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Forensic inferences
Forensic inferencesRe [2004] 1 FLR 161Ophelia, The [1916] 2 AC 206, [1915] P 129Re [2004] 2 FLR 710Times 30 JanuaryTimes 30 January
Nature
11.45A forensic inference1These are generally referred to as adverse inferences, but this is not a distinctive classifying feature as evidential inferences may also be adverse. The term forensic emphasises the basis on which the inference is drawn rather than its impact. may be drawn if a party or a witness refuses to co-operate with the tribunal. This section deals with inferences that lead to findings of fact; lack of co-operation can also provide a basis in regulatory jurisdictions for drawing inferences about good repute or fitness to practice.2Tacsi Gwynedd Ltd v Deputy Traffice Commissioner for the Welsh Traffic Area [2015] UKUT 0668 (AAC) at [84]–[88]. The evidential inference is that co-operation would be detrimental to the party concerned. Once drawn, it is then taken into account in assessing the probative worth of the evidence as a whole. The effect may well be a decision that is less favourable than it would have been if the party had been co-operative.3Fairclough Homes Ltd v Summers [2012] 1 WLR 2004 at [52]. A forensic inference may have a statutory basis.4HESC Rules r15(4)–(5).
When a forensic inference is necessary
11.46It is not always necessary to consider whether to draw a forensic inference from lack of co-operation. There are two circumstances in which it is not necessary.
11.47First, a party who fails to provide evidence that could lead to some advantage is deprived of the chance of securing that advantage. There is no need to achieve this by drawing a forensic inference. So, if a claimant before an employment tribunal fails to provide evidence in support of an alleged incident, that issue is decided against that party for failing to discharge the burden of proof.
11.48Second, the law may provide for the consequences of failure to co-operate. So under the child support scheme, a non-resident parent who fails to provide the necessary information for a maintenance calculation may be subject to a default maintenance decision.5Child Support Act 1991 s12(1).
Lack of co-operation that may permit a forensic inference
11.49There is no limit to the circumstances in which a forensic inference may be appropriate. They cover almost every lack of co-operation with the tribunal, including the following.
Refusing to answer questions
11.50Re O (Care proceedings: Evidence)6[2004] 1 FLR 161 at [13] and [16]. concerned an allegation of violence by a mother towards her children. The mother refused to give evidence and Johnson J held that it was possible to infer from this that the allegations of violence were true.7[2004] 1 FLR 161 at [13] and ]16].
Destroying documents or other property with the intention of preventing their use as evidence
11.51This is the basis of the rule in The Ophelia.8[1915] P 129 and [1916] 2 AC 206. It does not apply to routine destruction of documents.9R(IS) 11/92 at [36]. As the contents of destroyed documents may be proved by other evidence,10R(IS) 11/92 at [38(f)]. it may not be necessary to draw an inference.
Withholding written information in the possession of or available to the party
11.52Al-Khatib v Masry11[2002] 1 FLR 1053. concerned ancillary relief on divorce. The wife alleged that the husband had assets in excess of £200,000,000. The husband failed to make anything like an accurate and complete disclosure. Munby J held that the evidence was not sufficient to allow him to find that the husband had the amount alleged, but that it was sufficient to infer that he had sufficient assets to allow the court to make a settlement at the level that the wife was claiming.12[2002] 1 FLR 1053 at [96]. An appeal against Munby J’s decision was allowed by the Court of Appeal on consent terms following mediation. The background is reported at [2005] 1 WLR 381. It does not affect the principles underlying the judge’s reasoning for which the decision is cited here and elsewhere in this chapter. This was based on the analysis put by counsel for the wife that it was permissible to infer that the husband had calculated that he would obtain a more favourable settlement on this basis than if he made full disclosure. The judge used as a cross-check on this inference the evidence of the scale of the husband’s business activities over 20 years and the commission he had been capable of earning.
Failing to agree to undertake a test like a blood test or DNA testing for paternity
11.53Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Jones13[2004] 1 FLR 282. concerned paternity. The mother alleged that a man was the father of her child, but he refused to take part in DNA testing. The Court of Appeal held that this refusal allowed the court to accept the mother’s evidence of paternity.14[2004] 1 FLR 282 at [11]–[15].
Failing to co-operate in a procedure relevant to the court proceedings like family therapy
11.54Re S (Unco-operative mother)15[2004] 2 FLR 710. concerned a mother’s willingness to participate in family therapy in order to help her children establish a relationship with their father. Thorpe LJ said that the weak reasons given by the mother could be used as the basis for an inference that she lacked commitment to this process.16[2004] 2 FLR 710 at [21]–[22].
Failing to attend the hearing of an appeal or to arrange for witnesses to attend
11.55Secretary of State for Health v C (Tribunal: Failure to draw inference)17(2003) Times 30 January. concerned a man’s suitability to work with children. A woman alleged that he had raped her. On medical advice, she did not give oral evidence. The man did not attend to give evidence. The Court of Appeal held that, in those circumstances, the tribunal was entitled to conclude that the man had decided that his account could not withstand oral examination.
Criminal matters
11.56A party has no right to silence, even if this means disclosing matters relevant to criminal proceedings. As Megaw LJ explained in Jefferson Ltd v Bhetcha:18[1979] 1 WLR 898.
The protection which is at present given to one facing a criminal charge – the so-called ‘right of silence’ – does not extend to give the defendant as a matter of right the same protection in contemporaneous civil proceedings.19[1979] 1 WLR 898 at 905.
11.57It may, though, be appropriate to adjourn to allow the criminal proceedings to be heard before the case before the tribunal. But in some cases, it is logical for the issue before the tribunal to be decided before the criminal case. See chapter 8.
Lack of co-operation that does not permit a forensic inference
11.58However, a forensic inference may not be drawn from a party’s refusal to disclose information that is privileged.20Lord Chelmsford in Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 11 ER 1154 at 1155; Aldous LJ in Oxford Gene Technology Ltd v Affymetrix Inc (No 2) [2001] RPC 18 (p310 at [317]).
Attitude to proceedings
11.59By drawing a forensic inference, a tribunal uses lack of co-operation to identify one party’s attitude to the other party’s case. It is, therefore, always relevant to consider whether there is another explanation for the lack of co-operation. In Re A (A minor) (Paternity: Refusal of blood test),21[1994] 2 FLR 463. Waite LJ said of an alleged father who, within his rights, refused to provide blood samples for testing:
… the inference that he is the father of the child should be virtually inescapable. He would certainly have to advance very clear and cogent reasons for this refusal to be tested – reasons which it would be just and fair and reasonable for him to be allowed to maintain.22[1994] 2 FLR 463 at 473.
And in Secretary of State for Health v C (Tribunal: Failure to draw inference),23(2003) Times 30 January. Latham LJ said that the tribunal could have drawn the inference as a result of the man’s failure to give evidence ‘without any reason’.
11.60If the reasons given are not sufficient to prevent an inference being drawn, they may nonetheless affect the significance of the inference in the circumstances of the case. As Lord Lowry explained in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p T C Coombs & Co:24[1991] 2 AC 283.
In our legal system generally, the silence of one party in face of the other party’s evidence may convert that evidence into proof in relation to matters which are, or are likely to be, within the knowledge of the silent party and about which that party could be expected to give evidence. Thus, depending on the circumstances, a prima facie case may become a strong or even an overwhelming case. But, if the silent party’s failure to give evidence (or to give the necessary evidence) can be credibly explained, even if not entirely justified, the effect of his silence in favour of the other party may be either reduced or nullified.25[1991] 2 AC 283 at 300.
11.61A relevant factor in deciding the significance of a failure to co-operate is whether the party understood the risk involved in this stance. In some circumstances, the party must have realised the risk; for example, if the party is a lawyer. However, in other cases it may be relevant whether the tribunal warned the party of the possible consequence of failing to co-operate. In Al-Khatib v Masry,26[2002] 1 FLR 1053. Munby J emphasised that the husband had been given warning at an earlier hearing.27[2002] 1 FLR 1053 at [93]. The mere recitation of a formula is, though, not sufficient. What the tribunal must take into account, when deciding what inference if any to draw, is the reality of whether the party concerned would have understood the significance of the risk that the warning conveyed.
11.62Another relevant factor, related to understanding the risk of failure to co-operate, is whether the party knew the details of the other party’s case. A forensic inference can only relate to information that the party knew was before the tribunal or might be put to the tribunal. One party will know the general terms of the other party’s case from the documents. If the party fails to attend the hearing, the tribunal may conclude that the party has no answer to that case as presented. However, if the other party presents further allegations at the hearing, the tribunal is not entitled to infer that the party could not have answered the new allegations, because the party had no warning that these might be made.
If a forensic inference cannot be drawn
11.63If a party fails to co-operate but the circumstances do not allow the tribunal to draw a forensic inference, the effect is that the tribunal has to deal with the case on the basis of the evidence that is available. For example: a parent in a child support case may refuse to co-operate because of the effect that the proceedings are having on a new relationship. In those circumstances, the tribunal cannot draw a forensic inference against that party. It has to deal with the case on the evidence available. That evidence is likely to come from the other parent and may be out-of-date or not directly relevant to the issue. In the absence of evidence from the parent concerned, the tribunal may have to draw inferences from the evidence available in order to bring it up-to-date or to relate it to the issue. But these are evidential inferences. The reasoning process does not involve a forensic inference, because the party’s lack of co-operation is not indicative of the strength of the case that could be put to the tribunal.
Effect of a forensic inference
11.64If a tribunal concludes that the lack of co-operation by one party to the proceedings indicates that party’s view of the weakness of the case that could be presented, it may take this into account in assessing the evidence as a whole. It may form part of the tribunal’s assessment that leads it to accept the other party’s evidence on a particular point, as in Re A (A minor) (Paternity: Refusal of blood test),28[1994] 2 FLR 463. where the refusal to co-operate was used to show acceptance of the allegation of paternity. Or it may form part of the tribunal’s reasoning that leads it to draw an inference from the evidence available to it, as in Al-Khatib v Masry,29[2002] 1 FLR 1053. where the failure to co-operate was used to show that the husband had sufficient assets to allow a particular order to be made.
11.65A forensic inference cannot operate in isolation from the evidence as a whole. As Abbott CJ explained in R v Burdett:30(1820) 106 ER 873.
In drawing an inference or conclusion from facts proved, regard must always be had to the nature of the particular case, and the facility that appears to be afforded either of explanation or contradiction. No person is to be required to explain or contradict, until enough has been proved to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, in the absence of explanation or contradiction; but when such proof has been given, and the nature of the case is such as to admit of explanation or contradiction, if the conclusion to which the proof tends be untrue, and the accused offers no explanation or contradiction; can human reason do otherwise than adopt the conclusion to which the proof tends?31(1820) 106 ER 873 at 898.
11.66The forensic inference must operate as part of a process of reasoning. The point was made succinctly by Otton LJ in Baker v Baker:32[1995] 2 FLR 829.
Such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. On appeal it may be possible for either party to show that the inferences or the award [of ancillary relief in divorce proceedings] were unreasonable in the sense that no judge faced with the information before him could have drawn the inferences or awarded the figures that he did.33[1995] 2 FLR 829 at 837.
11.67A forensic inference cannot be used as a justification for guessing at the evidence that the party might or could have given.34Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415 at [45]. Nor can it be used simply to impose a penalty on a party who does not co-operate. The key distinction was drawn by Ewbank J in E v E (Financial Provision):35[1990] 2 FLR 233.
I have to say that the failures on the part of the husband would justify any inferences which were proper which could be drawn against him. At the same time it would be wrong to draw inferences that that husband had assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, I am satisfied he had not got.36[1990] 2 FLR 233 at 242.
11.68The terms of the inference drawn may, of course, operate as a penalty for a party who could have produced evidence that allowed findings more favourable than the inference.37See Otton LJ in Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829 at 837. But that effect is a matter of chance. It may be the effect of an inference, but it must not be the purpose, motivation or basis for the inference.
 
1     These are generally referred to as adverse inferences, but this is not a distinctive classifying feature as evidential inferences may also be adverse. The term forensic emphasises the basis on which the inference is drawn rather than its impact. »
2     Tacsi Gwynedd Ltd v Deputy Traffice Commissioner for the Welsh Traffic Area [2015] UKUT 0668 (AAC) at [84]–[88]. »
3     Fairclough Homes Ltd v Summers [2012] 1 WLR 2004 at [52]. »
4     HESC Rules r15(4)–(5). »
5     Child Support Act 1991 s12(1). »
6     [2004] 1 FLR 161 at [13] and [16]. »
7     [2004] 1 FLR 161 at [13] and ]16]. »
8     [1915] P 129 and [1916] 2 AC 206. »
9     R(IS) 11/92 at [36]. »
10     R(IS) 11/92 at [38(f)]. »
11     [2002] 1 FLR 1053. »
12     [2002] 1 FLR 1053 at [96]. An appeal against Munby J’s decision was allowed by the Court of Appeal on consent terms following mediation. The background is reported at [2005] 1 WLR 381. It does not affect the principles underlying the judge’s reasoning for which the decision is cited here and elsewhere in this chapter. »
13     [2004] 1 FLR 282. »
14     [2004] 1 FLR 282 at [11]–[15]. »
15     [2004] 2 FLR 710. »
16     [2004] 2 FLR 710 at [21]–[22]. »
17     (2003) Times 30 January. »
18     [1979] 1 WLR 898. »
19     [1979] 1 WLR 898 at 905. »
20     Lord Chelmsford in Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 11 ER 1154 at 1155; Aldous LJ in Oxford Gene Technology Ltd v Affymetrix Inc (No 2) [2001] RPC 18 (p310 at [317]). »
21     [1994] 2 FLR 463. »
22     [1994] 2 FLR 463 at 473. »
23     (2003) Times 30 January. »
24     [1991] 2 AC 283. »
25     [1991] 2 AC 283 at 300. »
26     [2002] 1 FLR 1053. »
27     [2002] 1 FLR 1053 at [93]. »
28     [1994] 2 FLR 463. »
29     [2002] 1 FLR 1053. »
30     (1820) 106 ER 873. »
31     (1820) 106 ER 873 at 898. »
32     [1995] 2 FLR 829. »
33     [1995] 2 FLR 829 at 837. »
34     Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415 at [45]. »
35     [1990] 2 FLR 233. »
36     [1990] 2 FLR 233 at 242. »
37     See Otton LJ in Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829 at 837. »
Forensic inferences
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