8.53R v Avon CC ex p M (1999) 2 CCLR 185, [1994] 2 FCR 259, QBD
An assessment must also encompass psychological needs and an authority had to have strong reasons for diverging from the cogently reasoned conclusions of a complaints panel
Facts: a social services complaints review panel concluded that, as a result of his Down’s Syndrome, M had developed the entrenched view that it was necessary for him to live in residential accommodation at a place called Milton Heights, such that to place him elsewhere would cause serious damage to his health; thus, he had a strong psychological need to live there. The panel recommended a placement at Milton Heights for three years, to allow for M to develop his living skills and be prepared to move elsewhere. In response, Avon concluded that whilst M had a strong personal preference to live at Milton Heights, his needs could be met at Berwick Lodge, which was substantially cheaper.
Judgment: Henry J held that Avon was under a duty to meet needs, including psychological needs of the kind that the panel held existed in this case and that Avon had not had Wednesbury rational reasons for disagreeing with the panel’s assessment:
Examining their reasons in detail, the following comments can be made:
•The panel correctly found that in law the assessment must be based on current needs.
•The panel correctly found that in law need is clearly capable of including psychological need. In particular, that must be so when (as it was on the evidence before them) that psychological need was contributed to by the congenital Down’s Syndrome condition itself. I have recited the evidence that the panel had had as to that. That evidence was all one way once Mr Passfield had agreed that he was not an expert on Down’s Syndrome.
•Next, the panel had found that M’s entrenched position was part of his psychological need. This is the crucial finding of fact. It is arrived at against the background, recited in these reasons, that M would not be forced to live anywhere against his will; that the only place he would presently consider would be Milton Heights, that that entrenched position was contributed to by the Down’s Syndrome, and that his present needs included a need for a period of stability.
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But the making of the final decision did not lie with the review panel. It lay with the social services committee. I would be reluctant to hold (and do not) that in no circumstances whatsoever could the social services committee have overruled the review panel’s recommendation in the exercise of their legal right and duty to consider it. Caution normally requires the court not to say ‘never’ in any obiter dictum pronouncement. But I have no hesitation in finding that they could not overrule that decision without a substantial reason and without having given that recommendation the weight it required. It was a decision taken by a body entrusted with the basic fact-finding exercise under the complaints procedure. It was arrived at after a convincing examination of the evidence, particularly the expert evidence. The evidence before them had, as to the practicalities, been largely one way. The panel had directed themselves properly in law, and had arrived at a decision in line with the strength of the evidence before them. They had given clear reasons and they had raised the crucial factual question with the parties before arriving at their conclusion.
The strength, coherence, and apparent persuasiveness of that decision had to be addressed head on if it were to be set aside and not followed. These difficulties were not faced either by the respondents’ officers in their paper to the social services committee, or by the social services committee themselves. Not to face them was either unintentional perversity on their part, or showed a wrong appreciation of the legal standing of that decision. It seems to me that you do not properly reconsider a decision when, on the evidence, it does not seem that that decision was given the weight it deserved. That is, in my judgment, what the social services committee failed to do here. To neglect to do that is not a question which merely, as is suggested in one of the papers, impugns the credibility of the review panel, but instead ignores the weight to which it is prima facie entitled because of its place in the statutory procedure, and further, pays no attention to the scope of its hearing and clear reasons that it had given.
It seems to me that anybody required, at law, to give their reasons for reconsidering and changing such a decision must have good reasons for doing so, and must show that they gave that decision sufficient weight and, in my judgment, it is that that the social services committee have here failed to do. Their decision must be quashed. As is often the case in Wednesbury quashings, it can be put in a number of ways: either unintentional perversity, or failure to take the review panel’s recommendation properly into account, or an implicit error of law in not giving it sufficient weight.