25.75R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 587, [2010] 1 WLR 363
On the assumption that some functions of an RSL were public functions, it was a public body for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 and for the purposes of judicial review proceedings, because its termination of a social tenancy was not a private act
Facts: London and Quadrant, a registered social landlord, served a notice seeking possession on Ms Weaver, who claimed that it infringed her rights under Article 8 ECHR.
Judgment: the Court of Appeal (Lord Collins, Rix and Elias LJJ, Rix LJ dissenting) held that it conceded that some of London and Quadrant’s functions were public functions, so the only question was whether the termination of a social tenancy by a social landlord was a private act: viewing all the circumstances in the round, it was not. There was no warrant for applying a different approach to the question whether London and Quadrant was amenable to judicial review:
Judicial review
83. Both the Aston Cantlow case [2004] 1 AC 546 and YL’s case [2008] AC 95 emphasised that it does not necessarily follow that because a body is a public body for the purposes of section 6, it is therefore subject to public law principles. The Divisional Court held, however, that in this case the two questions had to be determined the same way. Mr Arden does not now seek to contend otherwise. In my judgment, he was right not to do so.