On the other hand, the court in Mahfood did not – and was not asked to – quash the policy decision, made in September 1994, which led to the individual reductions. The court did not lay down precisely what the authority were required to do in cases other than those specifically at issue. Services of the type here in question inevitably raise considerations of an individual and personal nature. The council could properly take the view that a blanket decision to restore the services precisely as they were in September 1994 would not be appropriate. In particular I see force in the point that it would be confusing and unsatisfactory for services to be restored for a short time, only to be withdrawn or reduced shortly afterwards following a reassessment.

Thus, I do not think that RADAR were entitled reasonably to insist on a decision to restore services before the reassessments were carried out. Equally, it has to be recognised that those reassessments need to be carried out by properly trained persons and that the process will take time. It is not for the court to lay down a programme, but the arrangements outlined by Mr Davies to deal with the workload appear to achieve a reasonable balance.

Where, however, I would take issue with the authority, is the suggestion that the task of reassessment following the judgment is satisfied by writing letters to those affected or potentially affected, and simply offering them reassessment. In some areas of the law that might be an adequate response, where those affected can be assumed to be capable of looking after their own interests, and where silence in response to an offer can be treated as acceptance or acquiescence. However, that approach is not valid in the present context. The obligation to make an assessment for community care services does not depend on a request, but on the ‘appearance’ of need. Indeed, under section 47(2) of the 1990 Act [National Health Service and Community Care Act], where it appears that a person is disabled, the authority is specifically required to make a decision as to the service he requires without waiting for a request. Of course, the authority cannot carry out an effective reassessment without some degree of co-operation from the service user or his helpers. However, that is a very different thing from saying that they can simply rest on having sent a letter of the type to which I have referred.

In my judgment, the authority has not discharged its obligations following the judgment simply by reassessing those 273 persons who replied to the letter. By implication, all the people affected by the September 1974 decision were people who, prior to that date, ‘appeared’ to the authority to have need of its services. For the authority to justify the continued reduction or withdrawal of the services, it must carry out a reassessment as required by the judgment of the Divisional Court. Quite apart from the judgment, the clear scheme of section 47 is thatdecisions on services should follow assessments. As the Divisional Court recognised, that means individual assessments. There is no suggestion in the report to the Council in June 1995 that there is any practical difficulty in carrying out the reassessment of the 1,059 users. Clearly money would need to be found for it, but it is not suggested that that is impossible.

To summarise, I think both parties have taken unduly extreme positions. RADAR were wrong to insist upon full reinstatement prior to reassessment. But the Council were wrong to think that merely reassessing the 273 who had replied to their letters discharged their duties.

…

Next, Mr Eccles suggests that there is an alternative remedy by way of complaint, under the procedure set up pursuant to section 7B of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 (inserted by the 1990 Act s50). This may be relevant in particular cases, especially where individual relief is being sought. However, in relation to a general issue of principle as to the authority’s obligations in law, such as I have been discussing here, I do not think that can be regarded as a suitable or alternative remedy to the procedure of Judicial Review.