112. Against the above background, the court is satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to the CLR to act as a representative of Mr Câmpeanu, notwithstanding the fact that it had no power of attorney to act on his behalf and that he died before the application was lodged under the Convention. To find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level, with the risk that the respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention as a result of its own failure to appoint a legal representative to act on his behalf as it was required to do under national law (see paragraphs 59 and 60 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, P, C and S v United Kingdom, cited above, and The Arges College of Legal Advisers v Romania, Application no 2162/05, § 26, 8 March 2011). Allowing the respondent State to escape accountability in this manner would not be consistent with the general spirit of the Convention, nor with the High Contracting Parties’ obligation under Article 34 of the Convention not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right to bring an application before the Court.
113. Granting standing to the CLR to act as the representative of Mr Câmpeanu is an approach consonant with that applying to the right to judicial review under Article 5(4) of the Convention in the case of ‘persons of unsound mind’ (Article 5(1)(e)). In this context it may be reiterated that it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation, failing which he will not have been afforded ‘the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty’ (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 76, Series A no 12). Mental illness may entail restricting or modifying the manner of exercise of such a right (see Golder v United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 39, Series A no 18), but it cannot justify impairing the very essence of the right. Indeed, special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves (see Winterwerp v The Netherlands, 24 October 1979, § 60, Series A no 33). A hindrance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment (see Golder, cited above, § 26)
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2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Article 2 of the Convention
(i) General principles
130. The first sentence of Article 2(1) enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see LCB v United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III).
The positive obligations under Article 2 must be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake. This is the case, for example, in the health-care sector as regards the acts or omissions of health professionals (see Dodov, cited above, §§ 70, 79–83 and 87, and Vo v France [GC], Application no 53924/00, §§ 89–90, ECHR 2004-VIII, with further references), States being required to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives (see Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy [GC], Application no 32967/96, § 49, ECHR 2002-I). This applies especially where patients’ capacity to look after themselves is limited (see Dodov, cited above, § 81); in respect of the management of dangerous activities (see Öneryıldız v Turkey [GC], Application no 48939/99, § 71, ECHR 2004-XII); in connection with school authorities, which have an obligation to protect the health and well-being of pupils, in particular young children who are especially vulnerable and are under their exclusive control (see Ilbeyi Kemalo˘glu and Meriye Kemalo˘glu v Turkey, Application no 19986/06, § 35, 10 April 2012); or, similarly, regarding the medical care and assistance given to young children institutionalised in State facilities (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, §§ 105–116).
Such positive obligations arise where it is known, or ought to have been known to the authorities in view of the circumstances, that the victim was at real and immediate risk from the criminal acts of a third party (see Nencheva and Others, cited above, § 108) and, if so, that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see A and Others v Turkey, Application no 30015/96, §§ 44–45, 27 July 2004).
131. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Where the authorities decide to place and maintain in detention a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to his special needs resulting from his disability (see Jasinskis v Latvia, Application no 45744/08, §59, 21 December 2010, with further references). More broadly, the court has held that States have an obligation to take particular measures to provide effective protection of vulnerable persons from ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (Z and Others v United Kingdom [GC], Application no 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001-V). Consequently, where an individual is taken into custody in good health but later dies, it is incumbent on the State to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the events leading to his death (see Carabulea v Romania, Application no 45661/99, § 108, 13 July 2010) and to produce evidence casting doubt on the veracity of the victim’s allegations, particularly if those allegations are backed up by medical reports (see Selmouni v France [GC], Application no 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V, and Abdülsamet Yaman v Turkey, Application no 32446/96, § 43, 2 November 2004).
In assessing evidence, the court adopts the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Orhan v Turkey, Application no 25656/94, § 264, 18 June 2002, § 264, and Ireland v the United Kingdom, cited above, § 161).
132. The State’s duty to safeguard the right to life must be considered to involve not only the taking of reasonable measures to ensure the safety of individuals in public places but also, in the event of serious injury or death, having in place an effective independent judicial system securing the availability of legal means capable of promptly establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim (see Dodov, cited above, § 83).
This obligation does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. Where negligence has been shown, for example, the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts. However, Article 2 of the Convention will not be satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice (see Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above, § 53).
133. On the other hand, the national courts should not permit life-endangering offences to go unpunished. This is essential for maintaining public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for preventing any appearance of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts (see, mutatis mutandis, Nikolova and Velichkova v Bulgaria, Application no 7888/03, § 57, 20 December 2007). The court’s task therefore consists in reviewing whether and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, have carried out the careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention, so as to maintain the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and ensure that violations of the right to life are examined and redressed (see Öneryıldız, cited above, § 96)
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b) Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2
(i) General principles
148. Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order.
The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision.
The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘effective’ in practice as well as in law. In particular, its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v United Kingdom, Application no 46477/99, §§ 96-97, ECHR 2002-II).
149. Where a right of such fundamental importance as the right to life or the prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is at stake, Article 13 requires, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, including effective access for the complainant to the investigation procedure. Where alleged failure by the authorities to protect persons from the acts of others is concerned, Article 13 may not always require the authorities to assume responsibility for investigating the allegations. There should, however, be available to the victim or the victim’s family a mechanism for establishing any liability of State officials or bodies for acts or omissions involving the breach of their rights under the Convention (see Z and Others v the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, § 109).
In the court’s opinion, the authority referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily in all instances be a judicial authority in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the powers and procedural guarantees an authority possesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 67). The court has held that judicial remedies furnish strong guarantees of independence, access for the victim and family, and enforceability of awards in compliance with the requirements of Article 13 (see Z and Others v the United Kingdom, cited above, § 110).