32. Private life, in the court’s view, includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human beings (see, mutatis mutandis, the Niemietz v Germany judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no 251-B, p33, para 29).

33. In the instant case the applicant complained in substance not of action but of a lack of action by the State. While the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see the X and Y v The Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no 91, p1, para 23, and the Stjerna v Finland judgment of 25 November 1994, Series A no 299-B, p61, para 38). However, the concept of respect is not precisely defined. In order to determine whether such obligations exist, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual, while the State has, in any event, a margin of appreciation.

34. The court has held that a State has obligations of this type where it has found a direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an applicant and the latter’s private and/or family life.

Thus, in the case of Airey v Ireland (judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no 32), the court held that the applicant had been the victim of a violation of Article 8 on the ground that under domestic law there was no system of legal aid in separation proceedings, which by denying access to court directly affected her private and family life.

In the above-mentioned X and Y v The Netherlands case, which concerned the rape of a mentally handicapped person and accordingly related to her physical and psychological integrity, the Court found that because of its shortcomings the Netherlands Criminal Code had not provided the person concerned with practical and effective protection (p14, para 30).

More recently, in the López Ostra v Spain judgment (mutatis mutandis, 9 December 1994, Series A no 303-C), in connection with the harmful effects of pollution caused by the activity of a waste-water treatment plant situated near the applicant’s home, the court held that the respondent State had not succeeded in striking a fair balance between the interest of the town of Lorca’s economic well-being – that of having a waste-treatment plant – and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her private and family life (p56, para 58).

Lastly, in the Guerra and Others v Italy judgment of 19 February 1998 (mutatis mutandis, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I), the court held that the direct effect of the toxic emissions from the Enichem factory on the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life meant that Article 8 was applicable (p227, para 57). It decided that Italy had breached that provision in that it had not communicated to the applicants essential information that would have enabled them to assess the risks they and their families might run if they continued to live in Manfredonia, a town particularly exposed to danger in the event of an accident within the confines of the factory (p228, para 60).

35. In the instant case, however, the right asserted by Mr Botta, namely the right to gain access to the beach and the sea at a place distant from his normal place of residence during his holidays, concerns interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the measures the State was urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the private bathing establishments and the applicant’s private life.