Authors:Lee Marsons
Created:2024-02-23
Last updated:2024-02-23
Making bad asylum policy even worse
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Marc Bloomfield
Description: PLP
The UK’s asylum policies over the past several years must surely rank as some of the most immoral, ineffective, unworkable, unlawful and expensive of the modern era. From the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill currently before parliament, the government’s approach has been uniformly characterised by rhetoric over evidence, brinksmanship over legality and apathy over dignity. Each statute has been worse than the one before and the Safety of Rwanda Bill – which overturns the UK Supreme Court’s finding in November 2023 that Rwanda is not a safe country (R (AAA (Syria) and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and other appeals [2023] UKSC 42)1See February 2024 Legal Action 22. – decidedly follows that regressive trend. Parliament is being asked to legitimise one of the most brazen threats to human rights, the rule of law and judicial independence in recent history.
In the bill introduced to parliament, clause 2(1) requires all decision-makers, including the Home Office and the judiciary, to treat Rwanda as if it were safe. Clause 2(3)–(4) takes this further by expressly prohibiting the judiciary from questioning Rwanda’s safety, including – directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusions – requiring judges to presume that people will not be refouled by Rwanda. The clause also states that this ouster of the court’s jurisdiction applies irrespective of any domestic or international law that it violates (clause 2(5)).
Further, the bill contains a slew of provisions that radically undermine the effective protection of human rights, including:
at the beginning of the bill, an acknowledgement by the home secretary that he cannot certify that it is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights;
clause 1(4)(b), which states that the bill’s validity is unaffected by international law;
clause 3, which disapplies much of the Human Rights Act 1998; and
clause 5, which states that it is for a minister to decide whether the UK should follow an interim measure of the European Court of Human Rights and that a court must not have regard to such a measure.
Clause 4(1) outlines the only basis on which people may challenge their removal to Rwanda. This is that ‘Rwanda is not a safe country for the person … based on compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances (rather than on the grounds that … Rwanda is not a safe country in general)’. This is an extremely high threshold that, in practice, will likely fail to provide protection. When people have been forced to flee their homes due to ongoing or imminent persecution, they may not physically be able to collect any evidence prior to their departure. There is a special concern for groups with protected characteristics who may struggle to disclose the compelling grounds not to remove them to Rwanda, such as LGBT+ people.
Hopefully, the Safety of Rwanda Bill will not join the UK’s growing list of bad asylum statutes, or at least will emerge radically amended by the end of its parliamentary process. After all, even on their own terms, these policies have not worked. A February 2023 House of Commons Library briefing indicated that only 21 people had been removed from the UK after their asylum applications were declared inadmissible under post-Brexit asylum rules.2Refusing to process asylum claims: the safe country and inadmissibility rules, Research Briefing No CBP-9724, 8 February 2023. Moreover, the Rwanda scheme has cost £260m so far, only to be found unlawful.3Letter from the permanent secretary Matthew Rycroft to Dame Diana Johnson, chair of the HASC and Dame Meg Hillier, chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Home Office, 7 December 2023. Further, Home Office figures from January 2024 demonstrate that, as at 28 December 2023, there were still over 4,500 claims in the pre-June 2022 backlog and over 94,000 claims waiting an initial decision in the post-June 2022 backlog.4Statistics relating to the Illegal Migration Act: data tables to December 2023, Home Office, 2 January 2024, table IMB_02 ‘Asylum applications awaiting an initial decision’. All this is likely to get worse, especially if the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is brought into force in full.5Illegal Migration Bill – assessment of impact of inadmissibility, removals, detention, accommodation and safe routes, Refugee Council, March 2023. Expert analysis has even demonstrated that the decline in small boat crossings over the past few months is at least as likely to be down to weather as policy.6Rob England and Megan Riddell, ‘Weather data casts doubt on government’s claim over fall in migrant crossings’, BBC News, 7 February 2024.
The UK’s asylum policies over the past few years have been a failure. The UK needs a moral, legal, financially sustainable and workable asylum plan. Important work in this regard is being done, for example, by the Refugee Council, which in July 2023 published a National Refugee Strategy.7Towards a National Refugee Strategy: our vision for a fair and humane asylum system, Refugee Council, July 2023. Hopefully, in time, wiser heads will prevail. For now, the government is merely compounding the errors of the past – at great human, financial and legal cost.
 
1     See February 2024 Legal Action 22. »
2     Refusing to process asylum claims: the safe country and inadmissibility rules, Research Briefing No CBP-9724, 8 February 2023. »
4     Statistics relating to the Illegal Migration Act: data tables to December 2023, Home Office, 2 January 2024, table IMB_02 ‘Asylum applications awaiting an initial decision’. »
6     Rob England and Megan Riddell, ‘Weather data casts doubt on government’s claim over fall in migrant crossings’, BBC News, 7 February 2024. »