The right to life is often seen as one of the most fundamental of all fundamental rights. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. ‘Everyone’ applies only to human beings – these are human rights after all – but many people think the sanctity of life extends to many other sentient beings as well.

Anyone who believes in the sanctity of life of non-human animals may be vegetarian or vegan and there are different ways of expressing this. The common factor, as the Vegetarian Society states simply, is that ‘vegetarians don’t eat fish, meat or chicken’.

Other reasons for being either vegetarian or vegan are to do with climate change. This has come to the fore in recent months, with the rise in publicity about climate change and the destruction of the planet. It is now commonly known that meat consumption drives greenhouse gas emissions and affects the climate. Many people are changing their habits accordingly, to reduce meat consumption or end it altogether. Research by the Vegan Society (among others) found that the number of vegans in Great Britain quadrupled between 2014 and 2018.

While for some people these are practical lifestyle choices, for others they are – or become – fundamental aspects of their lives. At what point does such a way of life become a ‘philosophical belief’ that is protected by law?

The seminal case of Grainger Plc and others v Nicholson UKEAT/0219/09/ZT; May 2010 Legal Action 11 established that a belief in man-made climate change, and the alleged resulting moral imperatives, is capable, if genuinely held, of being a philosophical belief. The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a philosophical belief does not need to be a fully-fledged system of thought and drew on the House of Lords case of R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others [2005] UKHL 15; November 2005 Legal Action 33. This was a human rights case brought by head teachers, teachers and parents (though notably not the children) at four independent schools. They objected to the ban on corporal punishment in schools, citing their professed Christian beliefs. The head teachers’ appeal was dismissed. In the course of the judgments, Lord Walker observed that ‘[p]acifism, vegetarianism and total abstinence from alcohol are uncontroversial examples of beliefs which would fall within article 9’ (para 55).

So it was perhaps surprising that an employment tribunal felt it should treat as a preliminary issue the question of ‘whether or not vegetarianism is capable of satisfying the requirement and definition of being a philosophical belief (protected characteristic) under the Equality Act 2010’. However, that is what happened in the case of Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd and others Case No 3335357/2018, 6 September 20191Bailii reference: [2019] UKET 3335357/2018. (see para 1).

It was accepted that the claimant was a vegetarian and had a genuine belief in vegetarianism. However, the tribunal decided that vegetarianism could not possibly be a philosophical belief, partly because it believed that people had ‘numerous, differing and wide varying reasons’ for being vegetarian (para 41) – in contrast, it said, to veganism. An employment tribunal case on veganism is due to be heard in October, with the League Against Cruel Sports (surprisingly) defending on the basis that veganism cannot be a philosophical belief.

Cases brought on the basis of philosophical belief can be tricky. Once you are over the hurdle of establishing that a particular belief can amount to a philosophical one, within the meaning of Equality Act 2010 s10(2), there is not only the task of proving the factual situation but also a separate question of law as to whether the particular facts amount to the system of philosophical belief that is contended for.

The concept of philosophical belief is one of the most interesting areas for development of discrimination law. A first instance case is an opportunity for a useful demonstration of the application of rights in practice. Sadly, Conisbee is unpersuasive of any useful statement of principle.