officer was entitled to make a review decision that was less favourable to an applicant than the original decisionMs Temur applied to Hackney for assistance. She contended that she was homeless because she had been forced to leave the matrimonial home after suffering violence from her husband. She was prevented from taking her daughter with her. After leaving her home, she had been staying with friends and in a womens refuge. Hackney decided that she was homeless but did not have a priority need. Ms Temur requested a review. In the meantime Ms Temur acquired an assured shortold tenancy of a room and obtained a residency order so that her daughter could come and live with her. She contended that the room was too small for her and her daughter. The reviewing officer sent Ms Temur a letter stating that he was minded to find that she was now not homeless as she was occupying the room and it was reasonable for her and her daughter to continue to occupy.Ms Temur appealed to the county court. Her appeal was dismissed.The Court of Appeal dismissed her second appeal. A reviewing officer had to determine the review on the facts as they appeared at the date of the review. The statutory scheme did not prevent a reviewing officer from making a review decision that was less favourable to the applicant. Nor was the reviewing officer required to determine whether the room was statutorily overcrowded so as to be suitable within the meaning of section 210. The question of whether a property was suitable under section 210 only applied when the authority came to discharge its own duties; considerations of suitability under section 210 did not apply to the question of whether existing property was reasonable to continue to occupy.Temur v Hackney LBC

[2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 JulyWarsame v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 JulyWarsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 July0N200525N12410N1630The right in s202 to request a review included a right to request a review of a decision that a duty had been dischargedThe applicant sisters were accepted for the full housing duty (s193(2)). In due course they were offered a secure council tenancy under the councils allocation scheme (Housing Act 1996 Part 6). They refused the offer and requested a review of the councils decision that it had discharged its duty to them under section 193(7). The decision was upheld on review and the sisters appealed to the county court. HHJ Oppenheimer held that he had no jurisdiction to consider an appeal as no right to review of the decision arose under section 202 and that therefore there was no right to appeal (section 204(1)).The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The right to request a review arose in respect of any decision of a local authority on what duty, if any, it owed under ss190193 and 195197 (s202(1)(b)). These words are wide enough to include a decision that a duty once owed was no longer owed. Accordingly, the phrase any decision in section 202(1)(b) extended to decisions on the existence of events or factual situations which, if they had occurred, or had existed, would have the effect that the duty ceased to exist. It followed that the applicants could challenge the findings by the council which had led to the no duty decision (eg, on the suitability and acceptability issues in section 193(7) itself).Warsame v Hounslow LBC

[1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBDR v Camden LBC ex p MohammedN5766N200515[1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBDR v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed [1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Guidance on approach to be taken where inadequate reasons given under s184(3) and deficiency such that any attempt to use review mechanism rendered unfairR v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed

[2006] EWHC 2737 (Admin); [2007] HLR 15, 16 October 2006R (Lynch) v Lambeth LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWHC 2737 (Admin); [2007] HLR 15, 16 October 2006R (Lynch) v Lambeth LBC [2006] EWHC 2737 (Admin); [2007] HLR 15, 16 October 20060N200525N12410N1630Review decision not quashed despite it not being carried out within 56 daysR (Lynch) v Lambeth LBC

[2013] EWHC 3972 (QB), 13 December 2013Tachie, Terera and Il v Welwyn Hatfield BCN5766N200515[2013] EWHC 3972 (QB), 13 December 2013Tachie, Terera and Il v Welwyn Hatfield BC [2013] EWHC 3972 (QB), 13 December 20130N200525N12410N1630An ALMO was not permitted to carry out section 202 reviews where the power to do so had not been properly delegated by the authority; an authority could, however, delegate the power retrospectivelyThe three claimants made separate applications to the council for homelessness assistance. On review, it decided that the first two had become homeless intentionally and the third was not in priority need. They appealed to the county court (Housing Act 1996 s204), contending that their homelessness applications and reviews had wrongly been dealt with by an Arms Length Management Organisation (ALMO) instead of by the council itself. The county court transferred the cases to the High Court.Jay J held that the contracting out to the ALMO had initially been invalid because the relevant resolution had been made by the full council and had not been ratified by the councils cabinet. However, the reviews were not invalidated because the cabinet had the power to retrospectively delegate the power to carry out reviews to the ALMO and there were no other legal errors made in the reviewing officers decisions.Tachie, Terera and Il v Welwyn Hatfield BC

[2008] EWCA Civ 1443; [2009] HLR 29; [2009] LGR 536; (2009) Times 10 March, 17 December 2008Banks v Kingston-upon-Thames RLBCN5766N200515[2008] EWCA Civ 1443; [2009] HLR 29; [2009] LGR 536; (2009) Times 10 March, 17 December 2008Banks v Kingston-upon-Thames RLBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1443; [2009] HLR 29; [2009] LGR 536; (2009) Times 10 March, 17 December 20080N200525N12410N1630Where adverse review decision based on a change of facts, applicant should have been given a chance to make representationsMr Banks applied for homelessness assistance. Kingston decided that he was not homeless. He sought a review but, before it was concluded, he was given notice to quit by his private landlord. The reviewing officer decided that the original decision could not stand because Mr Banks was now homeless but that no duty was owed because he did not have a priority need. HHJ Crawford Lindsay QC dismissed an appeal against that decision.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. Although on a literal construction of the words of Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2) there had been no deficiency or irregularity in the original decision when made, a broad reading of the regulation required a reviewing officer to give an applicant an opportunity to address him or her (orally or in writing) before making an adverse decision on wholly different grounds. That embraced a situation where an original decision had become deficient simply because it did not deal with a matter raised by a changed factual situation since it was promulgated. Such a strained interpretation of the regulation would not have been necessary had the claimant taken the expedient course of making a fresh application when his factual circumstances changed rather than pursuing his review of a decision overtaken by events.Banks v Kingston-upon-Thames RLBC

[2005] EWCA Civ 1377, 3 November 2005Gentle v Wandsworth LBCN5766N200515[2005] EWCA Civ 1377, 3 November 2005Gentle v Wandsworth LBC [2005] EWCA Civ 1377, 3 November 20050N200525N12410N1630Permission for second appeal refused where no obvious injustice to applicant even if failure to apply reg8(2)Gentle v Wandsworth LBC

[2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 2010Gibbons v Bury MBCN5766N200515[2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 2010Gibbons v Bury MBC [2010] EWCA Civ 327; [2010] HLR 33; 26 March 20100N200525N12410N1630Where there was a deficiency in the original decision and, after a meeting, notification was given of intention to uphold decision on different factual basis, a further oral hearing should have been allowedGibbons v Bury MBC

[2007] EWCA Civ 604; [2008] HLR 7, 27 June 2007Gilby v Westminster CCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 604; [2008] HLR 7, 27 June 2007Gilby v Westminster CC [2007] EWCA Civ 604; [2008] HLR 7, 27 June 20070N200525N12410N1630Reg 8(2) did not apply as no inconsistency in reasoning of decision of intentionalityThe claimant and her husband gave up their privately-rented bungalow and applied as homeless persons. They were found to be intentionally homeless. They then lived for three years in Mrs Gilbys step-sisters council flat, which the sister had vacated, under an informal arrangement. When the council became aware of this, it obtained possession of the flat. The claimants later applied as homeless persons. The council initially decided that they remained intentionally homeless for leaving the bungalow because the council flat did not constitute settled accommodation since the claimants had only been unlawful subtenants of their sister. The claimant requested a review, contending that they had been paying rent for exclusive occupation of the flat and therefore had an assured shorthold tenancy of it. The reviewing officer spoke to the sister, who said that the claimant had occupied the flat as a bare licensee as a temporary arrangement only. The review decision upheld the finding of intentional homelessness but on the different basis that the claimant had been a bare licensee, staying only temporarily in the council flat. HHJ Knight QC dismissed her appeal. On a second appeal, the claimant argued that this shift in reasoning had required the reviewing officer to comply with the minded-to provisions of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2) and allow them to be heard.The Court of Appeal held that there was no inconsistency in the reasoning between the initial and review decisions. The question to be addressed was not the legal character of the claimants occupation of the council flat but whether it constituted settled accommodation. Both decisions were to the effect that the flat did not constitute settled accommodation. It did not matter whether the occupation was as unlawful subtenant (as the claimant contended) or as a bare licensee (as contended by the sister) if the claimant did not have the required solid grounds of any reasonable expectation of continued occupation for the foreseeable future or a significant period of time. In these circumstances there was no reason for, or purpose in, enquiring into whether as a matter of legal labelling the claimants occupation was as a lessee or licensee. There was no deficiency or irregularity in the original decision or the manner in which it was made and reg 8(2) was not triggered.Gilby v Westminster CC

[2004] EWCA Civ 1740; [2005] 2 All ER 192; [2005] HLR 23; [2005] LGR 350; [2005] Times 7 JanuaryHall v Wandsworth LBC; Carter v Wandsworth LBCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 1740; [2005] 2 All ER 192; [2005] HLR 23; [2005] LGR 350; [2005] Times 7 JanuaryHall v Wandsworth LBC; Carter v Wandsworth LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 1740; [2005] 2 All ER 192; [2005] HLR 23; [2005] LGR 350; [2005] Times 7 January0N200525N12410N1630Reg 8(2) applies where an important issue is not addressed adequatelyBoth claimants applied to Wandsworth as homeless persons. In both cases the council decided that the applicants were not vulnerable and had no other priority need. The decisions were confirmed on review. Appeals brought under section 204 were dismissed. The claimants pursued second appeals contending, among other matters, that the initial decision letters were flawed and that the reviewing officers had wrongly failed to comply with the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2).Allowing the appeals, Carnwath LJ said (para 30):To summarise, the reviewing officer should treat regulation 8(2) as applicable, not merely when he finds some significant legal or procedural error in the decision, but whenever (looking at the matter broadly and untechnically) he considers that an important aspect of the case was either not addressed, or not addressed adequately, by the original decision-maker. In such a case, if he intends to confirm the decision, he must give notice of the grounds on which he intends to do so, and provide an opportunity for written and (if requested) oral representations.In Mr Halls case, the initial decision incorrectly expressed the test of vulnerability as relating to ability to secure accommodation instead of relating to risk of harm, or was at least unclear as to what test had been applied. This lack of clarity was a deficiency which should have led to the application of reg 8(2). In Ms Carters case, the initial decision was sufficiently reasoned and applied the correct legal test. In any event, no prejudice was suffered by her (on the facts) even if reg 8(2) had been triggered. However, her appeal was allowed because the review decision letter and the reviewing officers witness statement in support of it both failed to explain with substantive reasons why the clear medical opinion of the GP (that the claimant was vulnerable) had been rejected. Both cases were remitted to the council for reconsideration.Hall v Wandsworth LBC; Carter v Wandsworth LBC

[2008] EWCA Civ 690; [2009] HLR 10; (2008) Times 30 June, 19 June 2008Lambeth LBC v JohnstonN5766N200515[2008] EWCA Civ 690; [2009] HLR 10; (2008) Times 30 June, 19 June 2008Lambeth LBC v Johnston [2008] EWCA Civ 690; [2009] HLR 10; (2008) Times 30 June, 19 June 20080N200525N12410N1630Reg 8(2) mandatory minded to letter must be sent despite applicant having opportunity otherwise to put in representationsMr Johnston was 42 and had a history of alcohol and drug abuse and rough sleeping. In September 2004 he applied to Lambeth for homelessness assistance and was provided with interim accommodation on the basis that he might have priority need (Housing Act 1996 s188). In October 2004 he was interviewed by a caseworker who recorded on file that he was vulnerable and therefore had priority need. The caseworker took no further action. Eleven months later, having made no further enquiries, a new caseworker notified him of a decision that he was not in priority need (s184). He applied for a review and Lambeth continued to provide accommodation pending review (s202). The decision was confirmed on review but that review decision was quashed on appeal in the county court (s204) on the grounds that it was Wednesbury unreasonable on the material before the reviewing officer. Lambeth was to conduct a further review. The reviewing officer interviewed Mr Johnston (without indicating to him or his solicitors that she was the reviewing officer) and, with the assistance of medical reports from NowMedical, reached a fresh decision that he did not have a priority need. On appeal, a recorder quashed that decision. The original s184 decision had been the result of a material irregularity ie, the failure to make appropriate (or any) enquiries between October 2004 and September 2005 (Code of Guidance para 3.16). That had required the reviewing officer to operate the provisions of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2) including the sending of a minded to letter. She had not done so. The council brought a second appeal contending that the reviewing officer had not erred because the applicant and his advisers had had ample opportunity (which they had exercised) to make representations and put in fresh evidence on the second review.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Rimer LJ said: regulation 8(2) is not a discretionary option that the review officer can apply or disapply according to whether or not he or she considers that the service of a minded to find notice would be of material benefit to the applicant. Regulation 8(2) imposes a dual, mandatory obligation upon the review officer. First, to consider whether there was a deficiency or irregularity in the original decision or in the manner in which it was made. Secondly, if there was and if the review officer is nonetheless minded to make a decision adverse to the applicant on one or more issues to serve a minded to find notice on the applicant explaining his reasons for his provisional views. In my judgment, there is no discretion on the review officer to give himself a dispensation from complying with either of those obligations. As regards the first part of it, I have referred to the fact that it is not a purely subjective exercise but that failure to arrive at the right consideration can be challenged on usual public law grounds. As regards the second part, the language of regulation 8(2) is unambiguously mandatory the reviewer shall notify (para 51).Lambeth LBC v Johnston

[2004] EWCA Civ 627; [2004] HLR 45Lomotey v Enfield LBCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 627; [2004] HLR 45Lomotey v Enfield LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 627; [2004] HLR 450N200525N12410N1630Oral review hearing not necessary where matters taken against applicant had been put to her and the original decision was not defectiveMs Lomotey bought a property with her brother. She later surrendered her interest in it to her brother, who served a notice to quit on her. She then applied to Enfield as a homeless person. The housing officer who interviewed her said that Enfield might decide that she had made herself intentionally homeless. Ms Lomotey did not deny that she had colluded with her brother and said that it suited them both for her to be rehoused by the council. Enfield decided that she was intentionally homeless. She requested a review and sought an oral hearing. Enfield refused an oral hearing, but requested further written submissions. The review panel confirmed the earlier decision. Ms Lomoteys appeal to the county court was allowed. Enfield appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that there was no reason why the review panel should have offered an oral hearing.The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It was accepted that the case did not fall within Homelessness (Review Procedure) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2) as there had been no deficiency or irregularity in the original decision making. Ms Lomotey argued that, even under reg 6, the review panel ought to have given her the opportunity to rebut propositions that they used to decide the case against her. It was held that the issue of collusion had been discussed with Ms Lomotey and she had responded accordingly. The judge was wrong to say Enfield had acted in a procedurally unfair manner. The rules of natural justice do not require more than that the substance of a point adverse to an applicant has been put to him or her. While it was considered that the adverse matters had clearly been put to Ms Lomotey, it was noted that caution should be used before holding that a matter had not been put simply because a housing officers notes do not specifically record the matter.Lomotey v Enfield LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 355; [2011] HLR 27, 31 March 2011Makisi v Birmingham CC; Yosief v Birmingham CC; Nagi v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 355; [2011] HLR 27, 31 March 2011Makisi v Birmingham CC; Yosief v Birmingham CC; Nagi v Birmingham CC [2011] EWCA Civ 355; [2011] HLR 27, 31 March 20110N200525N12410N1630Applicants had a right to a face to face meeting, rather than making oral representations by telephoneThe three appellants each sought reviews of decisions relating to their applications for homelessness assistance (Housing Act 1996 s202). Each claimed that there was a deficiency or irregularity in the councils initial decisions on their applications entitling them to make oral representations in support of their review requests (paras 8 and 9): Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2)(b). The council decided that the right to make oral representations could be satisfied by allowing applicants to speak to the reviewing officer by telephone (with an on-line interpreter, if necessary) unless there was a genuine practical reason why any submissions could not be made by telephone. All three appellants asked for face-to-face oral hearings. Their requests were declined. Their appeals to the county courts were dismissed. They made second appeals.In the Court of Appeal, all parties accepted that the term oral representations was wide enough to embrace representations made either by telephone calls or face-to-face meetings. The issue was whether the applicants or the council should be able to decide if there should be an oral hearing. The Court of Appeal held that the applicants had a right to insist on an oral hearing. This did not mean that there was any right to call and examine witnesses, but it did mean that an applicant had a right to insist on a meeting between the reviewing officer, the applicant and any representative of the applicant. In two of the cases, Makisi and Yosief, it was accepted that reg 8(2)(b) had been triggered and the right to an oral hearing wrongly denied. In Mr Nagis case, while highly critical of the form and content of the councils initial decision, the Court of Appeal was not prepared to hold that it was deficient or irregular.Makisi v Birmingham CC; Yosief v Birmingham CC; Nagi v Birmingham CC

[2011] EWCA Civ 1249; [2012] HLR 10, 1 November 2011Mitu v Camden LBCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 1249; [2012] HLR 10, 1 November 2011Mitu v Camden LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 1249; [2012] HLR 10, 1 November 20110N200525N12410N1630If correcting an original decision which was deficient gave rise to a different duty and triggers a discretionary power to accommodate, reg 8(2) appliesMr Mitu applied to Camden for homelessness assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. The council decided that he had become homeless intentionally and that he did not have a priority need for accommodation. Accordingly, the only duty owed was the duty to provide him with advice and assistance under Housing Act 1996 s190(3). He sought a review. The reviewing officer decided that Mr Mitu was not intentionally homeless, but confirmed the original decision that he did not have a priority need for accommodation. Accordingly, the duty owed to him was the different duty to provide advice and assistance under Housing Act 1996 s192(2). That duty triggered a discretionary power to accommodate which the reviewing officer declined to exercise: Housing Act 1996 s192(3). Mr Mitu appealed to the county court on the ground that the reviewing officer had identified a deficiency in the original decision and should therefore have followed the procedure in the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8(2). That requires a minded to notice and an opportunity to make oral representations. HHJ Baucher dismissed the appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. The reviewing officer had found that the original decision was deficient in that it had concluded that Mr Mitu had become homeless intentionally. That was a material error because correcting it gave rise to a different duty and triggered a discretionary power to accommodate. The requirements of reg 8(2) should have been applied but were not.Mitu v Camden LBC

[2014] EWCA Civ 227; [2014] HLR 22, 7 March 2014Mohamoud v Birmingham City CouncilN5766N200515[2014] EWCA Civ 227; [2014] HLR 22, 7 March 2014Mohamoud v Birmingham City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 227; [2014] HLR 22, 7 March 20140N200525N12410N1630New material which was brought to the attention of the reviewing officer by the applicant had not been considered by the original decision maker; that rendered the original decision deficient and so reg 8(2) appliedThe council accepted that it owed Ms Mohamoud the main housing duty because she was homeless: Housing Act 1996 s193. It told her she would be made only one offer of accommodation but that she could bid under the councils allocation scheme. In due course, the council made an offer which she refused because it was too small and was high rise. The council decided that its duty had ended: Housing Act 1996 s193(7). Ms Mohamoud asked for a review. She explained in submissions in support of the review that English was not her first language, that she had misunderstood the relationship between bidding and offers and that friends had led her to believe she would get a choice of three properties. The reviewing officer upheld the discharge decision. HHJ McKenna dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal. The new material put forward in the submissions in support of the review had not been available to, or considered by, the council in making the original decision. That decision was, accordingly, deficient (para 26). The reviewing officer had in those circumstances been obliged to issue a minded to letter and to follow the procedure in Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71 reg 8.Mohamoud v Birmingham City Council

[2007] EWCA Civ 483; [2007] HLR 40, 25 April 2007Rowley v Rugby BCN5766N200515[2007] EWCA Civ 483; [2007] HLR 40, 25 April 2007Rowley v Rugby BC [2007] EWCA Civ 483; [2007] HLR 40, 25 April 20070N200525N12410N1630No deficiency in decision triggering reg 8(2)The applicant and her partner moved out of their privately rented flat in Kent and applied to Rugby as homeless persons. They said that they had moved out as their landlord had said he was selling the property with vacant possession. They had applied to Rugby as they wanted to be nearer their family, for support. After enquiries of the landlord, the homelessness officer wrote to the couple and invited them to sign and return a tear-off slip to confirm the landlords account that they had not been given notice of any kind by him, although he had orally said that he was thinking of selling the property. After they returned that slip, a decision was made that they had become homeless intentionally. That decision was upheld on review. The applicant appealed, arguing that the council ought to have invited oral or written representations pursuant to reg 8(2) of the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) Regulations 1999 SI No 71, on the basis that its original decision letter was deficient because it failed to explain how their homelessness could be intentional when they felt under an obligation to leave the property, given their landlords apparent desire to sell. The appeal was dismissed by HHJ Pearce-Higgins QC.The Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal. Any implication that they felt obliged to leave was superseded by ratification of the landlords version of events. There was no factual dispute to resolve and no deficiency in the decision to be considered by the reviewing officer which triggered reg 8(2), even though those terms were to be construed broadly.Rowley v Rugby BC

[2013] EWCA Civ 1373; [2014] HLR 6, 7 November 2013Wandsworth LBC v NJN5766N200515[2013] EWCA Civ 1373; [2014] HLR 6, 7 November 2013Wandsworth LBC v NJ [2013] EWCA Civ 1373; [2014] HLR 6, 7 November 20130N200525N12410N1630Summary of legal principles governing reg 8(2)Lewison LJ summarised the principles governing reg 8(2):i)Regulation 8(2) imposes two mandatory duties on a reviewing officer: (a) a duty to consider whether there is a deficiency in the original decision; and (b) if the reviewing officer considers that there is a deficiency a duty to serve a minded to find notice: Lambeth LBC v Johnston [2008] EWCA Civ 690; [2009] HLR 10 at [51]iii)The reviewing officer should treat reg 8(2) as engaged whenever he or she considers that an important aspect of the case was either not addressed, or not addressed adequately, by the original decision-maker: Hall v Wandsworth LBC at [30].iv)That inadequacy may arise because of a subsequent change in the facts which was unknown to the original decision-maker, in which event the original decision may have become deficient: Banks v Kingston Upon Thames RLBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1443 [2009] HLR 29 at [71].v)The deficiency must be one that is of sufficient importance to the fairness of the procedure as to justify an extra procedural safeguard: Hall v Wandsworth LBC at [29]. Whether a deficiency has this character is to be tested by asking whether further representations could have made a difference to the decision that the reviewing officer had to make: Banks v Kingston upon Thames RLBC at [72]. If further representations could have made no difference to the decision then it is not a relevant deficiency: Ibrahim v Wandsworth LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 20 at [38]. But the reviewing officer must be careful not to prejudge that issue: Mitu v Camden LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 1249 [2012] HLR 10 at [27]. [70.]See Lambeth LBC v Johnston (), Hall v Wandsworth LBC (), Banks v Kingston upon Thames RLBC () and Mitu v Camden LBC ().Wandsworth LBC v NJ

[2003] EWCA Civ 927; [2003] 3 All ER 1277; [2004] HLR 4; (2003) Times 12 AugustR (C) v Lewisham LBCN5766N200515[2003] EWCA Civ 927; [2003] 3 All ER 1277; [2004] HLR 4; (2003) Times 12 AugustR (C) v Lewisham LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 927; [2003] 3 All ER 1277; [2004] HLR 4; (2003) Times 12 August0N200525N12410N1630Discretion to extend time to request review; reasons for delay and prospects of success relevantTimes 4 November, CATimes 3 February; 20 June 2006, CAIn 2000 Ms C was evicted from her council flat for non-payment of rent. Her case was that she had been incapable of properly managing her finances. In January 2001 the council decided that she had become homeless intentionally. She did not apply for a review within 21 days of the decision. She consulted solicitors, who wrote on 31 August 2001 asking the council to extend time and entertain a review of the January decision. In the absence of any reply, she began proceedings for judicial review. In support of her claim she filed medical evidence. The council provided a decision rejecting the request for an extension of time.The Court of Appeal, on a renewed application for permission to appeal, granted permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal.1)The discretion to extend time is unfettered and wide, but has to be exercised in a principled way. Where the purpose that the discretion was intended to serve was clear, it could only be validly exercised for reasons relevant to the achievement of that purpose. This required a consideration of the statutory scheme (R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Chetnik Developments Ltd [1988] 1 AC 858). Reasons for delay and the prospects of success were relevant, but did not always have to be balanced against each other. In this case the principal factors taken into account were: (i) the lack of proper explanation for the failure to seek a review in time and for the late supply of medical evidence; and (ii) the new material was not sufficiently compelling to suggest a good chance of success. When considering whether to extend time the decision maker could properly consider the strength of the new evidence and not just whether it was material. The council was entitled to take the prospects of success into account as a relevant factor. The decision was not irrational or perverse. The judge was entitled to refuse to admit further evidence.2)On the facts, the council had refused to extend time and Ms C had made a further application for the council to do so. The scheme envisaged only one application for a review or to extend the time for review if the 21-day period had expired. An applicant was not entitled to make repeated applications for extensions of time under s202(3) (R v Westminster CC ex p Ellioua () and Demetri v Westminster CC ()) although the council had an extra-statutory discretion to allow further requests. Any judicial review challenge to the decision made on such an extra-statutory application was highly unlikely to succeed (applying the test in R v Brighton and Hove Council ex p Nacion ()). The challenge to the further decision did not meet the necessary threshold and the judge had not erred in declining to require the authority to consider the second consultants report.R (C) v Lewisham LBC

[2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 2006R (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 2006R (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2006] EWHC 329 (Admin); [2006] HLR 20, 9 February 20060N200525N12410N1630Except where decision obviously perverse, authority entitled not to consider merits of challenge to decision when considering whether to allow an out of time reviewTimes 12 AugustThe applicant was accepted for the full housing duty (s193) on the basis that she had been made homeless from her matrimonial home by domestic violence (this resulted in her homelessness and priority need). In the process of offering her accommodation the council discovered that she had returned to live in the matrimonial home. It then notified the applicant that, in effect, it was rescinding its original decision on the basis that it was not satisfied that she was in fear of her safety. The letter informed her of her right to request a revew within 21 days.A request for review was made by solicitors three or four weeks after the 21 days had expired. The council re-interviewed the applicant and were satisfied that its decision letter had been translated and read to her (including a passage setting out the 21-day time limit) and that there was no good reason for missing the 21-day time limit. It declined to extend the time for the review request. The applicant appealed contending, among other things, that the council should have taken account of the merits of the proposed review at least where the merits were, on the face of them, very strong.Hughes J dismissed a claim for judicial review of that decision. On the facts, the council had been entitled to conclude that the applicant knew of the 21-day limit. The power to extend time in section 202(3) gives an unfettered discretion. There might be a case where a failure to consider the merits of a review reached the stage of obvious perversity if such a review was, on its face, clearly bound to succeed. Subject to that, the authority is entitled not to have regard to the merits in exercising its discretion whether to extend time. This was not a case where the applicant was bound to succeed on review.R (Slaiman) v Richmond upon Thames LBC

June 1999 Legal Action 24, Lambeth County CourtAdams v Southwark LBCN5766N200515June 1999 Legal Action 24, Lambeth County CourtAdams v Southwark LBC June 1999 Legal Action 24, Lambeth County Court0N200525N12410N1630Request for review made if sent by ordinary post and not returnedSee Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T45.4.Adams v Southwark LBC

(2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CACrawley BC v BN5766N200515(2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CACrawley BC v B (2000) 32 HLR 636; (2000) Times 28 March, CA0N200525N12410N1630Authority could reconsider review decision by carrying out an extra statutory reviewCrawley BC v B

[2000] 1 WLR 772; (2000) 32 HLR 470; (1999) Times 4 November, CADemetri v Westminster CCN5766N200515[2000] 1 WLR 772; (2000) 32 HLR 470; (1999) Times 4 November, CADemetri v Westminster CC [2000] 1 WLR 772; (2000) 32 HLR 470; (1999) Times 4 November, CA0N200525N12410N1630Unless authority agree to withdraw a review decision time limit for appeal runs from date of review, even if review reconsideredDemetri v Westminster CC

(1999) 31 HLR 440; EWCA Civ 1142, CAR v Westminster CC ex p ElliouaN5766N200515(1999) 31 HLR 440; EWCA Civ 1142, CAR v Westminster CC ex p Ellioua (1999) 31 HLR 440; EWCA Civ 1142, CA0N200525N12410N1630If authority refuses to reconsider review decision, remedy is appeal to the county court of the original review decision and not judicial review of refusalMs Ellioua applied as a homeless person to Westminster, which decided that she was intentionally homeless. The decision was upheld on review. She did not appeal to the county court but her solicitors wrote a lengthy letter, indicating that the review decision was factually inaccurate and asking for the review decision to be reviewed. The council responded by saying that there was no right to request a review of a decision on an earlier review (s202(2)) and that it had considered the information provided but remained of the view that the applicant was intentionally homeless. It refused to carry out a further review. The applicant applied for judicial review. Leave was refused. She renewed her application to the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal held that section 202(2) did not preclude an authority from reconsidering a review decision if minded to do so, although there could be no requirement for such reconsideration. The destination for an appeal against a review decision under section 202(1) was the county court. In reality the applicant was dissatisfied with the decision on the review and she ought to have appealed against it. As the applicant had not exhausted her statutory remedy, her application for leave was refused.R v Westminster CC ex p Ellioua

[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and AweysN5766N200515[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys [2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 20090N200525N12410N1630Authorities need not provide accommodation to applicants who are homeless where their existing accommodation is reasonable to continue to occupy in the short termBirmingham CC v Ali and Aweys

[1998] AC 188; [1997] 3 WLR 86; [1997] 3 All ER 23; (1997) 29 HLR 793, HLORourke v Camden LBCN5766N200515[1998] AC 188; [1997] 3 WLR 86; [1997] 3 All ER 23; (1997) 29 HLR 793, HLORourke v Camden LBC [1998] AC 188; [1997] 3 WLR 86; [1997] 3 All ER 23; (1997) 29 HLR 793, HL0N200525N12410N1630To the extent that there was a positive duty to re-accommodate the applicant following his eviction from Section 188(1), accommodation, that duty had been met by advice given and offers of alternative temporary accommodation. Breach of Part 7 did not give rise to a statutory duty actionable in tort.See Housing Law Casebook 3rd edition, M9.2. See also ECtHR decision at .ORourke v Camden LBC

[2008] UKHL 14; [2008] 1 WLR 535; [2008] 4 All ER 271; [2008] LGR 159; (2008) Times 3 March, 27 February 2008R (M) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBCN5766N200515[2008] UKHL 14; [2008] 1 WLR 535; [2008] 4 All ER 271; [2008] LGR 159; (2008) Times 3 March, 27 February 2008R (M) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2008] UKHL 14; [2008] 1 WLR 535; [2008] 4 All ER 271; [2008] LGR 159; (2008) Times 3 March, 27 February 20080N200525N12410N1630Where an applicant aged 16-17 applies for assistance the authority must provide accommodation under Section 188(1) pending inquiries into whether they are a child in need under Children Act 1989 s20R (M) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC

[2016] EWHC 173 (Admin); [2016] HLR 11, 8 February 2016Edwards and others v Birmingham City CouncilN5766N200514[2016] EWHC 173 (Admin); [2016] HLR 11, 8 February 2016Edwards and others v Birmingham City Council [2016] EWHC 173 (Admin); [2016] HLR 11, 8 February 20160N2398,N200525N12410N1630An authority is not under an obligation to provide interim accommodation to the homeless at home if the applicant has notified the authority that he is willing to remain in his current accommodation (see )Edwards and others v Birmingham City Council

[2015] EWHC 2657 (Admin), 22 September 2015R (Brooks) v Islington LBCN5766N200514[2015] EWHC 2657 (Admin), 22 September 2015R (Brooks) v Islington LBC [2015] EWHC 2657 (Admin), 22 September 20150N2398,N200525Ms Brooks applied to the authority as a homeless person. The authority decided that it had reason to believe that she might be homeless and might be in a priority need and accordingly provided her with accommodation under Housing Act 1988 s188(1). Ms Brooks accepted the accommodation, even though it was out of the authoritys borough. Ms Brooks did not, however, move into the accommodationN12410N1630An authority was required to do no more than make more than one offer of accommodation in order to perform its duty under section 188(1)Ms Brooks applied to the authority as a homeless person. The authority decided that it had reason to believe that she might be homeless and might be in a priority need and accordingly provided her with accommodation under Housing Act 1988 s188(1). Ms Brooks accepted the accommodation, even though it was out of the authoritys borough. Ms Brooks did not, however, move into the accommodation and the following day returned the keys to the authority on the basis that it was too far from her daughters school. The authority warned her that if she did not accept the offer she would not be provided with alternative accommodation and the authority would treat its duty under section 188(1) as having come to an end. Ms Brooks confirmed, however, that she did not want the accommodation and the authority wrote to her confirming that its duty under section 188(1) had ceased.Ms Brooks brought a claim for judicial review on the grounds that the duty had under section 188(1) continued until a decision was made under section 184. It followed that even if an applicant refused an offer of accommodation the authority remained under a duty to provide her with further offers of accommodation.The claim for judicial review was dismissed. An authority performs the duty owed under section 188(1) if it offers suitable accommodation, or secures the offer of suitable accommodation by another person, which is intended to be available to the applicant until the authority has completed its inquiries and notified the applicant of its decision as to whether a duty is owed. If the applicant does not take up the offer of accommodation, then he or she cannot require the authority to take different and further steps to perform the duty again.R (Brooks) v Islington LBC

[1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBDR v Camden LBC ex p MohammedN5766N200515[1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBDR v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed [1997] EWHC Admin 502; (1998) 30 HLR 315, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Guidance on exercise of discretion to accommodate pending reviewTimes 3 February; 20 June 2006, CAThe applicant applied to Camden on the basis that it was not reasonable for her to continue to live in the matrimonial home because of her husbands violence. The council considered that her account contained discrepancies. It did not put these to her for comment. It made a decision that she was not homeless. The decision letter under section 184(3) gave as reasons simply, there is accommodation available and reasonable for your family to return to. That statement shed no light on the reasoning which led to the not homeless finding. The applicant applied for a review of the decision and for interim housing pending the review (s188(3)). The council refused to continue to accommodate her, relying on its policy that no interim accommodation was to be provided to an applicant pending a review unless there were exceptional reasons. The applicant sought judicial review.Latham J allowed the application and quashed the decision not to provide accommodation pending review The council had a wide discretion in the matter and the authoritys use of the phrase exceptional reasons was a rational way of describing the approach to be adopted.When exercising its discretion the authority had to balance the objective of maintaining fairness between homeless persons in circumstances where it has decided that no duty is owed to them, and a proper consideration of the possibility that an applicant might be right, so that to deprive him or her of accommodation could result in the denial of an entitlement.In carrying out this balancing exercise there were certain matters that would always require consideration:First, the merits of the case itself and the extent to which it can properly be said that the decision was one which was either apparently contrary to the merits of the case or was one which required a very fine balance of judgment which might go either way. Second, it requires consideration of whether there is any new material, information or argument which could have a real effect upon the decision under review. Finally, it requires consideration of the personal circumstances of the Applicant and the consequences to him or her of an adverse decision on the exercise of discretion. It may well be that in some cases other considerations may prove to be relevant. (paragraphs 3133)In the instant case the original decision had been tainted with unfairness because the council had failed to put to the applicant its concerns about her account or to seek her explanation for inconsistencies before finding against her. When exercising its discretion to accommodate, it had failed to take into account this consideration.Note: Approved in R v Brighton and Hove Council ex p Nacion ().R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed

August 1998 Legal Action 23; 16 June 1998, QBDR v Haringey LBC ex p ErdoganN5766N200515August 1998 Legal Action 23; 16 June 1998, QBDR v Haringey LBC ex p Erdogan August 1998 Legal Action 23; 16 June 1998, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Injunction granted where failure to respond to request for accommodation pending review after 2 daysSee Housing Law Casebook 5th edition, T48.2.R v Haringey LBC ex p Erdogan

[2000] EWHC Admin 285; (2001) 33 HLR 11R v Newham LBC ex p LumleyN5766N200515[2000] EWHC Admin 285; (2001) 33 HLR 11R v Newham LBC ex p Lumley [2000] EWHC Admin 285; (2001) 33 HLR 110N200525N12410N1630Where original decision unlawful, justice required authority to accommodate pending review; no duty to consider accommodation pending review until request madeThe applicant applied as a homeless person and was placed in interim accommodation. On 1 November 1999 the council notified him of its decision that he did not have a priority need and that his interim accommodation would be withdrawn from 7 November 1999. No reasons were given for this decision. On 2 November the applicant asked for a review of the adverse priority need decision (s202) and requested that accommodation be continued pending the review (s188(3)). On 5 November 1999, in the absence of a reply, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review of the failure to consider the request. On 8 November 1999 the councils appeals officer wrote refusing to extend accommodation pending review. The judicial review application was amended to challenge that decision also. During the course of proceedings the council made two concessions: (1) its decision letter was not a proper decision letter as it gave no substantive explanation for its decision, and (2) it had failed in its duty to carry out enquiries necessary to satisfy itself what duty, if any, it owed (under s184(1)(a)).Brooke LJ (sitting as a single QBD judge) held:1)If the councils primary decision on priority need had been correct, there was nothing unlawful in determining the applicants accommodation at six clear days notice as he was a young single man (R v Newham LBC ex p Ojuri (No 5) () distinguished).2)No duty to consider the discretion to accommodate pending review arose until such accommodation was requested.3)The original adverse priority need decision was flawed by both a failure to make adequate enquiries into the applicants medical condition and a failure to put to him the adverse views of the councils medical adviser. Brooke LJ said the councils decision was even more seriously flawed because it did not pursue proactively any enquiries of its own into his medical condition after being told that he suffered from a severe depressive reaction. [para 54]4)Neither of these flaws, which rendered the decision unlawful, was considered by the officer who refused to continue accommodation pending review.5)Applying R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed () justice demanded that the council should have continued accommodating until it reached a lawful decision.6)Accordingly, the decision to refuse to accommodate was itself unlawful.Brooke LJ considered that Latham Js use of the expression the merits of the case in Mohammed must be taken to have meant the merits of the applicants case that the councils original decision was flawed (para 54).R v Newham LBC ex p Lumley

[2007] EWHC (Admin) 1565; [2008] HLR 5; [2008] LGR 676; (2007) Times 11 July, 26 June 2007R (Abdi) v Lambeth LBCN5766N200515[2007] EWHC (Admin) 1565; [2008] HLR 5; [2008] LGR 676; (2007) Times 11 July, 26 June 2007R (Abdi) v Lambeth LBC [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1565; [2008] HLR 5; [2008] LGR 676; (2007) Times 11 July, 26 June 20070N200525N12410N1630Not unfair for s184 decision-maker to make decision under s188(3)The claimant sought a review of an adverse homelessness decision and asked to be accommodated by the council pending the outcome of that review under the discretionary power in Housing Act 1996 s188(3). The decision to refuse that request was taken by the same officer who had made the original adverse section 184 decision. The claimant sought judicial review, asserting that fairness required that a different officer not involved in the original adverse decision-making and a more senior officer should take the decision on accommodation pending review or, in default, simply a different officer.HHJ Hickinbottom, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, dismissed the claim. The statutory scheme did not restrict the persons who could make a decision relating to interim accommodation under section 188(3). This was not a section 202 review. Nor did the general principle of fairness and the need to avoid the appearance of bias require that the decisions should be taken by different officers. A fair-minded and impartial observer would not have considered that there was any real possibility of bias. The section 184 decision-maker may be in the best position promptly to determine an application for accommodation pending review. He or she had knowledge and experience of the relevant law and the authoritys discretion under section 188(3). In this case the decision-maker had conscientiously and objectively considered the claimants application for accommodation.R (Abdi) v Lambeth LBC

December 2004 Legal Action 18, 1 November 2004R (Antoine) v Reigate and Banstead DC and First Secretary of StateN5766N200515December 2004 Legal Action 18, 1 November 2004R (Antoine) v Reigate and Banstead DC and First Secretary of State December 2004 Legal Action 18, 1 November 20040N200525N12410N1630In unusual circumstances of displacement of Chagos Islander and his claim to be habitually resident in the UK, accommodation should be provided pending reviewThe claimant, and about 30 other British citizens, arrived in the UK from Mauritius. They were Chagosians who had been displaced from what had been the British Indian Ocean territories. They first sought accommodation from West Sussex County Council under the provisions of the National Assistance Act 1948 s21. The county council refused to accommodate them as it was not satisfied that all of them were in need of care and attention. A challenge to that decision failed (R (Selmour) v West Sussex CC [2004] EWHC 2413 (Admin)). The claimant then applied to Reigate and Banstead DC for assistance under Housing Act 1996 Part 7. The council provided him with interim accommodation but then notified him of its decision that he was ineligible for Part 7 assistance as he was not habitually resident. He applied for a review (s202) and accommodation pending review (s188(3)). The council refused to continue to provide accommodation. The claimant sought judicial review.On an application for an interim injunction, Moses J held that the review application raised an issue of substance, ie, given the unusual circumstances that had led to the displacement of the claimant, the award of British citizenship and the exercise of the right to enter the UK, the usual approach to determining habitual residence should not be applied. It was appropriate to require the council to accommodate the applicant pending the outcome of that review. He granted the order sought.See: Couronne and others v Crawley BC and others ().R (Antoine) v Reigate and Banstead DC and First Secretary of State

[2009] EWHC 1962 (Admin), 29 July 2009R (Araya) v Leeds CCN5766N200515[2009] EWHC 1962 (Admin), 29 July 2009R (Araya) v Leeds CC [2009] EWHC 1962 (Admin), 29 July 20090N200525N12410N1630Applicant could be given short notice of requirement to move to other accommodationThe council provided interim accommodation for the claimant under Housing Act 1996 s188(1) pending the outcome of her application under Part 7. When that duty expired, it agreed to continue to provide accommodation pending a review of an adverse decision of intentional homelessness. The council then required the claimant to move at short notice to other accommodation designed to provide her with support in her bidding for permanent rehousing. In a judicial review claim, she asserted that the short notice given had infringed her rights under Article 8 ECHR and that the new accommodation was unsuitable because it was away from an area in which she had a safe base within an ethnic minority community.HHJ Grenfell dismissed that claim. The claimant had been fully aware from the outset that she could be required to move from the initial accommodation at very short notice. The several days notice she had been given did not infringe her Article 8 rights. Furthermore, the council had been entitled to conclude that the move-on accommodation was suitable. The move was logical and designed to promote a permanent solution of her housing needs. She could retain a connection with the area in which she had resided previously by using buses.R (Araya) v Leeds CC

[2015] EWHC 2515 (Admin), 28 July 2015R (Barrett) v Westminster CCN5766N200514[2015] EWHC 2515 (Admin), 28 July 2015R (Barrett) v Westminster CC [2015] EWHC 2515 (Admin), 28 July 20150N2398,N200525N12410N1630A decision not to accommodate was overturned where the authority had failed to give conscientious consideration to additional matters raised and not addressed the claimants medical evidence.R (Barrett) v Westminster CC

CO/97302008; March 2009 Legal Action 25, 13 January 2009R (Hassan) v Croydon LBCN5766N200515CO/97302008; March 2009 Legal Action 25, 13 January 2009R (Hassan) v Croydon LBC CO/97302008; March 2009 Legal Action 25, 13 January 20090N200525N12410N1630Consideration of Children Act duties not necessary when exercising s188(3) discretionThe claimant left her matrimonial home with her children and applied to Croydon for homelessness assistance. It decided that she had become homeless intentionally. She applied for a review, contending that she had become homeless as a result of domestic violence. When the temporary accommodation provided under the councils duty under Housing Act 1996 s190 expired, she applied for accommodation to be continued pending the outcome of the review. The council declined to exercise that power in her favour and she brought a claim for judicial review of that decision. An interim injunction and permission to apply for judicial review were granted.HHJ Mackie QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the claim. In addition to fact-specific grounds, the claimant had contended that the council, a unitary authority, had been wrong to decline to exercise the s188(3) power without considering the obligations it might have to the children of the family under Children Act 1989 ss1720 read with Article 8 ECHR. The judge held that to impose such requirements would be to add unnecessary complexity to the decision required by section 188(3). Although the two departments housing and social services of a unitary authority were required to co-operate (see Housing Act 1996 ss213213A) they were undertaking separate statutory functions.R (Hassan) v Croydon LBC

[2013] EWHC 1273 (Admin), 20 May 2013R (IA) v Westminster City CouncilN5766N200515[2013] EWHC 1273 (Admin), 20 May 2013R (IA) v Westminster City Council [2013] EWHC 1273 (Admin), 20 May 20130N200525N12410N1630An injunction was made requiring the authority to accommodate the applicant pending the outcome of her application for judicial review where insufficient inquiries had been carried out into the applicants mental healthThe applicant faced eviction from his private rented sector accommodation because of restrictions on his housing benefit causing him to accrue arrears of rent. He was a single man and a refugee from Iran where he had suffered imprisonment and torture. He went to the councils offices to apply for homelessness assistance. He took with him a letter from his GP describing his depression, panic attacks, insomnia and leg and back pain. The letter described him as requiring help and support with his daily needs (para 7). At the end of a short interview on that day, the councils officer printed off a letter, composed during the interview, notifying him of a decision that he did not have a priority need. The applicant applied for a review and asked for accommodation pending review. That accommodation was refused. He sought judicial review.HHJ Thornton QC granted permission to apply for judicial review both of the initial adverse decision on priority need and of the refusal of accommodation pending review. He also granted an injunction pending trial of the claim. The applicant had made out an arguable case that both decisions had been made unlawfully and that case was sufficiently strong to justify an injunction pending trial. Given the importance and topicality of this decision, the judge certified that his judgment may be cited and referred to in other cases or situations: Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001, CA, para 6.1.R (IA) v Westminster City Council

[2007] EWHC 2299 (Admin); [2008] HLR 20, 12 October 2007R (Lawer) v Restormel BCN5766N200515[2007] EWHC 2299 (Admin); [2008] HLR 20, 12 October 2007R (Lawer) v Restormel BC [2007] EWHC 2299 (Admin); [2008] HLR 20, 12 October 20070N200525N12410N1630Interim injunction obtained without notice relating to judicial review of section 188(3) refusal set aside where material non-disclosure and underlying judicial review was without meritThe claimant was the secure tenant of accommodation in Newquay which she fled with her children, asserting that she had been the victim of domestic violence. She then gave notice to terminate the tenancy. She applied to Restormel as a homeless person. In a letter dated 23 August 2007 it informed her of its decision that she was intentionally homeless and that it would accommodate her until 21 September. She applied for a review and requested an extension of her accommodation. The councils housing officer, in an undated letter, requested submissions for the review and refused further accommodation, without giving reasons. On 19 September the claimant instructed a solicitor who telephoned the council and requested accommodation pending review (s188(3)). The housing officer refused, stating that on the basis of the evidence there was no merit in the review. On 21 September the claimant and her children were accommodated by her parents until 26 September. Her parents wrote to the council saying that they would not be able to accommodate her after 26 September as their son and daughter-in-law were coming down to stay for a week. The claimant then claimed to be street homeless and sleeping in a car with her children. On Friday 28 September at 1.21 pm the solicitor faxed a Claim for Judicial Review and for Urgent Consideration (N161 and N463) to the councils homelessness department. At 2.12 pm he faxed the full court bundle to the Administrative Court and to the council. The documents came to the attention of the housing officer at 3.20 pm and she informed her legal department. The claimants solicitor contacted the housing officer at 4.50 pm advising her to place her out of hours service on notice. Attempts were made by the councils legal department to contact the solicitor. A message left for him was not returned and he was not contactable after his office closed at 5 pm. The housing officers detailed letter in response was e-mailed to the solicitor at 6.22 pm but he had left his office for the weekend. Counsel for the claimant made an application to the out-of-hours duty judge by telephone early that evening. A mandatory order was made for the council to accommodate the claimant pending review and provided that the defendant could apply to discharge on 24 hours notice. The council applied to discharge the order.Munby J discharged the injunction.1)The claimants case under s188(3) was hopeless and had no reasonable prospect of success. The council had applied the criteria set out in R v Camden ex p Mohammed () the merits of the review decision had been addressed, no new information or argument had been put forward and it was obvious that the officer was aware and had taken into account the claimants personal circumstances.2)There had been significant non-disclosure to the out of hours judge. The housing officer had explained and justified her decision to refuse accommodation by reference to the merits of the claimants case for review. This was confirmed by her note and the solicitors note of the conversation on 19 September. Counsel had read out to the out of hours judge the officers initial undated and unreasoned letter refusing accommodation but had not read out the solicitors attendance note of his later conversation with the officer, or at least not in a way to bring its full significance to the judges attention, where she gave reasons for refusing accommodation referring to the merits of the case.Munby J made the following observations:a)Too often ex parte applications are made which are not urgent or have only become urgent because of unnecessary delay. In the instant case the application had been delayed for nine days.b)A simple assertion had been made in the N161 that time had not allowed the Pre-Action Protocol to be followed. No explanation was provided as to why the application was delayed for nine days nor why the council had not been given warning, if only informal warning, before 1.30 pm on the Friday afternoon the application was made.c)The requirement in the protocol for service on the councils legal department was ignored.d)The solicitor had failed to give the council his out of hours contact details. This information should have proffered without being asked for.e)The duty to make proper disclosure requires more than merely including relevant documents in the court bundle. Proper disclosure for this purpose means specifically identifying all relevant documents for the judge, taking the judge to the particular passages in the document which are material and taking particular steps to ensure that the judge correctly appreciates the significance of what he is being asked to read.Note: In R (Awuku) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3298 (Admin) the court warned advocates that a failure to meet the duty of full and frank disclosure would be likely to result in the advocate being referred to their regulatory body for misconduct.R (Lawer) v Restormel BC

[2005] EWHC 3194 (Admin); [2006] HLR 18, 13 December 2005R (Mohamed) v Harrow LBCN5766N200515[2005] EWHC 3194 (Admin); [2006] HLR 18, 13 December 2005R (Mohamed) v Harrow LBC [2005] EWHC 3194 (Admin); [2006] HLR 18, 13 December 20050N200525N12410N1630Where EEA national not a worker or work-seeker and did not otherwise have a right to reside, decision not to accommodate pending review lawfulR (Mohamed) v Harrow LBC

[2006] EWHC 497 (Admin), 3 March 2006R (Paul-Coker) v Southwark LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWHC 497 (Admin), 3 March 2006R (Paul-Coker) v Southwark LBC [2006] EWHC 497 (Admin), 3 March 20060N200525discretion:pending reviews, accommodationhomelessness reviews:pending review, accommodationinterim accommodation duties and powers for homeless:pending reviews, discretion to accommodatepending reviews, discretion toN12410N1630Mohammed principlesMere lip service paid to Mohammed principles which had not been properly appliedOn 29 December 2005 the claimant, who had given birth a few days earlier, applied to Southwark as a homeless person. The council decided that she was not eligible for assistance because, although she was a British citizen, she had entered the UK from Sierra Leone on 6 May 2005 and was a person from abroad who was not habitually resident in the UK. She requested a review of that decision and to be accommodated pending the review. The council declined to accommodate her pending the review. Its decision indicated it had had regard to the criteria in R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed ().In judicial review proceedings, Forbes J quashed the decision. The decision letter refusing accommodation did little more than identify the relevant criteria and did little or nothing to apply the relevant facts of the case to those criteria and reach an adequately reasoned decision. In particular, no explanation was given of why over seven months residence was insufficient to justify the appreciable period of time element of the habitual residence test. Nor was the material that had specifically been brought to the councils attention addressed. The complete absence of any explanation or reasoning in the decision letter, dealing with these various important aspects of the case, demonstrates that the ex p Mohammed balancing exercise has not been fully or properly carried out by the decsion-maker, despite lip service having been paid to it. [50]R (Paul-Coker) v Southwark LBC

[2004] EWCA Civ 439; 26 March 2004Brookes v Croydon LBCN5766N200515[2004] EWCA Civ 439; 26 March 2004Brookes v Croydon LBC [2004] EWCA Civ 439; 26 March 20040N200525N12410N1630A second appeal against a s204A appeal was the exception and refused due to the practicalities involvedCroydon decided in July 2003 that Ms Brookes had become homeless intentionally after being evicted from her previous home for rent arrears. It decided that its duty to her (s190) could be met by a further short period in temporary accommodation. The council agreed to consider a review requested out of time and provided accommodation pending review. The review decision, given on 19 January 2004, confirmed that Ms Brookes had become homeless intentionally. An accompanying letter indicated that her accommodation would be continued until 8 February 2004 and that she could seek assistance at the councils Housing Advice Service. She lodged a county court appeal contending that the intentional homelessness decision was wrong or, if it was right, she had been allowed an inadequate period of accommodation under section 190 and that there had been no proper section 190(4) assessment. That appeal was scheduled to be heard in April 2004. Ms Brookes asked for accommodation to be provided pending that hearing. The council would agree to extend the accommodation only until 17 February 2004. Ms Brookes brought an appeal against that decision under section 204A. On 8 March 2004 HHJ Winstanley dismissed that appeal. Ms Brookes sought permission to bring a second appeal against that decision.Carnwath LJ refused that application and held that second appeals should be the exception. Even if an appeal raised an important point of principle the grant of permission was discretionary and that discretion would be exercised having regard to the practicalities. Those practicalities included:the difficulty of assembling a full Court of Appeal to hear a second section 204A appeal before the hearing of the section 204 appeal in the county court,the difficult questions as to what (if any) interim relief the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant andthe difficulty for an appellant assisted by solicitors and counsel in the Court of Appeal in demonstrating that she could meet the requirement in section 204A(6) to show that her ability to press her section 204 appeal was substantially prejudiced by the non-provision of accommodation pending appeal.Carnwath LJ further noted that authoritative guidance on section 204A appeals had been given in Francis v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC (). That guidance remained valid and it was difficult to conceive of further points arising which required Court of Appeal guidance on section 204A. In Brookes the primary attack on the section 204A decision had been on adequacy of reasons, but both the council and the judge had had regard to the Mohammed criteria approved in Francis. The reasons challenge did not raise an important point of principle or practice. Finally, although the case did raise an interesting point of principle about the timing of the duty to assess needs under section 190(4), that point had been raised in the substantive section 204 appeal which had yet to be heard.Brookes v Croydon LBC

[2018] EWCA Civ 529, 20 March 2018Davis v Watford BCN5766N200514[2018] EWCA Civ 529, 20 March 2018Davis v Watford BC [2018] EWCA Civ 529, 20 March 20180N200525N12410N1630Challenge to a refusal to provide accommodation pending an appeal against an original, as opposed to review, decision must be made by judicial reviewOn 29 August 2014, Mr Davis applied to the authority for homelessness assistance. On 8 December 2014, it decided that he was not in priority need. He sought a review of that decision. On 31 August 2015, the council sent a minded to letter indicating that it proposed to uphold the original decision. However, the council did not make or notify any decision on the review within the statutory limit of 8 weeks or within any longer mutually agreed period. On 27 October 2015, Mr Davis lodged an appeal in the county court against the original decision of 8 December 2014. He asked that his interim accommodation be continued pending that appeal. On 29 October 2015, the council refused the request. Mr Davis issued judicial review proceedings of that decision. Mitting J held that the claim was misconceived, that an appeal should have been pursued in the county court, and that permission to proceed by way of judicial review should be refused.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from that decision. The terms of Housing Act 1996 s204A(1) were plain. An appeal under section 204A was only available if there had been a decision on a review. Where an appeal was being pursued under section 204(1)(b), precisely because a decision on review had not been made, any refusal of accommodation pending that appeal could only be challenged by judicial review.Davis v Watford BC

[2003] EWCA Civ 443; [2003] 1 WLR 2248; [2003] 2 All ER 1052; [2003] HLR 50Francis v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200515[2003] EWCA Civ 443; [2003] 1 WLR 2248; [2003] 2 All ER 1052; [2003] HLR 50Francis v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2003] EWCA Civ 443; [2003] 1 WLR 2248; [2003] 2 All ER 1052; [2003] HLR 500N200525N12410N1630The effect of section 204A was simply to transfer to the county court the limited power of intervention which existed on a judicial review application as set out in NacionTimes 3 February; 20 June 2006, CAMr Francis applied to Kensington and Chelsea as a homeless person and was provided with accommodation pending its decision (s188(1)). The council made a decision that he did not have a priority need and confirmed its decision on review. In November 2002, Mr Francis appealed to the county court under section 204. In February 2003, the council terminated the provision of temporary accommodation. Mr Francis appealed against that decision under section 204A. HHJ Walker held that he was unable to interfere with the decision as the council had not refused to consider exercising its discretion, and that it was not therefore open to him to address the merits of the case. Mr Francis appealed contending that the new section 204A appeal was, in the light of the wording of section 204A(4), akin to an application for interim relief, and raised the test of whether an appellant had a strong prima facie case.The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. Section 204A did not give the county court the wide appeal power contended for. It simply transferred to the county court the very limited power of intervention which the Court of Appeal had identified in R v Brighton and Hove Council exp Nacion (). The county court should follow the approach set out in exp Nacion unless it decides that the local authority did not direct itself in accordance with R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed (). In that case it should quash the decision and decide whether it should itself exercise the s204A(5) power to order the authority to provide temporary accommodation. There is no question of the county court embarking on an assessment of the merits of the appeal. The court confirmed that a challenge to the exercise of powers under Housing Act s188 still has to be brought by way of judicial review.Francis v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

[2018] EWCA Civ 368, 6 March 2018Freeman-Roach v Rother DCN5766N200514[2018] EWCA Civ 368, 6 March 2018Freeman-Roach v Rother DC [2018] EWCA Civ 368, 6 March 20180N200525N12410N1630Fact that applicant was previously accommodated under section 188(1) was irrelevant to question of whether accommodation should be provided pending an appealMr Freeman-Roach, after receiving an adverse review decision, told the council that he would appeal and asked it to provide accommodation for him pending the appeal. It declined. Mr Freeman-Roach successfully appealed against that decision on the basis that having accommodated him pending review, it was irrational for the council not to have acceded to his request to accommodate him pending his appeal and otherwise Mr Freeman-Roach would have had to sleep in his car which would have prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. Rother appealed to the Court of Appeal.The appeal was allowed. The judge had ignored the fact that Mr Freeman-Roachs circumstances were no longer under review; the council had decided he did not have a priority need. That was sufficient to justify Rother arriving at a different conclusion in the exercise of its discretion whether to provide accommodation. Moreover, the judge had not dealt with Rothers case that the applicant could have stayed with relatives or in a homeless mens shelter rather than sleeping in his car and did not give any reasons for why Mr Freeman-Roach would be prejudiced in pursuing his appeal.Freeman-Roach v Rother DC

[2006] EWCA Civ 1793; [2007] HLR 20, 23 November 2006Lewis v Havering LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 1793; [2007] HLR 20, 23 November 2006Lewis v Havering LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1793; [2007] HLR 20, 23 November 20060N200525N12410N1630Council needs to consider grounds of section 204 appeal when making decision under s204AMr Lewis applied as a homeless person to Havering. It decided, and confirmed on review, that he was not in priority need. He intended to appeal that decision and asked for accommodation pending appeal under section 204(4). The council refused. Mr Lewis then lodged an appeal against both the review decision (s204) and the decision to refuse accommodation pending appeal (s204A).HHJ Platt allowed the section 204A appeal and quashed the councils decision to refuse accommodation pending appeal, on the ground that the decision contained no reasons. The council then reconsidered the position but issued a further decision not to accommodate pending appeal, addressing the criteria in R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed () and analysing the evidence. Mr Lewis lodged a further appeal under s204A contending that the council had failed to take into account the grounds of his main section 204 appeal. On the second section 204A appeal, HHJ Polden allowed the council to put in a witness statement from its officer indicating that he had considered all the documentation, including the grounds of appeal, when making his decision.The Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal. It was appropriate in such cases for the grounds of the substantive appeal to be considered when deciding on an application for accommodation pending that appeal. The grounds of appeal would help a local authority assess the merits of a case. This did not mean a local authority had to consider the legal and factual arguments advanced in the same way as a court would do, it merely had to take them into consideration when making its decision. It would often be enough for the authority to make reference to having considered the documents(s). In some cases there may be an important and striking ground that requires specific comment. In the present case, it was fairly to be inferred from the councils decision letter that the officer had not considered those grounds. However, the witness statement showed that this had in fact been done. The judge had not been wrong to admit the evidence, as it had caused no unfairness to the claimant (applying Hijazi v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC ().Lewis v Havering LBC

(1999) 31 HLR 1095; [1999] 11 Admin LR 472; (1999) Times 3 February, 20 June 2006, CAR v Brighton and Hove Council ex p NacionN5766N200515(1999) 31 HLR 1095; [1999] 11 Admin LR 472; (1999) Times 3 February, 20 June 2006, CAR v Brighton and Hove Council ex p Nacion (1999) 31 HLR 1095; [1999] 11 Admin LR 472; (1999) Times 3 February, 20 June 2006, CA0N200525N12410N1630If Mohammed principles applied any challenge futile; appropriate to seek expedited hearing of appealThe applicant lodged an appeal in the county court against a finding of intentional homelessness, which had been affirmed on review. Pending the hearing, he asked the council to accommodate him in exercise of its discretion under section 204(4). It refused and he applied for leave to move for judicial review of that refusal (pre-s204A).The Court of Appeal dismissed a renewed application for leave. Tuckey LJ indicated that helpful guidance on the approach a local authority should take in exercise of its discretion had been set out in R v Camden LBC exp Mohammed (). If that guidance was followed, any challenge would be futile and applications for judicial review of council decisions in such cases were to be strongly discouraged, with leave being granted only in exceptional cases. Lord Woolf MR agreed, indicating that, since the introduction of s204, it would be only in an exceptional case that the High Court would intervene on judicial review for example, if a local authority refuses even to consider exercising its discretion under s204(4). Faced with a refusal to provide accommodation pending an appeal, the appropriate step for an applicant to take was to make an application to expedite the hearing of the substantive appeal by the county court.R v Brighton and Hove Council ex p Nacion

[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CCN5766N200515[2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 2009Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CC [2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506; [2009] 4 All ER 161; [2009] HLR 41; (2009) Times 7 July, 1 July 20090N200525N12410N1630Ali and Aweys: Authority can perform main housing duty by keeping applicants in accommodation that it is not reasonable for them to occupy in the long term so long as it is suitable in the shorter termMoran: A refuge is not accommodation which it is reasonable to continue to occupy indefinitelyAli and AweysThe claimants were tenants living in unsatisfactory accommodation. Birmingham accepted that they were all homeless either because it was not reasonable for them to continue to occupy their accommodation (Housing Act 1996 s175(3)) or because it owed a duty to provide suitable accommodation but accepted that the accommodation provided was unsuitable (Housing Act 1996 s193(2) and s206). It decided that all the applicants should wait where they were while being considered for an offer of accommodation under the councils allocation scheme (Housing Act 1996 Part 6). Under that scheme, homeless households remaining in their own homes had a lower priority than homeless households placed by the council in temporary accommodation for the homeless. In a claim for judicial review, they obtained declarations that the council had to secure suitable accommodation for them and that the allocation scheme was irrational (because, by definition, those in temporary accommodation provided by the council had suitable accommodation). The Court of Appeal dismissed the councils appeal but the House of Lords allowed a further appeal.It held that:A local housing authority can properly decide that applicants for homelessness assistance are homeless simply because it would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy their present unsatisfactory home indefinitely. It is not necessary that conditions are such that they cannot continue in occupation for one day longer.The authority can then perform its main housing duty under Housing Act 1996 Part 7 by arranging for applicants to stay in that same accommodation for the short period for which it will be suitable accommodation.A local housing authority is not performing its duty if it simply accepts the homelessness application and adds applicants to its allocation scheme for long-term housing.It was doubtful whether, on the facts, the claimants had been dealt with lawfully but they had all since been rehoused.The allocation scheme was irrational (but had been replaced).MoranThe claimant fled domestic violence in her home and sought shelter at a womens aid refuge. After two weeks she was involved in a dispute with staff and was asked to leave. On her subsequent application for homelessness assistance, the council decided that she had become homeless intentionally. She appealed, claiming that she had been homeless throughout because either:the refuge did not count as accommodation (Housing Act 1996 s175(1)); orit had not been reasonable to continue to occupy that accommodation (Housing Act 1996 s175(3)).Her appeal was allowed in the county court but the Court of Appeal upheld the councils decision.The House of Lords quashed the councils decision. It held that a woman who flees domestic violence and is taken in by a womens refuge normally remains homeless while at the refuge because it is not accommodation that it would be reasonable for her to continue to occupy indefinitely (for the purposes of s175(3)). In those circumstances it was not necessary to decide whether a refuge counted as accommodation and thus whether R v Ealing LBC ex p Sidhu () had been rightly decided.Birmingham CC v Ali and Aweys; Moran v Manchester CC

[1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HLR v Brent LBC ex p AwuaN5766N200515[1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HLR v Brent LBC ex p Awua [1996] AC 55; [1995] 3 WLR 215; [1995] 3 All ER 493; (1995) 27 HLR 453, HL0N200525N12410N1630There is no requirement that accommodation must be settled to discharge the main housing dutyThe House of Lords considered the extent of the duty owed by a council to an applicant under Housing Act 1985 s65(2) (now Housing Act 1996 s193(2)) to secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant. Lord Hoffmann stated that there is no requirement in the legislation that the accommodation secured should be settled or permanent. The period for which a council provides accommodation was entirely a matter for the council. The word suitable in Housing Act 1985 s69(1) (now Housing Act 1996 s206(1)) imports no requirement of permanence.The distinction between the duty owed to the intentionally homeless and that to the unintentionally homeless under section 65(2) is simply that in the former case, once the provision of accommodation by the council ceases, it owes no further duty. If accommodation provided under section 65(2) ends, the council has a continuing duty to secure accommodation unless there is a reason why his consequent homelessness will not give rise to a further duty under section 65(2). A council might owe a full housing duty to a couple expecting a first child and discharge it by provision of short-term accommodation to wait and see if the child is actually delivered and stays with the family. If the child is lost or placed for adoption, no further duty will be owed once the temporary accommodation is terminated. Provided that the accommodation is arranged for more than 28 days (so that applicants are not threatened with homelessness), the courts will not interfere with a decision unless it is Wednesbury unreasonable.Note: In R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Wingrove and Mansoor () the court held that the comments in Awua about the discharge of duty were not obiter.R v Brent LBC ex p Awua

[2013] UKSC 10; [2013] 2 All ER 309; [2013] HLR 16; [2013] PTSR 343, 20 February 2013Sharif v Camden LBCN5766N200515[2013] UKSC 10; [2013] 2 All ER 309; [2013] HLR 16; [2013] PTSR 343, 20 February 2013Sharif v Camden LBC [2013] UKSC 10; [2013] 2 All ER 309; [2013] HLR 16; [2013] PTSR 343, 20 February 20130N200525N12410N1630An authority may provide a family with two units of accommodation in close proximity to each other provided that the family can still live together in practical terms; whether a family can still live together is a matter for the authority to decide subject to a Wednesbury challengeThe claimants household included her disabled father and her dependent younger sister. Camden owed the main housing duty under the homelessness provisions of Housing Act 1996 s193 and initially performed it by providing a three-bedroom house. Later, the council decided to provide the family with two selfcontained units in a hostel (one for the father and one for the two sisters) in continued performance of its duty. The units were on the same floor of the hostel, but a few yards apart. The Court of Appeal held that the statutory obligation to provide accommodation for an applicant together with other household members (Housing Act 1996 s176) could not lawfully be performed by the provision of two separate self-contained units: see [2011] EWCA Civ 463; [2011] HLR 32; June 2011 Legal Action 25.The Supreme Court, by a majority, reversed that decision. It held that the statutory test is satisfied by a single unit of accommodation in which a family can live together, but that it may also be satisfied by two units of accommodation if they are so located that they enable the family to live together in practical terms. Whether they are so located is a question of fact for the council on which a decision could be set aside only for error of law. In the instant case, there had been no such error.Sharif v Camden LBC

[2011] EWCA Civ 383; [2011] HLR 28, 12 April 2011Akhtar v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2011] EWCA Civ 383; [2011] HLR 28, 12 April 2011Akhtar v Birmingham CC [2011] EWCA Civ 383; [2011] HLR 28, 12 April 20110N200525N12410N1630No duty to give reasons where review against offer of accommodation successful; duty ended when further offer refusedBirmingham owed the claimant the main housing duty under the homelessness provisions. It made her an offer of a tenancy of council accommodation which she refused. The council decided that its obligations under section 193(2) came to an end once the offer had been refused. The claimant sought a review on grounds that the offered property had not been suitable because of:its small size; andits location in a particular part of the city.A reviewing officer found that the property had not been suitable. File notes recorded that the officer had accepted that the family required larger accommodation. The decision to uphold the review was notified by a letter that did not contain the reasons. The council then offered a second larger property in the same area of the city. The claimant again refused and sought a review on the basis that the second property was unsuitable by reason of its size and location. The reviewing officer upheld a decision that the second offer had discharged the councils duty. HHJ Worster dismissed an appeal.The Court of Appeal dismissed a second appeal. As the first review had succeeded, there had been no duty to give reasons for the successful review outcome. It had not therefore been necessary to spell out that the first review had only dealt with size and not location. Nor was there a duty in making a second offer to indicate expressly why the review of an earlier offer had succeeded.Akhtar v Birmingham CC

[2009] EWCA Civ 1279; [2011] HLR 17, 14 October 2009Ali v Birmingham CCN5766N200515[2009] EWCA Civ 1279; [2011] HLR 17, 14 October 2009Ali v Birmingham CC [2009] EWCA Civ 1279; [2011] HLR 17, 14 October 20090N200525N12410N1630Translation of letter offering accommodation not requiredThe authority made the claimant an offer of accommodation after it decided that the conditions in section 193(2) were met. When the claimant failed to accept an offer of accommodation, made in writing, the council decided that its duty had come to an end. The claimant had a poor command of English and asserted that the obligation that he be informed by the council of the consequences of the offer (see ss193(5) and (7)) and of his rights to review required the council to show that the information given to him had been understood properly. Recorder Tidbury dismissed an appeal.On a second appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the obligation to inform was different from the obligation to notify used elsewhere in Part 7. It simply required that the relevant information be conveyed in understandable English in cases where interpretation and translation services had been declined. A translation was not required in every case.Ali v Birmingham CC

[2008] EWCA Civ 1176; [2009] HLR 22; [2009] LGR 65, 29 October 2008Boreh v Ealing LBCN5766N200515[2008] EWCA Civ 1176; [2009] HLR 22; [2009] LGR 65, 29 October 2008Boreh v Ealing LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1176; [2009] HLR 22; [2009] LGR 65, 29 October 20080N200525N12410N1630Offer of accommodation that would only be suitable after adaptations only capable of discharge of duty if combined with binding assurances about work to be doneBoreh v Ealing LBC

[2006] EWCA Civ 160; [2006] 1 WLR 2233; [2006] HLR 29; (2006) Times 24 AprilGriffiths v St Helens CouncilN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 160; [2006] 1 WLR 2233; [2006] HLR 29; (2006) Times 24 AprilGriffiths v St Helens Council [2006] EWCA Civ 160; [2006] 1 WLR 2233; [2006] HLR 29; (2006) Times 24 April0N200525N12410N1630Refusal of an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy can end section 193 duty; offer letter should clearly explain situationThe authority were satisfied that Mrs Griffiths met the conditions in section 193(2). She was initially accommodated in a hotel but was then offered a six-month assured shorthold tenancy of accommodation in the private sector. There was the possibility of renewal of the tenancy and the council agreed to pay the shortfall between the rent and housing benefit for the initial six months and, if necessary, thereafter. She was informed that the property was considered suitable and that if she were to refuse it the council would regard its duty as having ceased under section 193(5). Mrs Griffiths refused the offer and the council decided that its duty to her had ceased. It upheld that decision on review. On appeal she contended, inter alia, that the council could not obtain release from the section 193 duty by the refusal of an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy, following amendments to the Housing Act 1996 by Homelessness Act 2002. HHJ Mackay dismissed the appeal.The Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal. Where a local authority was putting forward an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy as a qualifying assured shorthold tenancy (s193(7B)) as a method of relieving itself of the section 193 duty, a refusal of that offer could not bring the duty to an end: section 193(7C). But where the offer of the assured shorthold tenancy is made as a method of performing the section 193 duty (on the basis it will continue if and when that tenancy ends) a refusal can bring an end to the duty by application of section 193(5). Given the importance of that distinction, housing authorities should clearly explain the basis on which the offer is being made.Note: Section 193(7AA) now provides that an authoritys obligations under section 193(2) come to an end when it makes an applicant an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy with the stated purpose of bringing the duty to an end. The obligation to make a qualifying offer no longer applies.Griffiths v St Helens Council

[2012] EWCA Civ 669; [2012] HLR 37, 18 May 2012Maswaku v Westminster City CouncilN5766N200515[2012] EWCA Civ 669; [2012] HLR 37, 18 May 2012Maswaku v Westminster City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 669; [2012] HLR 37, 18 May 20120N200525N12410N1630An authority, when offering an applicant accommodation in performance of its obligations under section 193(2), was only required to warn the applicant that the refusal of the offer would result in the duty coming to an endThe claimant was homeless and was owed the duty under s193. The council made her an offer of temporary accommodation in performance of its duty. The offer letter warned that if you refuse this offer, you will have to find your own accommodation. The offer was refused and the claimant unsuccessfully sought a review of the councils decision that its duty had ended. The claimant said that the council had not complied with its notification duty under section 193(5) to inform her of the possible consequence of refusal of the offer because it should have informed her that:she would be evicted from her current accommodation;her homelessness application would be cancelled;there would be no obligation for the council to secure any further homelessness accommodation for her;she had the right to make a fresh application as a homeless person under section 193(9), but might be found to be intentionally homeless on any fresh application; andshe would be able to remain on the waiting list, but would lose priority for an allocation of long-term accommodation under Housing Act 1996 Part 6.HHJ Knight QC dismissed an appeal against the review decision.The Court of Appeal dismissed a second appeal. It held that the council had complied with its duty. The only possible consequence of refusal that an applicant needed to be informed about was the one stipulated in section 193(5) itself, ie, that a refusal would end the councils duty to accommodate. The councils offer letter had met this requirement.Maswaku v Westminster City Council

[2008] EWCA Civ 1447; [2009] PTSR 680, 19 December 2008Muse v Brent LBCN5766N200515[2008] EWCA Civ 1447; [2009] PTSR 680, 19 December 2008Muse v Brent LBC [2008] EWCA Civ 1447; [2009] PTSR 680, 19 December 20080N200525N12410N1630Refusal of offer of alternative accommodation resulted in the duty ceasing; no need to warn applicant of consequences of her application for a moveBrent was accommodating Ms Muse under section 193(2). Under that duty, it provided her with temporary accommodation on an assured shorthold tenancy with a housing association. As her family grew, the accommodation became overcrowded and she applied for a transfer to alternative accommodation. Brent decided that her present accommodation had become unsuitable and told her that it had instructed the housing association to recover possession. It offered other suitable accommodation but Ms Muse declined to move. Ms Muse requested a review. The council confirmed that its duty had been discharged.HHJ Powles QC allowed an appeal by Ms Muse but the Court of Appeal allowed a second appeal by the council. It acknowledged two possible variants of the application of the statutory scheme to the facts. It could be said that the section 193(2) duty had been completely performed by the offer and acceptance of the temporary housing association premises but that a fresh section 193(2) duty had arisen later when that accommodation became unsuitable. Alternatively, it could be said that a continuing section 193(2) duty had at all times been owed. However, the effect of the offer and refusal of the new suitable accommodation had been the same on either view: namely that the duty had come to an end. There had been no unfairness to Ms Muse in not warning her that an application to transfer to alternative temporary accommodation might, in some circumstances, lead to the duty being discharged. But the council had been wrong to make the misleading statement that it would instruct the housing association to recover possession. Whether the association wished to seek possession was a matter for its consideration and not the proper subject of instruction from a local housing authority.Muse v Brent LBC

[2003] EWCA Civ 1967; [2004] HLR 23Orejudos v Kensington and Chelsea RLBCN5766N200515[2003] EWCA Civ 1967; [2004] HLR 23Orejudos v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2003] EWCA Civ 1967; [2004] HLR 230N200525N12410N1630The duty ceased where applicant did not comply with BB signing-in rulesOrejudos v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC

(1998) 30 HLR 760, CAR v Hackney LBC ex p KN5766N200515(1998) 30 HLR 760, CAR v Hackney LBC ex p K (1998) 30 HLR 760, CA0N200525N12410N1630Change in law did not apply retrospectively to applicant already accepted for main housing dutyR v Hackney LBC ex p K

(1993) 25 HLR 158, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Ali and BibiN5766N200515(1993) 25 HLR 158, CAR v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Ali and Bibi (1993) 25 HLR 158, CA0N200525N12410N1630Referral under the local connection provisions does not terminate the dutyTwo separate applicants applied to Tower Hamlets, which decided that they were owed the main housing duty. Neither had a local connection with Tower Hamlets and both were referred to other authorities under the local connection provisions (Housing Act 1985 s67, now Housing Act 1996 s198). The other authorities accepted the applications and made offers of accommodation. Neither applicant took up the accommodation offered and both made their own arrangements to stay in accommodation in Tower Hamlets. About three years later, on subsequently becoming homeless, they applied to Tower Hamlets again. Tower Hamlets rejected both applications on the basis that it had discharged its duties by reason of the earlier referrals. In Ms Bibis case she then applied to Southwark Council, which decided that the main housing duty was owed but referred her back to Tower Hamlets. It again relied on its earlier discharge of duty. In separate applications for judicial review, the councils decisions were quashed.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. Glidewell LJ, giving the judgment of the court, held that, in respect of unintentionally homeless people in priority need with no local connection with the council they applied to, the council had two choices: (a) to notify the other authority with whom the applicant has a local connection or (b) to discharge the main housing duty itself (Housing Act 1985 s65(2), now Housing Act 1996 s193(2)). Where an authority chose to notify another authority and the applicant later reapplied, having acquired a local connection, the authority could not say that it had already discharged its duty under section 65(2) as no duty under section 65(2) had previously arisen. In relation to Ms Bibis referral from Southwark, Tower Hamlets could not say it had previously discharged its section 68(2) duty (see now the slightly different provisions of Housing Act 1996 s200(4)/s193(2)), as it had not previously itself been under, nor discharged, such a duty. The section 65(2) and section 68(2) duties were separate.R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Ali and Bibi

[1997] QB 953; [1996] 3 WLR 282; [1996] 3 All ER 913; (1997) 29 HLR 801, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p Wingrove and MansoorN5766N200515[1997] QB 953; [1996] 3 WLR 282; [1996] 3 All ER 913; (1997) 29 HLR 801, CAR v Wandsworth LBC ex p Wingrove and Mansoor [1997] QB 953; [1996] 3 WLR 282; [1996] 3 All ER 913; (1997) 29 HLR 801, CA0N200525N12410N1630Comments in Awua on discharge of duty not obiter; authority required to act reasonably in relation to the length of tenure providedobiter dicta commentsTwo applicants were provided with assured shorthold tenancies of accommodation in the private sector in performance of the councils Housing Act 1985 s65(2) (now Housing Act 1996 s193(2)) duty. Their applications for judicial review of the decision that the duty had been discharged were dismissed.The Court of Appeal upheld that dismissal. The applicants argued that the observation in R v Brent LBC ex p Awua ( and ), that the main accommodation duty could be discharged by the provision of non-settled suitable accommodation, was obiter. The court held that the relevant part of Lord Hoffmanns speech in Awua was not obiter but was in any event correct in principle. Furthermore, the court was not persuaded that the House of Lords had overlooked other persuasive case-law or parliamentary material or that its decision was inconsistent with other precedent. Evans LJ, while agreeing that an assured shorthold tenancy may discharge the s65(2) duty, said that the authority is required to act reasonably in relation to the length of tenure to be provided. Its decision on what was suitable tenure was not unfettered but must be proportionate to the circumstances of the case.R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Wingrove and Mansoor

[2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237; (2001) 33 HLR 84; (2001) Times 10 May, CAR (Bibi (No 1) and Al-Nashed) v Newham LBCN5766N200515[2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237; (2001) 33 HLR 84; (2001) Times 10 May, CAR (Bibi (No 1) and Al-Nashed) v Newham LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 WLR 237; (2001) 33 HLR 84; (2001) Times 10 May, CA0N200525N12410N1630Legitimate expectation resulting from the promise of permanent accommodation needed to be considered when deciding what accommodation was to be made available to the applicantsThe council accepted that it owed the applicants the main housing duty (Housing Act 1985 s65(2), now Housing Act 1996 s193(2)). They were repeatedly told that they would be provided with permanent council accommodation but would need to wait in temporary private sector leased accommodation until suitable permanent council accommodation became available. They waited, in a series of units of temporary accommodation, for many years. They then sought judicial review requiring the council to discharge its duty in the promised manner. The council then asserted that, in light of the decision in R v Brent LBC ex p Awua ( and ), the units of temporary accommodation had in fact operated to discharge the s65(2) duty some years earlier. If the applicants were again homeless (on the termination of any particular temporary letting) a new duty might arise (under Housing Act 1996 Part 7).Turner J allowed the applications. He held that, as a matter of strict law, the earlier temporary accommodation had discharged the section 65(2) duty (applying Awua). However, the councils representations repeated over many years led to the legitimate expectation that the council would not assert that the duty had been discharged until it had provided permanent accommodation. It was still so bound and the applicants were entitled to declarations to that effect. The council appealed to the Court of Appeal.The Court of Appeal held that it was clear that the local authority, albeit on the basis of a mistaken view of the law, had lawfully committed itself to providing the applicants with suitable accommodation with security of tenure. As a result the applicants had a legitimate expectation to that effect. The local authority erred in law in regarding itself as free of that commitment (in the light of Awua) by simply refusing to acknowledge thatthe promises made were a relevant consideration in deciding whether they should be honoured. That was an error of law since the law required legitimate expectation properly to be taken into account in the decision-making process. To disregard a legitimate expectation because no concrete detriment could be shown was to place the weakest in society, who were most likely to have no choice other than to trust in what had been promised to them, at a particular disadvantage. Nevertheless, the invidious choice of which of the many people waiting for permanent accommodation should be housed remained one which the local authority was singularly best placed to make. The judge had gone too far in his declaration. It was better simply to declare that the local authority was under a duty to consider the applicants legitimate expectation when deciding the accommodation to be made available for them. The councils appeal was allowed to that extent.R (Bibi (No 1) and Al-Nashed) v Newham LBC

[2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 2010Ravichandran v Lewisham LBCN5766N200515[2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 2010Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755; [2010] HLR 42; (2010) Times 19 July, 2 July 20100N200525N12410N1630Offer should be clear as to whether made under section 193(5) or section 193(7)Times 12 June; 7 June 2007The Court of Appeal gave guidance on the approach concerning reviews where an applicant has refused an offer of suitable accommodation and the authority has contended that its obligations under Part 7 have ceased.1)Section 193(5) is concerned with offers of temporary accommodation to meet a local housing authoritys duty. Section 193(7) is concerned with offers of permanent accommodation pursuant to the authoritys allocation scheme under Part 6.2)An authority making an offer of accommodation, the refusal of which it intends to rely upon to end its duty under section 193(2), should always make clear to the applicant whether the offer is intended to be within section 193(5) or within section 193(7). Where the authority makes clear that the offer is intended to be within section 193(7), it cannot subsequently treat the offer, and any refusal of it, as made under section 193(5).3)The applicant has an additional right of review if the authority decides, after a refusal of suitable accommodation, that its duty has come to an end.Note: this decision was also authority for the proposition that offers have to be both suitable and reasonable. It is no longer, however, necessary for an offer to be reasonable after amendments to section 193 made by the Localism Act 2011.Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC

[2014] EWCA Civ 41; [2014] HLR 33, 28 January 2014Solihull MBC v KhanN5766N200515[2014] EWCA Civ 41; [2014] HLR 33, 28 January 2014Solihull MBC v Khan [2014] EWCA Civ 41; [2014] HLR 33, 28 January 20140N200525N12410N1630There is no duty to explain in an offer letter why an authority considers a property to be reasonable or suitableMs Khan was homeless. The council accepted that it owed her the main housing duty under Housing Act 1996 Part 7 s193. She told the council that she could not live in a particular part of its district because of fear of violence from her former partner and a gang with which he was associated. The council made a final offer of accommodation in that area. Ms Khan assumed that the offer must have been made in error and refused it. On a review, the council decided that the offer had been suitable and reasonable to accept. It did not agree that she would have been at risk in the area in which the property was located.Recorder Mountfield QC allowed an appeal on the basis that, when making the offer (and before it came to be accepted or rejected), the council should have explained that it did not accept the alleged risk.The Court of Appeal allowed the councils second appeal. It held that there was no duty under Housing Act 1996 Part 7 to explain why any particular offer of accommodation was being made. That represented a sensible approach because [i]t enabled a hard-pressed housing authority to act more expeditiously because it was able to make its final offers in a standard format rather than in individually-crafted letters (para 31). If Ms Khan had thought that the offer had been made in error, she should have contacted the council.Solihull MBC v Khan

[2006] EWCA Civ 159; [2006] HLR 28, 7 March 2006Tower Hamlets LBC v DeugiN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 159; [2006] HLR 28, 7 March 2006Tower Hamlets LBC v Deugi [2006] EWCA Civ 159; [2006] HLR 28, 7 March 20060N200525N12410N1630In practice a decision that a duty had ceased under section 193(6)(a) needed to be communicated to an applicant, who would have a right of review and appealTower Hamlets LBC v Deugi

[2010] EWCA Civ 1278; [2011] HLR 22, 16 November 2010Vilvarasa v Harrow LBCN5766N200515[2010] EWCA Civ 1278; [2011] HLR 22, 16 November 2010Vilvarasa v Harrow LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 1278; [2011] HLR 22, 16 November 20100N200525N12410N1630It is not necessary to warn an applicant of the consequences of refusing an offer of accommodation at the date when specific accommodation is offered if he or she has been warned previouslyThe council accepted that it owed the claimant the main housing duty under the homelessness provisions of Housing Act 1996 Part 7: s193. It advised him that it would perform the duty by arranging an assured shorthold tenancy. It later contacted him identifying the particular property. The claimant visited the property but rejected the offer on the basis that it was not suitable for his needs. The suitability of the accommodation offered was upheld by the council on a review and HHJ McDowall dismissed an appeal. The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the totality of the councils correspondence suggested that the offer made was a qualifying offer of an assured shorthold tenancy designed to release the council from its duty and which the claimant would have been entitled to reject as of right: s193(7B) and (7C).The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The council had throughout been making the offer under section 193(5) as a method of performing its duty to secure temporary accommodation. Nothing in the wording of the letters undermined that intent. It was not necessary for them to warn the applicant of the consequences of refusing an offer of accommodation at the date when specific accommodation is offered. The requirements of section 193(5) are satisfied if the applicant is given a warning at some time prior to the offer. If, however, a long period has elapsed between the warning and the offer, it might be that section 193(5) would not be satisfied.Note: The Localism Act 2011 abolished qualifying offers. This would have affected the applicants submissions but not the decision.Vilvarasa v Harrow LBC

[2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 JulyWarsame v Hounslow LBCN5766N200515[2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 JulyWarsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696; (2000) 32 HLR 335; (1999) Times 21 July0N200525N12410N1630Right to request a review in section 202 included right to request a review of a decision that a duty had ceasedWarsame v Hounslow LBC

[1979] 1 WLR 1437; [1979] 3 All ER 344; (1979) 78 LGR 32, QBDR v Bristol CC ex p BrowneN5766N200515[1979] 1 WLR 1437; [1979] 3 All ER 344; (1979) 78 LGR 32, QBDR v Bristol CC ex p Browne [1979] 1 WLR 1437; [1979] 3 All ER 344; (1979) 78 LGR 32, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Duty ceased by securing that accommodation provided by someone elseMrs Browne and her seven children left the matrimonial home in Tralee, Eire, as a result of violence from her husband. She travelled to the UK and applied as a homeless person to Bristol. She had no local connection with Bristol nor any other authority in England, Wales or Scotland. Bristol accepted that it was required to secure accommodation for her. After receiving an assurance from a community welfare officer in Tralee that he would ensure that she would be housed safely if she returned, Bristol decided to perform its duty by advising her to return to Tralee and paying for her journey back.Her application for judicial review was dismissed. Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 s6(1)(c) (now Housing Act 1996 s206(1)(c)) provided that an authority could perform its duty to secure that accommodation became available by giving a person such advice and assistance as would secure that he or she obtained accommodation from some other person. When a council secures that accommodation is made available from some other source, the accommodation does not have to be within the authoritys own locality. Although it was not a case of a referral under the local connection provisions and section 5(4)(b) (now Housing Act 1996 s198(2)(c)) did not apply, the risk of violence was a matter for Bristol to consider. It had made appropriate enquiries and decided that accommodation could be provided in Tralee without a risk of violence. It was not necessary for the purposes of the Act that the welfare officer in Tralee should specify a particular house there, since it was sufficient for the authority to be satisfied that accommodation would be available.Note: Authorities must now accommodate in their own district so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so: Housing Act 1996 s208(1). If they are minded to offer accommodation out of the district they must have regard to Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 SI No 2601.R v Bristol CC ex p Browne

(1996) 28 HLR 279, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p Miah (Askir)N5766N200515(1996) 28 HLR 279, QBDR v Newham LBC ex p Miah (Askir) (1996) 28 HLR 279, QBD0N200525N12410N1630Policy not to move people with rent arrears to permanent accommodation lawfulLegal Action 14, CAIn 1991 the applicant applied to the council as a homeless person and was provided with temporary accommodation. In 1992 he received a Housing Act 1985 s64 (now Housing Act 1996 s184(3)) notice accepting him for the main housing duty. However, arrears accrued in the temporary accommodation and in 1994 reached 7,000. The council issued a notice to quit and brought possession proceedings. The applicant sought judicial review to challenge the councils policy that it would not move people with arrears of rent from temporary to permanent accommodation, relying on R v Tower Hamlets LBC ex p Khalique ().Carnwath J dismissed the application. It was lawful for the council to take into account rent arrears in relation to their duty under s65(2). The line of cases including Khalique and R v Westminster CC ex p Mulonso March 1995 Legal Action 14, CA had been overtaken by the decision in Rv Brent LBC ex p Awua (T21.2 and T51.3). Following Awua the position was relatively straightforward. The council accepted a duty under s65(2). That duty was to provide suitable accommodation which it did. The accommodation was not precarious in the sense explained by Lord Hoffman in Awua. The provision of the accommodation had itself discharged the councils duties. If and when the applicant was required to leave that accommodation, he would be free to apply again to the council and, if he had lost the accommodation because of rent arrears, he might be found to be intentionally homeless.R v Newham LBC ex p Miah (Askir)

[2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 45R (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBCN5766N200515[2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 45R (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBC [2005] EWHC 1127 (Admin); [2005] HLR 450N200525N12410N1630Policy that tenant had to serve NTQ on tenancy from which she fled before acceptance under section 193 unlawfulThe claimant and his wife were joint tenants of a council flat. The wife left with the children claiming that she had been the victim of domestic violence. On her application for accommodation, the council accepted that she was homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless. The notification of that decision read Provided you relinquish your tenancy the Council accepts that under section 193(3) it has a duty to secure that accommodation remains available to you. As required by that proviso, the wife then gave notice to quit the joint tenancy and was accommodated elsewhere. The claimant sought judicial review of the decision to impose the proviso.Wilkie J held that, once the conditions in section 193(1) were met, the duty to accommodate was triggered and it would be unlawful to impose any further hurdle or proviso before accepting that the duty arises. The proviso in the notification letter was not an aberration but a manifestation of council policy requiring the relinquishment of any extant council tenancy before provision of further accommodation. As such it was plainly the imposition of a further requirement over and above the statutory requirements. He granted a declaration that the policy evidenced by the letter was unlawful. He declined to quash the notice to quit, leaving the issue of its validity to be determined in the possession proceedings that the council had initiated and which had been adjourned pending the judicial review.R (Hammia) v Wandsworth LBC

[1994] 2 AC 402; [1994] 3 WLR 403; [1994] 3 All ER 313; [1994] 2 FLR 671; (1994) 26 HLR 659R v Northavon DC ex p SmithN5766N200515[1994] 2 AC 402; [1994] 3 WLR 403; [1994] 3 All ER 313; [1994] 2 FLR 671; (1994) 26 HLR 659R v Northavon DC ex p Smith [1994] 2 AC 402; [1994] 3 WLR 403; [1994] 3 All ER 313; [1994] 2 FLR 671; (1994) 26 HLR 6590N200525N12410N1630Children Act 1989 s27 required co-operation between the housing and social services departments; it did not require a housing authority to accommodate an applicant who it had decided was intentionally homelessThe authority found the applicant to be intentionally homeless. She was told that it would take around two and a half years until she would be housed under (what is now) Part 6. The applicant approached Avon County Council for accommodation under Children Act 1989. Avon requested that the authority provide the applicant with a tenancy that met her needs. The authority refused.The House of Lords held that the obligation to co-operate with a social services authority did not impose a duty on a housing authority to provide housing where it had decided that it did not owe a duty under Housing Act 1985 Part 3 (now Housing Act 1996 Part 7). Any request for co-operation had to be compatible with the requested authoritys own duties and obligations. The duty to co-operate did not change the extent of each authoritys functions.R v Northavon DC ex p Smith

[2006] EWCA Civ 718; [2006] 1 WLR 2808; [2006] 4 All ER 917; [2006] HLR 45, 8 June 2006R (Conville) v Richmond upon Thames LBCN5766N200515[2006] EWCA Civ 718; [2006] 1 WLR 2808; [2006] 4 All ER 917; [2006] HLR 45, 8 June 2006R (Conville) v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2006] EWCA Civ 718; [2006] 1 WLR 2808; [2006] 4 All ER 917; [2006] HLR 45, 8 June 20060N200525N12410N1630The period for which an intentionally homeless applicant is to be accommodated will depend on their circumstances and an authority should not have regard to its resources when considering thisThe claimant applied to Richmond as a homeless person. The council found that she was eligible, homeless, had a priority need but that she had become homeless intentionally. In those circumstances its duty under section 190 was to assess her housing needs, to supply advice and assistance and to provide her with accommodation for such period as will give [her] a reasonable opportunity of securing her own housing. The claimants only realistic opportunity for securing accommodation was to rent in the private sector. She found a suitable property but could not afford the deposit or rent in advance required by the landlord. The council declined to provide a grant or loan to meet those costs and directed itself that in determining the reasonable opportunity it could have regard to its own resources and the other demands made by homeless people on those resources. GoldringJ dismissed a claim for judicial review.The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal. While it is for an authority to decide what amounts to a reasonable opportunity (challengeable only on public law grounds) it is not permitted, in doing so, to have regard to considerations peculiar to it, such as the extent of its resources and other demands on it. It is what is reasonable from the applicants standpoint, having regard to his or her circumstances and in the context of the accommodation potentially available. What is reasonable will depend on the particular circumstances of the applicant. The duty to provide a reasonable opportunity falls short of a duty to provide long-term accommodation.A moment will normally be reached when, in spite of reasonable efforts, time willl expire if possibilities have not come to fruition. (Pill LJ at [40]).Note: The English Code of Guidance no longer refers to a 28-day period in reference to the section 190 duty. At para 14.28 it advises that authorities must treat each case on its merits and refers to relevant considerations.R (Conville) v Richmond upon Thames LBC

[2008] EWHC 847 (Admin); [2008] HLR 37R (Nipyo) v Croydon LBCN5766N200515[2008] EWHC 847 (Admin); [2008] HLR 37R (Nipyo) v Croydon LBC [2008] EWHC 847 (Admin); [2008] HLR 370N200525N12410N1630Provision of accommodation for seven days after advice and assistance given under section 190(2) not lawfulThe council decided that the claimant (a single mother with two dependent children) had become homeless intentionally. It also decided that the duty it consequently owed her (under Housing Act 1996 s190(2)) could be met by:providing temporary accommodation for ten days (expiring on 21 December 2007); andgiving her advice about crisis loans, registering with estate agents and obtaining access to bed and breakfast (BB) or other temporary accommodation.The council later agreed to extend provision of accommodation to 1 January 2008. The claimant sought a judicial review. The council then offered a further extension to 5 March 2008 if the proceedings were withdrawn.Dobbs J dismissed the claim. In view of the fact that the authority only gave advice and assistance on 13 December 2007, it only effectively secured accommodation for her for seven days. That initial period had been unlawfully short. However, by the date of trial the claimant had had accommodation for a period of three months. The council was entitled to say that had given her a reasonable opportunity to find her own housing: Housing Act 1996 s190(2)(a) and R (Conville) v Richmond upon Thames LBC (). The claimant had not taken steps in that time to obtain a crisis loan or explore other housing options. The council had been entitled to suggest that she consider BB accommodation as a means of meeting her immediate housing needs.R (Nipyo) v Croydon LBC

[2010] EWHC 88 (Admin), 28 January 2010Savage v Hillingdon LBCN5766N200514[2010] EWHC 88 (Admin), 28 January 2010Savage v Hillingdon LBC [2010] EWHC 88 (Admin), 28 January 20100N2398,N200525The applicant was a single mother with a four-year-old son. She was evicted from her accommodation and applied to Hillingdon for homeless assistance. Hillingdon subsequently found that she had become homeless intentionally because she had failed to pay the rent. Hillingdon also decided that they would provide her with accommodation for an additional 28 days, along with advice and assistance, toN12410N1630The authority was not required to carry out an assessment of the applicants housing needs for the purpose of performing its obligation under section 190The applicant was a single mother with a four-year-old son. She was evicted from her accommodation and applied to Hillingdon for homeless assistance. Hillingdon subsequently found that she had become homeless intentionally because she had failed to pay the rent. Hillingdon also decided that they would provide her with accommodation for an additional 28 days, along with advice and assistance, to give her an opportunity to find her own accommodation. Neither decision was reviewed. The applicants solicitors subsequently requested that Hillingdon provide her with a deposit in performance of its obligation under Housing Act 1996 s190. Hillingdon refused and the applicant applied for judicial review. She contended that Hillingdon had failed to comply with section 190(4) by failing to carry out a proper assessment of her housing needs, failing to provide adequate advice and assistance and failing to secure her with accommodation for a reasonable period.The Administrative Court held that Hillingdon had provided her with sufficient advice and assistance: the duty did not require the provision of a deposit to obtain other accommodation. Likewise, it was artificial to require Hillingdon to perform a second assessment of the applicants housing needs. Hillingdon were already familiar with her circumstances from her homeless application, eg that she had little money, and was therefore aware of her housing needs. Hillingdon had also been entitled to provide the applicant with accommodation for 28 days; the length of time given was a matter for the authority and it was not irrational in the circumstances. Judicial review was the appropriate forum for the claim as Hillingdon did not have jurisdiction to review, under section 202, whether it had properly performed its duties under section 190.Savage v Hillingdon LBC